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# The German Federal Republic: Problems and Prospects

Frank H. Jonas

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THE GERMAN FEDERAL REPUBLIC:  
PROBLEMS AND PROSPECTS

A lecture delivered  
at the Naval War College  
18 October 1960

by

Professor Frank H. Jonas

The scope and subject for the lecture this morning, "The German Federal Republic: Problems and Prospects," is sufficiently broad for the speaker to follow his peculiar predilections in the choice of categories. When I returned from Germany in September, 1953, I found that audiences at home were interested mainly in three questions with reference to postwar Germany. First, they were interested in democracy, that is, was there any in Germany, and if so, what was its nature and extent and what were its prospects? As a corollary they were interested in what had been accomplished by the United States occupation of Germany, that is, was there any residue in terms of democratic practice from the efforts of the American administration in bringing democratic programs and examples to Germany? Was there any residue in democratic action from the multimillion dollar exchange program which brought 10,000 Germans to the United States and which took 3,000 to European countries?

Secondly, the people at home were interested in the reports they had read of the rise of neo-fascism in the resurgence of Nazism. What was the extent of this movement? Did it mean that the Germans had not yet shelved their receptivity for a strong and spectacular leader, and that another Hitler would appear soon on the horizon to endanger the peace of the world?

Third, the folks at home were interested in the remilitarization of Germany. Would there be a resurgence of the familiar Prussian-type militarism, and would the new military establishment be placed at the disposal of Soviet Russia? To what extent could the apprehension over the rearming of the Germans be interpreted as a threat to the allies and to the peace of the Free World?

The answers, with descriptive and supporting data and discussion, to each one of these questions could fill a book-size publication. I shall confine my statements and commentaries to the question of democracy in Germany, though observations on the economic and social life of Germany do not have to be precluded, for democracy itself is a broad term within whose meaning one can talk about a great many things.

First of all, with reference to democracy in Germany one should note that the only times it has been experienced in that country have been when it has been imposed twice by force from without after a crushing military defeat. Democracy was introduced as a substitute for an authoritarian-type government and particularly for a *Weltanschauung* which had been developing over the centuries. In Germany, one could have been shocked to wake up one day and find that a cherished past and a comforting tradition had been repudiated and rejected.

Another point to be remembered about Germany's history is the fact that this country has never had a revolution and a symbol comparable to the Boston Tea Party and the American Revolution of 1776, and to the Bastille and the French Revolution. It has not had the historical experience similar to Great Britain's in the period preceding the year 1689 or even to Soviet Russia's in 1917 during the ten days which shook the world. Democracy in Germany never emerged after a long and painful growth nor after a great social upheaval.

The Germans might have had a revolutionary experience had it not been for a very astute and aggressive politician, Bismarck, who deprived them of an heroic revolutionary event which would have brought national freedom in its wake and the names of many heroes which would have been identified with it, mainly by measures which today would be viewed as attributes of the welfare state. Bismarck dispelled social unrest by social legislation.

Germany's experience with the Weimar Constitution was not a happy one. In retrospect, the conservatives in Germany today view that period with great misgivings. They do not hesitate to hold Hitler responsible for their post-World War II plight and for their low prestige in the world, and they also blame Germany's second president under the Weimar Constitution, Paul von Hindenburg, who, when he was past his middle eighties and in a senile condition, appointed Hitler as Chancellor of Germany. He did not have to appoint him, but he listened to the advice of others and did not follow his own good sense in this matter. True, Hitler, though not commanding a majority of the German electorate in 1932, had over 17,000,000 supporters, as revealed by the vote in the 1932 presidential elections. In that year, no one was coerced or bribed to vote for the National Socialist Party.

Hitler himself had some doubts about his position. In fact, after his defeat at the polls in 1932, he almost gave up, pacing the floor of his room a whole night through trying to make up his mind whether to quit or to go on. He made one more effort to acquire the chancellorship, and this time he succeeded.

What made it possible for the German Republic's president to appoint Hitler as a virtual dictator was a section in the Weimar Constitution which permitted the president to appoint a "dictator" in an emergency or a crisis for the country. Indeed, he had previously

appointed Heinrich Bruening, who served in 1931, and subsequently he called Franz von Papen and General Kurt von Schleicher to the chancellorship under emergency conditions. None, except Hitler, dealt successfully with the consequences of bank failures, widespread unemployment, and huge relief rolls.

The Germans remembered this experience with Hindenburg and Hitler when they prepared the Basic Law, the framework of their present republican government. They stripped the president of his exclusively appointive power, and made it impossible for the Chancellor to be voted out of office by the new Bundestag without his successor being simultaneously voted into office.

This constitutional device is based on the knowledge in applied psychology that hate is a stronger emotion than love, and that in practical politics it is easier for men of various parties to unite against a chancellor or a prime minister than it is for them to agree on his successor. This provision may be recorded in history as the greatest achievement in constitution writing in this century.

At the same time Germany provided originally for half of the 402-member Bundestag to be elected from districts by direct vote. With proportional representation, the Weimar period had produced 24 parties in the Reichstag. The German temperament simply was not suited to deal with so many clashing views and the resultant delays in establishing a coalition and in doing effective work in the nation's legislature.

From 1949 to 1953 there were twelve political parties in the Bundestag, still too many to suit Chancellor Konrad Adenauer. Speaking vigorously for at least an hour at a time and ignoring the "loyal opposition," the SPD (socialists), he would shake his pointed finger at the ten or twelve Communists on the left side of the chamber who had annoyed him with their constant heckling, often without clear purpose.

Before the elections in September, 1953, the Bundestag passed a law which required party candidates to receive at least five per cent of the vote in their district before they could sit in that chamber. In the meantime, the Constitutional Court outlawed the neo-Nazi party. As a result of these actions, there were no extreme left or right-wing groups in the Bundestag after the 1953 elections. Indeed, today among the little over 1400 legislators in the 519 member Bundestag and in the legislative bodies of the eleven states there is only one single Communist and his election can be explained wholly in terms of very local conditions. Germany today has a republican constitution and a democratic form of government in the sense that similar governments in England and France are democratic.

Probably the key to success of democracy in Germany in the future lies with the fate of the Constitutional Court. This court has been functioning since 1951. For the first time in German history, and as a major exception in Europe as a whole, a judicial body has been created that is capable of outlawing both legislative enactments and governmental actions, if such laws and actions violate the Basic Law. This body of twenty-four judges, which sits in two separate panels of twelve judges each, can also decide if political parties and organizations are legal. In 1952 it outlawed the Nazi party, and in 1956 after some turbulent sessions which almost wrecked it, the court outlawed the Communist party.<sup>1</sup>

This court has many more cases brought to it than it can physically and legitimately handle. It must sift them very carefully within the framework of its jurisdiction and competence. To date, it has

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<sup>1</sup>Twelve of the judges are elected by the Bundesrat and twelve by the Bundestag. Eight judges have life tenure, the others are elected for eight-year terms.

weathered many pressures and its future position in the constitutional framework seems assured, at least for some time.

Germany has had a very stable government. By 1961 Adenauer will have been president for three full four-year terms. The Germans generally believe he will be re-elected. They say, with typical German humor (travelers in Germany who understand the language and have some intimate German connections are often surprised to find that the Germans do have a sense of humor), that Adenauer has now reached an age (85) when his death is becoming an increasingly remote possibility. Probably the problem at this point is the apparent failure of Adenauer and his party to provide adequately for the renewal of leadership. However, there are some strong personalities in both the CDU, Adenauer's Christian Democratic Union, and the SPD, the Socialist Democratic Party, who could take over the reins of government at a moment's notice, perhaps not with Adenauer's prestige and purpose, but at least with considerable strength and skill. In view of the available field from which to pick a replacement for the present government, the prospect for a continuously stable republican government is quite bright; it certainly is not forbiddingly dark.

In other ways, Germany has found stability, mainly through its economic prosperity and the social rehabilitation of its citizens. Much has been recorded about Germany's so-called miraculous economic recovery. One has only to glance at a few figures to sustain this description of its economic progress. From 1948 to 1959, the invested capital increased 47-7/10 billions. Employment figures increased from 13-1/2 to 20-1/10 million. Exports increased from 1-1/10 billions to 9-8/10 billions. Savings increased from 400 million to 10-5/10 billions, and the Bundestag controls 5-7/10 billions in gold and foreign currency. The gross national increase at the present time is 58.2 billion.

Americans generally, but quite correctly, attribute this phenomenal economic growth largely to United States financial aid, particularly the Marshal Plan. The Germans generally would agree with them, except they would add another factor, German labor. One may note a few facts about German labor and labor organization. Others have noted that German labor is better disciplined than its counterparts in the United States. Also different is the fact that German labor seeks a solution to its problems in law and government. One factor usually not mentioned is the intangible characteristic of pride in one's work. This pride, found generally in the German worker, especially the craftsman, survived the regimentation of the Nazis and the devastation of World War II. In 1958, during a visit in Germany by nine professors of political science and history, the group was briefed in Berlin by the top-ranking American civilian officer. He pointed out that in East Germany the Soviets had made some progress by virtue of the nature of German labor. This pride in one's work was also breaking through Communist regimentation.

Another factor, not often mentioned, is the thrift of the German housewife. During the same trip with the American professors, I heard a vice-president of Germany's third largest bank analyze the prospects for inflation. Much, he said, would depend on the United States. Inflation would come through the expansion of credit. He noted that increased credit buying was taking place in Germany, especially in department stores; he also admitted that installment loans were necessary, especially for the purchase of dwelling units, but he did not think it was a good condition when a woman could charge every little article of her clothing. "Thank God," he said, "the German housewife has not heard of John Maynard Keynes." "When women charge the purchase of brassiers at a store," he added, "that is just going too far."



Another fact to remember about the German economy is its many small businesses. Americans have heard repeatedly about Fritz Thyssen, the Krupps, the chemical and dye cartels, and many other large business enterprises and monopolies. Actually, however, most characteristic of the German economic structure is the small manufacturing plants, owned by a single family and employing not more than 50 or 60 workers, which dot the countryside in the Ruhr Valley. These plants usually manufacture items for established outlets and a stable market in which the quality of the goods is the most important factor.

From another standpoint, both Germany's economic and political life have been stabilized in the process of growing. In reality, German industry has not become completely rationalized; it is, in fact, quite inefficient for this reason. One example will illustrate this point. In 1953, I learned that the Volkswagon factory could make the same car to sell for 2,000 DM less than its current retail price of 7,000 DM in Germany with one half of its then-present number of employees, i.e., with 900 of its then 1800 workers. When asked why they did not streamline the plant and run it efficiently, the reply was in the form of another question, "What would happen to the 900 men who would be let off?" Incidentally, at the time the Volkswagon factory was owned by the Federal Government of Germany.

It has been generally conceded that German industry is inefficient when compared to American industry. This difference has been pointed out by some of the German exchangees in the "leader program" the United States has sent to this country. The basic fact is that the money available from the sales of cars at 7,000 DM each is spread among 1800 employees rather than 900. However, if only 900 persons were employed, and if the price of each car could be reduced to 5,000 DM, the 900 persons would receive a higher wage than they are now receiving, but they would not share

proportionately the present return from the sale of cars at 7,000 DM each. The emphasis in this enterprise is on the 900 persons who would become unemployed and who would have to make an adjustment in their economic life, an adjustment that would be difficult to make in view of the crowded conditions in Germany and generally the lack of the opportunities to make such adjustments, at least when the individual is left entirely to his own resources.

A case in point was revealed by an American HICOG official who, after his service with HICOG (U.S. High Commission for Germany) spent two years in the United States and then returned to Germany as the executive secretary or director of an American private propaganda organization, the Franz Lieber House, sponsored by German-American businessmen, especially the Weyerhaeuser lumber interests. At a dinner meeting, almost immediately upon his return to Germany, he criticized German industry for its lack of efficiency or rationalization. He said that instead of using modern IBM bookkeeping machines, the Germans were still making hand entries. This story suggested the characteristics of the way the German Government has operated in recent years in order to stabilize the nation's economy and social life, and the conception of freedom and governmental action entertained by the German people.

First of all, one must constantly keep in mind Germany's basic problem which arises from the fact that the country is about 60 per cent self-sufficient. It must export manufactured products and import foods. Even before World War II, and before Hitler made any of his aggressive moves, Germany was no larger than the states of Utah, Idaho and one-sixth of Nevada. On this territory there were 65,000,000 people. On the comparable American area there were about one million persons. One must recall also that there are extensive non-arable land areas in Germany, as compared with France, which has a much higher percentage of arable land and as a result a much higher percentage

of self-sufficiency. Today, West Germany is about six-sevenths the size of Nebraska. On this piece of land there are 52,000,000 persons. Nebraska's population is about a million and a half.

Germany's position has been complicated by probably the largest public relief problem and program the world has ever known. This country has had to find lodging and work for about 12,000,000 refugees and expellees. One example will illustrate the strong measures government has had to take in order to meet this problem. In the first place, these persons may be housed temporarily in former warehouses in Berlin. The sanitary and food problems alone are significant in places that were never meant for human inhabitation where hundreds and thousands sleep side by side on hard concrete floors.

After these persons are screened they are placed, about a hundred at a time, in a transport plane and taken to a town in West Germany, usually in the Ruhr. There the city government is told to provide housing and jobs for these people. No American city has been faced with the problem of an additional population that drops down from the skies, especially before provision has been made for its care, economically and socially.

The German Federal Government has taken the bull by the horns and created what Americans know as the welfare state. Indeed, Chancellor Adenauer and his economics minister, Erhard, have had a single purpose in mind, the creating of a welfare state within the framework of capitalistic, economic structure, or rather a system of free enterprise; they have staked the fate of their administration, and therefore their careers as politicians, on achieving this objective. They have provided the German people with housing, medical care, vacations, old age pensions, old folks homes, unemployment compensation, job security, and increased educational and cultural opportunities.

These governmental activities must be paid for, but the recipients of these benefits have had to make contributions by deductions from payrolls. They have been paid for also by the fact that the German worker receives less in wages than he otherwise would if he were the recipient of a wage in a highly competitive market. These activities have had to be administered rigidly and by a central agency. This does not mean that private enterprise has been left out of the picture. For example, the individual German may still arrange for his own unemployment compensation through a private insurance company, and in a great many instances, especially if he is in public administration or in a higher wage bracket, he chooses to deal with a private company for, although private insurance costs more, it does provide more benefits. The law simply states that every German worker or employee must have unemployment compensation; if he does not arrange for it with a private company, the company will provide it for him.

The principal point to keep in mind is that the welfare state is not socialism in the technical sense. Socialism is the public ownership and control of the sources and means of production. The welfare state is neither communism nor is it incompatible with capitalism. This is the lesson Chancellor Adenauer, Minister Erhard, and the German Government have taught so-called free enterprise countries, which themselves have already provided in some areas for the welfare state, for safe competition, or otherwise modified an earlier predatory economic system by government licensing and regulation.

Probably more by these measures of the welfare state, which have provided the Germans with what they have wanted, and which may be packaged in the single word "security," than by any other action, Adenauer has literally taken the wind out of the sails of the German socialists. Adenauer has not left his opposition any real issues. The only alternatives the SPD or

socialists in Germany appear to have are either to become more extreme in the field of domestic legislation or to fall back on foreign policy as a major campaign issue. They have been reluctant, indeed they have refused, the former course, and therefore they have conducted most of their recent campaigns on the issue of foreign policy. In 1958, the major issue was the location of atomic weapons on German soil even if they remained in American hands or under American control. Even the German constitutional court had to step in with a ruling that no single state could prevent by a local referendum the policy of the Federal Government from being applied with respect to the location of atomic weapons. Both the government and the court survived this crisis.

In other ways the political life in West Germany has become more stable. After the 1953 elections there remained only six of the previous twelve political parties in the Bundestag. Today, West Germany has become practically a two-party country. Eighty-two per cent of the vote in the 1957 elections was cast for the two major parties. At the present time only a single third party has played much of a role. This is FDP or the Free Democratic Party.

German elections in other ways have taken on some of the characteristics of campaigning in the United States. Candidates are going into factories, holding rallies, giving public speeches, and shaking hands all around. As in the United States, personalities are playing an increasing role. Elections are becoming more personalized and sloganized. In 1953, one slogan read: "We want Adenauer and not Ollenhauer." Ollenhauer was the socialist party chairman and spoken in German the slogan was a play on words or rather on sound.

Actually, these two men were not running against each other, since each was standing for election from a separate legislative district, but they were both the titular and real leaders of their respective parties in the Bundestag.

In the 1957 elections, Adenauer's slogan was "No More Experiments." The socialists used a familiar American campaign slogan, "Time for a Change." This slogan reminded one of the 1946 elections in the United States after World War II, when people were weary of wartime rationing and price controls. The slogan of the Republicans in one state of the West was "Had Enough"; they were swept into office. In such circumstances, conditions and not personalities prevail. In 1957, in Germany, personalities and not conditions prevailed; the German people were quite satisfied with the economic and social security Adenauer's government had provided for them. This satisfaction apparently surmounted any fears they might have had of the consequences of Adenauer's foreign policy. Also in the 1957 election, Adenauer's party gained fifty-one per cent of the vote. This was the first time in Germany's history that a single party had won an election by a majority vote.

So far I have discussed democracy rather as a form of government than as a social philosophy or as a way of life. It is in this manner that the Germans themselves are apt to define democracy. One may conclude that it has a republican constitution and a democratic form of government. One may also conclude that the behavior of its politicians and administrators has been essentially democratic. If its bureaucracy still smacks of the old Prussian type, this may be for the good; though it was rigid and unbending in relation to the people, it was also efficient and honest in the rendering of its services. This rigidity is represented by the trains which arrive and depart on time and by the post office window which is slammed down promptly at closing time sometimes in the face of a customer, but if one meets the requirements of the bureaucracy, its services are generally honestly and efficiently rendered.

In the other category of social philosophy, however, is there any democracy in Germany? If by

democracy one means precisely what we have in the United States in terms of a way of life, then the answer is "no," but I do not think it is an equivocal "no."

If one's conception of democracy is derived solely from his experience in the United States or is based upon what he thinks democracy ought to be, then he is bound to find differences and diversions in Germany and perhaps conclude that there is no democracy in Germany. If his ideas are accompanied by strong negative feelings about that country, he will conclude invariably that the prospects for democracy in Germany are very slim and remote.

Perhaps this problem can be discussed in terms of the German views on political participation and political education. The German people, for example, the families one might see sitting in a park or garden in Munich, sipping beer or juice and listening to band music on a Sunday afternoon, would not be interested in attending political rallies, forming committees for public action, listening to debates on public issues, or in being actively engaged in furthering some public or social enterprise. Women's legislative councils, leagues of women voters, committees appointed by a city mayor or a state governor to serve as a council or as an investigating committee would be strange and even distasteful to them. This attitude, however, has been a derivative of their traditional emphasis on the expert in all activities, not only in politics, and on their more recent experiences under Hitler and after World War II. They have not yet developed the idea of the amateur in politics.

But this distancing of himself from all activities in which he himself is not trained goes deep into Germany's cultural history. In the past, and still to a great extent, when a boy terminated his education at the age of fourteen, he would be apprenticed until he was eighteen, when he would pass an examination and

become a journeyman. He could then increase his efficiency, take another examination and become a master craftsman, usually not before he was thirty years of age. Only then could he own and manage a business. Even then, he could not begin a new business; he would usually have to buy out an established business. In other words, his business opportunities would be regulated by a combination of government regulation and standards set down by private chambers or guilds. The important point here is that the craftsman or professionally trained German considers himself an expert. As a result he would be proud of his achievement, since he could attain a high position in his field only after hard work, personal sacrifice, deprivation, and examinations. He would say his attitude was one of pride in his work; a foreigner, particularly an American, would say perhaps that it was one of arrogance.

A few anecdotes might illustrate the point intended to be made here. During the United States occupation of Germany after World War II, an American HICOG official noticed that American administrators, generally experts in their particular fields in the United States, such as youth, recreation, and labor, would devise programs patterned after American practices, and then try to apply them in Germany where the conditions were different, and above all, when there was no receptivity for them. Dr. Nels Anderson, the head of the labor affairs section of HICOG, observed that before American administrators applied and devised their programs in Germany, they ought to know some facts about the German people. As a result of his efforts to supply this information he arranged for a ten-volume community survey, patterned after "Middletown" and "Middletown in Transition" in the United States, but designed to include the environs of a city, to be made of the city of Darmstadt and several small nearby agricultural communities.



Sponsored by the German Academy of Labor, paid for by the United States, the organization Anderson established consisted of ten young university students working on their doctorates and headed by an American sociologist. He was successful in securing the complete co-operation of the city government. In a typical American fashion, he asked the Lord Mayor to appoint a committee of citizens to assist the survey group, especially in the field of public relations, for individual German citizens resented being asked personal questions by a stranger who suddenly appeared at their doors with pencil and paper in hand. Then the Americans formally organized the survey group and gave it the name of "Institute for Social Research." Immediately, the citizens committee quit. Their reason was simply that this was a group of experts; this was their work, let them do it.

This attitude spills over in political life. The entertainment and festival life in German cities and towns are sponsored and administered by governmental officials and not by private groups. When HICOG organized and subsidized an international festival in Passau, Germany, the Lord Mayor, and the members of the City Council complained bitterly that they had to do all the work; they found it difficult to get any co-operation or assistance even from the so-called Chamber of Commerce.

This notion of the expert, however, permeates all phases of German life. The feeling of pride in one's achievements or the attitudes of arrogance are not peculiar to university graduates with doctor degrees; they permeate the entire German social structure from the plumber and the auto mechanic to the university professor and the bank president.

The German today is quite disillusioned about individual participation in public affairs. Because of the Hitler regime, the war, and then the allied policies of occupation after the war he has withdrawn

further into his own shell, doing his daily work for a livelihood and then finding his relaxation at cards and over a drink in a tavern in the evening or motor-cycling to a river beach to sun himself over the week end. He eschews public and political life. This attitude is reflected in his acceptance of what has become known as existentialism, which had a major beginning in Germany during the Hitler period. The individual, feeling himself completely impotent in the face of realities and in no position to exert any influence on public policy or in foreign affairs, simply takes no interest in political affairs.

Also the Nuremberg trials have had something to do with their attitudes toward politics. The possibility of Soviet Russia overrunning Germany in the event of war could place the German citizen in the same position in relation to Russia as he was in relation to the allies after World War II. Any membership in an organization favoring either the United States or the German Government which was allied with the United States Government would be enough evidence for Soviet Russia to deal with him as the allies dealt with Germans who had memberships in National Socialist organizations.

The traditional German attitude of "let the expert do it, that is his job, that is what he is paid for," has been reinforced by the feeling of hopelessness in the face of realities, principally that no individual person can hope to influence governmental policy by his interest or activity.

Perhaps more important the lack of a political consciousness on the part of the individual German citizen has been the huge gap in political education. However, it is in this field that a great deal of progress is being made and that the prospects seem brighter.

Political science as a recognized discipline has made great strides in German universities. In some universities, for example, at the universities of Frankfurt, Marburg, Cologne, Munich and others, it has been recognized by the establishing of institutes and chairs for full professors. The universities of Tübingen and Freiburg have full professors and seminars in this field, though the field is still encompassed in the traditional faculty of jurisprudence or law. The universities of Bonn and Hamburg have institutes of international law and politics. Much political research, writing and teaching are being done by professors of contemporary history. The number of institutes and libraries and the amount of research and writing in this field are extraordinarily high.

Teachers' colleges, which are separate from the universities, are offering courses in the teaching of social studies, and the instruction in this field in secondary education has been increasing. There have been established institutes in political science not directly connected with any teaching institution and some chairs or institutes have been established in engineering schools. Eric Voeglin, formerly at Louisiana State University for twelve years, was called, in the spring of 1958, to the first chair of political science at the University of Munich, with an enrollment of approximately 15,000 students, the largest of sixteen universities in Germany. Professor Carl Friedrich of Harvard University now spends half of each academic year at the University of Heidelberg. The Hochschule für Politik, a graduate school in political science established in 1920 in Berlin, has now become fully affiliated with the Free University of Berlin.

This is only a cursory glance at the development of education for politics in Germany, especially in the fields of the teaching of social studies in the high schools and of political science in the colleges and universities.

Certainly an American need only be reminded that American democracy did not spring up overnight, neither was it imposed on the nation by a conquering enemy. Indeed, it was developed through a colonial experience of over 150 years and won from an enemy after a bitter revolutionary war. German citizens have not had either experience. In view of its short experience in trying to make a republican constitution work, and in view of the fact that it has suffered two defeats at the hands of democratic nations, one may view with considerable optimism the chances for democratic action to survive and to grow and flourish in that country.

Some die-hards say that when Germany's present prosperity has declined, democracy will have received a setback and probably will die out. It is true that in Germany there is an element which would like to see a stronger executive office. This does not mean that this element entertains a longing for another Hitler. Some Germans are watching Charles de Gaulle in France very closely. The new constitution in France incorporated some features of the German Basic Law with reference to strengthening the executive. On the one hand, the Germans can see the need for a stronger executive in France, but on the other hand, they do not want it to be too successful so that the movement for a stronger executive in West Germany would be given any encouragement. Germany will need time for democracy in terms of political behavior and as a way of life to develop. One will not encourage the development of democratic action by saying that the task is hopeless, that the Germans are wholly incapable of such action and behavior. Certainly the prospects for democracy, barring a sudden downswing in its economic prosperity, are excellent. One may venture to ask casually just how much democracy would remain in the United States, in France and England, and the other so-called democratic nations, if the economics in these countries should suddenly take a comparable downward turn, as they spiraled, almost to the bottom,

after that memorable year 1929, when nearly every state in the world called for a "stronger" government, and in many instances established at least a "constitutional" dictatorship. The United States (Franklin D. Roosevelt), France (Pierre Laval and Leon Blum), and England (Ramsay MacDonald) were no exceptions in that movement.

## BIOGRAPHIC SKETCH

Professor Frank H. Jonas

Present Position: Professor of Political Science, Department of Political Science, University of Utah, Salt Lake City, Utah. (On leave from position to occupy the Nimitz Chair of Social and Political Philosophy, Naval War College.)

### Schools:

- 1928 - University of Utah, B.A. degree.
- 1929 - University of Utah, M.A. degree.
- 1931 - University of Berlin, certificate.
- 1938 - University of Washington, Ph.D. degree.

### Career Highlights:

- 1935-36 - Head teaching fellowship, University of Washington.
- 1936-37 - Instructor, Idaho State College.
- 1937-38 - Research fellowship, University of Washington.
- 1938-41 - Asst. Prof. Political Science, University of Southern California.
- 1941-43 - Asst. Prof. Political Science, University of New Mexico.
- 1946-47 - Asst. Prof. Political Science, Utah State University.
- 1947 - Summer, Visiting Lecturer, University of Illinois.
- 1947-56 - Assoc. Prof. Political Science, University of Utah.
- 1955-59 - Summers, Visiting Professor, Vanderbilt University.
- 1956 - Professor, Political Science, University of Utah.
- 1958 - Summer, Guest Professor, Foreign Office, West German Federal Republic.

**Military and Government Experience:**

- 1943-45 - Signal Corps, U.S. Army.  
1951 - Personnel Expert, Personnel Section, Hill  
AFB, Ogden, Utah.  
1951-53 - U.S. Dept. of State, Office of the High  
Commissioner, Frankfurt, Germany.

**Publications:**

**Books and monographs:**

- Western Politics in the 1956 Elections*, 1957.  
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