Naval War College Review

Volume 16
Number 3 *November*

Article 2

1963

Economics in International Relations

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NAVAL WAR COLLEGE

REVIEW

Issued Monthly
U.S. Naval War College
Newport, R.I.

ECONOMICS IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

A lecture delivered
at the Naval War College
on 20 September 1963

by

Professor David J. Ashton

The general topic for this morning is *Economics in International Relations*. This is another one of those impossible academic titles which includes a body of material deserving at least a lifetime of study. In an arbitrary, but I hope reasonable, attempt to keep an important luncheon engagement, I shall confine my comments to three discreet areas: (1) we'll examine the role of economic factors in determining the nation's international status and prestige and the relationship of economics to nationalism; (2) we'll look quickly at the principal tools and techniques which economic policy contributes to international relations; (3) finally, we'll have a little to say about the origins and functions of a selected number of international economic organizations, some information about which you received as you entered today and which is a kind of hedge for me in case we run out of time before I'm able to give this area as much coverage as I'd like.

You may note as we go along that I shall deal only marginally and very summarily with the role of economics in U.S. national strategy, or with the peculiar and particular international economics problems which now face the United States. This is because we shall have special lectures and seminars dealing with these topics in the weeks immediately ahead.

Perhaps we should recognize at the very outset that there is a good deal of ambiguity and confusion inherent in this morning's title. The confusion arises because of the word *international*. *International* sometimes means across national boundaries; at other times it means among national governments. It is, of course, in this latter sense that the term *international relations* is used. This being the case we should also be warned of a fundamental difference between international economics and international

INTERNATIONAL ECONOMICS AND INTERNATIONAL POLITICS

THE ROLE OF NATIONAL GOVERNMENT



EXHIBIT I

politics. Whereas the term *international relations* includes the entire field of international political activity (as indicated in Exhibit 1) most international *economic* activity does not qualify as international relations because it is not intergovernmental. The international economic activities of private enterprises and organizations, therefore, are, by definition, outside the scope of our discussion of this morning, except to the extent that these private entities may become government spokesmen, or government representatives, in one way or another. We are discussing, therefore, (with respect to Exhibit 1) the area of convergence which is less than a major share of either international economics or of international relations, but one which is vital and controversial nevertheless. Inis L. Claude says, and who among us could disagree, that the management of power in international relations looms as the central issue of our time. Indeed, international relations today offers us the spectacle of the major powers walking the diplomatic tightrope as they try to manage power in such a way as to (1) advance their international interests, (2) extend their spheres of influence while, at the same time, (3) avoiding mutual annihilation. For lack of a better term we call this peaceful coexistence. Its ingredients include political and economic competition between East and West, carried on under a kind of Damoclean sword of nuclear stalemate and punctuated by occasional outbreaks of old-fashioned conventional and guerrilla warfare. Operational deficiencies in any of these areas obviously reduce the effectiveness of our diplomacy, of our ability to carry on effective international relations. Economic capability is an important part of this total ability which we generally refer to as national power.

Now, certain expert opinion holds that the bases of national power are essentially three: the quantity and quality of population; the stage of industrial development; and governmental administrative efficiency. There may be those who would disagree with this categorization, but mostly in that they would like to add additional factors to the list rather than because of specific disagreement with any of the above. Each of these has strong economic implications. Population size and education levels control the capabilities of the national labor force. The planning, organizing and evaluating functions of administration are also economic in nature. It is the stage of industrial development, however, which is most clearly economic in its implications and to which we shall give our primary attention here and now.

HUMAN BEINGS AND ENERGY SLAVES, WORLD DISTRIBUTION



% = HUMAN POPULATION
% = ENERGY SLAVES

EXHIBIT II

Economic capability and performance are very unevenly divided among the peoples of the earth. About 2 billion persons, 75% of the human race, live in 100 poverty-stricken countries where the income per person per year is below 300 dollars. The top 15% live in the United States and Canada, in Northwest and West Central Europe, in Australia and New Zealand. This top 15% receives about 70% of the world income. Even farther up on this sharply peaked income pyramid are the 6% who live in the United States and who receive 50% of the world's income. This is truly the economic elite, with a real income per capita about double that of Europe's most prosperous countries, and 50% above that of Canada, which is our nearest rival.

What is the basis for this elitism? The answer to this question is certainly tremendously complex, and it cannot be discerned by economic analysis alone. But of this much we are sure: the mechanical revolution, the shift from animate to inanimate energy, holds the key to the modern global layout of resource patterns and of economic well being. In the world of today, nothing differentiates people and regions more than their use of inanimate energy, of the capital equipment which harnesses it, and of the science and technology which render it efficient. Only where mankind effectively exploits many mechanical slaves—that is, machines—per worker is a high level of living possible for any substantial portion of society. It is not at all surprising, then, that North America's 8% of the world's population possesses about 54% of the world's mechanical slaves, (Exhibit 2) along with the previously mentioned major share of world income. Asia's poverty-stricken status, it seems to me, could be no more graphically illustrated than by the fact that this continent's 50% of the world's people has only 9% of those tools without which economic potential is meaningless. Moreover, in recent years the economic gap between the developed and the less-developed countries has been widening, as has the gap in their strategic capability. The ability to muster the materiel and logistic support for a Cape Canaveral or a Newport is essentially an economic capability. The gap between the lesser and the greater military powers, therefore, has also grown in recent years, and differential economic capabilities are basic to this gap. The fact that the United States with 6% of the world's population produces 50% of the world's goods is as good a measure of general strategic capability as one would want. It is also a measure of the reason why the rest of the world so unfailingly looks to us as the major source of economic assistance, and one of the reasons why United States pleas and statements to the effect that it is time that the rest of the world began to bear its fair share in the fields of economic assistance and foreign aid seem quite laughable to many of our allies and associates.

Now whether these capabilities for military potential or general economic potential or foreign assistance activity—whether these are ever translated into actualities is, of course, a political, cultural, and a social question. Clearly, however, industrial capability based upon the mechanical revolution is a critical component in military potential as well as in economic potential generally. National power is increasingly a function of these mechanical slaves or robots rather than of population size, numbers of men under arms, or of territorial extent. This, in a cruder way and in an earlier age, was the basis of British ascendancy in the 18th and 19th centuries, when Britain temporarily had a monopoly on the industrial revolution. The general principle holds true today.

International relations are, of course, manifestations of the activities—the functioning—of the earth's nation-states. They constitute one aspect of nationalism, whereby each national entity seeks to advance its own interests in its dealings with other nations. National economic policies enlist the support of each national population, and the popular emotional commitment to such policies is usually very high. Thus, nationalism is a local, political and cultural sentiment. Economics, like the wheel or atomic energy, is a universal tool which can serve the nationalist or the world federalist, the dictator or the democrat, the communist or the capitalist, equally well. There is really no such thing as capitalist economics, or socialist economics, careless labeling notwithstanding. There are merely capitalist and socialist economists and politicians.

However, it would not be quite correct to say that economics is essentially neutral toward nationalism because, taken in the abstract, nationalism makes no economic sense. Why? Well, among other reasons, the boundaries of the earth's nation-states have been drawn with little or no regard for economic logic; therefore, although economic analysis can, and does, serve the ends of national policy, it also tends to lead to the viewpoint that nationalism is uneconomical, and many economists tend to be just a little bit sheepish about lending their professional imprimaturs to narrowly conceived and jingoistic national policies. This, I suppose, is because a rational pursuit of economic efficiency almost always tends to weaken nationalism for at least the following reasons: first, nationalism is exclusive, but economic rationality shows that national barriers which lessen international trade prevent the full development of economic potential, and make for lower incomes both at home and abroad. Secondly, nationalism protects *our* producers against so-called unfair competition from *them,* but economic rationality shows that competition is rarely unfair, merely unforeseen, and that spirited competition within reasonable ground rules is both personally energizing and productively bountiful. Thirdly, nationalism tends to be greatly concerned lest our nation be put in a position of excessive dependence on goods and services from other nations. It worries lest outsiders be able to diminish our national power and sovereignty through blackmailing threats to withhold essential strategic commodities from us. But economic rationality says that well being and higher productivity can be achieved only through increased *inter*dependence, and not *in*dependence. Economic analysis tends to accept closer international ties as the price and the risk of opulence. At the same time, of course, that freest trader of all, Adam Smith, said that defense is superior to opulence, meaning that economic logic must bow to considerations of military strategy when and if national survival is threatened. The disputes come as to what constitutes a threat to the nation, and which industries are crucial to national defense. Economics may be neutral but, I repeat, economists are not.

Partly because nationalism and economics tend to be, if not mutually exclusive, at least working at cross-purposes, the main stream of economic activity in the world today is not only international but, I suggest, *anti*national. Nations are being increasingly pushed toward positions which will compromise somewhat their national sovereignty, in return for some rather attractive economic rewards. Most conspicuous among these is the vogue of regional common markets, each of which exhorts its members to relinquish national control over the international movement of goods, money, and people, in return for higher income and improved levels of living. As the fortunate beneficiaries of one of the world's oldest common markets we can testify as to the benefits. Imitation being the sincere flattery that it is, we are glad that the backyard provincialism which has characterized so much of the rest of the world is gradually giving way, even though it may mean stiffer competition for U.S. products.

Another example of this antinationalist drift is what might be called international welfarism which I shall define as the increasing tendency of the governments of the more affluent nations of the world to take an interest in, and some degree of responsibility for, improving the lot of those peoples and nations which are less fortunate. This, too, represents a substantial departure from traditional nationalism, but moves contrary to the erosion of traditional national prerogatives; it represents rather an extension of national responsibilities beyond the frontiers of the nation-state. It suggests that the sovereign states' social and economic responsibilities do not stop at the national frontier and I suggest that this is true even if the government in question insists that it is only protecting its own national interest. Once a government accepts a policy statement such as, 'Poverty anywhere in the world is a threat to our way of life,' or something of this sort, its viewpoint has become *de facto* global rather than national.

Thirdly, the nations of the noncommunist trading world are increasingly aware of the undesirable stresses and strains which traditional national prerogatives and responsibilities with respect to gold and the balance of payments tend to inflict on the international payments mechanism. As we used to say in the ordnance disposal business, the nations are inspecting 'cautiously, from a safe distance,' a new supranational central bank and clearing house arrangement to facilitate international payments. Interestingly enough, the essence of this proposal was before the Bretton Woods Conference back in 1944. However, at that time it was rejected largely because it had been suggested by the late John Maynard Keynes whose name was, and in some instances still is, anathema to the banking community.

Now the Good Book says that in order to be saved it is necessary to be born again. Accordingly, this proposal has been given second birth, this time by the highly regarded Brookings Institution. Paternity has been attributed to the internationally respected Professor Robert Triffin of Yale, with an impressive staff of economists attending the delivery. So far the Wise Men have not come from the East at all, and most of those who have come have come to scoff and not to bring gifts. The fate of each national currency is charged, like sin and motherhood, with a great deal of emotional political high voltage, and the monetary authorities of the United States, Britain, and the Common Market countries, are outdoing one another in their reluctance to be associated with any proposal which might lessen U.S. control of the dollar or British control of the pound sterling. Yet just as the Federal Reserve system was needed to eliminate or modify local banking and clearing idiosyncrasies here in the United States when our national economy became integrated, so the next five years will almost certainly see the establishment of a new international currency and clearing mechanism, the operation of which will erode substantially the national monetary sovereignty of the participating nations.

One current economic pattern which seems to be accentuating, rather than diminishing, economic nationalism is the drive for development of the less-developed nations. This developmental process is usually accompanied by an intensification of exclusive economic nationalism—become self-sufficient, keep the foreigners from stealing our resources, monopolizing our trade, etc. This stems in many instances from the countries' recent emergence from colonial status and the politico-psychological need to demonstrate their ability to progress without assistance from former colonizers or from their allies and associates. Even in developing countries where colonialism hasn't been a factor for over a century, the heady wine of economic self-sufficiency and national pride can be so intoxicating as to offset for a long time the lower real income stemming from the flouting of economic logic and the frightening off of foreign investors. For example, Brazilians for over 20 years now have been paying anywhere from 50% to 100% above world market prices for steel delivered in Brazil. At the same time Brazilians point with great pride to their Volta Redonda steel complex, the first and the largest integrated steel facility on the South American continent. They show no signs at all of relaxing the import restrictions which prevent Brazilian manufacturers from buying steel at lower world prices. Brazilian consumers, too, have to pay more for their steel-content goods than they need to. Among other things, this merely verifies what all wise men know—namely, that man does not live by bread alone, but by all those things which produce in him a sense of well being or the good life. Some of these are nonmaterial such as a pride in exclusive membership or a pride in accomplishment. This was Marx's great mistake. He assumed that economic interests alone motivate men. It is true when men have not enough basic food, clothing and shelter, that nothing will take precedence over economics in their motivation. But let them get beyond the threshold of subsistence and mere acquisitiveness or the commercial instinct is not enough. Men seem to need more abstract challenging and inspiring ideas than mere self-interest. Also, although I hate to have to admit this in front of my colleagues from the political sciences, that which is economically rational and reasonable must always wait upon that which is politically possible. There is no better example of that in the present world than the situation in the European Economic Community. This is doubly confusing to a great many people because they say, 'Well, now, your chronology is wrong in this case. The European Economic Community is going to be an economic community first, and a political community second, and so isn't that evidence of the primacy of economics?' The answer is, 'Not at all, because the European Economic Community is based on a *de facto* informal political settlement among the countries of the continent—a Franco-German rapproachement—an agreement to co-operate, if you will.' It is true that we may not be setting up a formal Parliament of Europe at this point, but the political settlement is there, and it was not until this political settlement was achieved that the economic mechanism could be set in motion. At present this political mechanism is breaking down. To bear this out, the net effect of General de Gaulle's saying, 'We must re-examine the political basis,' has been to stop in mid-stream the progress of the EEC toward more complete economic integration. But at the same time, (although I readily concede that economics must be secondary to politics), developments in science and technology, and in transportation and in communication, have combined in recent years to emphasize the benefits which can flow from a more rational international economic organization. And this has become increasingly apparent to the general public, and has put a gradual but persistent pressure, you might say, on the politicians to move toward increasing economic rationality. I believe, for example, that the long-run political pressnre for the more rational integration of Western Europe's economy is essentially irreversible, and that it will be strong enough to overcome any French obsessions with national *gloire* or *grandeur*. However, this is essentially a humanitarian age and if a distinguished representative of an earlier age decides to stretch his elongated person across the main stream of traffic, he will not be run over and crushed summarily—no, the traffic will halt temporarily—will be detoured, and some may even get lost in the detour. But a by-pass will certainly be built, and the main road will, I'm sure, be reopened before very long. So then, nationalism is served by economic analysis, but at the same time, nationalism has a certain degree of incompatibility with economic analysis.

What, then, does economics have to offer the practitioner of international relations? I suggest that it provides him with a diversified bag of tools, whether his objectives are international co-operation or the unilateral furtherance of particular national interests. We shall have more to say about international co-operation just a bit later, but let's start with policies which advance particular national interests. These we can divide further into those which are essentially offensive and expansionist on the one hand, and those which are essentially defensive and protectionist on the other. Expansionist policies seek to increase national economic influence outside national borders. The specific objectives ordinarily include achieving for one's nation a predominance, if not a monopoly, of one or more types of economic activity in a particular foreign territory. Efforts may be directed toward agriculture, mining, industry, finance, trade, or any other aspects of economic activity. How is this achieved? Well, in the western world if the government of Country A wishes to increase its economic influence in a particular area it may order specific steps to be taken by appropriate government agencies, but it is more likely that it will try to achieve these same objectives indirectly through private organizations. These private corporations ordinarily do not regard themselves as national agents, and they may be completely ignorant of the grand strategy which they are serving. They will be responding to indicated profit potential in the area in question; they may be spurred on by their governments' exhortations to trade more, to invest overseas, or by more specific incentives such as tax concessions, low cost loans, export subsidies or investment guarantees. In the Soviet Bloc, government agencies would carry out the entire trade and/or investment programs designed to achieve this diplomatic end.

Economic assistance is also an important technique. It can develop in the overseas area some degree of specific political leverage while subtly gaining a foothold in the recipient territory for the donor country's products, industrial specifications, currencies, systems of weights and measures, and channels of trade. Any or all of the above may be assisted and confirmed by special treaties by which Country B accords preferential treatment to Country A's traders, bankers, and investors. The assumption (rather reasonable, I think) is that economic predominance can some day be converted into political influence at the appropriate moment, although the record on this is by no means unequivocal.

Such measures also enhance the economic well being of Country A—that is the aggressive country—either through multilateral general benefits which would also be shared by Country B, benefits which stem from increased international specialization and trade, or through the economic exploitation which is traditionally inherent in such economic imperialism, for we really should call it by its proper name.

A nation's defensive foreign economic policy measures, by contrast, involve varying degrees of restriction and control of the movement of goods, money, and people across its national boundaries. These ordinarily reflect national concern about an invasion of foreign goods, capital or labor. They include financial penalties such as import and export taxes (or tariffs as they are usually called), anti-dumping penalties, special taxes on foreign investment and bank accounts, quantitative controls such as quotas or embargoes on goods or people, and exchange and investment controls which limit or prohibit international financial transactions. All of these defensive measures run contrary to economic rationality. They lower international economic efficiency, and they tend to make poor both the country imposing them as well as the rest of the world.

A third category of policy procedures differs from those above only in degree but it is perhaps worthy of a separate mention. It consists of what is usually termed, 'economic warfare.' Any or all of the previous offensive or defensive techniques may be employed; the difference is that the measures are directed specifically against a particular antagonist rather than against foreigners in general. Mining concessions may be sought in Country B, for example, not because of their prospective profitability, but in order to deny them to Country C. Similarly, unneeded goods may be subjected to preclusive buying in world markets. Trade barriers may be erected, not to protect domestic industries, but to deny markets to the enemy. Erratic commodity purchases and sales may be carried out, and new industries may be started, in order to disrupt the world market for certain commodities believed vital to the enemy's economy. Economic warfare tactics, like the defensive policy actions described previously, are equally costly both to the initiator and to those against whom they are directed. They are unilateral acts with multilateral consequences.

Before we leave this area we should add that the converse also applies; that is that unilateral measures to liberalize the international flow of goods and capital benefit both the initiator and the rest of the world as well. These, too, are unilateral acts with multilateral consequences, and it is an ironic commentary on the 'Alice in Wonderland' nature of the politics associated with international economic policy that we dwell almost entirely on the impact of these measures on the domestic and foreign *producers* of the goods, and ignore the consequences to *consumers* and to other affected industries. Thus, if we lower our tariff we are granting a concession to the foreigner, or if we increase our tariff we are withdrawing a concession to the foreigner. No politician would dare to advocate publicly that the United States unilaterally reduce its tariffs lest he be accused of selling out his country. Yet it can clearly be shown that U.S. producers and consumers would derive just as much benefit from this as would any of our foreign trading partners.

Let's look, for example, at the current 'chicken war.' Now, if you are like most of us you have read in the accounts of the chicken war that the EEC, on behalf of Germany, has imposed higher duties on U.S. poultry, and that because they have done this to us, we are considering a retaliatory imposition of higher duties on a variety of German products in return. We say, in effect, that they can't get away with doing that to us; we're coming back at them. But I submit that the Germans have already, in effect, retaliated against themselves by the mere act of increasing poultry duties. This is apparent if we proceed in our analysis beyond the superficial. First, both the United States *and* Germany are poorer because of what the Germans have done. In Germany, the consumer has been deprived of low cost, high quality poultry. The German people are poorer; the poultry they now get is either lower in quality or higher in price than what they had before. The German people as a whole have been penalized. What else have the Germans denied themselves by raising the tariff on U.S. poultry? They have denied to themselves employment opportunities and investment rewards in the industries which export to the United States, and these by definition are their most efficient industries. This is so because the United States is bound to reduce somewhat its purchases of automobiles and instruments and all those things that we buy from Germany even if nobody does anything about retaliation. This is because we will have earned less Deutschemarks by selling fewer chickens and therefore we will be both less able, and less willing, to buy German goods than we were before. Therefore, not only are German consumers penalized, but German producers are having part of their U.S. market taken away from them, not by U.S. retaliation, but by the action of their own government in protecting the German chicken farmer.

Now in the United States what is happening? Well, we have been deprived of investment and employment opportunities in poultry production; this is very obvious. And our consumers are less likely now to be able to avail themselves of low-cost German compact cars and instruments. Both nations are poorer, and in addition, within our economies, we have pursued a policy of 'penalize the efficient and reward the inefficient.' Which producers have suffered from this? The efficient producers of poultry in the United States, and the efficient producers of compact cars and instrument manufacturers (whom I'm using to characterize all German export industries) in Germany. We have rewarded the inefficient who are the poultry growers in Germany and the compact car substitute manufacturers in the United States. Stated otherwise, we are encouraging the transfer of resources out of efficient employment into less efficient employment, thereby lowering both the national productivities of both of our countries and the overall world production of useful goods and services. In conclusion, therefore, this unilateral act by the EEC has had a multilateral effect. It has made both Germany and the United States poorer, and in both countries it has penalized the efficient and rewarded the inefficient. If we in turn retaliate, we shall start another cycle of multilateral impact from a second unilateral action. However, unless the EEC recants, we shall probably be compelled by political pressure to proceed with the threatened retaliation. Not only is Congressional appreciation of these subtleties rather inadequate, but those legislators who *do* understand feel that it is politically impossible to explain them to the public. Again, the economically logical waits upon the politically possible.

We may conclude, then, that economic policy measures are potent, although poorly understood, weapons in the diplomatic arsenal. In an age of competitive coexistence they are among the strongest sanctions available. At the same time, however, we must remember that many of them are economically irrational, and that they will be under increasing attack as economic integration moves ahead in the world.

Having looked then down the avenues of action available to the nation-state acting on its own, so to speak, we should note in concluding that international economic relations are increasingly multilateral in character, and that these multilateral relationships are being increasingly institutionalized in more or less permanent international organizations which range in their scope from the Economic and Social Council of the United Nations and its associated auxiliary agencies to the members of the International Coffee Agreement. We have time here only for the very briefest of summaries. A few international economic organizations are truly omnilateral, in the sense that they take in almost all of the world's sovereign states. For example, both the Universal Postal Union and the International Telecommunications Union have more members than the United Nations itself. They represent international functionalism, which is a concept of international relations which holds that politicians negotiating political disputes can rarely come to agreements because each one has to try to prove to his constituents that he has outtricked the others. But the people working together on essentially nonpolitical functional economic activities between nations will build up such a web of interdependence, communication and co-operation that international conflict will be impossible. Functionalism has had only modest success in achieving these objectives, being incorrectly premised on the primacy of economic factors.

We have, also, a large number of multilateral organizations; that is, organizations which are open to world-wide membership but in which the Soviet Union for its own purposes and for a varying number of reasons has refused to participate; to a large extent the satellite countries also have abstained from these. Yet all of these, except the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, are under the general aegis of the United Nations. Therefore, they are supposedly nonpolitical in their essence and open to membership by the Soviet Union when and if it chooses.

We have international economic organizations whose bases are hemispheric as in the Alliance for Progress, and the Inter-American Development Bank. We have those whose bases are regional economic co-operation, as in the various common markets and free trade associations. We have two international economic organizations which are essentially ideological in that they are the main spokesmen in economic matters for the cold war groupings. This includes the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development, (OECD) the outgrowth of the Marshall Plan-stimulated OEEC, and the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance, also known as COMECON or CEMA, depending on where you sit. We also have international economic co-operation which is based on the creation of instrumentalities to effect or carry out individual great power foreign policies. Although the Colombo Plan has been expanded since its original inception to include non-Commonwealth countries, it was originally conceived as a means for maintaining British investment pre-eminence in those parts of the Commonwealth in Southeast Asia. The sterling area and the Commonwealth preference systems provide a monetary and a trade policy which also tends to tie the Commonwealth and dependencies to one another and to Great Britain. Through the French community and the Franc Zone, France accomplishes these same purposes. COMECON is listed twice because it serves not only as an ideological organization, but also as the instrument through which communist economic control over Eastern Europe is effectively maintained.

We may, therefore, summarize the role of economics in international relations as follows: (1) Economic capabilities are basic to achieving a prestigeous stature in international relations. (2) Economics tends to be internationalist in its influence on policy, but ordinarily must defer to political considerations, at least in the short run. In the long run, it tends to influence and to shape political considerations. (3) Economic policy provides the diplomat with some of his most convincing persuaders in international negotiations, but these must be used with care because they are like the overloaded gun—they shoot both forward and backward at the same time. (4) International economic relations are marked by a growing proliferation of international economic organizations, and it is likely that government participation in international economic activity will continue to expand for the foreseeable future.

BIOGRAPHIC SKETCH

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EDUCATIONAL BACKGROUND:

Tufts College, 1942, B.S.
Boston University, 1950, M.B.A.
Fletcher School of Law & Diplomacy, 1959, 1952, Ph.D, M.A.

MILITARY SERVICE:

United States Naval Reserve, 1942-1945; Mine Disposal Officer, North Atlantic

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