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The Free Press in a Democratic Society

Robert J. Manning

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NAVAL WAR COLLEGE

REVIEW

Issued Monthly
U.S. Naval War College
Newport, R. I.

THE FREE PRESS IN A DEMOCRATIC SOCIETY

A lecture delivered
at the Naval War College
on 1 April 1963

by

The Honorable Robert J. Manning

It is a great privilege for me to be here today. I'm flattered by the opportunity and hope I will be able to make enough of it to partly repay you for your invitation. As Admiral Austin pointed out, I'm relatively new in government. I have been in this job approximately one year, and for the previous twenty-six years I was in journalism. I have been characterized as a poacher turned gamekeeper, a fairly apt description but not entirely true.

I had the opportunity only last week to think a great deal about this subject and talk before a House Subcommittee on this whole matter of conducting foreign policy and political military affairs in an open society. I observed then that a fundamental obligation of those charged with the responsibility for foreign affairs decision-making in this democracy is to see to it that the basic policies which guide our activities as a nation are fully and openly discussed, with ample time and opportunity for Congress, the press, and the public to affect the issue. This means public enunciation of policies and objectives, and even of some of the means by which the government proposes to attain the objectives. It then becomes necessary for those charged with carrying out the policies to have certain interludes of privacy during which negotiations can be conducted and the policies carried forward to, one hopes, success. To men like yourselves I'm sure there is no need to explain why these private interludes are needed—interludes to carry out already enunciated policy, not to alter it. All of you know that military actions carried out in pursuit of national goals frequently depend on deep secrecy for their success. There are many examples out of the recent Cuban crisis—preparations for the picket line and the quarantine; orders on what sort of ships to intercept, and what to let go through; and the movements and whereabouts of naval vessels.

The same is true, of course, of the other military services; and to a lesser but important degree for the diplomats who conduct our State Department negotiations. A tremendous number of the activities of the military

today are so intertwined with the activities of diplomats that a relatively new kind of problem has been created by this paradox between the necessity for open discussion of policies—a discussion that makes it possible for the public to understand and approve or disapprove—and the necessity for privacy in which to carry out the policy.

I am not here today to discuss the need for the interludes because, as I say, this is well understood in a group like this. I would like to talk instead about the obligational twin—that is the *necessity,* indeed, in my estimation, the *duty,* which all government officers have, and particularly in those matters which the military shares with the State Department in responsibility, to find ways of informing the American people about what is being done in their name, in a manner that does inform but does not hamper or cripple the policies.

This is not an obligation that can be fulfilled by simply appointing information officers, fitting them out with Western Union suits, and telling them to go and deliver certain specified messages. Rather it is a responsibility that must be shared deep down in the whole machinery of government even by those whose work may be connected with highly sensitive matters. Individuals in these sensitive areas may not be able to discuss the immediate project, but behind their thinking at all times should be the assumption that some way is going to have to be found to bring great elements of the project up to public scrutiny and discussion.

Take, for example, the Polaris submarine force—ranging around the globe, berthing in many foreign countries, soon to be affiliated in part with the inter-Allied arrangements of the NATO organization. While it is not proper, of course, to discuss without specific authorization the details of the nuclear propulsion plant or the guidance system for a Polaris missile, certainly it is not only proper, but a near necessity, for officers connected with this formidable arm of our modern power to recognize the obligation in which they share to explain the whys and wherefores of their mission to audiences both here and abroad. I know that Admiral Rickover, for example, and other senior officers of the Polaris submarine project are well aware of this responsibility, and I'm sure they have impressed it upon their subordinates. Let me echo their thoughts on this and urge you at the same time to look on this matter not only as a simple command, but as an inescapable responsibility.

A Government of Consent. Ours is a government of consent in an open society, one in which the right to know and the right to discuss are, as Admiral Austin pointed out, as unfettered as it is possible for human ingenuity to make them—consistent, of course, with 'the requirements of national security'—simple but very complex words. We believe that our

system, including government by consent, not authority, is a source of strength, but if our public is to be a plus in this matter rather than a negative factor, it simply must have access to the information on which intelligent, reasonable decisions can be made.

Mr. James Reston of *The New York Times* recently characterized the internal structure of the Defense Department as based on command. He contrasted this with the State Department in which he discerned a pattern of consent. 'In the State Department,' he argued, 'policies rise from the bottom to the top; when they are accepted they float back down to be carried out by the same individuals who conceived them in the first place. In the military, by contrast,' he says, 'decisions begin at the top, and move to the point of execution by a rigid system of command.' I venture to say that there is some oversimplification in this comment. Certainly in the State Department every officer must expect to be a good soldier much of the time and to carry out policies originating outside his purview. More important to my mind, I am convinced that no Defense establishment in a democratic society could function effectively unless it was founded on a generous ladle of consent.

You here are studying policy questions relating to military as well as nonmilitary political activities, if such a distinction indeed can still be drawn in this day in which almost every major foreign policy concern is intermeshed in some way with a major military concern. Later, you will be in positions—some of you already have been, I'm sure—from which you can significantly influence the course of thinking on policy questions. You will rightly expect your views to receive a respectful hearing and, if they make sense and are clearly expressed, to influence policy formulation itself.

Moving from inside government to the pathways of democracy, there is no doubt that consent is the mechanism that makes our whole system go. The President and Congress have been described as engineers of consent, not an inaccurate appellation nor one that is intended to be pejorative. Those who deal with policies must be skilled at translating the facts of life in the mid-twentieth century—in this nuclear and missile age—into terms that make sense to people generally, and to voters particularly.

The success of bipartisanship in foreign policy is a measure of the dedication that a great many distinguished and able politicians have brought to the job of keeping the American people informed, with the result that a very broad consensus of support does exist for the fundamental goals of our policies today. Consensus, of course, is a form of the word *consent* and in a democracy both must come freely. No matter what assignment a military officer has today, he shares in the responsibility

for building the consensus, for engineering the consent which is the foundation for the strength of not only our military establishment but our entire government, and our entire position in international affairs.

To illustrate just how closely intertwined military and foreign affairs and public affairs questions have become, we need look no further than at one of today's top diplomatic stories. This is the negotiation for the proposed NATO multilateral nuclear force. It is difficult to say which of three aspects—the military, the diplomatic, or the public aspect of this proposal—is the most crucial. We all know that the origin of the nuclear plan grows not so much out of a military need, but out of a predominantly political need, or desire, in Western Europe. So the proposed plan may as easily fall or stand on its public presentation, its seeming capacity to fulfill the Allies' political need, as on its diplomatic workability or its military value. Every diplomat or military or naval officer engaged in planning or negotiating the MLF blueprints must have this public aspect as much in mind as the pure technological details or the complex diplomatic niceties.

On the other side, meanwhile, the journalist who proposes to write about this plan, must, if he is to encompass all the essential elements, gain a more than rudimentary feel for all the technological, strategic and diplomatic aspects. It is incumbent then on planners and diplomatic negotiators that they find a way to convey their problems and proposed solutions to the public, not only in this country but, in a case like this, to our Allies as well. It becomes equally incumbent on the military and naval experts to do the same thing. If these propositions are accepted—(1) that the MLF proposal is an important new aspect of U.S. foreign policy; (2) that its success is dependent in appreciable part on its public presentation and the public's (Allied as well as American) understanding of it—then every official engaged in policy assumes for himself a certain public affairs responsibility. I don't mean to suggest that each is somehow obliged to become a public salesman or an expositor of the MLF. Rather I simply suggest that at every turn of his own particular activity in the development of this plan, each officer should be aware that it must stand public scrutiny or involve public explanation.

The MLF is merely one example of a proposition that lies very close to the center of the truth about the conduct of military, political foreign affairs in this country's moment of history. To a tremendous degree this business, the great gut business of conducting national activities and furthering national interest in the age of nuclear cold war, is public business. There is a certain irony here because we are in a time when it is really more dangerous to have to talk out loud, explain and argue in public at the expense of conveying more perhaps than we want to convey

to the other side. Certainly, at this most dangerous time, less than ever, are the great issues of national strategy subject to limited discussion, perhaps at small gatherings in closed-off places. Less than ever can the few who ponder these issues wish like Thoreau that they could ponder in seclusion away from the many 'who follow and paw me with their dirty institutions.' Secrets, private facts, closely guarded contingency plans and military blueprints: guarding these remains as essential as ever to the protection and furtherance of the national interests; but the basic policies for which these are the tools are the subject today of unrelenting public discussion, journalistic commentary, wide-open debate, representation and sometimes misrepresentation.

If the public were broadly educated in, and interested in, the big issues; if the press were deeply understanding and responsible in reporting and explaining them; if the world society generally shared in the practice of full disclosure and frank discussion; we would not be faced with a great problem of carrying out the basic obligation of informing without fear of harmful disclosure or dangerous misrepresentation. Sadly though, that is not the kind of world we have; nor have we even here at home the happy mixture of mutual interests, mutual intelligence, and mutual willingness to ponder and to understand that joins all three elements—government, press, and public—into one near-perfect mental union. Lacking this perfect situation then, how do we solve the paradox, the built-in conflict, if you will, between the right and need of the public to know the basic policies and facts on which the nation's business is being conducted, and the day-to-day necessities for privacy and secrecy in which the country's business can get done successfully?

Growing Recognition of the Problem. I think that there has been in this country, especially since the war, a growing appreciation by government—military as well as civilian—of the need to solve this dilemma by means other than wishing it didn't exist, and acting as if it didn't exist. When I first covered the Department of State, right after the end of the war, even then the building was still full of classic diplomatists who were reluctant to confide very much. You could hardly find out Albert Payson Terhune's middle name. That has changed a great deal. It has changed, too, in the services and other areas of government, areas where formerly the need for public representation—public eloquence if you will—was long regarded to be a limited responsibility with execution relegated to a limited number of persons. This is not to say that recognition of public opinion and public pressure is new. Lord Canning of Great Britain, one of the fathers of modern diplomacy, spoke a long time ago about 'the fatal artillery of public excitation.' (From my reading of history I gather that this got him in less trouble than a colleague of mine when he recently referred to news as 'weaponry.') What I am trying to say is that the recognition of the

publicness of foreign and political military affairs has by now, or should have, reached very far down in the ranks of officials engaged in those affairs. Contrasting with this is the recognition that every utterance, every fact or opinion that is thrown into the public air for the education of our own public, flows out to three other audiences: to our Allies, to the uncommitted countries, and to our cold war antagonists.

How then do we live with these facts—facts that impose on our democratic society a disadvantage borne more heavily by us than by any other nation in the world, and borne least of all by the communist societies which oppose us? The answer lies in great part in the interworking of government with the press. By press I mean all the media of communication. I say this not because the press is the sole channel of communications between government officials and the people they represent, nor because the press represents the sole custodian of the people's right to know (although some of us in journalism may frequently act as if we believe this to be the case). I say it because for all practical purposes the press is by assumption and acceptance the principal machinery of this communication and dialogue. In Thackeray's words: 'the corporation of the goosequill, the press, the fourth estate, there she is—the great engine; she never sleeps; she has her ambassadors in every quarter of the world; her courtiers upon every road; her officers march along with armies and her envoys walk into statemen's cabinets; they are ubiquitous.'

If we accept, then, the government servant's recognition of the obligation to inform, the way in which he carries out this obligation obviously will depend in great measure on his understanding and his opinion of the press. I doubt that we will find great unanimity of opinion in this gathering about the press and its role in our society. Perhaps then I can best contribute by venturing some opinions of my own, growing out of twenty-six parts journalistic reflex and one part governmental, although I think that is not a fair suggestion of the balance. These are highly personal opinions, but I think within journalism, within the public, and within government, many of them are shared in degree, if not in entirety.

Characteristics of the U.S. Press. What are the characteristics of the American press, the American communications media, today? (1) jealous of its rights and prerogatives; (2) fascinated with speed and exclusivity although tending more and more to a larger interest in analysis and interpretation; (3) insistent on its economic viability, including the right to make profits; (4) convinced that its primary enterprise is that of disclosure.

Let me digress here for a moment. Lord Derby in Great Britain in 1851 got a bit angry at *The Times* of London and exploded one day to the effect

that if the press aspired to share the influence of statesmen it must also share in the responsibilities of statesmen. This is disputed by many in journalism as it was at the time Lord Derby spoke. In *The Times* he received a classic answer, part of which I quote: 'The first duty of the press,' said *The Times,* 'is to obtain the earliest and the most correct intelligence of the events of the time and instantly by disclosure of them to make them the common property of the nation. The press lives by disclosure.' Of statesmen, the editorial writer added: 'The statesman's duty is precisely the reverse. He cautiously guards from the public eye the information by which his actions and opinions are regulated. He reserves his judgment of passing events until the latest moment and then he records it in obscure or conventional language. He strictly confines himself, if he be wise, to the practical interest of his country or to those turning immediately upon it.'

In the United States we take some exception to this British view that so limits the responsibility of the statesmen to tell the public the 'information by which . . . [their] . . . opinions and actions are regulated.' It just doesn't work that way here. Otherwise we have in this exchange, I think, a very useful view of the different means by which press on one hand, and government on the other, may find themselves pursuing an often mutual aim for furtherance of the public interest.

A fifth characteristic of the press today relates somewhat to the first. The press itself is not completely unanimous in agreeing as to just what its public responsibilities are. It is not as unanimous about its obligations as it is about its rights as guaranteed in the First Amendment. Journalism, I think you all have discovered, is far more eloquent in the assertion of its rights than in the parceling of its responsibilities. Generally speaking, though, there is in the journalistic profession a very strong pulse beat of obligation, an acceptance of the fact that the First Amendment in granting this special freedom to one part of our society, the press, automatically sets it apart from other businesses and imposes on it an obligation. It is important to keep in mind the fact that this is not 100% accepted. I don't mean by that that there are many journalists, editors or publishers who say we have no public obligation, but they will say, as one great editor in this country has told me, that the obligation is something that comes from himself and not from anything imposed by the constitution or by law, but just by his being public-minded. 'They are my newspapers and magazines,' he is fond of saying, 'and I can do with them as I please. It happens that what I want to do with them is to further my own country's interest and to inform.'

A last characteristic which is very important and something of a new one, I think, since the war is the fact that the press—the communication

media—is in great danger of being overwhelmed by the very torrent of events and facts. Journalism, to a great extent, not completely but to a great extent, still practices, particularly in the daily newspaper area, pretty much the form of journalism that was practiced before the last war in a period when this country was involved in perhaps no more than one crisis at a time. Yet those same mechanics, that same approach to the collection, dissemination, and composition of news and stories, are still in use these days when we are engaged in a dozen, fifteen, or even twenty crises at a time, or potential crises. In those days any of us not engaged in the daily flow could somehow, by reading each day's paper, collect today's fragment of the important issue of the moment, relate it to yesterday's fragment, and remember tomorrow when we add it to the next day's fragment. This doesn't work any more. These fragments aren't enough when you have twelve or thirteen crimes at a time—the Congo, Vietnam, Laos, the Alliance for Progress, Cuba—you can put together quite a list. Each day's fragment remains too often only a fragment. Meanwhile, not only has there been a multiplication of crises, there also has been a multiplication of events which are of crucial importance to the United States and the American people; those have grown far beyond the capacity of even modern communications to handle. One example: every day in this country the Associated Press carries to newspapers around the country approximately thirty columns of news about foreign affairs. The average coverage of foreign affairs in the American newspaper consists of four to eight columns a day. If you add to the Associated Press traffic an equal traffic from the United Press, and a great flow of foreign policy information from other agencies, you see here a tremendous dilemma, a dilemma, I might say, of 'news management' that faces every editor, publisher, radio station and TV station owner in this country. The average amount that is printed or broadcasted is astonishingly small in contrast to the importance and size of this flow, and I might add in contrast to the growing interest on the part of the American public in these very affairs. This is a serious problem that has not been solved - perhaps the most important of the half dozen assessments that I have given of the nature of the press today.

How Free the Press? Another area worth going into is the question: Just how does the press measure up to some of the rules by which we assume it operates? For example, how free is the press in the one country that guarantees a complete freedom of the press, and with the exception of radio and TV, a complete absence of any regulatory controls other than the laws of libel? I think the press in this country is tremendously free; in a political sense it is utterly free. The limitations on its freedom, aside from the few laws that have a bearing on what one can print about another person, are mostly of its own making. Its own intellectual and financial resources, and the willingness to use them, are the most important factors in determining the use of the freedom that is stated in the constitutional

amendment. Its reflexes in many parts of the country are sometimes tired, sometimes based on perhaps too long a membership in a country club and not enough of getting back on the streets in the First Ward. There is a tendency to use this freedom in a way that accents the parochial as against the perhaps more important but less interesting affairs in other parts of the country or the world. All of these are inhibitions on true freedom of the press in this country. They are important intrusions, but the situation is such that any time anyone wants to change these reflexes, wants to exert this freedom in fresh ways or original ways, the freedom is there to be exerted.

How good is the press? We talk often about having the best press in the world. I think we do. There is great variation, obviously, although not to the extremes of some other countries where, particularly in Great Britain, the good press is very, very good and the bad is scandalously awful. There is, however, a tendency still—that old-fashioned editors' tendency—of thinking of the reader as having the I.Q. of a twelve-year old child. There still is that ancient reflex that is mindful of an old Chicago city editor who once in anger called his staff together, pounded on the desk, and said, 'What this newspaper needs is some new clichés!' There are important exceptions in all these generalities, but to a very large degree the press is, I think, too greatly preoccupied by entertainment—by what it takes to reach the easier side of reader interest.

I have mentioned the low volume of international affairs coverage and the rather old-fashioned form in which it is done. I don't think the press has been sufficiently interested in seeing to the proper training and recruiting of really top-level people. When I was growing up, to get into the newspaper business was an exciting prospect. I have been struck in several years since the war to find that newspapers and magazines, even some very good ones, have to go out and really do much arguing and cajoling to get a man to turn toward journalism as a career as against any number of the other fascinating things that are now open to him. The tendency to call journalism a profession and pay for it as if it weren't is still rather strong when you get away from the large metropolitan areas. All these, I think, have a bearing on the performance. Intellectually, I think, the performance is spotty, and for the most part, I think, more mediocre than it should be, especially with the presence of opportunity and absence of political controls that exist for the press in this country.

Given all this freedom—given this great access to the public life—how responsible is it? Again I thiuk there are great variations, but we have fewer problems of irresponsibility of the press in this country than anywhere else in the world. The average publisher, editor, or correspondent is a cautious, careful man who takes pains to get his facts straight. That

he sometimes gets frightened; that he sometimes gives in to the notion to write a lead that says, 'Hey, everybody, listen to this!' is certainly true, but I think in the matter of the standards of performance and the acceptance of responsibility, the press of this country is probably unparalleled. Where there is irresponsibility, in my opinion, ninety-nine times out of a hundred it is an unintentional irresponsibility. Often it comes from having only part of the facts or part of the story; only rarely is it a deliberately executed misrepresentation of the facts or the situation. I might give one example of a painful case of what I think should be called irresponsibility in the few days just after the Cuban crisis, when one newspaper carried a story saying that according to sources unnamed, the United States officials who received and read the letter from Premier Khrushchev in which he agreed to take his missiles out of Cuba, had come to the conclusion from its language that he was on the verge of hysteria. It turned out that the story came from a dinner party conversation, from an expression of opinion by a high officer of a foreign embassy who had not read the letter - nor had the man who wrote the story. This example was considered to be shocking and dangerous because any notion that the leaders of this country thought - which they did not - that the Premier of Russia was in a hysterical condition could have gravely influenced the Cuban situation, or could at a later stage be a factor that could turn a political situation around inside Moscow and alter our relations with the Soviet Union. Such examples, fortunately, are rare.

How Powerful the Press? Lastly, just how powerful is the press? We often hear the term 'the power of the press.' I think here, too, we have to agree that it is extremely powerful, but powerful more as an exciter than a provoker, and for the most part a channeler of other people's ideas and arguments. Not a great deal of political, intellectual, philosophical, theological inspiration comes out of the average newspaper in America today. I'm not sure that this has always been the case, but it does seem to me that when I compare a large proportion of our press with the British press and periodicals, that there is a great deal more intellectual adventurism, a great deal more provocative tossing out of ideas in the good press of Great Britain than in our own.

The power of the press directly to influence is partly negative power, in the sense that it stems in large part out of reliance on other's ideas. It is also related to the power of omission that comes from the fact that each day the writers and the managing editors have to choose which segments of a very large pie are going to be passed to the public.

An example of the press' lack of power is the classic one of the editorial pages of the newspapers during the entire period of Franklin D. Roosevelt's presidency, when they were, to a tremendous degree, opposed

to him. But he, by 'managing' the news columns, used that part of the press to overcome the power of the editorial pages. This is something that is apt to go on in varying degrees all the time. The old-fashioned ability of the editor to affect big issues with his editorials—to horsewhip the situation into the way he wanted it—has almost disappeared. I don't mean to say that there isn't great power to do good and to do bad—great power to make or break careers or ideas—but it is undoubtedly limited. And the chief limit is set by the ability and willingness of the possessors of the power to use it.

Another great element of press power, I think, is its power as a conduit of dissent. Again, this power is used to varying degrees by the press, depending on how vigorous it is or how tired it has become. Generally, one might justifiably complain that it is a little too conformist to be a conduit for all the areas of opinion and dissent going on in a country like this. But there is one area, and one related very closely, if I may say so, to the whole defense complex, where the press has served a very interesting and, I think, important role. It has been a conduit of dissent within the policy-making levels of government of the sort that has profoundly affected policies. Many of you in naval careers are perfectly aware of how important this can be. One example was the aircraft carrier argument of several years ago. Another example is the Skybolt story which led to a new diplomatic situation between us, the British, and the Western Europeans. This conduit of dissent represents one of the great elements of potential power, and often used power, of the press today.

I mentioned earlier the matter of 'tiredness' on the part of the press. In the past month I have traveled to five major U.S. cities with top officials of the State Department, at each of which the official spoke on a background basis; that is, what he said could be used by the press but they couldn't quote him directly. Newspaper men don't particularly like this, but audiences do because officials are able to speak more candidly. In any case, I was struck by the fact that at each of these places, after the official had spoken on a background basis and left the podium, he was buttonholed by several reporters, each of them asking, 'Would you mind giving me an 'on-the-record' interview?' In each case the reporters were television or radio men who had their tape recorders or their cameras set up near by. The 'word' men in these communities, by contrast, had gotten a bit tired; they weren't going out looking for a story the way they did fifteen or twenty years ago. I have a feeling that this lively competitiveness on the part of TV and radio is going to have an invigorating effect on the reportorial initiative of a lot of newspapers.

Another asset of radio and television is the ability to show a wide public that a man—who may be controversial or espousing a dramatic policy—is, for all that, a normal-looking man, with one head and no tail. This feature is of immense importance in all public affairs matters affecting the government, since it lends immediacy and realness to policy statements, as well as an invaluable human quality. It may also cause printed journalism to find ways to invigorate the interview form, to seek new methods of conveying the sound and feel of policies and their makers.

I would like to cover one last area. Obviously those of us involved in government always have to consider the two problems of classified information and censorship. Ours is the only country that has no regulations, public laws, or statutes that impose censorship on the press, with the exception of those relating to officially classified information. It was interesting to note in the recent Moss Subcommittee hearings that several editors and publishers testified that the press continues to respect the principle that there must be classified information that must be kept secret. Recent discussions about access to information have not caused the press to attack the principle that certain information must be kept from the public, in accordance with clearly stated laws and regulations. What was additionally interesting was that they, on several occasions, remarked that they would be willing to consider proposals for introducing some form of censorship in a nonwar crisis period. This grew out of the realization that it is almost impossible not to draw a line between war and nonwar in a nuclear situation where the confrontation can develop in a matter of hours or days. The issue of censorship is one that has never really been faced up to in this country except in time of war. I for one hope we are moving toward a discussion and debate of the problem of how we can continue to carry out some of the delicate negotiations and military decisions that are necessary in this world, and yet find a way to bring journalism in on what is happening, so that when it becomes possible for it to be disclosed, newsmen are not suddenly exposed to a whole set of preordained facts, but have been able to participate in and understand the action. I was interested to note that several of the Moss Subcommittee witnesses expressed a willingness to sit down with government and discuss guidelines for the handling of important information that cannot become public at the moment.

To sum up briefly, I hope I have been able to leave these impressions: first, that the public affairs problem—the business of finding ways to convey—is an obligation that cuts all the way across government (except perhaps to the Top Secret code room); and second, that communication is one of the primary tools for the conduct of government, probably the most important tool.

There are still flaws and drawbacks in the ability of the press to function as the sole conduit for information, so we've got to find ways of reaching out in other directions, as we are doing with our State Department briefing programs, with which we go out directly to audiences that are not able in any other way to get *at length* the discussion of important policies. Within journalism itself there is much discontent and concern about the problem of not being able to harness the whole torrent and still express the necessary essence every day. There is healthy emotion within journalism itself--soul searching and the beginning of self-criticism.

I think that the combination of awareness of the problem within government and a developing trend of self-criticism within journalism will make it possible to live with the dilemma of full discussion versus full disclosure. In doing so I am confident we shall prove, strange as it may seem to other parts of the world, or those up on Mars who look down on us, that democracy not only works but will prevail while still being able to talk out loud, and argue out loud, about some of the most delicate and sensitive matters facing us both in government and in everyday life.

BIOGRAPHIC SKETCH

The Honorable Robert J. Manning

Present Position: Assistant Secretary of State for Public Affairs.

Mr. Robert Manning, a reporter with twenty-six years of experience in journalism, was born in Binghamton, N.Y. on December 25, 1919. After attending local schools, Mr. Manning was hired in 1936 as copy boy and cub reporter on *The Binghamton,* New York Press. He became Night Editor for the Associated Press in Buffalo in 1941. He entered the United States Army in the following year and served through 1943.

After his discharge from the Army, Mr. Manning became Department of State and White House correspondent for the United Press. In 1945 he was selected as a Nieman Fellow at Harvard University. The following year Mr. Manning was transferred to New York where he founded and headed the United Nations Bureau of the United Press. He left the United Press in 1949 to become a Contributing Editor for *Time* magazine. For the next eight years he served in a variety of positions with *Time* magazine including that of Senior Editor.

Mr. Manning began a two-year tour as Chief of the London Bureau for *Time, Life, Fortune* and *Sports Illustrated* in 1958. Early in 1961 he resided for a time in Washington while doing free-lance work for the *Saturday Review, Saturday Evening Post, New York Times Magazine* and other publications. From July 1961 until the end of the year Mr. Manning was Sunday Editor for the *New York Herald Tribune.*

In April 1962, Mr. Manning was appointed Assistant Secretary of State for Public Affairs.