

## Naval War College Review

---

Volume 16  
Number 1 *September*

Article 2

---

1963

# Evolutionary Aspects of Command

Robert B. Carney  
*U.S. Navy, (Ret.)*

Follow this and additional works at: <https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review>

---

### Recommended Citation

Carney, Robert B. (1963) "Evolutionary Aspects of Command," *Naval War College Review*: Vol. 16 : No. 1 , Article 2.  
Available at: <https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol16/iss1/2>

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Naval War College Review by an authorized editor of U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons. For more information, please contact [repository.inquiries@usnwc.edu](mailto:repository.inquiries@usnwc.edu).

## SPECIAL ATTENTION TO THE READER

The material contained herein is for the professional education of officers of the naval service. The frank remarks and personal opinions are presented with the understanding that they will not be quoted. It shall not be republished or quoted publicly, as a whole or in part, without specific clearance in each instance with both the author and the Naval War College.

*Naval War College Review* was established in 1948 by the Chief of Naval Personnel in order that officers of the service might receive some of the educational benefits of the resident students at the Naval War College. It must be kept in the possession of the subscriber, or other commissioned officer and should be destroyed by burning when no longer required.

The thoughts and opinions expressed in this publication are those of the author, and are not necessarily those of the Navy Department or of the Naval War College.

**NAVAL WAR COLLEGE  
REVIEW**

**Issued Monthly  
U.S. Naval War College  
Newport, R. I.**

## NAVAL WAR COLLEGE EXTENSION COURSES

General Order Number 325 of 6 October 1884, established the Naval War College at Newport, Rhode Island, as a 'college for an advanced course of professional study for naval officers.' It soon became apparent that the resident courses could not educate the numbers of officers which the Service required. In order to overcome this deficiency and extend as much professional education as possible to all officers of the Navy, General Order Number 89, issued 1 April 1914, authorized the conduct of professional courses by correspondence. This was the beginning of the present Extension Education Department of the Naval War College. From the beginning the aim of this Department was to provide as many as possible of the educational benefits of the College to those officers of the naval Service not in residence. To this end the extension courses are continually reviewed and compared with the resident courses. The most recent revisions were made during calendar year 1962. Listed below are the courses currently available.

**NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL SECURITY ORGANIZATION.**  
Two installments, approximately 60 study hours.

**MILITARY PLANNING.**  
Two installments, 60 hours.

**COMMAND LOGISTICS.**  
Three installments, 60 hours.

**NAVAL OPERATIONS.**  
Two installments, 60 hours.

**INTERNATIONAL LAW.**  
Six installments, 250 hours.

**INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS.**  
Six installments, 250 hours.

**READING COURSE, INTERNATIONAL LAW.**  
One installment, 50 hours.

**READING COURSE, INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS.**  
One installment, 50 hours.

**STRATEGIC PLANNING.**  
Four installments, 120 hours.

**COUNTERINSURGENCY.**  
Four installments, 150 hours.

Prior to applying for any of these courses, consult BUPERSINST 1500.49 (series) which contains brief course descriptions, previous course equivalents, and present course prerequisites.

Officers on active duty should submit their applications for enrollment to the Extension Education Department, Naval War College, Newport, Rhode Island, via their Commanding Officer.

Officers not on active duty should submit their applications for enrollment to the same address via the District Commandant or other command carrying their records.

Requests for detailed information on any of the courses should be made by informal letter direct to the Extension Education Department, Naval War College, Newport, Rhode Island.

## EVOLUTIONARY ASPECTS OF COMMAND

A lecture delivered  
at the Naval War College  
on 31 May 1963

by

Admiral Robert B. Carney, U.S. Navy (Ret.)

It has been eight years since I hauled down my flag for the last time, and I have misgivings about expressing conclusions concerning any military event occurring during those years. Nevertheless, I was afforded frequent and diverse opportunities to practice, and to observe, the workings of Command, and I trust that where these remarks may have current implications, I have correctly interpreted the trends since the day of my retirement. In any event, I feel personal pleasure and satisfaction in once more being invited to stand on this platform where I have confronted patient and courteous audiences on a number of occasions.

In 1961, I spoke to the faculty and students on 'The Gray Areas of Command and Decision.' My appearance, then, was timed to coincide with that part of the curriculum set aside for the specific examination of those two functions. On that occasion I outlined the ever-widening complex of interests which must be taken into consideration in the formulating of decisions at virtually every level, a situation in which there is implicit dilution of authoritative initiative by any one individual. The discussion illustrated the give-and-take inherent in latter-day decision-making, and also pointed out numerous examples illustrating how the actions of commanders, at various levels, were profoundly influenced by considerations originating outside of their own Command structures. It was explained how both, planners and commanders alike, are rarely free from the pressures of outside but legitimate interests of others. Actually, despite the bracketing of those two functions—Command and Decision—my earlier paper was weighted more toward the problems of decision-making. Today, I intend to direct my remarks to the executive function of Command.

As in the previous discussion of the gray areas, the speaker's objective today is to spotlight certain realities, and thereby provide a basis for the discussion, analysis, and introspection which are necessary if one is to understand the real factors of his own era, and his own walk of life. First, I would say that the qualifications for appointment to Command responsibility have a long history of evolution - and I am sure that the end is not yet in sight. This is as true of the exercise of Command, as it was previously shown to be in the field of decision-making.

Captain Bligh relied on seamanship, aloofness, nerve, and the cat-o'-nine-tails. By the yardstick of his times those were deemed to be adequate assets for commanding the *Bounty*. The outcome of his cruise on the *Bounty* might be interpreted as indicating differences between 'Command' and 'Leadership.' Today, as things have evolved in our Services, commanders no longer have unquestioned Olympian life-and-death authority, and Leadership is needed to inspire the sort of confidence and loyalty which can compel intelligent men obediently to follow. The Uniform Code of Military Justice by its restrictions on the authority of the individual, imposes obligations for leading by precept and intelligence not laid down even as recently as World War II.

To make a comparison closer to home than Bligh's times, in the decade, say of the thirties, the spectrum of Navy jobs and Navy life was relatively uncomplicated. Under the influence of Jutland, Navy thinking was predominantly influenced by tactical considerations, with the result that the Naval Establishment rested on the philosophy of a numerically large Fleet and a minimum Shore Establishment. Today, the situation is sharply reversed - so sharply, in fact, that sea billets for senior officers are hard to come by.

In the thirties, the rotation for officers up to the grade of lieutenant commander followed a pattern of three years at sea and two years ashore. Thereafter it was reversed - two years at sea and three years ashore. This we could count on, and we were reasonably certain as to the strictly Navy flavor of the assignments which might come our way. In the thirties, qualifying for selection and preparing one's self for higher responsibilities, were quite simple, viewed in retrospect. We in the Navy concerned ourselves solely with the Navy's business; we learned the mariner's trade; we endeavored to acquire reasonable understanding of the capabilities and limitations of ordnance and engineering; we learned how to estimate the Navy situation and to write intelligible Navy orders; we molded ourselves in the classic pattern of the seagoing leader; and we strove to acquire reputations as shiphandlers and tacticians. In the thirties, the sea officer had disciplinary authority which, while not countenancing the brutalities of other days, did nevertheless permit him to exercise far greater authority over the persons of his subordinates than is the case today. In the thirties, a naval officer's competence was measured by his Navy Fitness Reports and his response to formal professional promotion examinations. Such circumstances, characteristic of that particular period, all influenced the criteria of qualification for Command, and they illustrate the effect of current environment on Command criteria and practices.

World War II brought about some drastic changes in concept with respect to Command qualification and the exercise of Command. The

rapidly expanding Services brought an influx of patriotic citizens rallying to the flag, civilians at heart, unaccustomed to the regimentation of military life. Here, again, the importance of Leadership, as opposed to stark Command, was obvious. The ramifications of World War II forced a closer association of the Services, working together toward common objectives. There was need for planning on a scale that was new. Communications were improved, automatically opening doors for remote control of operations. New weapons and new techniques came into being overnight with attendant burdens of technological understanding. Certainly, as the war progressed, new technical horizons imposed new demands on commanders for widening their professional qualifications; furthermore, no officer had a place in the joint-operations scheme unless he acquired a grasp of many things outside of the Navy's own orbit. The business of Command was changing, changing. The postwar years have, perhaps, produced even more radical changes and developments: unification, alliances, a racing technology, weapons of undreamed of lethality, and an ever-increasing trend toward centralization. It is quite plain that over the years the environment of the times has profoundly affected the requirements, the privileges, the restrictions, and the obligations of Command. It is equally apparent that the attributes of Leadership, as opposed to raw authority, have assumed ever-increasing importance in military life.

And what of the environment of the sixties? I believe that the five phenomena presently having primary impact on Military Command are (1) service and national interdependences, (2) unification, (3) specialization, (4) civilian control and (5) centralization. Each has had, and is having, a profound influence on the practice of Command. As will be pointed out later, the impact is not on the Uniformed Services alone; there are also significant implications in the field of civilian control.

Let us examine these five prime factors. World War II forced recognition of the fact that the Services were mutually dependent upon each other at every step, from planning to combat and logistical support. Joint operations pointed up the vital necessity for professional knowledge and competence extending beyond the horizons of one's own Service. These expanded horizons of military understanding quickly became new and added requirements for Command competence. Those who lacked the perception, analytical objectivity, and the flexibility to see, and to adjust to, the new parameters arising from the developing strategic and tactical situations, soon faded from the comprehensive Leadership picture. Many officers, highly respected in the years between the wars, failed to qualify under the new criteria and unhappily surrendered their major positions of Leadership to others who saw, understood, and acted accordingly.



Wartime realization of the necessity for inter-Service co-ordination inevitably led to postwar analysis of the entire war effort with resulting conclusions to the effect that there had been costly duplications and profligate use of resources. Limited or parochial viewpoint not infrequently led to generalizations and extremist advocacy of complete merger of all fighting and support elements. Out of a welter of differing, and sometimes shrill, viewpoints came legislation which directed the establishment of authoritative co-ordination, but which preserved Service identities. Most people were at a loss precisely to define 'unification,' but the legislation of 1947 was generally, if somewhat loosely, accepted and spoken of as the 'Unification Act.'

Whatever the other effects of unification may have been, it certainly had an impact on Command in that it placed a further premium on an understanding of the viewpoints, the functions, the business, the management, and the aspirations of all the Services. Whether at the council table, in the planning conference, in the logistical and procurement agencies, or in the exercises of the operating forces, broader inter-Service knowledge was a prerequisite for effective participation in matters of joint interest; a Navy-only outlook was, and is, a professional impediment—one might say, a fatal impediment—to such participation.

To the change wrought by unification and the interdependence of the Services in the criteria of professional competence were added still further requirements brought about in connection with the alliances, doctrines, and facts involving our national undertakings and obligations. These made it necessary for the military practitioner to acquire a grasp of new geographical areas, and of other national mentalities, aspirations, organizations, and procedures. New dimensions of historical understanding, geopolitical knowledge, tact and tolerance were added to the qualifications necessary to be eligible for the numerous new assignments in the international field.

Let there be no doubt that the Department of Defense attaches great importance to this broadening of knowledge and participation. Those officers who perform at the DOD level wear the outward and visible sign of their broadened military horizons in the shape of special insignia. Experience in the joint fields of endeavor is a prerequisite for assignment to the top echelons of the Flag and General officer grades. This is a fact of life, and one more example of the impact of environmental change on the criteria for command qualification.

And now we come to one of the knottiest of our personal problems: specialization. There is no escaping the fact that every officer who has Command aspirations must now have a working understanding of the

technical problems affecting material performance and personnel capabilities. In every Command, large or small, technological principles and functions play a vital part in the capability for accomplishing the assigned missions and tasks of the Command; the officer in Command must be able to understand and to utilize the technical tools at hand, and he must be able intelligently to consider, and to decide on, recommendations and alternatives involving his equipment. It is manifestly impossible for every officer to become an expert in every technological field; and yet there will never come a time when some one officer will not be needed to make an intelligent decision involving a complex of systems, each requiring specialized knowledge beyond the grasp of any individual who has not devoted full time to the specialty concerned. In concept, this is not a new problem; it has always existed in some measure. The ship captain of the thirties needed a basic understanding of the capabilities and the limitations of his ship, his guns, his power plant, and his equipment. The same sort of need exists today, but the technologies of our times are more complicated, the rate of scientific advancement is swifter. What, then, is the answer?

Without presuming to recommend a fixed policy, or a specific educational program, it seems axiomatic that every officer who today aspires to Command must acquire a basic and fundamental scientific and technical understanding which goes far beyond what can be taught in four collegiate years. In other less complicated times the necessary additional understanding could be gleaned from manuals and publications—and homework. It is very doubtful if that sort of self-made-man program would be adequate for keeping up with the parade today. Some measure of universal and formal postgraduate instruction would appear to be needed as a prelude even to general qualification for Command, such instruction to include scientific basics which would lead to an understanding of the nature of technical problems. Only through the medium of some such technical groundwork can an officer acquire ability to evaluate technical recommendations and factors, and intelligently to make decisions as to the optimum operational use of modern weapons and equipment.

At this point, a question is sure to arise: What are the comparative advantages and penalties of specialization vis-à-vis the more general qualifications for broader co-ordinating or Command responsibilities?

First, it is necessary to face up to the fact that exclusive specialization precludes opportunities to learn by experience many of the other skills that make up the broad picture of over-all military competence. It is also necessary to recognize the needs of the High Command structure to grant increased rank authoritatively and effectively to command

subordinate echelons, and to focus emphasis on the supreme importance of the fighting forces in the military scheme. Implicit in these facts is the conclusion that the restricted specialist must content himself with a somewhat restricted rank ceiling.

On the other side of the coin he who elects, and is selected, to specialize finds satisfactions in devoting himself to his chosen field; he may escape much of the recurring uprootings of the General Line; and he acquires marketable qualifications as a hedge against the hazards of selection and involuntary retirement. But these advantages may not silence discontent with restricted prospects for career prestige, and it is therefore essential that there be worthy and acceptable goals within the specialties to attract and hold top quality men.

As to the various categories of commissioned officers, including the Staff Corps, Specialists, and even the Limited Duty group, each category has its own vital need for leadership, each category has its own technical problems, and each category today must be responsive to superior coordinating authority and to the impinging interests and needs of sister Services and other outside agencies. Therefore it is safe to say that all of the foregoing remarks, and those which follow, are applicable in great measure to all categories of commissioned officers. It is equally safe to say that we cannot do without full-time specialists, and that we must create specialist environments offering adequate rewards and satisfactions.

Reverting, for a moment, to the basic theme of this discussion, it is evident that requirements for specialization are having a powerful collateral impact on the specifications for Command qualifications, and that here again the criteria for the attributes of Command are being subjected to the pressures of evolution and change.

With the termination of hostilities in 1945 a new factor began to make itself felt on the military scene: civilian control. Perhaps it would be more accurate to say that the concept of civilian control began to change, for policy-level civilian control had always been implicit in the language of the Constitution and in the statutory provisions concerning the authority of the President and the Service Secretaries, and in the legislation having to do with appropriations and their utilization and management.

If this discussion dwells at some length on the subject of civilian control, it does so for two reasons. First, because civilian control coupled with centralization, appears to be overlapping some controls heretofore entrusted to the military. Second, because it is necessary that the fact, and the implications, of such overlapping be widely understood as a basis for intelligent approach to matters touched by this trend.

With the advent of unification in 1947 there began the evolution of the office of the Secretary of Defense. The original concept of a small group of policy co-ordinators soon proved illusory, and eventually subdivisions and large staffs came into being. Many functions previously administered by uniformed officers were taken over by civilian administrators. Understandably, firm convictions of military experience did not always find concurrence in the thinking and philosophies of the appointive civilian officials in whom ultimate control was vested. This phenomenon merits consideration because it does, in fact, have Command implications, and it is germane to the thesis that Command criteria change with changing times.

At the fountainhead of policy—Washington—ultimate policy decision is, of course, vested in civilian authority. This is as it should be; but it is axiomatic that civilian authority will view events and problems in the context of its own personal and individual experiences and past environments. It is equally axiomatic that certain military philosophies, bred and crystallized in the crucible of war against the elements and other adversaries, may not convincingly register on mentalities trained and experienced in totally different circumstances. Civilian questioning of our way of doing business is a recurring phenomenon. And this is quite natural. Each new administration brings in its own civilian executives who have an obligation and a natural desire to examine everything in their respective bailiwicks as a prelude to doing a job. Military thinking in the fields of operation, maintenance, management, personnel criteria, selection, promotion, etc., thus goes under the microscope periodically. There are advantages, and there are dangers, inherent in these cyclical examinations; they serve to prevent the Services from becoming complacent about their ways of doing things; but, on the other hand, there is room for error in civilian conclusions based primarily on civilian experience and on corridor and office observations.

Understandably, the fortunes and affairs of the denizens of the Pentagon are closer and more understandable to the civilian leadership than are the more remote problems and responsibilities of those who man the operating forces. However, where policy decision impinges on the competence, effectiveness, morale, and operational performance of those who man the fighting forces, there is a Command responsibility which devolves on civilian authority, and which calls for attentive and understanding harkening to the considered opinions of those who have spent their lives in preparing, maintaining, and operating our Armed Services to do the safeguarding job for which they were created. It is also a fact that success or failure in battle has traditionally been recorded and remembered as the responsibility of the uniformed leaders; historically that is not a responsibility to be laid at the door of American civilian leadership. Perhaps, under a concept of extreme centralization, history would call upon civilian leadership to assume a

greater measure of responsibility for the outcome of military operations. At one point, a reorganization plan placed the Service Secretaries in the chain of Command. This did not appear to be sound from the standpoint of professional and technical qualification, and it was subsequently rescinded.

One of the recurring aspects of civilian control has to do with the selection of officers for assignments and for promotion. Recently, under the direction of the Secretary of the Navy, there has been an examination of the criteria for selection to Flag rank. The underlying purpose of such a review is, obviously, an endeavor to determine what sorts of qualifications are required in the Flag grades, how these qualifications should be apportioned qualitatively and quantitatively, and what types are needed to provide the experience and the leadership which will be required from among the Navy's senior officers. Any such study inevitably will have overtones of interest in the entire philosophy of educating and training the officer corps - a factor which must immediately arouse the interest and close attention of officers in every grade because of implications concerning the criteria for advancement and qualifications for Command.

It would seem reasonable to expect that our civilian leadership might place different emphasis on that subject than would the experienced military professional. This is not to say that irreconcilable differences of viewpoint would be inevitable. However, it would be naive not to recognize the possibility of significant differences of viewpoint arising from the differences in the experiences and past environments of the civilian and military leaderships. Good can come of this if differing opinions as to the needs of the Navy, as seen from potentially different but mutually interested viewpoints, are wisely reconciled. Significant disregard of experienced professional opinion could lead to belief that career safety lies in the regard of politically appointed superiors. In any event, formulation of selection and assignment policies does have Command implications, and whenever civilian authority influences the shaping of those policies then civilian authority must assume a measure of Command responsibility.

It is worth repeating that the civilian executives of the Military Establishment have an over-all responsibility which extends to the outermost fringes of the operating areas, and therefore have a profound obligation to accord the views of the military thoughtful and respectful attention. As a corollary, Service leadership has a grave obligation to present its concepts of competence and leadership in documented and convincing manner. So, here again, is evidence that the concepts and practice of military Command are constantly subjected to pressures having implications of change. In this instance, we see factors which may tend toward the injection of appointive civilian viewpoint and authority into the basic policies of education, training, administration, and even the conduct of operations.

The fifth point which was mentioned as a prime factor in the environment of the sixties is centralization. This is a subject which is too complicated for more than the broadest of broad-brush treatment in any such discussion as this. Basically, it divides itself into three philosophical areas: (1) policy control; (2) operational control; and (3) administrative control. Centralization of operational control can be dismissed, here, by simple acknowledgment of the existence of the Unified and Specified Commands, and the capabilities for directing certain operations from Washington through the medium of available communications. From the standpoint of Field Command, such arrangements may stultify decision initiative to a certain extent, but they do not significantly alter the criteria of Command attributes. Evolutionary aspects do, however, enter the picture in that civilian leadership now does have the tools—staffs and communications—by which it can, if it chooses, exercise actual military direction of operations. In other words, even the operational aspects of centralization could have important implications with respect to civilian control. Civilian control and centralization are also closely interrelated in the fields of policy control and administrative control. Here, the possibilities and the actualities are accentuated.

Congressional inquiry and discussions in the various media of public information indicate current strong trends toward the centralization of controls in the person of the Secretary of Defense. Like functions previously handled in the military departments are being pulled into the Department of Defense for control and actual administration. Decisions in the fields of weapons and weapons systems are made at the DOD level, at times in opposition to military evaluation. The Service Chiefs have only very limited Command authority, and it appears that the JCS must be regarded as a primarily advisory agency. For many years there has been lively debate on the pros and cons of the all-powerful single Chief of Staff. Those earlier discussions were concerned with the advisability of placing great power of decision in the hands of one uniformed officer. Today, it would appear that such arguments are somewhat academic in view of the greater authority which has been assumed by the Secretary of Defense.

As disconcerting as these developments may be to the military, it must be recognized that somewhere along the line deciding positions must be taken when unanimity of military opinion does not exist, or when military viewpoint is not consistent with superior national policy. This is implicit in the legal responsibility of the Secretary of Defense for direction authority and control in the Military Establishment. The real issue thus becomes one of judgment by the deciding authority; and any real danger lies in such things as the potential for fallacy in one man's thinking, or the mathematical equating of business efficiency and

combat efficiency. Such factors are not cited with specific instances in mind, but as illustrating what can take place in a climate of civilian assumption of certain Command responsibilities.

There is one more facet of military business which, while not new, has been increasing in importance as a function of Command: management. Speaking now of the Navy, business and industrial management have been old hat to the Staff Corps for longer than my Service recollections cover, but there was a time when the typical Line officer did not concern himself with these matters. With the postwar formal establishment of Op-04 (Deputy Chief of Naval Operations, Logistics) in the Navy Department, the problems of industrial, business and financial management became a charge on Line concern. In the late forties Comptroller-ship at the Department level was accorded recognition as an essential tool for managing the resources made available for the creation, support, and operation of the Forces. More and more, the Line has come to realize that the Comptroller, if left to his own devices without Command supervision and direction, would in effect take over many functions of Decision and Command. Parenthetically, it might be noted that the Air Force was the first of the Uniformed Services to recognize the Command implications of the Comptroller function. Succeeding DOD administrations have laid increasing emphasis on business administration procedures and techniques. This emphasis is currently so sharp that no program, of whatever nature, escapes cost-effectiveness scrutiny, and no officer-Line, Staff, Specialist, or LDO can dodge the necessity for presenting his proposals in terms acceptable to management scrutiny. All of these things are part and parcel of the evolutionary processes affecting Command in the United States Military Establishment. They are realities with which the military of today must live. They are realities which must be pondered, seriously and objectively, by those who aspire to, and are preparing themselves for, Command.

Thus far, this discussion has been primarily a recitation of events and developments which have led to changes in the qualifications for Command and in the mechanics of Command. Contributing factors have been pointed out without attempt to justify or criticize. And yet in any such discussion there must be implicit recognition of the fact that people, and the reactions of people, are involved and are inevitable. No black box has been devised successfully to control human emotions and responses. Consequently, a consideration of the developments just recounted is certain to give rise to human questions, human doubts, human plans and objectives, human apprehensions, and human hopes.

What can be distilled, by way of guidance, from an examination of the evolution of this business of Command? First, I fear that much of

the existing literature on the subject will be of but limited help to the laborer in the military vineyards of the sixties. No one has yet improved on the character and personality specifications which John Paul Jones laid down for the guidance of naval officers. He was far ahead of his times in his dream of the truly professional naval officer, and, today, any officer would benefit by an endeavor to live up to the standards which John Paul Jones enunciated. Nevertheless, he who aspires to Command today, must develop within himself skills and understandings not dreamed of by that great fighter of the days of sail.

The same might be said of many other treatises on the subject of Command penned in earlier days. Much that was accepted as gospel in years gone by, no longer can be considered as covering the subject to include all of the additional obligations and responsibilities which have been imposed on military officers by the developments of recent years. Nor, as far as I know, is there available much in the way of codified guidance on these matters. However, there are some signposts along the military road. For every man who wears an officer's uniform, be he Line, Staff Corps, Specialist, or what have you, there are certain attributes of attainment and character that are essential to qualify for leadership. To name some: understanding of superior policy; understanding of the missions and structures of related organizations; professional competence; willingness to assume responsibility; understandings of the techniques of guidance, delegation, and supervision; capacity for articulate presentation; loyalty up and loyalty down. With these in one's personal inventory, any officer—Line, Staff Corps, or Specialist—can reasonably hope for command assignment within his sphere, and can contemplate the responsibilities of command with self-assurance. Deficiencies in one or more of those attributes condemn to mediocrity.

Despite controls which may at times inhibit initiative, there is still a whale of a Command job to be done, and there are innumerable opportunities for displaying leadership. Each has it in his power to guide his subordinates to responsive competence and confident disciplined behavior. Each has endless opportunities to lead and to guide and to inspire; by his inspections he can set standards; through knowledge and fairness he can set goals and inspire both confidence and self-respect in his subordinates. These opportunities are open to junior officers as well as to the Flag grades with their wider horizons.

The Staff Corps man with a desk job may, by the quality of his performance, make his efforts felt in the farthest reaches of the Fleet and the Shore Establishment. He may have an important impact on industry's participation in the national defense effort. If his job is one of importance in the Shore Establishment, he assumes obligations of precept, direction,



supervision, management, the wise handling of military and civilian personnel, and heavy custodial responsibilities. All of these things are functions of Command and are essential to the smooth performance of the military machine.

The opportunities and the responsibilities in the field of the Specialist fall into the same pattern. He must, of course, excel in the techniques of his specialty, but there is more to it than that. Whether he is engaged in research, technical development, administrative activities, instruction, or the management of some project or installation, the attributes of Command and leadership come into play; the greater his ability to make use of those attributes the greater will be his value in the defense effort, and the better his prospects for advancement.

Entirely outside each Service's framework there are scores and scores of billets being manned by military officers of every category. For the most part such billets are concerned with various aspects of staff work, but the need for leadership capability is no less in that environment than it is elsewhere. What I am saying is this: Regardless of the field of endeavor, the measure of success will largely be determined by the measure of leadership demonstrated. At every level leadership is required, and leadership will only be achieved by mastering those fundamentals which make for loyal obedience to superior authority, intelligent co-operation with related activities, and the successful channeling and co-ordinating of the efforts of subordinates.

Here at the Naval War College Command and Decision are considered in conjunction. It might be easy to fall into the habit of thinking of 'commandanddecision' as one word - something like 'damnyankee.' However, the two functions should be mentally sorted out, for there are factors in each of the processes which will call for attributes not necessarily of equal importance in both. For example, in the business of formulating decisions, there are undoubted opportunities for council and conference leadership where the emphasis will be on a comprehensive grasp of the 'gray areas' involved in the problem at hand and on powers of persuasion. On the other hand, the Commanding Officer of a ship or an operating unit may not have much to say about superior Decision, but he is confronted with the obligations and responsibilities of Command 24 hours a day - on the bridge, instructing his officers, inspecting, maintaining morale and discipline, and functioning intelligently in the field of public relations.

By its very title this discussion is identified as an exercise to point up origins of innovations in Command concepts which have been born of changing circumstances. We have seen some examples of creeping

infringement of military Command initiative. However, it is safe to predict that there will never come a time when the military Services will be able to turn their business and their operations over to computers and to put the Command types out to pasture. If our country is to place justified reliance in its Armed Services, the proven standards of military character can never be relaxed. If Service-wide emphasis on leadership and Command is diluted, our Services will find it difficult, if not impossible, to live up to the proud record of the past. So I would say to every uniformed officer that as important as the latter-day professional criteria may be, they alone do not constitute a substitute for military character, leadership attributes, and the ability to 'take charge' with wisdom and firmness, and in a manner to inspire the confidence and respect of seniors and subordinates. On the other side of the coin, those who exercise civilian control of the military under our American system should realize that even the greatest mastery of the skills of civilian life does not carry with it an automatic competence to pass judgment on what it takes to make a dependable and properly armed fighting man and fighting force.

One last thought: As each generation approaches the end of its allotted span, it views with concern the modern new-fangled developments. 'The Navy isn't what it used to be' - and, I suspect, it never was. My generation lived through what, to us, seemed to be startling changes, and we accommodated to them, survived them, and usually harnessed them. Later generations undoubtedly will work out a modus vivendi for recent changes and those which are sure to come. It can all work out in the end with the help of intelligence and objectivity, the wit to see and to analyze impending change, the mentality to arrive at sound and reasoned conclusions, and the integrity and moral fibre to stand by those conclusions.

## BIOGRAPHIC SKETCH

Admiral Robert B. Carney, U.S. Navy (Ret.)

Admiral Carney was appointed to the U.S. Naval Academy in 1912, and graduated with a B.S. degree and a commission as Ensign, on 3 June 1916.

His first assignment was to the battleship *New Hampshire*. In October of that year he was transferred to the *USS Dixie*, a tender to the Atlantic Torpedo Flotilla. In 1917 he was ordered to the destroyer *Fanning* and in July of 1918 was ordered to the Bethlehem Shipbuilding Corporation in Squantum, Massachusetts, in connection with fitting out the *USS Laub*. He remained with that ship when it was commissioned, and later was given command. From 1920 to 1928 he served aboard the *USS Reno*, *USS Rathburne*, *USS Delphy*, *USS Mississippi*, and *USS New Mexico*.

From August 1928 to April 1930 Admiral Carney served in the Division of Fleet Training, Office of the Chief of Naval Operations. He was then ordered to sea duty in the *USS Cincinnati*. Between June 1933 and June 1935 he was Commanding Officer of the Receiving Station of the Washington Navy Yard and War Plans Officer of the Naval Gun Factory and Washington Navy Yard and District. From 1936 to 1937 he commanded the *USS Buchanan* and the *USS Reid*, both destroyers.

His next duty was in the Shore Establishment Division of the Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Navy from August 1938 to June 1940. When Crown Prince Olaf of Norway visited Washington during his American tour in the summer of 1939, Admiral Carney served as his naval aide.

In June 1940 the Admiral joined the *USS California*, and served as Executive Officer until February of the following year. He next had staff duty with the Support Force of the Atlantic Fleet from March 1941 until September 1942.

In 1942, Admiral Carney assisted in fitting out the light cruiser *USS Denver*, which he commanded in the Southwest Pacific from October 1942 until July 1943. He was Chief of Staff and Aide to Admiral William F. Halsey, Jr., Commander of the South Pacific Force, from July 1943 to June 1945, after which he was assigned to the staff of the Commander of the Third Fleet in the same capacity. In August 1945, Admiral Carney formally accepted the surrender of Yokosuka, Japan's second largest secret naval base, at the entrance to Tokyo Bay.

Ordered to duty in February 1946 as Assistant Chief of Naval Operations (Logistics) at the Navy Department, the Admiral later assumed the duties of Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Logistics and continued in that capacity until 1950.

On 1 April 1950, Admiral Carney took over formal command of the Second Task Fleet in the Atlantic. Five months later he was assigned as Commander in Chief of the United States Naval Forces in the Eastern Atlantic and Mediterranean. On 18 June 1951 he became Commander in Chief of Allied Forces in Southern Europe and the Allied Naval Forces in Southern Europe. He assumed the position of Chief of Naval Operations on 17 August 1953.

In August 1955, Admiral Carney retired and since then has been serving as Chairman of the Board of Bath Iron Works, and as Director of Fairchild Engineer Aircraft Corporation and Nation-Wide Securities Company, Inc.