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U.S. Military Strategy in the Sixties

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Ginsburgh, Robert N. *U.S. Military Strategy in the Sixties*. New York: Norton, 1965. 160 p.

Here the reader is given a brief and concise, but relatively comprehensive, analysis of the developments in United States strategy, beginning with the Revolutionary War and continuing, broadly, through 1970. The author has done an admirable job in outlining the various domestic influences on national military strategy, such as the interrelationships and interactions between the military and civilian components of the Department of Defense and the executive and legislative branches of the government, and the American concepts of legality and morality. In addition, he makes a meaningful comparison of the fundamental differences and similarities in the national strategies of the United States and the U.S.S.R. The advanced student of strategy and international relations will find little in the book that is particularly revelatory or profound. However, it is an excellent primer and a valuable summary synthesis and is highly recommended as such.

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Heilbrunn, Otto. *Conventional Warfare in the Nuclear Age*. New York: Praeger, 1965. 164 p.

This work is a valuable and most timely contribution to the study of modern warfare. Having written books on guerrilla warfare, partisan warfare, and warfare in the enemy's rear, Dr. Heilbrunn now turns his expertise to the contemplation of a major conflict between nuclear powers. With tight reasoning and clear logic, he analyzes the possible courses of action available to NATO in the event of an attack by the Soviets. He carefully weighs the advantages and disadvantages accruing to the attacker, or the defender, with the introduction of nuclear weapons by either side, and he makes a fair case against those who would base NATO's defense upon the use of tactical nuclear weapons. In fact, the only case in which he considers that either side gains a clear advantage by the introduction of nuclear weapons is in the preemptive mode; and in most other cases the Russians seem to have a slight edge. Thus, he presents the rationale for a NATO defense strategy limited to conventional means—something which, he makes quite clear, NATO is ill-prepared to implement. This is the second major thesis of his book. While the war contemplated may be conventional, the tactics are dictated by the nuclear capabilities of the opponents.