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The Troubled Partnership

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Brown, Neville. *Nuclear War*. London: Praeger, 1964. 227 p.

The author, a research associate at the Institute for Strategic Studies in London, has presented an interesting and helpful work for both the layman and the military professional. It is an orderly development of the available tools of war and the current strategies governing their use. It contains excellent descriptions of current weapons and their capabilities. The technology and effects of nuclear weapons are outlined in comparatively understandable terms. A comparison is made of the complete gamut of Soviet and Western bloc weapons. The book would be of value as an unclassified source of information and comparative statistics if there was nothing else in it.

In addition, however, the author discusses current Soviet and Western doctrine and goes into detail concerning the strategies and relative strengths and weaknesses of NATO and the Soviet bloc. He outlines the basic difference between Western and Soviet thinking with regard to the control possible in a modern conflict. He traces the changes in Western thinking and the resulting "Forward Strategy" adopted by NATO. He compares not only the major powers forces but includes the smaller powers capabilities and contribution. He also discusses the possibilities and probabilities of direct confrontation on the NATO flanks.

After the careful and factual preparation offered the reader, Mr. Brown then discusses his ideas of some of the problems involved in the present NATO strategy as he envisions it in actual execution. He then offers his ideas as to how it could be improved. The reader may or may not agree with the author's ideas but the exposure to them is both educational and worth the effort involved.

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Kissinger, Henry A. *The Troubled Partnership*. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1965. 266 p.

This book grew out of a series of lectures delivered at the Council of Foreign Relations in March 1964. It focuses attention upon the structural problems of the Atlantic Alliance, by pointing out the changes that have occurred in the basic nature of alliances. Mr. Kissinger says that the deepest problem before NATO is that the pressures of technology run counter to the traditional notions of sovereignty. He examines the nature of the strategic debate

now in progress with a constructive critical analysis of the flaws of the United States. It serves as a gentle but firm reminder that the United States cannot rest on the theoretical adequacy of its views. Part one of the book is the most thought-provoking because it lays the foundation for a much-needed rebuilding of United States policy toward the Atlantic community. The political issues which Mr. Kissinger believes to be the root problems, are exemplified by the competition between the United States and France. He gives strong indications that the differences are not all the fault of Charles de Gaulle. The following quote may help clarify the issues between the United States and De Gaulle. It may also have an impact upon those who have tried to reconcile the inconsistent turns of United States policy from one part of the world to another.

"In the emerging areas the nation-state was treated as natural, and in Eastern Europe great hope was placed in nationalism as a counterweight to communism. But in Western Europe, where the concept of nationalism had originated, American policy decried the nation-state as outdated and backward."

Mr. Kissinger reminds the reader that United States policy has been to foster political unity (federation) of the Western European nation-states through promotion of economic integration; and since it has become clear that such a hope was unduly optimistic, American policy has been at odds with itself and at times appears to be seeking a scapegoat to blame for this frustration. He drives home the point that even if a political united Europe were to be achieved, it would inevitably dissipate American hegemony in Atlantic policy. The United States may not be entirely satisfied with such a turn of events, nor even come to recognize that it may be the price of European unity. For the issue of political control of nuclear weapons is not likely to be resolved by a United Europe any more than by the MLF. Mr. Kissinger sees East-West relations and the future of Germany as the chief factor in the question of what kind of Atlantic partnership we should have in the future.

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