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NATIONAL STRATEGY

A lecture delivered
at the Naval War College
on 17 August 1965

by

Admiral Arleigh Burke, U.S. Navy (Ret.)

Before I start any lecture on anything I would like to express to Admiral Melson my great appreciation for the invitation to appear before you today. It is a great honor for any lecturer to appear in this lecture hall in which so many eminent men have lectured before—and from which so many students have gone forth to *make* the proud history of the United States and the United States Navy.

It is a particularly great honor for a retired naval officer to be here—not just because it disproves the old saw, "A man is not without honor—except in his own country," which has been translated in the Navy to "Nobody is so critical of naval officers—as other naval officers," but because it gives the old fellow an opportunity to discuss current problems with the group of people whom he knows and who know what he means when he says "service—and loyalty—and honor" and all the other copybook phrases which are not admired so much these days.

It's always good to be with people who have done much for their country—and who will do much more—for this country will depend on your capability—on your skill—and on your convictions. You know that, of course, just as much as I do, but still that's another strong factor in the total pleasure I have today.

I have been tempted to change the topic of my lecture today to another one which is shortly going to be most important to all

Americans, but it will be of particular significance to those in the military service—that is—"Negotiations with a dedicated enemy who proposes to do everything he can to do us in—and what the United States should do about it." This timely subject has a vast reservoir of recent history to call on—history which does not make very happy reading—if anybody ever chose to read it—which nobody does. Perhaps some of you will choose as your thesis that fascinating subject of recent negotiations and will point out the lessons that could be learned from the Cairo, Yalta and other agreements we made during and shortly after World War II, and the results of the negotiations at Panmunjom, Warsaw and Geneva, and the ones about Laos, Cuba and Africa. There are bright spots too, like the one on Berlin. Contrasts could be made with the results when there were no negotiations, like Greece and Quemoy and Matsu. Many of the details of the thinking leading to these past negotiations are not yet known, nor are all the maneuvers and the causes of the maneuvers published yet. Still there is a lot of material available. If any of you do select this subject I certainly would appreciate a copy of your paper.

Strategy is also a fascinating subject, for it deals with the methods of how to influence the trend of events. This has been going on throughout all history and so what I have to say today will not be new to you. You know it already, but I would like to review some of the most important principles with you. As in most studies, the most important principles are the most elementary ones. This fact, combined with another one, that these principles are all old, has caused people who want a new and better way of doing all things—and who insist that if it has been done before, it can't be any good—to overlook or perhaps ignore the lessons of history.

Before we talk much about strategy perhaps we should try to determine what it is and what it's for.

A national strategy is the way that *all* the resources of the nation are to be used to achieve the *goals* of the nation.

There are many ways of saying this, but a national strategy is how a nation can use what it has available to it to influence the world to be the way that nation wants it to be.

All of you have read and heard many definitions of the term "National Strategy." It has been the study of many profound treatises and much learned debate over the years—particularly

since World War II. You who are serving our nation in the profession of arms have been especially familiar with the term for a long time. In recent years, however, there has been an increasing tendency for civilian strategists—historians, scientists, and other scholars—to venture into the fields of national and military strategy—and to devise more erudite interpretations and definitions for the term "National Strategy."

However, most all these definitions simply state the same thing in different but equally elegant language.

In any case, the great volume of written matter devoted to the subject of national strategy over the past several years clearly proves one point—national strategy is an increasingly fascinating subject for people—inside and outside of government and military circles.

The aims, the objectives, the goals—the "to-be-hoped-for condition of the world at some future date"—must be known before a national strategy can be devised.

But equally indispensable to our national strategy are the requirements for finding the means necessary to achieve those objectives—and then using these means appropriately when the occasion demands.

So—both "ends" and "means" are vitally important.

Let us first take a look at the ends—since a nation must know what it wants before it makes plans to get it. A nation must know where it wants to go—before it can determine how to get there. A nation must know what kind of world it wants—before it can use its means—its resources—in the best manner to bring about that kind of a world.

This is a point which is not always made clear during discussions of United States national strategy.

Our adversaries, the communists, on the other hand, know very well what their aims and objectives are. They intend to dominate the world. Not only they know it, but so do we—and everybody else. And just so nobody ever forgets it, the communists keep saying so.

Moreover, they take courses of action in various parts of the world aimed at achieving this objective. There are differences within the communist camp, but these differences concern mainly who is to take charge of the communist hierarchy—with perhaps lesser differences involving the strategy to be used to achieve their avowed aims.

Just like the differences between Stalin and Tito looked at one time as if they were irreconcilable, and then they made up, so now it is possible the differences between Mao Tse-tung and the Soviets may be bridged—and if they are never reconciled, will it really be in our favor? We have learned in the last year that the differences among the communists does not help us much. We are not gaining in Viet Nam on that account. In fact just a few weeks ago the Soviets said that they would not consider negotiations on proliferation of nuclear weapons unless the United States withdrew its forces from South Viet Nam. I'm not at all convinced that an agreement on proliferation of weapons would improve the world situation anyway, but the point is—we took the stand we wanted such an agreement. The Soviets said they would not discuss it until we withdrew. They knew what they wanted. The objectives and aims of all communist elements are clear. They aim to take over the world.

Within the United States, however, there are differences in opinion as to what our basic national goals and aims should be. So far, there has not yet been any concise statement of just what kind of world we would like to see fifty years from now.

Obviously, there can't be a very consistent national strategy unless we are first certain of what our aims are—or should be. In point of fact, some of our conflicting differences on strategies have stemmed more from differing ends—differing views on national aims that discussants have in mind but haven't stated—rather than on differing means to be employed.

So, the devising of a national strategy requires that we first define what we want to do.

What do we as a nation want?

Do we want the status quo—the world to remain as it is?

Do we want to make sure the United States maintains its freedom—and present type of government?

Do we want to extend our system of free enterprise—and our type of representative government which has suited us so admirably—to other parts of the world?

Do we want to see communism contained—or do we want to see it rolled back and eliminated from the world?

If we consider attempts to roll it back are too dangerous in the nuclear age, and choose instead to contain it—for what do we contain it—or until when? What is the long term objective of containment? Will containment be a static objective—or will it be an intermediate objective in an overall dynamic strategy? If the latter, do we look forward to the modification of communist philosophy to a position more compatible with democratic ideals—or do we anticipate a rotting away of communism due to its own inherent fallacies and ineptness in meeting man's minimum needs—both spiritual and material.

Or, do we just want to be left alone—to enjoy the many material things that we have developed—to ignore or push aside our responsibilities as a great nation—and to let the rest of the world take care of itself?

There have been quite a few books and many more articles written on this subject—but there still isn't a clear understanding among Americans as to where we want to go. There is even more confusion, I suspect, among our allies and friends.

Our enemies, of course, take advantage of this confusion and do everything they can to get us to modify our aims—to their advantage—and to make it easier for them to achieve their goals.

What then are our true ends—our long-term objectives? For the purposes of this discussion, let us take as our national aim a national goal of:

"We want the United States to remain free with our present type of government, economic and political systems. And we want to continue to be a powerful nation in the world so that we can contribute to the establishment of a world order in which other nations will have responsible governments that not only serve their own people well but do not transgress on other nations."

This was stated better in our colonial days—but the ideas are still pretty good.

Let us now examine the next vital element in devising national strategy—the "means" to achieve our ends—and the use of those means in a way best calculated to achieve our ends with least cost to ourselves. In other words, let's look at the way *all* the resources of the nation should be used to achieve the goals of the nation.

This is a big order. The first thing to be done is to get a fairly good idea of the inventory of national resources which are available to a nation. The inventory of the resources available to the United States is tremendous—but not unlimited.

I'm not going to go over such an inventory—either for the United States or for any other nation. But I am going to emphasize one point of which, I am sure, you are all aware. Both the achievable ends and the available strategies open to any nation depend on—and are limited by—the resources available to it—and *the national will and ability to use those resources.*

Before we examine that point of national will and national ability let us look back to history again. The Roman Empire established peace in Europe by the use of power—not only its military power but also by trade, its economic ability and its statesmanlike perception of maintaining order among the diverse people who composed the empire. Commercial law and civil law were established which did not do violence to people's basic freedoms or convictions but which were enforced—enforced by all means at their disposal—by economic means, by psychological means and quite frequently by military means. Order *was* maintained and law *was* enforced. The empire deteriorated when the Romans became so self-indulgent as to be unwilling to maintain order or to enforce their laws.

After hundreds of years and after Napoleon and his brothers and sisters messed up Europe, the European powers formed the Concert of Europe and again there was peace in the world. It was no coincidence that law and order were established throughout the world, too, for peace then—as always—was dependent on law and order being established and being maintained.

The preservation of peace at that time depended as much on controlling the conflict within and among the colonial dependencies

as on the preservation of clear interstate understandings in Europe. Nations used their power to maintain order and again the power used was economic, psychological, political, and frequently military. Vigorous activity was necessary to maintain order. Trade was used—and so was the British Navy.

The Pax Britannica, then, just as the Pax Romana, rested on a core of power and the will to use it. But this delicately balanced system for maintaining order in the world broke up with the collapse of the Concert of Europe, and World War I ensued. As a result of that war and the economic consequences of the depression, both Europe and England lost their dominant position in the world. This loss manifested itself by first, a quantitative reduction in the amount of absolute power of all kinds available to the European system, and second and perhaps more importantly, an emotional exhaustion that resulted in a general unwillingness to intervene actively in world developments.

This deficiency of will was manifested by the series of disarmament conferences. The major nations were unwilling to bear the burden of power, and Europe attempted to achieve peace through abdication of power. The search for peace revolved around the assumption that arms were the cause of war. The Western publics embraced the idea that relative peace would be assured if armaments were reduced relatively, and absolute peace if they were reduced absolutely. The West further nourished the illusion of international law bereft of the power of enforcement. Gradually the Western nations lost their willingness to exercise power either for the good of the world or in their own interests.

From this power vacuum emerged total dictatorship. The Nazis established a strong power center. They used trade and psychological pressure and military power in their expansionist campaign. They were permitted to expand and aggress by the other powers who were unwilling to face the Nazi challenge and who hoped it could be diverted by piecemeal appeasement. In a world of aimless nations many people were attracted to Nazism by their firm purposes and their willingness to use power to achieve their purposes. Thus World War II was caused.

But to return to strategy—the strategies of any nation depend on—and are limited by—the resources available to it, and the national will and ability to use those resources.

Resource-poor nations must of necessity develop strategies considerably different from resource-rich nations. True—as we have seen in the past—much dissension and trouble have been caused by resource-poor nations coveting the resources of their neighbors—and then taking steps to get them.

Resources alone, however, are not enough! The ability and the *will* to use these resources are equally important. A tool can be of value—even when not in use—providing there is an unquestionable understanding that, under the proper circumstances, the willingness to use it—and the skill and techniques to make it effective—are unquestionable. To make this tool of credible value, it is necessary at some time or other to demonstrate the will to use it—its readiness to be used—and its effectiveness in use. It must be used properly and skillfully, of course, but used—to leave no doubt of its purpose and its capabilities.

Many of the differences over strategy concern the subject of the proper use of *all* the resources of the nation to achieve national aims. For example, which ones of our political, economic, and military resources should be used—and how—to eliminate the communist government in Cuba. We can ask ourselves similar questions again in respect to many other areas of the world—Southeast Asia being an especially applicable area.

For their part, the communists have demonstrated considerable skill in using all their resources—including their resources of propaganda, persuasion, and psychological warfare to inhibit the free world from taking counteraction. That statement may be disputed—but still there are more people and more territory under communist control now than there were five years ago—or even one year ago.

This communist skill—and will—in using resources available has an interesting parallel in our own free world community.

France had neither nuclear weapons—nor the means to deliver them. But France decided to get them! She did so because she felt that they would be important—that they would be necessary if France were to have a voice in influencing the trend of future world events so that these trends would move in the direction France wanted them to go.

The other western nations who had nuclear weapons didn't think France should have them—and nobody wanted to help her

get them. France decided to get them anyway—and will get them—even though the effort has certainly cost her. Only history can show—and perhaps it won't be clear on this issue either—whether or not France was wise in making this choice. Only time will tell, given the dynamic situation in strategic nuclear weapons countermeasures and counter-countermeasures, whether France will be able to stay in this game of high stakes and high costs—whether she will be able to maintain a credible nuclear posture in the face of a fast-changing and costly nuclear technology.

On the other hand, only the future history of our NATO alliance will reveal to us whether we were wise in not helping France get her nuclear weapons under any circumstances—particularly when it became evident France really intended to have them, one way or another.

NATO is not quite as healthy as it was—and the nuclear weapon matter is a major underlying virus that has affected the organism. There are other differences, but this is a major one. Hopefully, despite the differences and disagreements within our NATO family, there will be continuing common agreement that we and our allies need each other—and hence NATO—in order to keep our respective nations free and secure.

Nuclear weapons, then, do constitute a major resource for nations in this era when national survival depends so vitally on their ready availability—and could depend, paradoxically, on their never being used. Yet, there are other resources—less fascinating and thus frequently overlooked in the contest of wills—which are more basic and, perhaps over the long term, will be more decisive. One such resource is food.

The Soviet Union ran short of food—wheat—during the last several years. Given the inherent inadequacies and the characteristic incompetence of autocratic control and centralized planning exercised by an all-powerful bureaucracy—institutionalized to its ultimate folly in the communist system—and the harsh ineptness of communist reality in dealing with human factors, the Soviet Union's shortage of wheat was preordained.

The big question facing us was, What should the free world do about it? What we actually did about it, we all know now. Whether our generous actions will influence the communists to change their goals—or feel more kindly disposed toward capitalism which provided the wheat in abundance—is quite another matter. They

certainly have not made many statements of expressing their gratitude. Neither have they indicated that they will no longer make efforts to control the world.

However, this food episode may have caused them to change their strategy—as well as their leader. They have probably concluded that their timetable for conquest will have to be set back just a bit. Logically, it would appear that improvement in their own national resources posture would be a matter of first priority. The increased purchases of fertilizer plants, as well as wheat, appear to support this assumption. The Soviets might also change the emphasis on how they will use their resources in the future in order to achieve their ultimate goal.

Again, only history will show the wisdom of our decision—whether our benevolence has modified the aims and goals of the Soviet Union to ones more compatible with the hopes of all free men—or whether the shipment of wheat and chemical plants has served only to help the Soviet Union toward its ultimate goal of our destruction.

The main point I continue to emphasize here is that national strategy must not only be directed toward the nation's aims, but it must also be cut to fit the nation's means—its resources—and *the nation's will to use those means.*

Resources, however, are not static assets—always to be counted upon. Some resources change, others can be developed, and still others can be countered, or substituted for. The ultimate effect is that changes in resource position will inevitably modify or change strategy. This is one of the reasons why the strategy of a nation must be reexamined continually—to insure that it fits the situations existing or foreseen. Aims, goals, and objectives of a nation change slowly. Many times they do not change at all. But the strategies devised to achieve these goals, aims, and objectives will change.

Strategy, therefore, is dynamic. It has to be responsive to changing world conditions. This is particularly true of our own era which has witnessed a worldwide explosion of political, economic, and technological forces. New weapons systems can dictate new strategy. Changing alliances can dictate new strategy. New political administrations can dictate new strategies. Forces for change are always at work. Strategy, therefore, must undergo constant reevaluation—and adjustment—to new military threats, to political challenge, and to technological opportunity.

There are many basic factors which affect strategy. Most of them are not static and, as each factor is modified, the way by which all the resources of a nation are to be used, to achieve the goals of the nation, will be modified accordingly. However, since conditions usually change slowly and not abruptly, the strategy normally evolves slowly and not abruptly. But once in a while there are abrupt changes in some of the factors. A revolution may erupt suddenly in some country. The top people of a government may change fast, as they have in England and the Soviet Union, and even India and Japan. The enemy may suddenly expose a new weapons system. A dramatic scientific breakthrough may be announced. Any one of these factors could impose fast modification in the strategy—of all nations.

Now, since military strategy is so intimately related with national ends and means, and is dependent upon the kind and effectiveness of weapons systems which are available—or soon will become available—there always has been considerable discussion about weapons systems—some of it quite tumultuous—among the services—and within the services.

These arguments about what system will do what job best are not all bad—even when adversaries sometimes resort to exaggeration in claims supporting the weapons system they sponsor. Seldom are worthwhile new devices developed—or effective new weapons systems created—without the enthusiastic support of zealous advocates. Of course, they can be wrong. Therefore, there must also be skeptical people—who question—who have to be shown. The resulting discussion brings out all the points—pro and con—and the final decision, though frequently arrived at through painful means, is usually sound.

This questioning process—this vigorous debate over opposing views—is fundamental and indispensable to a free society. Debate is equally indispensable to the formulation of valid strategic concepts and military policy to sustain and protect our free society.

This is the basic and fundamental reason why, during my tenure as Chief of Naval Operations, I strongly opposed all efforts to do away with the Joint Chiefs of Staff system—and to substitute in its place a single Chief of Staff concept—or any other single all powerful honcho.

There is no one human being, no matter how brilliant he may be, no matter the breadth of his experience, no matter the depth

of his integrity—who is so omniscient that he can foresee all possible problems—and invariably make flawless decisions regarding the ways and means of meeting them. Judgments on military strategy and weapons systems—which in these days could involve national survival—must be subjected to the closest and most critical scrutiny by many minds—and, in some instances, after all pros and cons have been examined, final judgment must be referred to that leader in whom the people as a whole have freely placed their ultimate faith and confidence—the President of the United States.

However, there are several features which are sometimes overlooked—or at least do not receive sufficient emphasis—during these heated discussions of opposing viewpoints.

I stated earlier—and I reiterate again—one of the most important features in devising national strategy is in determining how to use *all* the resources of a nation. This point has its parallel in military strategy. Too frequently there has been excessive reliance on one resource alone to serve the end which is sought—with consequent neglect in determining how to use other available resources—and in some cases without even considering whether or not a proper balance has been struck.

These mistakes in strategy possibly stem from exaggerated claims—or hopes—or even improper analysis of the situations at hand. Rarely does any nation know—or foresee—all the factors which may require modification of its strategy. Mistakes are made—and probably always will be—not only in determining the optimum allocation of national resources—but also in estimating the enemy's resource allocation and resulting capabilities. The rather well-publicized—but nonexistent—"missile gap" is a classic example in point.

Another broad area of error—which is at least as important as estimating the enemy's capabilities—is estimating the enemy's intentions—what the enemy will do in a particular situation.

In discussions on strategy, it is not at all unusual to hear categorical statements that the enemy will do such and such. History holds some classic examples of an enemy doing the opposite to what he was supposed to do. Too often we estimate an enemy's intentions on the basis of what our mentality tells us is the logical thing for him to do—but too often his mentality differs from ours—and hence his course of action differs from what we anticipated he would do.

We tend to credit the enemy with following the "norm" that we would follow—and then we relegate to low order of probability those courses of action which would seem to us to be unprofitable or unlikely. Unfortunately, in this changing world in which we live, the low order probability and unlikely courses of action have had an increasingly uncomfortable habit of turning up—Cuba, Laos, the Congo, and now Viet Nam being rather dramatic examples.

Certainly there are many uncertainties in attempting to assess an enemy's intentions. One constant in the equation that we can usually count on, however, is that the enemy is not trying to help us. This is something we can be sure of—even though he does not always do what we think would be logical for him to do. In short, the communists' aim is constant—to dominate the world.

His means, however, are not limited to only those resources and capabilities to which we normally address ourselves. His means have also included a psychological weapon that has been well coordinated with all the rest—and it has been used with much greater sophistication than we have perhaps realized. This is why he doesn't always do what we think would be the logical thing for him to do. He has other ideas—and they are oftentimes devious and cunning. These ideas of our adversaries frequently change to adapt to the situation at hand—but the long-range objective—the long-range aim of communism—has not changed.

And here we get to another point which has become important. Much of the discussion these days on national strategy does not pertain to strategy at all—but rather to only one part of it—the estimate of enemy intentions. Moreover, there are some loquacious people recommending radical changes in our generally held estimate of basic communist aims and intentions—without very good evidence that these aims and intentions have actually changed.

Today, we are being increasingly asked to believe that communism—or at least the Soviet brand of communism—has changed its aims. However, we have been taken in several times in the past when we were led to believe that the communists intended to stop their aggressions—only to learn to our own chagrin later that we had given them their desired "pause that refreshes"—before they launched into a new series of aggressions.

Now, I am not saying that Soviet strategy has not changed—or that it's impossible for Soviet national aims to change.

In fact, I believe Soviet strategy has changed. The communists are having much trouble with their resources—and with each other. So, they have changed their strategy—they have changed the way of using the resources they do have available. And one of their most potent ways is to use our hopes, our great desire for peace, and our own natural inclination to believe that communist aims might change if we are good enough to them. It's not impossible for the communists to change their aims—but there is very little evidence that they have done so.

The communists, of course, don't cause all the international trouble for us in the world. But they are particularly good at exploiting trouble they don't start—in any way they can—to further their own cause and to get control of more people and more territory. Here we again see evidence that our enemies are quite adept at using *all* the resources available to them to help them towards their final objective.

Since World War II our own strategy has been devised to stop communist aggression and to keep the free world free—with the hopeful wish that this can be accomplished peacefully. Our success can be measured by the relative amounts of territory and numbers of people who have remained free from communist domination.

The last twenty years have been—in Mao Tse-tung's words—an era of protracted conflict. It still is—as Viet Nam, Cuba, the Congo, Algeria, the Mid-East and other areas indicate.

United States strategy has had many modifications during that period—modifications caused by many factors, but all related in some way or other to the resources available to the United States, to the free world, and to the communists.

One habit U.S. strategic planners have fallen into over the years is that of labeling transient strategic concepts by a few simple words. These vivid and descriptive words ostensibly convey the complete idea of the labeled strategy. Of course, they don't. It's a semantic device which we may have picked up from our adversaries. Maybe this public relations gimmick of labeling things—and then attaching fulsome praise or violent condemnation to the label—has not done us any good. Whether it has or not, the labels don't accurately describe what's in the strategy package.

There's a parallel tendency that has also become habit, that is—to label a strategy which somebody else proposes—or more aptly, a strategic concept which somebody else proposes—and then define it in terms which are not at all what the originator had in mind.

Anyway, whether for good or bad, we have come to label strategies—and strategic concepts—with catchy names. The label means different things to different people—and sometimes different things to the same person at different times.

The first one which has now apparently come into disrepute is the strategy of "massive retaliation." This came about after the Korean War when Mr. Dulles wanted to make it clear to the communists—and to our allies—that if the communists launched an attack against any one of us, the United States would launch an attack against the communists. This reassured our allies. They knew that we really intended to come to their immediate defense with atomic weapons if they were attacked. Our intentions were also clear to the communists.

Our strategy at that time was not limited solely to launching a massive retaliatory strike against the Soviet Union if she did anything at all which displeased us—for Mr. Dulles also said that "the punishment must fit the crime."

As a matter of fact, the Berlin crisis and other critical events of those days were handled without the use of nuclear weapons. Suez, Lebanon and the off-shore islands' crises were conducted later by means other than nuclear weapons. We did use other resources to control all the situations which arose but, in the background, the Soviet Union and Red China knew that if they launched an attack intended to destroy either the United States—or its allies—they would receive that massive retaliatory strike.

There may have been too much emphasis on one resource—on one capability. Some few extremists claimed that all that was needed in our arsenal was plenty of nuclear capability—while extremists on the other side said that nuclear weapons were either at or near a stalemate and that therefore the effect of our massive nuclear retaliatory strike strategy was nil.

There was much discussion as to trip wire concepts on the one hand—and the possibility of conducting a full-fledged conventional arms war in Europe on the other. Neither one of these

ideas made our allies feel any easier, and they became somewhat concerned. They asked themselves, "Does the U.S. really intend to launch an atomic attack on the Soviet Union if the Soviet Union attacks one of us and does not attack the U.S.?"

There was also much talk about how much is enough on the one hand, and very much concern about the missile gap on the other—frequently by the same people.

What was forgotten then was a fundamental precept—I reiterate it again—a nation's strategy should be based on how *all* the resources of the nation should be used to achieve the goals of the nation.

From this political argument many strategies were quickly and violently discussed—including preventive war, finite deterrence, minimum deterrence, finite deterrence plus insurance or plus damage-limiting capability, flexible response, controlled flexible response, and a host of others.

Regardless of what each of the proponents of the various kinds of strategy may have meant to include in their strategy—and regardless of the intent the advocates had in proclaiming the cure-all properties of their strategy—and the great dangers obviously inherent in all the other strategies—our European allies became even more concerned and started some debates on their side of the ocean.

Whatever the reasons, NATO became what the Marines would call "all shook up,"—and NATO relationships became strained and aren't so good now as they once were. France is going after her own nuclear delivery capability no matter what, and we are telling our NATO allies, "Honest, fellas, we mean it—we will come to your defense if you are attacked, whether we are or not"—only they don't quite know whether to believe us or not.

But NATO isn't our only pressing strategic problem. The most pressing military problem at the moment is as old as nations themselves. The Greeks, the Romans, the French, the British, the United States, and the Soviets, have all faced up to this problem before—off and on throughout the history of their existence. In other words, this problem of fighting in the bush to protect those who are friendly—and to defeat those who would do you or your friends in—is not a very new problem. Neither are the weapons which are usually used.

In this type of war the old precept of using *all* the resources available is very well demonstrated by the use of knives, spears, crossbows, and old fowling pieces. Modern weapons are used too, but if there aren't any modern weapons to be had—by manufacture, gift or capture—then the old ones are made to do.

Now, I don't know of any instance in which such a war was won unless somebody made up his mind to fight real hard. The sooner this is done, the easier it is usually.

Again, suitable resources must be used—the punishment must fit the crime. But when there is crime, there very definitely should be suitable punishment—or there will be more crime, which is another but related problem.

Our strategies in the recent past have not always been successful. We have relied on promises rather than deeds too much. We have depended on persuasion and on powerless organizations to achieve a world order that we, as a nation, were unwilling to undertake. We have accepted protestations of peaceful coexistence and suggestions for trade without inquiring into the reasons for these protestations or examining the actions taken by our adversaries at the very time they made peaceful sounds. We have based much of our policy on the wishful hope that our concessions, our generous help would cause a change in the attitudes and goals of our enemies. Our policies have been vitiated by our recently acquired guilt-ridden conception of power and the use of power. Hypnotized by the atom bomb, our thinking has stopped at massive retaliation and deterrence. Such policies have their place, but they are negative and defensive, and do not offer solutions to the problem of order. When such policies have failed, we permit the enemy to escalate, and we respond with limited response delicately and centrally controlled, and are surprised and disappointed when the enemy does not reduce his aggressive efforts. We plead for peace but are unwilling to exert the power necessary to achieve peace. We fight, but seemingly only to arrive at the negotiating table with no clear understanding of definite aims to insure law and order—and freedom—in the area in which we fight.

Certainly the United States should not create by force an enclave of ordered freedom in a despotic world. But it should be our aim to destroy the ideological and evil communist movement. It should use its power, all kinds of its mighty power, to establish law and order in the world. That power should be used in cooperation with the power of other nations of the free world. With the

power of the North Atlantic community as its core, the free world *can* defeat communism and it can bring peace and order to the world.

This means facing our problems—it means confrontation:

Confrontation of communism with the challenge of a vigorous freedom;

Confrontation of dissident and diffident neutrals with the responsibility for their choice;

Confrontation of the West, in general, and America, in particular, with the responsibility of the effective and wise use of power.

I know that all this is very elementary for this particular audience. All of you are well-informed and sophisticated people. Many of you have had long experience with national goals, strategy and policy.

I haven't said anything this morning that you didn't already know—but I have stressed the fundamentals—and the fundamentals of strategy are very important. They must always be kept in mind. We get accustomed to hearing them repeated often, but we should never forget that they are a safe guide and a sound discipline.

Now, to summarize what I have covered this morning:

A nation must have clearly understood general goals, aims and objectives, or it cannot have a consistent strategy.

National strategy must take full consideration of *all* the resources of the nation to achieve the goals of the nation—and demonstrate, on appropriate occasions, the national will to use those resources.

Military Strategy must relate to the national strategy, must *serve* and *support* the national strategy, and must be subjected to repeated close and critical scrutiny to insure its continuing validity.

Finally, neither national policy nor national strategy is any good unless it is carried out.

BIOGRAPHIC SKETCH

Admiral Arleigh A. Burke, U.S. Navy (Ret.)

Admiral Burke was graduated from the U.S. Naval Academy in 1923. After various duty assignments, including postgraduate training in Ordnance Engineering, he had his first command in USS *Mugford* in 1939.

During World War II, he served in destroyers in the South Pacific and later as Chief of Staff to Admiral Mitscher, Commander Fast Carrier Task Forces. In 1945, he became Chief of Staff to Commander EIGHTH Fleet and, in 1946, Chief of Staff to Commander in Chief, U.S. Atlantic Fleet.

Following a year of duty with the General Board in 1948-49, Admiral Burke assumed command of USS *Huntington*, after which he returned to the Navy Department as Assistant Chief of Naval Operations (Organization, Research and Policy Division). In 1950, he became Navy Secretary, Research and Development Board.

During the early part of the Korean War, Admiral Burke was Deputy Chief of Staff to Commander U.S. Naval Forces, Far East. In the spring of 1951, he assumed command of Cruiser Division FIVE and, while on this duty, he was ordered as a member of the Military Armistice Negotiating Team in Korea. In December 1951, Admiral Burke became Director, Strategic Plans Division, in the office of the Chief of Naval Operations.

After serving as Commander, Cruiser Division SIX in 1954 and 1955, he became Commander Destroyer Forces, U.S. Atlantic Fleet.

From 1955 through 1961, Admiral Burke served as Chief of Naval Operations, retiring from active duty in 1961 to become a Director and a member of the Executive Committee of Texaco, Inc. He holds or has held several other corporation and nonprofit organization directorships.

MEDALS AND AWARDS:

Navy Cross, Legion of Merit (2 gold stars and 1 OLC), Purple Heart, several awards from foreign allied governments.

PUBLICATIONS:

American National Power and World Peace, Princeton University.

Power and Peace in International Affairs, Princeton University.

Discipline in the U.S. Navy, Bureau of Naval Personnel.