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The Management of Defense

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The epilogue of this account of the seven-day war at Suez is particularly valuable in pointing out mistakes made and lessons to be derived from the Anglo-French experience. The author sums up the fiasco at Suez very briefly: "As a classic example of a 'limited' warfare operation it is unique; as an example of how such an operation should not be planned and mounted, with political interference at every step, it is equally classic." Barker stresses that the Anglo-French forces, lacking a sufficiently large and suitably equipped mobile reserve capable of striking as soon as Nasser had announced nationalization of the Suez Canal, were compelled to spend many weeks trying to gather makeshift resources, during which time world opinion was mobilized against the British and French, so that when and if they did undertake the operation, the political climate was very much in opposition to the operation. As the author reviews the situation, "there can surely have been only one real political objective: securing the Canal. This was certainly General Keightley's declared military aim and as it was not achieved, 'Musketeer' must be regarded as having failed militarily."

The Hon. R. McCLINTOCK
State Department Advisor

Ries, John C. *The Management of Defense*. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1964. 228 p.

With a certain amount of tongue in cheek, the author incites his military readers with an initial indictment: "The Army, Navy, and Air Force are outmoded. They are the vestigial remains of the last war. They represent an era that is past—a time when armies engaged armies, navies engaged navies, and aircraft engaged aircraft . . ." Therewith, Professor Ries of the United States Air Force Academy gives as the purpose of his book, to ascertain what defense reformers have sought to do and to determine their successes. The first several chapters outline the history and background leading to the formulation of the National Security Act of 1947. Much detail is given to the various schemes for this great experiment in decentralized unification, including the Collins plan, the Navy plan, and the latter's model—the British defense organization. Dr. Ries's main theme concerns the cause and effect of military reorganizations—not so much how the laws are written or rewritten, or whether authority and control is centralized or decentralized—but the way the defense secretary uses (or abdicates) authority and how he views his role in politics and defense. Subsequent chapters describe the

reorganizations of 1949, 1953, and 1958, showing how each was a further step toward centralization up to the present: "When the current defense agencies are viewed collectively—the eight combat commands, the assistant secretaries who give orders, and the defense agencies—they bear a striking resemblance to the War Department before the Root organization of 1903 Fantastic though it may seem, defense reformers have succeeded in turning the calendar back sixty years and are ready to face the demands of 'modern warfare' with a bureau system similar to one that failed to meet the test of the Spanish-American War!" *The Management of Defense* summarizes reorganizations of defense; it is of value to students in this field. The small book is well footnoted, and has an outstanding bibliography of books and articles in the related area.

B.B. GARLINGHOUSE
Commander, U.S. Navy

Cochran, Bert. *The War System*. New York: Macmillan, 1965.
274 p.

This polemical book should be read by officers interested in reactions to what is herein termed "the war system." The author reflects a kind of pacifist, antimilitary, nuclear "disarmer" point of view, which is current with large numbers of intellectuals. He argues his case dramatically and flamboyantly. To Bert Cochran, we are caught in a dangerous game played by our military political leaders who themselves are not to blame. The stakes of this game are total nuclear destruction, which the author believes is inevitable as long as the nature of the present military-political complex continues. No longer is the military-civilian dichotomy the existing situation—as it was before World War II. Now the civilian industrialists are interchanged with military leaders and to this mix has been added what Cochran calls "the university and foundation warriors." He argues that this system, enmeshed in nuclear war and strategy, is propelling us willy-nilly into an arms race which, if nations pursue their present course, will end in nuclear annihilation. This book is good on exhortation, but weak on sound historical analysis. The author misreads history and fails to see that our country has not been the causative force in the war system. Our actions have been reactions to the power development of the Communist bloc. A careful reading of our defense budgets until the middle fifties would have demonstrated the weakness in his argument. Regardless of who is wrong, the fact remains that we should all try to substitute peace for war, and reason for force.