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## The Great Debate

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Aron, Raymond. *The Great Debate*. Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1965. 265 p.

*The Great Debate* is a French contribution to the twenty-year old discussion of the apparent inability to use the vast strength of a nuclear armory to achieve political objectives. Mr. Raymond Aron is a renowned French interpreter of United States strategic thought, who also has an American audience in proclaiming European political views. He commences his book with a summary of the evolution of United States strategic thought, continues with a discussion of specific problems facing the Atlantic alliance, intermingling the French idea of independent deterrent, and concludes with his own look into the future. His discussion of the application of nuclear technology and military strategy to political questions is not new nor unique. He does add a continental flavor to the interrelationship between force and diplomacy with which the American reader may be unaccustomed. Furthermore, a knowledge of French internal affairs will greatly assist the reader in a clearer understanding of Mr. Aron's viewpoints. Due to the currency of the subject and the already voluminous works attempting to measure national power in the nuclear age, the first chapters of the book are elementary. Nevertheless, this book deals clearly and understandingly with the inherently complicated and esoteric theories of military interaction of various nuclear forces and their association with political reality. Perusal of this short volume leaves the reader with a real appreciation that any adopted nuclear strategy must not be so complicated that it cannot be put to practical use by decision-makers who lack the time for complete and detailed analysis and who must employ the existing political process, regardless of the theoretical merit of the strategy itself.

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Barker, A.J. *Suez: the Seven Day War*. New York: Praeger, 1965. 223 p.

*Suez: the Seven Day War* by A.J. Barker is a book written by a soldier for soldiers. Touched with a wry humor and brightened by sprightly anecdotes, it is a terse and exceedingly readable account of the Anglo-French fiasco at Suez. Although the author stresses that the basic reasons for failure were political, he does not go deeply into the political background, and his account is almost entirely one of military planning and operation. As such, the book certainly should have high priority among War College readers.