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**THE JAPANESE-AMERICAN TREATY OF  
MUTUAL COOPERATION AND SECURITY AND THE  
UNITED STATES NAVY—1970**

A Research Paper written by  
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**INTRODUCTION**

The Japanese-American Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security will be susceptible to first renegotiation in 1970. This is not to say that the Treaty will be terminated or even that renegotiation is mandatory. The apparent mutually compatible relationship between the United States and Japan would, on the surface, tend to discourage consideration of this future event, particularly in view of the myriad of other world problem areas with which the United States is currently faced. History and contemporary writers, however, have emphasized the accelerated rate of change in international affairs and attitudes; the increasing influence of political, economic, and social factors on the military position; and finally the changing phases of United States national strategy. These same sources disparage the American penchant for myopic obsession with contemporary problems while ignoring or taking for granted passive or latent relations. This idea gains importance with the realization that many of these problems are generated by sources other than the United States or over which this country has little control. Too often, as a result of these influences the military forces find themselves in weak or untenable positions from which extrication in the face of international events or crises would be accomplished only at the further risk of temporary degradation of security posture, national embarrassment, or loss of prestige.

The persistence of the unexpected is acknowledged. In spite of this, the question remains as to whether it is possible through a continuing review of factors having a potential effect on a future known event to meet the occurrence with a positive response rather than to react negatively after the fact. The requirement for uninterrupted naval strength in the Pacific and the effect of the Japanese-American Treaty on the United States Navy in that area seem to make consideration of this subject appropriate. From the foregoing, it is apparent that this consideration cannot be treated in a vacuum. The Treaty affects not only the sister services in the Defense Department, but encompasses international cooperation in nonmilitary matters. It is affected by other international documents and by both Japanese and American influences. In order to treat the subject in meaningful depth and yet within manageable scope, it will be the purpose of this paper to develop only those facets of documents and Japanese and American factors which seem to have sufficient bearing on the Treaty to provide an objective determination of its possible future. From this consideration an attempt will be made to formulate conclusions and recommendations pertaining only to the United States Navy.

## CHAPTER I

### DOCUMENTARY FACTORS

The Japanese-American Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security is the progeny of several historical documents which precede it. Some of these, such as the Cairo and Potsdam Declarations, are significant in their contributions as the source for initial Japanese-American relations following World War II and as guides for the subsequent Japanese Constitution and treaties. These later documents, however, directly interrelate with and influence the subject Treaty. A chronological review of their contents and the circumstances surrounding their formulation and change seems to reveal a trend in Japanese-American treaty relations which, if continued, could very possibly manifest itself in a mandate for renegotiation of the Treaty in 1970. The first document in this chronology is the Japanese Constitution.

**Japanese Constitution.** The Japanese Constitution was announced on 6 March 1946. It was the result of extremely close but not always compatible consultation, which began as early as October 1945, between the Japanese government and United States Occupation authorities. At that time, General MacArthur, Supreme Commander Allied Powers (SCAP) urged Prince Konoye to take the leadership in liberalizing the old Japanese Constitution.<sup>1</sup> After a period of disagreement with the Japanese concerning the extent and nature of the modification, the SCAP directed his Staff Government Section to prepare a model constitution. This effort which served as a guide for the Shidehara Cabinet was the most effective method of instructing the Japanese on principles that he considered basic. One significant element of the draft was to be a statement that "War as a sovereign right of the nation is abolished. Japan renounces it as an instrumentality for settling its disputes and even for preserving its own security."<sup>2</sup> This prohibition against preserving security was not included in the final draft by the staff lawyers, however.<sup>3</sup> The Constitution as finally accepted by the Japanese conformed very closely with the draft, and the essence of SCAP's instructions concerning Japanese war potential is embodied in Article IX.

Aspiring sincerely to an international peace based on justice and order, the Japanese people forever renounce war as a sovereign right of the nation and the

threat or use of force as a means of settling international disputes.

In order to accomplish the aim of the preceding paragraph, land, sea, and air forces, as well as other war potential, will never be maintained. The right of belligerency of the state will not be recognized.<sup>4</sup>

This article has been interpreted, on the one hand, to specify the demilitarization of Japan to the extent that her security must be guaranteed by a foreign power; it thus forms the basis for a security treaty. On the other hand, the previously mentioned omission or deletion by staff lawyers has permitted an interpretation or defense rationale that forms the basis for the Japanese Self Defense Force. This paradox, together with the taint of Occupation control over the contents of the Japanese Constitution, has given rise to much discussion in the Diet with regard to amending the document so that it might reflect current Japanese sovereignty and conform more closely with present-day realities. The Constitution Research Council was established in 1958 by the Hatoyama Cabinet to develop conclusions concerning Constitutional amendment. This council reported on 3 July 1964, in favor of revision. Prime Minister Ikeda demurred on this step, however, since he was aware that public opinion polls indicated a majority of opinion against change.<sup>5</sup> Whether or not this condition has been reversed in the brief period of seven months, the new Premier Eisaku Sato is not so reticent. On 19 January 1965, the ruling Liberal-Democratic party adopted the revision of the postwar Constitution as its goal for the year.<sup>6</sup>

The influence of the Constitution on the current Treaty is centered in Article IX and the question concerning Japanese military forces. Also, the Constitution, formulated under the firm Occupation guidance, serves as a point of departure from which to trace the course of developing changes in Japanese-American postwar relations. The Constitution was created during the Occupation of Japan. The reaction to the very recent war is apparent in its Preamble. Russia, although showing signs of hostility, was still generally considered an ally. Chiang Kai-shek was still on the mainland of China. This situation had altered considerably by the time the next document in the chronology came into being.

**Peace Treaty.** On 8 September 1951, 48 nations and Japan signed the Japanese Peace Treaty in San Francisco. The Treaty

entered into force on 28 April 1952. During the interval between acceptance of the Constitution and this event, the international scene had undergone major changes. The Cold War chill had definitely set in. Chiang Kai-shek had been evicted from the mainland of China, and the Communists were in control. The Korean War was currently in progress. The Occupation of Japan was in its sixth year, in spite of the original three-year estimate by General MacArthur, and was experiencing a period of diminishing returns.<sup>7</sup>

The Cold War and the fall of China to the Communists were the events which finally dominated the preparation of the Treaty. Mr. John Foster Dulles, who had been given the authority and responsibility for bringing a treaty into being, had at least one firm conviction: In the postwar era the greatest threat to peace was the Communist movement, and not a resurgence of Japanese military power. Further, the lessons of the Versailles Treaty had established the view that imposition of harsh retaliatory terms on a defeated enemy out of fear that the enemy would become militarily powerful again was an unsatisfactory measure.<sup>8</sup> This theme pervaded the year-long negotiations between the Allied Powers. Mr. Dulles had instituted bilateral diplomacy for this purpose to circumvent Soviet obstructionist tactics which were anticipated in a traditional peace conference. There was evidence of a firm desire that the terms of the Treaty be such as to win Japan's allegiance as a strong ally of the West rather than to impose the retribution of the victors over the vanquished. This evolutionary attitude was reflected in the Preamble: "Whereas the Allied Powers and Japan are resolved that henceforth, their relations shall be those of nations which, as sovereign equals . . ."<sup>9</sup> This could be regarded as the first step in the changing trend in Japanese-American postwar relations.

The distinction became more apparent as a product of the old attitude, Article IX of the Constitution, haunted the treaty-making process. The Article had struck the imagination of the war-weary Japanese. The people now desired neutrality, disarmament, withdrawal of Occupation forces, and guarantees of inviolability by the United Nations. America's allies, particularly Australia, New Zealand, and the Philippines, were understandably not as quick to make the transition and endorse scaled-down reparations and a rearméd Japan. The original concept of a Pacific security pact which would have included all of these countries plus the United States unfortunately had to be fractionalized. The individual countries were not yet ready to enter into a common arrangement

with their recent enemy.<sup>10</sup> Even within the United States government there was divergence of opinion. The State Department, abetted by SCAP, favored early conclusion of a peace treaty, end of the Occupation, and, in general, the continued observance of Article IX of the Constitution. The Defense Department claimed that the Treaty was premature. The Navy insisted on retaining control of the Japanese-mandated islands and the Ryukyus. Neither the Army nor the Navy was impressed by the antiwar Article. Both were willing to rebuild Japanese arms; but they also wanted to retain Japanese bases during the interim.<sup>11</sup>

All of the foregoing conflicting desires bore on the Treaty. The mechanics of reconciliation were conducted through a series of vehicles. The fear of a resurgent Japan on the part of the American allies was allayed through creation of the three-power Anzus Pact between Australia, New Zealand, and the United States and a separate bilateral American-Philippine security arrangement.<sup>12</sup> The Navy's requirement for the Ryukyus was temporarily answered in Chapter II, Article III of the Treaty, which gave the United States trusteeship, exercising authority but not sovereignty over the islands.<sup>13</sup> One of these, Okinawa, now figures prominently in United States-Japanese relations. The desire for American bases in Japan and provision of security for the physically and mentally disarmed country were questionably but effectively satisfied by a concurrent bilateral security treaty.

Security Treaty between the United States of America and Japan. Signed on the same day as the Peace Treaty was another document, the Security Treaty between the United States of America and Japan, also known as the 1951 Security Treaty. This Treaty becomes germane to a consideration of the trend in United States-Japanese relations when its contents are compared with the current 1960 Treaty which supersedes it. Although the Peace Treaty recognized the equality of Japan in principle, actual conditions prevented this from becoming a reality. Not the least of these was conflict with Article IX of the Constitution. The drafters attempted to bridge this dilemma with the following clause in the Preamble to the 1951 Security Treaty:

The United States of America, in the interest of peace and security, is presently willing to maintain certain of its armed forces in and about Japan, in the expectation, however, that Japan will itself increasingly assume responsibility for its own defenses against direct and indirect aggression, always avoiding any armament which could be an offensive threat . . .<sup>14</sup>

How offensive armament was to be distinguished or how Japan was to assume increased responsibility was left to conjecture. Nevertheless, since this corner has been turned, the United States has persisted in encouraging Japan to comply with this conflicting pronouncement and increase her defense effort.<sup>15</sup>

In view of existing circumstances, it would have been difficult for the Treaty not to have reflected the actual inequality in the statuses of the two countries. As a result, the Preamble recognized the 1951 Security Treaty as provisional.<sup>16</sup> At least six points were cited by the Japanese as witness of the inequality and as justification for renegotiation of the Treaty. First, although Americans were provided the right to maintain bases in Japan, there was no clear stipulation obligating them to defend the country. Second, without prior consultation, United States forces could be deployed from Japan for the maintenance of peace anywhere in the Far East so that there was a danger that Japan would be drawn into a war (Art. I). Third, American forces were authorized, albeit at the request of the Japanese government, to quell large-scale domestic riots and disturbances (Art. I). Fourth, Japan was denied the right to grant bases to a third power without prior consent of the United States (Art. III). Fifth, the compatibility between the Treaty and the United Nations Charter was not sufficiently definitive. Sixth, no effective Treaty term was specified.<sup>17</sup>

With regard to expiration provisions, Article IV of the Security Treaty states:

This Treaty shall expire whenever in the opinion of the government of the United States of America and Japan there shall have come into force such United Nations arrangements or such alternative individual or collective security dispositions as will satisfactorily provide for the maintenance by the United States or otherwise of international peace and security in the Japan area.<sup>18</sup>

Whether the conditions for termination, as outlined in Article IV, were actually fulfilled, the point remains that it was Japan and not the United States that initiated the proceedings. On a visit to the United States in June 1957, Prime Minister Kishi proposed to President Eisenhower the revision of security arrangements between the two countries.<sup>19</sup> The United States may have felt that she could not reject the proposal and still maintain friendly relations with the Japanese; whatever her reasons, she



acquiesced. Secretary of State Herter's justification for accession seems pertinent to a consideration of possible reasons for future renegotiation of the new Treaty in 1970:

By 1957, Japan had made great progress toward lessening its dependence on the United States. Its restoration to a respected position in the community of nations was attested by its election to the Security Council of the United Nations, its defense capabilities were growing, and its economic health was vastly improved.<sup>20</sup>

The emphasis in the above statement would appear to be on Japan's extant independence, enhanced stature, and economic well-being. This seems significant in that the singular objective of the old Treaty had been security. At this point, Japan's defense capabilities were a growing potential, not an accomplished fact. The document that was assisting in the transformation of the potential into a semblance of reality should probably be mentioned.

**Mutual Defense Assistance Agreement.** On 8 March 1954, in Tokyo, the Mutual Defense Assistance Agreement between Japan and the United States was signed. In this document Japan actually assumed increased responsibility for self-defense (Art. VIII).<sup>21</sup> Subsequent domestic implementary laws such as the Defense Agency Establishment Law and the Self Defense Forces Law transformed Japanese units into the current Self Defense Force.<sup>22</sup> Equally important was the Agreement's theme of "mutual cooperation," which was to appear later in the 1960 Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security.

**Japanese-American Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security.** It should be remembered that at the time of Premier Kishi's visit with President Eisenhower, the United States and other powers were conducting atomic tests to which Japan was opposed. The Premier had made a statement before the Diet in February 1957 that no United States atomic forces would be permitted to enter Japan.<sup>23</sup> Also, Corporal Girard, United States Army, had killed a Japanese woman gathering scrap brass on a military firing range in January of the same year. The ensuing legal controversy over trial jurisdiction was well covered in the newspapers of both countries for the following five months with an inflammatory effect on public tempers.<sup>24</sup>

The Washington meeting between the two heads of government resulted in recognition of a need to review the Treaty of 1951, and

charted the development of a new relationship between the United States and Japan, based on equality, mutuality, common interest, and trust.<sup>25</sup> Thirty-six additional months passed before these broad ideas were reduced to terms of the new Treaty. Possibly as an indication of prevailing attitudes, however, the removal of United States Army combat forces was accomplished much faster, being completed in the following year.<sup>26</sup>

On 19 January 1960, the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security was signed. Ratification followed on 21 and 22 June by Japan and the United States respectively.<sup>27</sup> One might ask what changes are reflected in this new document to correct the inequalities of the old Treaty. The use of American forces in domestic disturbances and Japan's relations with third powers are not mentioned in the Treaty. In this way, two of the six Japanese complaints are resolved by omission. By commission, the Preamble and three of the ten articles—I, V, and VII—specifically subject the Treaty to provisions of the United Nations Charter. Further, Article V obligates the United States to act in accordance with her constitutional provisions in meeting an armed attack against the territories under the administration of Japan. These are currently defined as the Japanese home islands.<sup>28</sup> Article VI and an exchange of notes between Premier Kishi and Secretary of State Herter on 19 January 1960 govern the employment of American forces from Japanese bases.<sup>29</sup> This subject would seem to require further elaboration in view of its effect on a later consideration of United States Navy commitments.

The Preamble of the present Treaty recognizes that maintenance of peace and security in the Far East is a common concern. The Far East, for purposes of the Treaty, has been defined as the region north of the Philippines inclusive, as well as Japan and its surrounding area, comprising the Republic of Korea and the area under the control of the Republic of China.<sup>30</sup> However, use of any United States forces based in Japan to defend the foregoing region is subject to prior consultation with, and consent of, the Japanese government. The region was not defined in the old Treaty, and there was no requirement for Japanese assent in the commitment of American forces. While Article V of the new Treaty obligates forces of both countries in defense of Japan, Article IX of the Constitution has been interpreted as precluding the use of Japanese forces outside the country in defense of the Far Eastern area. There is no reciprocity, and Japanese forces are not required to aid the United States in the event of attack elsewhere in the Pacific.<sup>31</sup> For purposes of contributing

to the security of Japan and the Far East, Article VI grants the United States the use of facilities and areas in Japan. The United States agrees, however, to consult with Japan regarding major changes in deployment of forces into or from the country or any changes in equipment. By this provision, Japan retains the "veto" privilege on introduction of atomic weapons into Japan or the employment of American forces from these bases in defense of the Far East.<sup>32</sup> President Eisenhower assured Premier Kishi that the United States had no intention of acting in a manner contrary to the wishes of the Japanese government on matters involving prior consultation.<sup>33</sup> Previously, there was no restriction on deployment of forces or type of weapons. Finally, Japan, in Article XII of the associated Status of Forces Agreement is relieved of contributing financially to the support of American forces in the islands.<sup>34</sup>

Considering that Japan has acknowledged a common concern for peace in the Far East and that United States forces are in the country for defense, it would appear that Japan has gained considerable equality vis-à-vis the United States in return for what seems essentially base rights. In fact, the question might be raised as to whether the balance had not shifted in the other direction. This, and the belief that the majority of the Japanese people desire close association with the United States seem incompatible with the political furor that accompanied the ratification of the Treaty. Political factors will be treated in a later chapter.

In justifying renegotiation of the 1951 Security Treaty, much weight was given to the fact that it was an interim or provisional treaty and that the new Treaty was created in response to a Japanese desire to correct unsatisfactory provisions.<sup>35</sup> In projecting the trend in treaty relations forward to 1970, one might wonder if all known differences have been reconciled, or if there still remain latent conflicts to serve as a catalyst for renegotiation in the future. Congressional testimony involving Senator Theodore Greene of Rhode Island, Secretary of State Christian Herter, and Mr. Ralph Parsons, Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs casts some insight:

- Senator Greene: Has the United States agreed to all requests that have been made?
- Mr. Parsons: No. Certain aspects had better be discussed in Executive session.
- Senator Greene: In other words, this is the result of negotiations for changing the existing treaty and we only gave way to a certain extent, and there are other points which we have not assented to which they have requested. Why won't there be just as much dissatisfaction afterward as before?
- Secretary Herter: That I think applies to both treaties.
- Senator Greene: But it just reduces the amount of dissatisfaction while, by the same token it reduces our power to negotiate, does it not?
- Secretary Herter: Yes, but we believe it is in our interests to do so.
- Senator Greene: . . . this treaty does not clear up all the differences between Japan and the United States and we might expect in the future some further negotiations as to further changes . . .<sup>36</sup>

Finally, Article X provides that after the Treaty has been in force for ten years, either party may give notice of its intention to terminate the arrangement. In commenting on the term of the Treaty, Secretary Herter was of the opinion that the extended period was preferred over an annual basis, which was desired by some Japanese, in order to preclude a sudden loss of bases resulting from the vagaries of politics.<sup>37</sup>

Since the existence of Japanese influences has been indicated, consideration of this potential factor in regard to Treaty renegotiation is now appropriate.

## CHAPTER II

### JAPANESE FACTORS

As with any sovereign power, Japan's national character—and therefore orientation on any given subject—is made up of a myriad of complex and interacting elements. For purposes of this study, however, four of these seem worthy of consideration: politics, economics, public attitudes, and the Maritime Self Defense Force.

**Politics.** Although Japanese politics is made up of a plethora of parties, only four of them seem destined to influence the government for the foreseeable future. These parties are the Liberal-Democrat (LDP) or Conservative party, Socialist (JSP), Communist (JCP), and a relatively new party, the *Komeito* (JKP), which is the political voice of the *Soka Gakkai* religious group. Theodore McNelly, in his book *Contemporary Government of Japan*, reveals that contemporary parties, with the exception of the *Komeito*, are resuscitations of pre-World War II affiliations. They are not exclusive products of the Occupation, as might be supposed.<sup>1</sup> The purge of suspect political leaders by Occupation authorities in the postwar era drastically affected the personnel composition of parties. However, in certain attributes the contemporary Liberal-Democrats seem to have changed little from prewar orientation. "The old wine has been poured into new bottles."<sup>2</sup>

The Liberal-Democratic Conservatives were particularly affected by the "purge." As a result, many of the old professional politicians have been replaced by a new group of pragmatic bureaucrats.<sup>3</sup> Significantly, though, the current power bloc retains strong ties with the past. The present Premier, Eisaku Sato, is the brother of Nobusuke Kishi, who as Minister of Commerce and Industry in the Tojo Cabinet signed the resolution for war in 1941; he was imprisoned subsequently as a war criminal, but later became the Prime Minister who initiated and completed negotiation for the existing Treaty.<sup>4</sup> Although party factionalism has been listed as a contributory cause, the political upheaval associated with ratification of the Treaty precipitated Kishi's resignation.<sup>5</sup> His persistence in forcing the new Treaty in the face of adversity has been explained as a willingness to sacrifice his political future in the interest of Japan's regaining a position as a world power. Alliance with the United States was seen as a pragmatic necessity in continuing Japanese freedom and prosperity. The

renegotiation enhanced Japanese stature in the arrangement.<sup>6</sup> It should be remembered that it is a member of Kishi's family who is now driving to revise the Constitution.

This heritage seems instrumental in forging not only the party's goals but also its power support. The former interdependence of government and the prewar *zaibatsu* is manifested to a degree in the LDP. Marriage ties between the families of business and party leaders are not uncommon. Financial support of the party by industry has been recognized.<sup>7</sup> The current ten-year economy doubling plan is a product of the party. As the government in power, the conservatives have been identified as the party of "big business" and have benefited from the existing economic prosperity. By the same token, this close association would prove to be a double-edged sword in the event of a business recession.<sup>8</sup>

Although the method of achieving the goal is different, the stimulus for the Liberal-Democratic platform is the same as in the past—returning Japan to a position of authority in world affairs.<sup>9</sup> While friendship with the United States is desired and acknowledged, the cost of regaining true international stature also seems to be understood—a self-defense posture commensurate with sovereignty and a voice independent of American influence. Although an apparent awareness of the economic and political facts of life temper public pronouncements, the Conservatives argue for continuation of the present security arrangements until Japan can undertake its own defense.<sup>10</sup> They insist, however, that if the nation is to be truly independent, it must have the power to defend itself. Repeal of Article IX in the Constitution would seem to be a step in that direction.

In opposition to the Liberal-Democrats is the Socialist party (JSP). This party is split into left-wing and right-wing factions which have their origins in disagreement over the Japanese Peace Treaty. The right wing was willing to accept the Treaty; the left-wing was not. Neither group supported the accompanying Security Treaty. The party is endorsed, and, to a certain extent, dominated by the left-oriented *Sohyo* labor union.<sup>11</sup> The Socialists have rejected Communist efforts to form a united front, and Communist affiliation is denied, but, as a result of actions and pronouncements, the party has been identified with the Russian faction of the Sino-Soviet split.<sup>12</sup> Significantly, in view of the Conservative party identification with the current period of prosperity, the Socialists gained their brief and only majority in government as

a result of national economic difficulties in 1947.<sup>13</sup> Although the Socialists seem poor prospects for a return to power under current economic conditions, the possibility should not be completely discounted. This eventuality would have drastic effects on the current Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security. The Socialists are vociferous in their denouncement of the Treaty as a violation of the Constitution. They complain that the method of deliberation and ratification in the Diet was illegal and that the pact is, therefore, invalid. The Socialists feel that there should be no American forces of any kind in Japan and desire an end to the Japanese-American security system. As an alternative they would entrust the security of the country to the United Nations and an incongruous collective security treaty encompassing Japan, the United States, the People's Republic of China, and the Soviet Union.<sup>14</sup> There is a school of thought which believes that the Socialist party would become more rational, particularly vis-à-vis the United States, if subjected to the sobering influence of government rule.<sup>15</sup> This idea seems to discount the prospect that conditions which placed the Socialists in power would also dictate adherence to previous pronouncements and commitments.

The political orientation of the Socialists has literally emasculated the Communist party. The left-wing Socialists compete with the Communists on ideological and policy grounds without the stigma of appearing to be subject to foreign direction.<sup>16</sup> Although professing independence from outside domination, the Communists have been identified with the Peking segment of the Sino-Soviet disagreement.<sup>17</sup> Despite the fact that the standard Communist, anti-American line is directed against the Treaty, the party enjoys little popular support and has been relatively ineffective as a factor in Japanese government. Party influence has been manifested primarily in extra-parliamentary tactics. Public reaction to demonstration violence directed against ratification of the Treaty in 1960, however, has had an adverse effect on the party.<sup>18</sup>

The final political party for consideration was inaugurated in November 1964, as the *Komeito*, or clean government party. The organization immediately assumed status as the third-ranking political force in Japan, since it is the successor to a former political movement of the *Soka Gakkai* religious sect. The aggressive recruitment tactics and highly organized participation activities of the party have caused concern among religious elements in Japan. A preliminary evaluation of the party would probably assign a right-wing status; however, its relatively brief history precludes an objective assessment of true orientation. A

position of power by the *Komeito* party, either in majority rule or coalition, would very likely endanger prospects for continuation of the Treaty. The platform calls for peace and disarmament, abolition of nuclear weapons, retention of the "no war clause" in the Constitution, and a more independent attitude toward the United States.<sup>19</sup>

The following results of past elections indicate the relative strengths of the parties in question:

HOUSE OF COUNCILLORS ELECTION 1962\*

PARTY	ELECTED	HOLD OVERS	CURRENT SEATS	PREVIOUS SEATS
Liberal-Democrat	69	73	142	137
Socialist	37	29	66	65
Communist	3	1	4	3
Soka Gakkai	9	6	15	9

\**Japan Report*, 20 July 1962, p. 2.

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ELECTION 1960\*

PARTY	TOTAL SEATS
Liberal-Democrat	296
Socialist	145
Communist	3

\**Japan Times*, quoted in McNelly, p. 150.

In summary, the political factors would seem to bode ill for the Treaty in its present form in 1970. The Socialists, the Communists, and the *Komeito* party are opposed. Only the Liberal-Democrats are pro-American; however, the increasing desire for an independent voice in world affairs appears to mitigate against accepting security from a foreign power if other means are available. The party's goal of revising Article IX of the Constitution could be an attempt to achieve those other means.



**Economics.** By almost any standards, Japan's economic recovery and development in the postwar period has been phenomenal. In 1964, Japan reported a gross national product of over \$70 billion which, averaged against its population of 96 million people, resulted in a \$729 per capita income. Economists expect an 11 to 12 percent GNP increase in 1965, compared to a 9.4 percent average for the past ten years.<sup>20</sup> The nation ranks fourth internationally in total industrial production. Only the United States, the Soviet Union, and West Germany stand higher. Japanese shipbuilding exceeds that of any other country.<sup>21</sup> To continue this growth, the Liberal-Democratic government in 1960 initiated a plan which calls for doubling the national income by 1970. The chart which follows reflects some of the results that might be anticipated if the plan succeeds.

JAPANESE ECONOMIC PROJECTIONS FOR 1970<sup>a, b</sup>

	1956-58	1970	PERCENT INCREASE	ANNUAL AVERAGE PERCENT INCREASE
Population (millions)	91.1	102.2	12	0.9
GNP (billions)	27.1	72.2	167	7.8
GNP/Capita (\$)	297	707	138	6.9
National Income (billions)	22.2	59.2	167	7.8
Income/Capita (\$)	244	579	138	6.9

<sup>a</sup>All values 1958 prices.

<sup>b</sup>Japan, Ministry of Finance, quoted in Warren S. Hunsberger, *Japan and the United States in World Trade*, (New York: Harper, 1964), p. 371.

Many factors have been cited as contributing to the success of the Japanese economy; two currently appear to have a bearing on Treaty considerations. First, as a result of the United States' subscribing to the security of Japan, the nation is spared the

burden of a large defense budget. The Japanese have allocated less than two percent of their budget to defense. This has permitted reinvestment of 35 percent of the gross industrial product back into domestic capital formation. The following chart compares the defense effort of various countries.

DEFENSE EXPENDITURES 1962-1963\*

COUNTRY	DEFENSE BUDGET AS % OF NATIONAL INCOME	% MALE LABOR FORCE IN ARMED FORCES
Australia	3.22	1.45
Britain	6.67	2.47
Canada	5.61	2.58
France	7.20	5.33
Italy	4.43	2.84
Japan	1.41	0.89
United States	11.25	5.68
West Germany	5.91	2.20

\*Institute for Strategic Studies, *The Military Balance 1962-1963*, (London: 1963), p. 25.

This saving should encourage the sufferance of American forces and bases by the Japanese. The above chart also indicates that a greater defense effort is not unreasonable if the Japanese become so inclined.

The second stimulus has been American trade. Although it has become trite to repeat that Japan must trade to live, the statement is nevertheless true. The United States provides Japan its best export market, while Japan is second after Canada in receipt of American products.<sup>22</sup> A preponderance of writers cite continued United States-Japanese trade relations as a cohesive factor in the alliance.

This description of the Japanese economy presents an optimistic picture; however, in the interest of objectivity, a possibly negative side should also be considered. This view would encompass the increasing costs of the Japanese economy and some of the difficulties attending the expansion of Japanese economic interests in the international arena.

Japanese industry is characterized by a technically advanced and highly efficient segment operating in juxtaposition with small, inefficient, labor intensive "cottage" production. Further, the tradition of Japanese business dictates continued employment of nonproductive workers. This inefficient employment of manpower has resulted in what might be termed an artificial labor shortage.<sup>23</sup> A real labor shortage has been produced, however, by Japan's success in curbing its birth rate. The nation's annual growth rate of 17.2 per thousand is roughly comparable to the West European average of 18, the United States average of 21.6, the Soviet Union average of 22.4, and the Communist Chinese average of 34.<sup>24</sup> The end result is that wage scales in industry are being pushed up in competition for workers. These factors are domestic in nature and would probably be responsive to corrective measures; but in the interim, the attendant high cost of production is expected to have an adverse effect on Japan as it meets increasing competition in the drive for world trade.<sup>25</sup>

Other obstructions to Japanese economic interests reside in the area of foreign trade practices, and seem to have a significant bearing on Japanese-American relations. Premier Sato on his recent visit to the United States presented an example in his statement:

Japan has achieved nothing in its drive to end the U.S. equalization tax. But as I understand it, the treaty is to be enforced for the remainder of the year, and so it would be my intention to ask the United States not to have such a law again or repeal it.<sup>26</sup>

It is not the purpose of this paper to pass judgment on United States trade practices. The statement is cited to point up what the Japanese consider to be one of their historic vulnerabilities--foreign economic restrictive measures.

Possibly in response to a feeling of excessive economic dependence on the United States and a desire to increase exports, the Japanese have made efforts to expand trade with Communist China. Sino-Japanese trade amounted to \$250 million in 1964, compared to \$3.5 billion between the United States and Japan.<sup>27</sup> The relatively brief history and small scope of Sino-Japanese trade efforts are deemed an insufficient basis upon which to formulate conclusions at this time. Nevertheless, it would appear safe to say that this orientation is of political if not economic importance for the United States. Japan attempts to placate

American concern for this move by professing to separate economics from politics, as stated again by Premier Sato: "We would like to deal with the Communist China question on the principle of a bigger separation of politics and economics and have continued trade relations with them."<sup>28</sup>

From the foregoing, it is indicated that the factor of Japan's economics exerts an ambivalent influence on the Japanese-American Treaty. Efforts to expand the economy may drive the Japanese to greater trade relationships with Communist China. In turn, continued success of the economy may tend to enhance nationalistic feelings and encourage increased independence from the United States. Further, it would appear to provide the financial means for expansion of the defense force to accomplish this end. On the other hand, the preponderant trade orientation toward the United States, and the economy of a low defense budget seem to temper an independent attitude on the part of Japan. Finally, in view of the previous discussion of political factors, a healthy economy would indicate that the pro-American, Liberal-Democratic party would be maintained in power.

**Attitudes.** As with any country, a characterization of Japanese attitudes affecting the Treaty will not reflect a unanimity of the populace. Writers and students of Japan, however, have developed what appears to be a consensus worthy of consideration. First are the remarkably good general relations between the Japanese and Americans following World War II. Public opinion polls in Japan have continually selected the United States as the best-liked country. Nevertheless, the policy of military alliance with the United States probably has support from only about one third of the people. Many Japanese see America as being militarily oriented.<sup>29</sup> As a result, United States bases have provided a convenient focal point for any anti-American grievances.

Two rather conflicting attitudes further inhibit Japanese defense arrangements. On the whole, the Japanese do not seem to fear the Chinese Communists, but rather are conscious of Japanese superiority in technology, administrative skill, and living standards. Seemingly reduced East-West tensions in the spirit of "peaceful coexistence" with the Soviets also reduce the urgency of defense preparations.<sup>30</sup> On the other hand, a certain element of the population recognizes the size and proximity of both China and Russia and seems pragmatically inclined to feel that no amount of defense would prevent a determined Communist

effort. They also remember the futility of the devastation incurred during World War II, since occupation resulted nevertheless. As a result, they appear to question a military solution for defense.<sup>31</sup>

In spite of these considerations, the increasing desire for "full independence" seems to be creating an atmosphere that supports limited rearmament for defense purposes only.<sup>32</sup> How the recent explosion of an atomic device by the Chinese Communists will influence this attitude remains to be seen. The outcome of attempts to revise Article IX of the Constitution could be an indicator. The case for an adequate military policy may well rest with the ability of the government to create a climate of opinion in which its proposals will be given the benefit of the doubt.

**Maritime Self Defense Force.** Admiral Mahan has written: "When for any reason sea trade is again found to pay, a large enough shipping interest will reappear to compel the revival of the war fleet."<sup>33</sup>

Japan's requirement for sea trade can hardly be questioned. The nation's merchant marine is represented by 4,372 ships of 8,870,150 gross tons.<sup>34</sup> Whether or not the Maritime Self Defense Force (MSDF) will eventually evolve to fulfill Admiral Mahan's dictum, it seems to be a growing fleet today. The Force, which was established in 1952, is now composed of the following ships, as shown in the following table.

MSDF SHIP TOTALS\*

TYPE	NUMBER
Guided Missile Destroyers	1
Destroyers/Destroyer Escorts	46
Submarines	8
Patrol Craft	17
Mine Sweepers	42
Mine Layers	2
Support Ships	5
Miscellaneous	209

\**Jane's Fighting Ships 1963-64*, p. 153-164.

In spite of the obstruction imposed by Article IX of the Constitution, Japan has been building, under the second five-year defense program from 1962 to 1966, 11 destroyers, 5 submarines, 1 mine layer, and an experimental hydroplane. These ships are to be constructed in Japanese shipyards. In addition to the surface fleet, the MSDF has an air component of shore-based patrol aircraft.

Although hindered by the Japanese labor shortage, aggressive recruiting has produced a steady increase in the manning level. The Force is composed of 6,000 officers and 32,800 ratings.<sup>35</sup>

The JMSDF is not a large naval force; however, before disparaging its size, one should consider its defensive mission and relation to potential adversaries. The JMSDF is probably the most modern navy in the world. About 90 percent of its combat ships were launched after World War II. Personnel are well trained and there is a solid base of experience. In size it is exceeded only by the United States and the Soviet Union in the Pacific.<sup>36</sup>

Chapter I dealt with documentary considerations that entered into renegotiation of the current Treaty. It should be recalled that it was not so much the force in being but rather the potential for expansion under the 1954 Mutual Defense Assistance Agreement that recommended acquiescence by the United States. The JMSDF has five more years before 1970 in which to expand on its current respectable stature. In this light, the JMSDF, it seems, could be used again as a substantial factor if Treaty renegotiation were desired by the Japanese. The question seems to involve not so much the Force *per se* but rather the national will to employ it.

## CHAPTER III

### UNITED STATES FACTORS

Our military policy under the Secretary of Defense is now more closely tied than ever to the conduct of foreign policy under the Secretary of State . . .

Defense expenditures in the years ahead must continue to be guided by the relentless pursuit of efficiency and intelligent economy.<sup>1</sup>

The quotation from President Johnson's recent defense message to Congress sets the tone and direction of military policy—or, in the context of this study, naval posture—for the foreseeable future. From this, three United States factors seem to be recommended for review with regard to Treaty determinations in 1970: foreign policy, economy, and naval considerations. Since the Navy's position in respect to the Treaty centers primarily on the subject of Japanese bases, this will tend to be the focal point for discussion.

**Foreign Policy Strategy.** In view of the many variables involved in foreign policy, projecting a specific, detailed strategy into 1970 would seem a risky basis for considering influences on the Treaty in relation to the United States Navy. In attempting to establish reasonable parameters for evaluation, therefore, recourse shall be made to what might be termed the essence or preponderance of views held by scholars and writers on future foreign policy strategy.

Grayson Kirk has observed that United States foreign policy has passed through at least three phases in its history and may be about to enter a fourth. The first phase was characterized by avoidance of long-term international commitments in favor of reliance on the oceans and British sea power while this nation achieved strength. The second phase, commencing about the first half of the twentieth century, involved international undertakings on a balance-of-power theory. *Ad hoc* intervention on a selected basis saw the country through World Wars I and II. The third and current phase arose subsequent to World War II, attendant upon the recognition of the threat and scope of international communism.<sup>2</sup> One of the stated goals of this phase has been "a peaceful world community of free and independent states, free to choose their own future and their own system [of government] so long as

it does not threaten the freedom of others."<sup>3</sup> The nature and extent of the worldwide undertaking has required international commitment with the acceptance of relatively permanent diplomatic and military associations. One of the features of this strategy has been a system of collective security with other nations under a broad concept of containment of Communist aggression. The Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security is an example. In applauding the system, it has been argued that no member of the several alliances has suffered defeat by the armed forces of Communism.<sup>4</sup> To this extent, the policy and the phase might be considered a success. Writers concerned with future foreign policy strategy, however, have observed certain changes in world affairs and weaknesses in "containment" that may presage Kirk's fourth phase. In describing the limitations of "containment," the difficulty of containing revolutionary ideas in terms of physical boundaries and military force has been cited.<sup>5</sup> National wars of liberation and insurgency are examples. The current philosophy of "peaceful coexistence" seems to have a debilitating effect on the alliance systems by reducing the urgency of defense measures for which they were created. The insistence of sovereign nations upon freedom of action with respect to their economic and political development, both domestic and international, is tending to precipitate divergent attitudes within the collective security system.<sup>6</sup>

As a result of the foregoing, a fourth phase of foreign policy strategy seems to be evolving. The new theory would retain the massive military deterrent, but emphasize economics and diplomacy rather than a primarily military approach. This would be the case both against Communism and between participants in the free world alliance system.<sup>7</sup> In consonance with this idea, and with application to the Treaty and the United States Navy, foreign policy writers tend to advise a critical review of the merits of foreign bases which seem to entail more political liability than military advantage with United States allies. These authors do not argue that, "military considerations are unimportant or should be ignored, nor do they deny that public reactions to military policy are sometimes unwise and unfortunate." Their decisions are defended as having to be, "related to constraints that exist, not those that one would choose."<sup>8</sup> The trend toward increasing nationalism and sensitivity to sovereign rights is seen as anathema to American foreign bases, particularly in Asia.

This would appear to pose certain problems, since the trend does not necessarily provide a commensurate reduction in the military threat. It has been acknowledged that three possible



forms of Communist aggression will exist in Asia for the prospective future: global war by the Soviets or Chinese forces, involving strategic nuclear attack; limited war on the Korean model; and subversion or national wars of liberation.<sup>9</sup> To solve the dilemma of Far Eastern antipathy toward American forces and bases in spite of a continuing military threat, several concepts have been offered. Ambassador George Kennan suggests that mutual suspicion and antagonism in the Sino-Soviet split have effectively guaranteed the security of both Japan and Korea. He seems of the opinion that the proximity of these countries to the Sino-Soviet border will inhibit aggression by China or Russia for fear of opposition by the other. The necessity for American military presence is thereby precluded.<sup>10</sup> Another concept that is not quite so willing to entrust defense to the vagaries of Communist maneuver has been outlined by the Conlon Study. This proposal, while acknowledging the need for United States bases in 1959, suggests that as the Japanese gain strength in the future, the desirability of overseas bases will become questionable. At that time, an alliance is envisioned, with Japan maintaining her own defense. United States forces would then provide support, relying on secure bases in depth from the American continent outward to the mid-Pacific. From these bases mobile personnel strike forces and such units as atomic-powered submarines, aircraft carriers, strategic bombers, and missiles would operate. The strength of this alliance should then be enhanced by greater political, economic, and cultural rapport.<sup>11</sup> The physical location and political status of Guam would recommend that installation for the Conlon concept. Detailed feasibility studies for the transfer of naval facilities from Japan to Guam might be the appropriate subject for another paper; however, important considerations are immediately posed. Foremost, Guam, being a territory of the United States, could be relied upon as a secure base, unaffected by foreign dictates, at all times and throughout the spectrum of international tensions. Guam is also centrally located. While it is less convenient to Korea, it is equally close to the current and possibly continuing threat—Southeast Asia. The Philippine bases are even closer to the latter area; yet they appear to suffer from the same vagaries of public opinion, cost, and gold flow as those in Japan. The industrial base, technical skill, and labor costs found in Japan are not common to Guam; nevertheless, the advantages accruing to the reduction in balance of payments, plus the permanency of the installation, would seem to temper the cost disadvantages of providing naval support facilities and labor.

The significance of the foregoing discussion is that while the basic objectives of United States foreign policy will remain constant, the strategy of implementation will be increasingly responsive to foreign influence. There would appear to be a tendency, in accommodating Japan, to reorient United States strategy in the interest of overall foreign relations, including politics and economics, as well as security. Possible future foreign policy, it is believed, will acknowledge the continued military threat in the Far East, but will be influenced by the presumption that overseas bases offer a potential for adverse effects in the overall schema. For the Navy, this would seem to require a continued ability to respond promptly and effectively in support of foreign policy, while facing increasing demands to defend the need for Japanese bases in 1970.

**Economics.** The economic aspects of relations with Japan are reflected in the mutual cooperation theme of the Treaty. Article II states that the two countries "will seek to eliminate conflict in their international economic policies and will encourage economic collaboration between them."<sup>12</sup> In actual practice, however, economic and, particularly, trade relations seem to be discussed apart from their relationship to the Treaty. This writer's research has noted little specific identification between the two except in broad general ideals. From a United States point of view, however, the economics associated with security, specifically defense costs and the flow of gold, are very closely related to the Treaty. The scope of this paper recommends these two topics for discussion as possible influential factors concerning the document.

Since "defense" represents approximately one half of the national budget, its economic significance is obvious. This point becomes intensified when other domestic programs vie for a greater share of the national treasure. President Johnson has stated:

Arms alone cannot assure the security of any society or the preservation of peace. The health and education of our people, the vitality of our economy, the equality of our justice, the vision of the fulfillment of our aspirations are all factors in America's strength and well being . . .<sup>13</sup>

President Johnson also emphasized the reduction in the defense budget over the past year and prophesied that further reductions

should be expected in order to meet other vital needs, both public and private.

One of the factors which has permitted the reduction in defense costs has been attributed to the "cost-effectiveness" policy of Secretary of Defense McNamara. This policy has been described as "first assessing military needs on the basis of the best possible defense posture, then satisfying those needs at the least possible cost."<sup>14</sup> The recent closure of certain bases in Spain in pursuance of this policy would seem to point up overseas bases as a potential area for further cost reduction.<sup>15</sup> This could apply to the East when it is remembered from Chapter I that the Japanese, under the terms of the Treaty, no longer contribute to the support of the bases in their country.

With regard to the gold-flow problem, Warren Hunsberger has revealed that although the United States enjoys a favorable trade balance with Japan, military expenditures have in effect erased this advantage. Because of these costs, the United States has consistently paid Japan more dollars than the totals accrued from America's profitable trade with that country. Since 1958, these payments have declined, but, except in 1961, they more than offset the Japanese deficit on current account.<sup>16</sup> In an effort to curb the outflow of gold, certain maintenance and repair services performed by indigenous labor at United States bases and many stock purchases from the local Japanese economy have been curtailed. Of the approximately 200,000 Japanese employed by United States forces in 1950-1953, only 58,000 remain. Admittedly, the first and largest reduction was a natural cutback after the Korean War, followed by the Army phase out in 1958; however, the trend has continued as a product of the deficit in American balance of payments.<sup>17</sup> The gold-flow problem seems to pose three adverse conditions affecting the future of the Navy's overseas bases within the Japanese-American Treaty arrangement. First, the deficit balance would appear inimical to American financial interests. Second, reducing the services performed by the bases, as a method of alleviating the problem, tends to detract from their value and, if continued, would seem to make justification of their extended existence questionable. Finally, the reduction in Japanese labor employment and restriction on local purchasing would doubtless make the Japanese less inclined to suffer the bases.

Economic factors, like foreign policy strategy, dictate a continuing and possibly increasing requirement for the Navy to

evaluate its operations and its bases within the Treaty arrangement.

**United States Navy Factors.** In scope, the Treaty envisions maintenance of naval security not only in Japan, but also in the Far Eastern area. Although the area has been restricted, as stated in Chapter I, the Treaty is only one of a system of Pacific alliances in which the United States is involved. Specific naval forces have not been allocated to each of the alliances. In the interest of economy of forces, the mobility of the Pacific Fleet and Marine Force has been relied upon to mutually support the entire area with the same men and equipment. This involves an area roughly 6,000 miles in length extending from Japan through Australia. Within this area and in support of foreign policy, the military threat has been deemed to include a spectrum of insurgency, limited war, and all-out global conflict. The scale of weapons may escalate from conventional through nuclear. The Navy is committed to respond within this area and within these parameters rapidly and effectively.

In support of the Treaty provisions and in justification of the bases in Japan, it must be acknowledged that the Navy has operated within this arrangement since 1960. The bases at Yokosuka and Sasebo have served as supply stock points for both the ships in port and the underway replenishment operations at sea. By having stock inventories at these bases in the area, the supply line and, therefore, reaction time in direct support of operations at sea have been reduced. This shorter transit time has also permitted the underway replenishment function to be conducted with fewer Navy support ships than would be required if the stock points were located in the United States. The excellent facilities and the efficient and relatively cheap Japanese labor at Yokosuka have made possible major repair work on all types of ships in the fleet. In some cases this work would have otherwise required a return trip to Hawaii or the United States for completion. The air station at Atsugi has served as a base for air reconnaissance patrols with land-based aircraft. Aircraft carrier pilots have used the field to maintain flight proficiency while the carrier was in port and as an emergency divert base while operating at sea. The Marine air station at Iwakuni, Japan is used for basing Marine aircraft in the Far Eastern area. The communication station at Kami Seya has provided fleet broadcast relay service. All of these functions have been convenient and have furnished desired support in the seemingly endless period of Cold War tension,

On the surface, the enumerated assets would seem to justify a continued requirement for the bases. It should be remembered, however, that during the period since the Treaty came into force no hostile military action in the Treaty area has tested this alliance. The Korean War and the peak of the Taiwan tension occurred under the now superseded 1951 Security Treaty. Significantly, the current and possibly future military threat seems to lie primarily in Southeast Asia—relatively far from Japanese bases. One of the stated reasons for renegotiation of the old Treaty was to provide Japan with more control over the use of United States military forces from Japanese bases. There was a fear that a shooting engagement involving American forces in the Far East might precipitate Japan into a war.<sup>18</sup> In view of the foregoing, a quote from an article on Mao Tse-tung's strategy seems relevant. "Communists understand what is frequently forgotten, that it is not simply the weapons one has in one's arsenal that give one flexibility, but the willingness and ability to use them."<sup>19</sup> Some of the Treaty provisions possibly should be reviewed in relation to the ability of the United States to employ its own forces when and where required.

As previously considered, Article VI and an associated exchange of notes necessitate consultation with Japan prior to deployment of significant American forces from that country in support of the Far Eastern area. General concert of purpose is supposedly assumed and expected. With the current trend toward Sino-Japanese trade rapprochement, and the public attitudes in Japan, however, it is not inconceivable that action of the United States in response to any one of many potential threats might be embarrassing to the Japanese government. A resulting veto on deployment of forces from Japan could require reorientation of the military effort at an inopportune time. When this circumstance was brought out in Senate hearings, Secretary of State Herter responded, "If you get into a period of war, what is based on Japan can be moved elsewhere."<sup>20</sup> While this may be a practical diplomatic solution, it hardly seems a firm basis for military planning—particularly concerning fixed bases. With the present reliance upon Japanese bases, defense of an area such as Korea would be extremely difficult if not concurred in by Japanese authorities. On the other hand, if there were accord in this instance, would not Japanese facilities be made available whether or not a treaty existed?

Another requirement for prior consultation originates in the Japanese psychosis against atomic weapons. This feeling can

be understood; however, since the Navy must respond to nuclear as well as conventional threats, the accepted prohibition against introduction of these weapons into Japan imposes severe constraints.

The subject of the use of Japanese bases points up another possibly adverse element of the Treaty. The Navy seems to gain considerable advantage from the claim of not being dependent upon overseas bases. While naval forces may have this potential, continued use of the convenience of foreign base support would seem to have an atrophying effect on the means that make the potential a reality. The practice of supplying carrier task forces at sea from mobile support ships does much to keep the technique viable. It satisfies only one element of the system, however. The convenience and economy of resupplying the support ships in Japan would seem to invite neglect of adequate numbers of ships and alternate stock points that would be required if the bases were denied under the "prior consultation" clause.

The Conlon Study invites attention to still another facet of Treaty provisions. Under the terms of the Mutual Defense Assistance Agreement of 1954, Japan was to develop her defense capabilities in expectation of assuming increased responsibility for self-defense.<sup>21</sup> In view of the scope of United States naval commitments in the Pacific, any relief in this area would appear to be an asset. The consideration of Japanese economic factors, in Chapter II, seemed to indicate that continued provision of Japan's defense by the United States had reduced the urgency of a build-up in the Japanese defense budget. It might be argued, then, that the continued presence of American forces serves to retard actual Japanese acceptance of responsibility for self-defense.<sup>22</sup>

The Navy can, and apparently has continued to, support United States foreign policy in the Pacific under the provisions of the Treaty. Peaceful coexistence with the Soviets and relatively subdued overt physical, if not vocal, threats by the Chinese Communists have characterized much of the period. This latter fact may be debated as a cause or result of Treaty success. In spite of the apparent compatibility of the Treaty and current Navy operations, the foregoing discussion has endeavored to point up areas for consideration if the Treaty is opened for renegotiation in 1970.

## CHAPTER IV

### CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

**Conclusions.** Looking to the future of the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security in 1970, it would seem that the following conclusions might be drawn concerning the United States Navy.

Article IX of the Japanese Constitution has inhibited the development of a sizable military force in Japan, and to this extent has served as a basis for a treaty in which the United States provides the defense for the nation. This fact has precluded the necessity of a large defense budget, thereby contributing to the phenomenal growth of the Japanese economy. This factor would seem to recommend a continuation of the Treaty on the part of the Japanese.

The ramifications of the explosion of an atomic device by the Chinese Communists are yet to be fully manifested; however, the event would seem to recommend a continued requirement for a deterrent posture on the part of Japan. It remains to be seen, though, whether or not the Japanese will retain this defense under the present arrangement. Several other defense measures afford possible choices: expansion of the Self Defense Force to a size that will obviate the necessity for assistance from a foreign source—a Switzerland of Asia; sole reliance upon the United Nations; or continuation within an alliance but with renegotiation for the exclusion of foreign units from Japan. The following Japanese factors are likely to influence the foregoing decision.

The trend in treaty relationships between the United States and Japan since the Occupation has been one of increasing recognition of Japanese sovereignty. In the case of the subject Treaty, the request for negotiation was initiated by the Japanese government, ostensibly with a view to obtaining a more favorable position in its relationship with the United States. Although agreement on many points was achieved, there still remain certain unresolved differences which may serve as a basis for renegotiation in the future.

The growth of the Japanese economy has not only enhanced the desire for international sovereign prestige; it has also intensified the desire for expanded trade. Although the United

States remains the greatest single participant in trade relations, a trend toward commercial rapprochement with the Chinese Communists has been noted. This latter development, if continued, could present a divisive effect in the concert of purpose required in a security treaty.

The history of the governing political party, which might be termed the only pro-American party in Japan, reveals a strong aspiration for greater international stature independent of United States influence. In consonance with that aspiration, the party initiated renegotiation of the predecessor of the current Treaty. In January of this year the party announced a drive to repeal Article IX of the Constitution. Success in this effort should serve to clear the way for development of an independent Japanese military deterrent—a seeming prerequisite to true Japanese sovereignty.

Finally, Japanese public opinion, while favoring Americans in general, seems antipathetic toward the military aspects of the Japanese-American relationship.

The increasing preoccupation with sovereign independence on the part of the Japanese does not seem unnatural, and the trend will most likely continue rather than recede. From this and the other factors mentioned, it would seem that a request by Japan for renegotiation of the Treaty in 1970 is a very distinct probability. Since American bases seem to pose the most tangible infringement on Japanese sovereignty, this would appear the probable subject for negotiation.

Japanese factors are not the only influence on United States bases under the terms of the Treaty. American writers on foreign policy seem especially impressed with the negative aspects of their presence in overall foreign relations. Despite the continued military threat in the Pacific, strategy recommendations advise a critical look at the necessity for the extended existence of overseas bases when they conflict with political considerations.

Projected trends in the United States defense budget seem to indicate rigorous pursuit of economy and efficiency. While this does not arbitrarily dictate termination of Japanese bases, the total cost of their operation plus the adverse effect on the balance of payments would seem to bring them under continual and critical review. The Navy, then, would be well advised to review the actual utility of the bases beyond the terms of mere convenience.



The "prior consultation" provisions of the Treaty impose constraints upon the employment of naval forces from Japanese bases. The rationale which dictated this departure also makes questionable the reliability of the bases for defense of the Far Eastern area unless the Japanese are in accord with the venture. This becomes significant in view of the possible Japanese commercial association with the Chinese Communists.

Although utilization of the Japanese bases under the terms of the Treaty is convenient during periods of reduced tension, the foregoing factors would seem to "make questionable their reliability and full freedom of action for United States forces during certain periods of conflict in the Pacific."

**Recommendations.** The preceding conclusions lead to recommendations of the following action with regard to the Navy and the Treaty, looking to 1970.

In the interest of Treaty commitments, operations should be continued in accordance with current practices for the present time. However, it should be realized that a change might be dictated by the Japanese, through renegotiation in 1970, or even sooner through a "prior consultation" prohibition on the employment of bases in Japan, or from United States nonmilitary considerations. In view of this, a survey of other means of providing for the naval defense of the Pacific should be explored. The defense in depth concept with a base in the mid-Pacific proposed by the Conlon Study—maybe Guam—suggests one possibility. The foregoing does not envision termination of an alliance. Trade, diplomatic and cultural rapport should remain or be increased where possible. However, based on feasibility studies, preparation for a reorientation of naval support to rely primarily on secure American bases and for a change in military psychology to incorporate a corresponding defense posture should be undertaken.

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