

Naval War College Review

Volume 17
Number 4 *April*

Article 2

1964

The People's Republic of China in Historical Perspective

Richard L. Walker

Follow this and additional works at: <https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review>

Recommended Citation

Walker, Richard L. (1964) "The People's Republic of China in Historical Perspective," *Naval War College Review*: Vol. 17 : No. 4 , Article 2.

Available at: <https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol17/iss4/2>

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Naval War College Review by an authorized editor of U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons. For more information, please contact repository.inquiries@usnwc.edu.

THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA
IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE

A lecture delivered
at the Naval War College
on 27 September 1963

by

Professor Richard L. Walker

We live in an age of really prodigious and remarkable change, intensity of feelings, and crises. It is just nigh impossible to keep up with the crowding events and strange turns of policy. Khrushchev is calling Mao Tse-tung a dogmatist and a warmonger, and Mao is referring to this very same Khrushchev, who just in the late fall of 1962 was implanting nuclear-capable missiles in Cuba, as 'cowardly,' 'absurd,' 'reactionary,' 'insolent,' 'rotten,' and 'loathsome.' Not only that, in rapid order India has finally dismissed Krishna Menon, and Mr. Nehru now believes in the abominable snowman. Sukarno, since he could not have all of his other wishes, is determined that Malaysia should not have North Borneo. American leaders are calling the Soviets 'realistic' and Mr. Khrushchev says the American President 'is wise and wants peace.'

There is no topic more pressing, more urgent, more significant, and in many respects more important for America today than the subject of the People's Republic of China. October 1, 1963 marked the 14th anniversary of the Mao Tse-tung regime. In those fourteen years, such grandiose changes have taken place in China, and China has moved so far forward toward asserting its weight as a world power, that the whole balance in the world has been shifted and changed.

In considering historical perspectives, we must be willing to understand the historical perspective of a Mao Tse-tung, or, for that matter, of the Chinese Nationalists. From their historical perspective, a once-great empire about 450 years ago (roughly about 1500) began to be subjected to the pressures and the power of the white man, and for a 400-year period, from approximately 1500 to 1900, the areas of Asia and the Far East had their fate decided by decisions made in the capitals of Europe, and, indeed,

in Washington. Then, with the emergence of a new power, Japan, an uneasy equilibrium was achieved. A turning point came in 1902 when Japan, having mastered some of the technological capabilities the West had demonstrated, became such a power that England that year made an alliance with Japan to form a sort of balance of power against Russia in the Far East. A nation in the Far East had, to use Mao Tse-tung's term with regard to China, 'stood up;' a nation in the Far East had demonstrated that the colored people, the nonwhite people, once equipped with the methods and science of the technological West, could arrive at a status of equality. From that time forward, it was possible to observe, particularly after the end of World War II, during which the Japanese had set in motion a great number of forces, the gradual retreat of Western power from the Far East. In its place, fourteen years ago, was erected a new totalitarian despotism pledged to making its weight felt all over the world. The Chinese can therefore view themselves as continuing an historical process which the Japanese started.

Thus the importance of the emergency of Communist China cannot be stressed too much. It has become the center of hatred of the white man (and of the United States in particular); a center for testing a strategy for seizure of power in economically underdeveloped areas; a center for the threat of overt violence; a center for some of the dullest and most dogmatic features of Marxism, a center for testing the resolve and the will of the West; a center, if you will, for the resurgence of oriental despotism in its most intense form.

In order to add another dimension to Communist China in historical perspective, it is instructive to quote from an observer who has written:

After all, what is China but a large and strict school—on an enormous scale, it is true—where neither the youths are allowed to go out nor other persons come in. Thus have its inmates no opportunity to learn anything, either good or bad, that is prohibited by their master. . . . Prail mortals, assuming the garb of truth, wormed themselves into the vast edifice. Time, the destroyer and the discloser of all things, laid them bare in all their native nakedness. The master's jealousy was aroused. He trembled for his authority; expelled some, punished others, and forced the rest to betake themselves to the obscure corners and outhouses of his capacious mansion.

This observer, writing an article which, it must be remarked, is singularly appropriate for, and applicable for, mainland China today, was writing in Canton in the year 1840.

We must understand, therefore, that the Chinese have a background attitude of exclusiveness and exclusion. There is historical precedent for many of the policies which Mao's regime undertakes today. Further, more than any other people, the Chinese have a sense of history. There is every reason to believe, therefore, that in order to understand the new despotism which rules mainland China today, it is necessary to have some familiarity with some of the traditional concepts which underlie the Chinese approach to the outside world and which underlie the Chinese approach to history.

The Chinese have a deep sense of destiny. The name for their country, Chung-kuo, means 'the central country,' or 'central kingdom.' They have long visualized themselves as the center of the world, the center of the universe, so to speak, from which radiate out all sorts of cultural and good influences. They never visualized anyone else really influencing them upon matters that counted most. Mencius (or Meng-tzu), one of the earliest Chinese philosophers and the first deep interpreter of Confucius, said in the fourth century B.C.: 'I have heard of men using the doctrines of our great land to change barbarians, but I have never yet heard of any being changed by barbarians.'

This attitude—that China is the center of all learning and of the right way, and that all answers of right or wrong for the world reside in China—has given the Chinese over a long period of time a real sense of destiny. The Manchu Emperor of China in 1795 wrote a letter to King George III, in which he said:

Swaying the wide world, I have but one aim in view, namely to maintain a perfect governance and fulfill the duties of the state. . . . Our dynasty's majestic virtue has penetrated unto every country under Heaven. . . . As your ambassador can see for himself, we possess all things.

This bears a close resemblance to the words of Mao today, talking about the very same self-sufficiency, an attitude which Khrushchev ridicules. The Emperor goes on to say:

I set no value by object, strange or ingenious, and have no use for your country's manufactures. . . . It behooves you, O King, to respect my sentiments and display an even greater devotion and loyalty in the future, so that by perpetual submission to our Throne, you may secure peace and prosperity for your country.

The Chinese have an innate sense, not of superiority alone in culture, but of overall supremacy. Down through the years, anyone outside the center of Chinese civilization was known as a 'barbarian,' and the various barbarians were classified according to the direction from which they came. Those that came overland were usually regarded as the worst. The Chinese have numerous descriptions and unflattering designations for the Russians. They have called the Russians 'O-kno ta-pi-tzu,' 'the big-nosed Russians.' They have another term for the Russians which is likely to be resurrected by Chinese Communist leaders very shortly: 'Hu-iu iao-mao-tza,' 'the crazy, old hairy ones.' Such an attitude has characterized the Chinese view of outsiders throughout time. It has colored many of the words in the Chinese language with which Mao must speak.

Again we must note that the Chinese have had, through history, a strong authoritarian tradition. The Emperor, who was at the pinnacle of an authoritarian structure, was the man who expounded dogma from on high. He was the embodiment of Confucian learning. In like manner, Mao Tse-tung, the new emperor, is the embodiment, and the only interpreter, of what must be right in Marxism-Leninism. There was always the expectation that the barbarians who came to China came to learn the truth as embodied in the structure of the Confucian gentry state and in the learning expounded by the monopoly bureaucracy. There was an insistence on orthodoxy. Confucian orthodoxy permeated the whole of Chinese society. In many respects this led to the pattern of conformity which also marked traditional China. Within the framework of the wonderfully humanistic attitude of the Chinese philosophy, there were, nevertheless, certain things that the individual did not do. In the 11th century, for example, a court painter was exiled to Hainan Island in the south of China, because he had painted fishermen in the wrong colored garb. Such insistence on conformity was thus part of a standard expectation of conduct in China.

Within this authoritarian tradition of conformity, of submission to dogma as expounded on high, the idea of checking up on each other was part of the Chinese behavior pattern. This was especially true

regarding relations with foreigners. It is not surprising, therefore, that the Chinese have maintained a splendid isolation from the realities of the outside world. This is a rather important point to stress. The Chinese judged, and still judge, the outside world in terms of what happens in China. Thus, this magnificently cultured people, this people with the longest historical tradition of any civilization in the world, have had, and still have, a sense of destiny, a sense of authority and self-sufficiency, and indeed, a sense of isolation, which have been written into their language, their art, and their way of life. It is this background which we have to understand in dealing with Mao Tse-tung and his colleagues. History influences the Chinese profoundly.

There are other forces and factors which must be understood if we are going to deal effectively with the new despotism in China. We must also consider Chinese geography. This is a poor land, greatly divided by large mountain ranges. Many areas such as Chinese Turkistan and Inner Mongolia are very sparsely inhabited. On the other hand, in areas around Canton in the south, the Yangtze River valley in Central China, and in the North China plain, there are frequently as many as 7,000 people per square mile. The land is divided in many ways. For instance, it is divided racially. All of the areas in the western part of China are inhabited by people who are not Chinese, but are minority nationality groups of different races and religions. Many of them generally have had a contempt for, and hatred of, the Chinese who have traditionally been their oppressors. The Chinese in the south consider themselves the only true Chinese, while the Chinese in the north look with contempt on the southern Chinese. The division between northern and southern Chinese has played an important part in Chinese politics. Thus, in addition to the weight of history, the Chinese Communists face a geographical challenge and geographical barriers which have carried through their history. Mao Tse-tung and Liu Shao-chi, number one man and number two man of the Chinese Communist Party, for example, both come from Hunan Province. They are fellow provincials from a province noted for providing revolutionary leadership for the Chinese.

Let's add another factor to the equation—Chinese national character. This is vital, and needs to be understood. As Mu Fu-sheng says in his very important volume, *The Wilted of the Hundred Flowers*:

To understand the Chinese Communists as people, one must try to understand first this background that gave them the mixture of disillusion, callousness, selfishness, courage and desperation. When we look back at history we realize that, although it is easy for us to locate the mistakes of the past, we would very likely have acted in the same manner as our ancestors did were we in their place. To live close to the Chinese Communists who, like other people, are products and victims of their environment, often gives one the same feeling. It is hardly possible for them not to be ruthless once they are in power. They are quite as hard on themselves as on others. . . . It requires imagination for those who have never seen China to understand that the country has been too poor for its common people to see any good in democratic ideals. In times of crisis it was not even a matter of choosing between different types of morality; it was simply a situation in which any morality, even the traditional Chinese type, lost meaning, and only practical measures, moral or immoral, by peacetime criteria, to save life and provide food, were relevant.

The Chinese have therefore lived in a situation of desperation which frequently has imposed mass starvation, hardship and hunger. It has given them a different outlook on life, and a willingness to risk more; in fact, a different national character. This national character manifests itself in terms of attitude toward life and death. This is apparent, for example, in Mao's recent statements showing relative indifference to the consequences of atomic destruction. The Chinese have an abundant energy and ability to work. In Southeast Asia, where they are a force to be reckoned with, they have been able to outwork and underlive any of the natives.

The Chinese have a population problem which is one of the most formidable in the world. It's difficult for Americans, who tend to think of population in terms of long-range trends, to appreciate the full dimensions of this problem. The Chinese are adding more people every year to their country than any one of four fifths of the world's countries have people today; they could provide the whole population of the British Isles in less than four years. In the decade of the 1960's there will be more people added to China's already overburdened agricultural scene than there are people in the United States today! In 1963, the Chinese added to their

population more than eleven times as many people as live in Albania, their current ideological ally in the struggle with Khrushchev. This is a factor which cannot help but weigh in decisions.

To the above should be added a fifth factor into this equation for understanding modern China, and this is the factor of violence. China, since the start of the 19th century, at least since the Opium War began in 1839, has not known peace. The war continues between the Chinese Nationalists and the communists. For China, violence has been the order of the day, whether it has been the communists putting down student riots, such as the very formidable high school student riot in Hengyang in 1957, whether it was fighting the Tibetans or the Moslems, or whether it was fighting the Chinese Nationalists, armed violence--organized armies--have been the rule, not the exception, in modern China.

To continue, a sixth factor is the new nationalism, a new identification of the motherland of China with the sense of destiny already discussed. The Chinese, as we have learned, have a sense of mission for their country. Not only is China to be a great power, able to demonstrate its great status, but its leaders are determined that in so doing China will not have to knuckle under to anyone. This part of the Chinese traditional outlook has been reinforced by the modern nationalism of its present ruler.

The final key factor in the historical perspective of the rulers of China today is the manner in which the regime came to power, and the formulas which it is likely to apply to the world in interpreting its mission. Almost three decades ago, Mao Tse-tung and his colleagues were a rag-tail group of apparent remnants, former warlords in retreat on their famous 'Long March.' It seemed that the fortunes of communism in China were at their lowest ebb and that communism was likely to be destroyed as an organized force in China's future. Mao and his cohorts started out from the hills of Southeast China and made their famous 'Long March' to Northwest China. Out of 90,000 who broke out of Nationalist encirclement, only 20,000 straggled into Shensi province, which was to become the new communist base. Those who went through this ordeal by fire, those who made the famous 'Long March' of six thousand miles, naturally ended up with a sense of destiny pervading their ranks. They were convinced that nothing could destroy them. From that time, Mao Tse-tung, who became

chairman of the Chinese Communist Party on January 13, 1935, has seen his power grow until he presides over the largest Communist Party in the world, over 17 million dedicated, disciplined communists.

As Mao stands upon the Gate of Heavenly Peace, from which Chinese emperors used to look down on their forces, and sees parade in front of him, in perfect order, over a half million people, mostly disciplined civilians, he must have a renewed sense of destiny, infallibility, inevitability, and power. In 1959, when Mr. Khrushchev went to Peking for the tenth anniversary celebration of the Mao regime, he was given reason for pause. Observers could see in Mr. Khrushchev's face that he was somewhat shaken as he looked out upon this great mass of disciplined Chinese—the 'Blue Ants' as they have been called. Imagine the impact of observing 500,000 civilians marching in perfect order in front of the Gate of Heavenly Peace! Little wonder Mao has a sense of power and destiny.

He naturally attributes to those factors which he thinks brought him to power a universal validity and significance. These become universally applicable truths for Mao. What, then, are the factors which he has isolated in looking back over his success of the last twenty-eight years, and about which he has said, "These are the universal factors which are applicable everywhere in the world; these are the truths by which we are going to live and which we are going to export to the rest of the world"?

First, and not immodestly, he stresses *leadership*—leadership by the Chinese Communist Party—a leadership which has been steeled in combat, in class struggle, in discipline by purge after purge, by rectification movement after rectification movement. No one can build power without the right leadership, and the Chinese Communists are convinced that they have the right leadership. Listen to what they say about Mao Tse-tung:

Comrade Mao Tse-tung is about the most outstanding exponent of the proletariat of our country, the most distinguished representative of our superior tradition in the entire history of our great nation, a beacon on our country's road to communism, and the most outstanding contemporary revolutionist, statesman, and theoretician of Marxism-Leninism.

No wonder Mr. Khrushchev has doubts about his Chinese comrade these days. The cult of Mao Tse-tung, built up and worshipped as

the ancient Chinese emperor used to be worshipped, symbolizes the leadership in Communist China, which is composed of first generation communists, fanatically dogmatic and convinced by their own success of their destiny around the world—convinced that the great tide of history, which was reversed in 1902, is going against the West, as nation after nation, once subjected to the white man, has become independent. And as a new tide seems to move forward, little wonder Mao Tse-tung has proclaimed that 'The east wind prevails over the west wind.' Further, he has now borrowed from the Japanese the potential dynamic derived from interpreting this in racial terms.

The second factor to which Mao attributes his success is the factor of *struggle*—class struggle, personal struggle, world struggle. The Chinese Communists are far more committed to, and dedicated to, the concept of struggle, including violence, than are their Soviet comrades, some of whom are actually a little bit more interested in living the quiet life at the moment. In the Chinese Communist official national newspaper, *The People's Daily*, every page is filled with references to *tou-cheng* or 'struggle.'

This leads to the third factor to which Mao Tse-tung attributes his success: the right outlook on the world, a dualistic concept of the world, the world divided between friend and enemy, the world as symbolized by the famous Soviet dictum, *kto-kogo*, 'who-whom,' or 'who destroys whom.' Khrushchev and Mao have refined this today to 'who buries whom,' but it still reflects the same theme—a dual world in which there must always be struggle to the end. Within this black and white interpretation of life, anyone who resists the Chinese Communist regime internally is obviously an ally of the enemy, the imperialists. By definition, within the doctrine, the 'United States imperialists,' being the most powerful opponent of communism, must be the key enemy. Therefore, the peasant who resists the movement to set up 'people's communes' is naturally accused of being a tool of the United States imperialists.

To these three factors Mao adds a fourth, which is vitally important in understanding Communist China today, as well as some of the seemingly stupid policies followed by the regime. Mao has a sublime belief in the efficacy of organization. He has arrived at, so to speak, a new dimension of power in this world, in terms of organizing, controlling, and disciplining human beings. This is obviously not the place to go into the details of the

methods by which the Chinese Communists have imposed 'psychological mass coercion' on their people. But to take a war-torn, weary, large, desperate nation such as China was in 1949, and in record time turn it into the most disciplined, well-co-ordinated, centrally controlled nation in the history of the world, takes no mean ability. Mao Tse-tung, who during World War II perfected techniques of discipline and of psychological control, some of the aspects of which we call 'brainwashing,' feels that he has discovered a new dimension of power in this world—a dimension of power which is as important for the future of mankind as was liberating the force of the atom. It is not surprising, therefore, that he asserts: 'If the masses are organized, anything can be accomplished.' Little wonder he had little children, women, as well as the soldiers and workers, stoking 'backyard furnaces,' apparently convinced that organized masses were all that is required to make first quality steel. He mobilized well over a hundred million men, women, and children for backyard steel-making in 1958. It was one of the most tragic blunders in modern history, one which gave ample reason to doubt Mao's sanity and to worry about his isolation from the real world.

Believing that the organized masses can accomplish anything, Mao has this great faith that the 'masses' count in history and that he has uncovered a decisive new dimension of power in this world. Behind all this he gives great credence to a fifth factor explaining his success, namely, Marxist-Leninist doctrine. It's important to understand that for the Chinese, Marxism-Leninism is not simply a foreign doctrine that came from Europe by way of Russia. Marxism-Leninism for the Chinese Red leaders is a universal law which is applicable anywhere and therefore capable of being understood by the Chinese and understood perhaps even better, because of their superior cultural tradition, than the Russians understand it. For the Chinese, given their historical perspective, there is every reason to believe that they are uniquely best qualified to be the interpreter of Marxism-Leninism, a universal dogma, for the rest of the world.

The sixth factor to which Mao attributes his success, and which he projects into the future world, is his assessment of the decadent capitalist world. He has looked out over his rise to power and the way in which the West responded or did not respond to the Japanese challenge; he has observed what he assessed as a wavering United States policy which he scorned and excoriated during the period 1945-49 when he came to power; he has observed indecision in Viet Nam, Laos, and West New Guinea, and, perhaps

with some justification, Mao has concluded that division, indecision, and failure to work together characterize the camp of his enemy. Little wonder he is convinced that the West, the United States and its allies, are 'paper tigers,' when confronted with a solid, disciplined, organized mass with the correct doctrine.

Now the achievements of the Chinese Communist regime are enough to reinforce Mao's belief in these great truths which he believes he has discovered. The achievements are so formidable that it is necessary to point out the pendulum effect they frequently have on our interpretations of China. In 1958 and 1959 we were apparently so impressed with the Chinese claim that even one of our most knowledgeable commentators felt that if the Chinese kept up at their then proclaimed current rate of economic growth, they would overtake the Russians before the Russians overtook us. Many tended to believe that the Chinese Communists could accomplish anything. Now, following the revelation of the failures of the much-ballyhooed 'great leap,' the general tenor with regard to Communist China is to believe that they are unable to do anything right. We tend to swing back and forth. Both generalizations are equally wrong. We would be foolhardy, indeed, to underestimate the power and potential of this regime despite its many problems. Their very accomplishments, even in the face of failure, are enough to make us pause. Despite economic difficulties, the Chinese are still turning out more steel today than Japan produced at the time of Pearl Harbor. Despite difficulties, they have a smoothly working communications and transport network—the transport inadequate but nevertheless working. They have a standardized language and they have embarked on a formidable program for literacy which can make their people more docile and understanding minions for their command. They have a stable currency and a price control system. They have made their power felt everywhere in the world, not only along the Indian border but along the Russian border and in the Pacific. Communist China has 'stood up' as Mao Tse-tung says, and in doing this it has demonstrated only too clearly the achievements and energy of the new leadership.

Mao's regime has formidable problems, and a few of these deserve at least passing mention. They have the problem of Chinese nationalism and their relations with the Soviet Union to deal with. They have the problem of a snowballing bureaucracy. Snowballing committee work in bureaucracy has been quite a problem for the Chinese, and this is directly related to the

problem of quality control in their manufactured goods. They have a formidable problem in the lack of critical raw materials, particularly of petroleum. They seem regularly to fire their Minister of Petroleum Industry for his failure to fulfill his quota of discovering new petroleum reserves according to quota. They commit doctrinaire blunders like the communes and the backyard furnaces and they continue to have hostile relationships abroad and a continuing war with the Nationalists on Formosa. Despite such problems, Mao's China is a formidable power whose policies dictate that it will be in a constantly hostile relationship with the United States, and we in turn must be prepared for the problems which this great new power center of Communist China is going to continue to pose for the Free World. Many of these stem from the policies pursued by the Chinese Communist regime. These, too, can only be understood in terms of an appreciation of the historical perspective.

Mao makes perfectly clear his bid for hegemony in the Far East. This has been a Chinese policy for centuries. As one worried Indian journalist has noted:

Chairman Mao Tse-tung writing some twenty years ago (1939) pointed out: 'In defeating China in war, the imperialist powers have taken away many Chinese dependent states and a part of her territory. Japan took Korea, Taiwan and the Ryukyu Islands, the Pescadores, and Port Arthur. England seized Burma, Bhutan, Nepal, and Hongkong. France occupied Annam, and even an insignificant country like Portugal took Macao.'

Does China now claim all these territories? No, not yet.

A second policy of this regime, based upon the belief of its leaders that they have the answer to the world's problems, is to establish leadership in the underdeveloped world—Asia, Africa, and Latin America. Here is a major source of difficulty with the Soviets, for they attempt to exclude the Soviet representatives from active participation in the revolutionary strategy in these areas. The Chairman of the Chinese Communist Government, number two man in the Party, Liu Shao-chi, within a month after the regime came to power, said that the road by which the Chinese Communists achieved their victory and by which they came to power, is the road which *must be followed* by other colonial and semicolonial countries in achieving the people's victory. The Chinese, therefore, regard themselves as the foremost leaders and

trailblazers for the underdeveloped world. This is marked by some of their activities in Cuba and by some of their ambitions in Africa. Mr. Khrushchev has been more than a little irritated that the Chinese have been saying in Africa that they are colored and the Russians are not colored, and that the Russians have no place there.

A third policy, which is just as much a part of this regime's standard policy as any could possibly be, is to control all Chinese. Until all areas where the Chinese live and constitute a formidable segment of the population are controlled, Mao Tse-tung can never feel secure. It was based on the contributions of the overseas Chinese in Southeast Asia, that Sun Yat-sen was finally able to overthrow the Manchu regime. As long as formidable groups of Chinese remain outside the control of Communist China, Mao's regime will never feel secure—totalitarian regimes never are anyway. It must press forward to the solution of the Chinese problem, 'China irridenta,' so to speak.

A fourth policy of this regime is to sell its doctrine of inevitability, to point out that Chinese doctrine constitutes a force on the side of history, that it is natural that the Chinese are going to assert their hegemony, their great power status, and their influence, particularly in Asia. This is a possible motive behind the attack on India launched October 20, 1962. In addition to attempting to discredit India, Peking kept stressing its theme that the Nehru government could not possibly stand up against the power of the great masses of the people as symbolized by 'People's China' and its allies all over the world.

The doctrine of inevitability and the manner in bringing about a world victory for communism underlie some of the difficulties which the Chinese Communists are having with the Soviet Union at the moment. In order to achieve its goals, another major policy of this regime is to isolate and destroy the United States. Nowhere in the history of the world has an intense hate campaign been carried on against any government of the magnitude and duration of that which the Chinese Communist regime has carried on against the United States government within the last 18 years. We are the only power in the Western Pacific capable of preventing Mao Tse-tung and his comrades from achieving their goals of regional hegemony and moving on to the 'inevitable' victories they expect. Therefore the 'hate-America' campaign has been played at constant high pitch. The Peking leaders attempt to intimidate the smaller powers to prevent them from coming to any sort of accommodation or amicable

relationship with the United States for fear that it will antagonize the great neighbor to the north. There is much logic behind Peking's policy of hatred for the United States. It has had a profound impact in Japan, and the Chinese Communists are very sensitive about Japan.

Behind all of these policies of this regime lies a goal of achieving for China, for Communist China, and for Chinese civilization, a major world power status. On this the Chinese Communists, every last one of them, exhibit a sensitivity that bespeaks an essential chauvinism in their makeup which we have too little appreciated in the past.

The conclusions which one reaches after this brief survey of the forces and factors behind the Mao Tse-tung regime, of the doctrines and factors which Mao Tse-tung himself puts forward as the truth, the achievements of the regime and its policies, are not very pleasant conclusions. First, the Chinese Communist regime today is a major, if not *the* major, threat to world peace. They believe in the efficacy of military action. Says Mao, 'Political power grows out of the barrel of a gun . . . War can only be abolished through war.' Mao parrots Clausewitz and Lenin by saying, 'Politics is war without bloodshed; war is politics with bloodshed.'

A second conclusion is that this regime has created a totalitarian despotism unmatched anywhere in history for the intensity of its control, for the scope of its control, and for the threat it poses to its neighbors.

A third conclusion follows: any accommodation, any concession to this regime in the context of the great sweep of history—in the context within which Mao Tse-tung and his colleagues view the world—can only be viewed as a further step in the inevitable victory of their dogma and of their system, and will only be used as the basis for pressing for yet another victory. This means that in order to break the myth of inevitability the only power capable of preventing further concessions, the United States, is going to have to stand as inflexibly steadfast in opposition as it possibly can. And in these days of emphasizing relaxation of tension this is going to be a very difficult task indeed. On the manner in which we approach it may hang the fate of freedom's struggle against despotism everywhere in the world.

BIOGRAPHIC SKETCH

Professor Richard L. Walker

Present Position:

Head, Department of International Studies; Director, Institute of International Studies, University of South Carolina

Schools:

Drew University, B.A.

University of Pennsylvania, Certificate in Chinese Language and Area Studies

Yale University, M.A., Ph.D.

Career Highlights:

Consultant to the United States government, 1953-54.

Visiting Associate Professor at the National Taiwan University, 1954-55.

U.S. delegate to the SEATO Conference on countering Communist subversion, 1957.

Visiting Professor, Far Eastern and Russian Institute, University of Washington, Seattle, Washington, Summer 1959.

Recently completed one year as member of the faculty, National War College.

Presently holds the position of James F. Byrnes Professor of International Relations and Director of the Institute of International Studies at the University of South Carolina, Columbia, South Carolina.

Honors and Publications:

In addition to his frequent contributions to scholarly journals and to the USIA publication, *Problems of Communism*, Dr. Walker is the author of five books, including *China under Communism* (1955), *China and the West*, (1956), and *The Continuing Struggle* (1958). He has visited the Far East numerous times since World War II. From December 1958 to February 1959 he lectured at various universities in Asia and interviewed refugees in Red China in Hong Kong. In the Summer of 1960, Dr. Walker was a U.S. delegate to the XXVth International Congress of Orientalists in Moscow. During the Spring of 1961, Dr. Walker was the senior faculty advisor for the National War College group which visited countries of the Middle East and South Asia. During the Summer of 1961, he surveyed developments in thirteen countries of the Far East and Australia.