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We Give to Conquer

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is most interesting. This is not a good research book, but it is pleasurable, interesting reading for anyone, without regard to political party affiliation.

J.R.M. FISHER

Commander, U.S. Navy

Brynes, Asher. *We Give to Conquer*. New York: Norton, 1966. 219p. (HC 60 .B87)

On 10 January 1967, *The New York Times* printed the text of President Johnson's special message to Congress on aid to foreign lands. The \$6.2 billion that he requested for the next two fiscal years is the smallest since the program started 20 years ago. In his message, President Johnson stated in part, "The threat to our security posed by internal subversion and insurgency cannot be countered by withdrawal, isolation or indifference."

According to Mr. Asher Brynes' thesis, as expounded in *We Give to Conquer*, the United States foreign aid program is a threat to world peace. He maintains that all unilateral foreign aid to poorer nations is essentially imperialistic. It seeks to create, maintain, and defend spheres of influence and thus, under the guise of philanthropy, it carries on the old statecraft in a new way. Mr. Brynes says that American foreign aid programs are designed to promote within the assisted countries the emergence of middle-class populations; therefore, it is from the Communist point of view as subversive as their own tactics which encourage the creation of new proletariats. He argues that since the American foreign aid program is much larger than the Communist effort (about 30 to 1), it tends to exert a controlling pressure in areas where the Soviet Union has an equal interest. This contest for uncommitted nations, the author holds, can have the same consequence as the diplomatic rivalry that preceded the great wars of this century. The position taken in this book is not antiforeign aid. As a matter of fact, the author offers a proposal which would greatly expand the

United States' contribution to developing nations. He proposes that the United States take one-fifth of the current defense budget, add it to the foreign aid budget, and offer it on a pro rata basis to the underdeveloped nations. The underdeveloped countries would have to agree to act in concert against any international aggression among themselves. This U.S. offer would be made under an all-or-nothing rule: should the peace be broken by any of the developing nations, all aid would be withheld until the aggression stopped. Mr. Brynes goes farther in that he would have this financial aid distributed through organizations of the United Nations.

The views and proposals expressed in *We Give to Conquer* are decidedly those of a liberal. Whether one subscribes to the author's position or not, his arguments and discussion of the U.S. foreign aid program are most interesting. Mr. Brynes has treated a controversial subject in a most controversial manner.

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Macintyre, Donald. *The Battle for the Pacific*. New York: Norton, 1966. 240p. (D 767 .M2 1966b)

The Battle for the Pacific contains a history of the air and sea battles during World War II, beginning with a brief look at the prewar situation and the attack on Pearl Harbor. The author has written about the engagements in the Java Sea; Coral Sea; Guadalcanal, under which he groups the battles of Savo Island, the Eastern Solomons--Cape Esperance, the Santa Cruz Islands, Guadalcanal, and Tassafaronga; Kula Gulf--Empress Augusta Bay; Philippine Sea; and Leyte, comprising the fighting in the Sibuyan Sea, Surigao Strait, Samar, and Cape Engano. He has omitted all but a brief summary of the Battle of Midway, stating that it has previously been well covered and is fully understood. However, the same could be said for almost all the actions covered in the book--at least for naval readers. The author reemphasizes the primary role of the carrier in the Pacific and