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Power and Impotence

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PROFESSIONAL READING

nonprofit research firm associations, but it is not recommended reading for those who are acquainted with such relationships.

W.D. CLARK

Colonel, U.S. Air Force

Stillman, Edmund and Pfaff, William. *Power and Impotence*. New York: Random House, 1966. 244p.

The authors of this book on United States foreign policy since World War II have put together a volume that should be immensely popular with the same type of individual who preached bringing all of the American troops home immediately after V-J Day. Although somewhat oversimplified, basic tenets of the authors' theses are the apparent beliefs that Russia or China comprise little threat to free world security, that the United States has no great strategic interests external to her borders, and that internal disorder cannot be "stimulated" by a foreign power. The book, is in part objective, biased, penetrating, and naive. The volume is often without hope ("we are fools to expect very much of the future"), and lacks belief in the United States' ability to take correct action in the diplomatic field. Stillman and Pfaff use the debater's techniques of selected facts, self-formulated assumptions, and self-created "straw men" for the purpose of lending credence to their arguments. Possibly the book's most exciting aspect is its title. The authors classify American foreign policy as a kind of "modern global interventionism--a belief in the special goodness of America, projected outward into the world." They portray the United States as having an ingenuous faith in law, in organizing the world in a way that will outlaw conflict, in reason, and in steady progress; and as fearing politics. "This country needs to acknowledge that it is, simply, a troubled human society like all the others," Stillman and Pfaff

assert. The authors further contend, in the field of diplomacy, that American arguments are out-of-date and won't stand up to elementary analysis, that the United States knows that many things are true but will not admit so, and that she fails to distinguish what an enemy (or friend) says and means, wants and can do, and wants cheaply and is prepared to pay. "We are acting stupidly--and cruelly," these writers conclude.

What path would Stillman and Pfaff have the United States follow? They argue primarily for a policy of isolation: "America should do less, not more." They speak of the Russian empire's "disintegration" and the "exaggerated fear" with which Communist China is viewed by Americans, and maintain that "internal disorder cannot really be stimulated by foreign powers." Having disposed of the threat to free world security, they next reduce United States strategic interests to an almost nonexistent point, e.g., "the American material or strategic interest in the region of Southeast Asia is not great." Translating these views into action, relative to Europe, the authors would seek a withdrawal of United States and Russian forces from Europe and would have a policy of guarded cooperation with Russia (but not to bolster Russia with regard to Eastern Europe and China). In the Western Pacific, Americans should "detach ourselves" from Japan and let Japan contain China. The authors advocate "an autonomous and isolated Vietnam--even if it were unfriendly to us," and would also have the United States pull out of Thailand. In Latin America, the United States should scale down the Alliance for Progress, and, generally, stay out of the area. "Get out, give up, and go home" is a general, though brief, summary of their proposals for the United States. How the authors' courses of action redound to the benefit of American national interest is never adequately or objectively addressed. The book's value might possibly have been enhanced had the authors made an effort to

use United States national interest as a measuring stick.

B.E. KEITH
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Tung, Chi-ping and Evans, Humphrey. *The Thought Revolution*. New York: Coward-McCann, 1966. 254p.

The Thought Revolution is an autobiography of a young Chinese proletarian, Tung Chi-ping, who grew up and completed his education under the Communist regime. The book is written by Evans from 300,000 words of translated notes. Therefore, much of the Chinese flavor is lost. The book is unique in that it is from the younger generation. Tung grew up under turbulent conditions with a tyrant father in a family that was constantly starving. From the hate and avarice that existed within his household, coupled with his desire for recognition and love that were never forthcoming, Tung became a radical and a troublemaker. He once said, "I was not the most unruly pupil in class, but I was one of the worst." This attitude permeated his life, which was filled with conflicts and disdain for authority. After much finagling, Tung was admitted to a low-rated college and was scorned by his father for failing to obtain entrance to a better school. From this background of bitterness, Tung purports to relate an unbiased view of Red China. In this book of easy and light reading, most of the main ideas are conventional in nature. Touching lightly on the Communist Youth League and Communist Party, Tung offers nothing new or thought provoking. He concentrates mainly on the Communist school system, which, in his opinion, is one of repression, re-trenchment, and struggles against fellow students and teachers. The schools are politically oriented and manipulated, with the best professors being dismissed if they deviate from the Party line. Tung's final disappointment and his defection