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Naval Command Course: Seapower in the Mediterranean

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
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SEAPOWER IN THE MEDITERRANEAN

A lecture delivered at the Naval War College
on 19 May 1966 by
Professor William A. Reitzel

This may not seem a particularly good time to talk about the Mediterranean. Various members of the free world are not exactly on the best possible terms. One of their key associations, NATO, is in some disorder—its future form a little uncertain. And it would certainly not be easy at this time to define a common interest with which all would agree.

In spite of these drawbacks, I think that this may be a very good time to talk about the Mediterranean. Circumstances force us to take a fresh look at a situation that time has perhaps made too familiar; perhaps our established formulas no longer fit the facts. The confusions of the moment may give us a chance to get back to basic considerations. At any rate, I'm going to treat the present state of affairs as an opportunity for exploration.

The discussion arranges itself in three parts: (1) an examination of strategic significance; (2) a discussion of free world and related interests; and (3) the application of seapower, or, to put it in other terms, the strategic exploitation of the Mediterranean situation.

A distinction must be made between strategic significance and strategic exploitation.

Strategic significance is a pattern that develops from geographical relations, from political interaction between states, from particular forms of economic exchange, and finally from the shifting location of areas of critical conflict between states. It is the situation that is presented to us for action.

Strategic exploitation, in contrast, is the product of conscious and deliberate human planning and action, aimed at achieving objectives in the situation thus presented. Effective *exploitation* clearly depends on an accurate interpretation of *significance*; a wrong interpretation can easily lead to a waste of resources and to strategic failure; a right interpretation can produce great rewards at relatively little cost.

I have always tried to be guided in analyzing a problem by a remark of Abraham Lincoln: "If we could first know where we are and whither we are tending, we could better judge what to do and how to do it." So in taking our three points in order: strategic significance, interests, strategic exploitation—the first two are concerned with *where* and *whither*; the third with *what* and *how*. First, strategic significance. At the risk of giving shock treatment, I'll start with a flat statement. No one, at this juncture in world affairs, can honestly say what the strategic significance of the Mediterranean actually is. The most he could reliably say would be: (1) none of the previously known historical patterns seem to apply; (2) a number of potentially significant possibilities exist; and (3) which of these possibilities will develop into a clear predominant strategic significance seems unpredictable at the present time. Let me illustrate what I mean.

The Mediterranean is a simple geographical fact. This fact has historically developed a variety of strategic significances. I have four such to show you. In each case, I'll give you the strategic pattern at its moment of sharpest definition.

Figure 1 illustrates the pattern at the peak period of the Roman Empire. It persisted from about 81 B.C.-300 A.D. It represents the true *Mare Nostrum* situation.

Note: 1. A land-based center of control.

2. Subordinate centers are reached by sea.

3. Sea movement of men and materials—civilian and military—is fully protected.

4. Peripheral pressures are relatively weak and disorganized, and force can be readily concentrated against them—in most cases by sea.

In Figure 2 you see the pattern of a Vertical Split. It is characteristic of the period from 300 A.D.-700 A.D.




Figure 1 - True *Mare Nostrum*, 30 B.C.-330 A.D.




Figure 2 - Vertical Split, 330-730 A.D.

- Note: 1. Two land-based centers of competing power, each subjected to mounting pressures on their peripheries.
2. The seapower they can assemble has divided objectives:
- (a) movement of each against the other
 - (b) movement of each against peripheral pressures.
3. A resulting effect of limited force widely dispersed and a highly unstable pattern inadequately exploited.

Figure 3 shows the pattern of a Horizontal Split. It represents the expansion of Islamic power on the southern littoral and the gradual organization of Christian-European power on the northern, with shifting back and forth on a sea frontier. It had a long lifespan as a pattern—from the 8th to the late 17th centuries.




Figure 3 - Horizontal Split, 730-1700 A.D.

- Note: 1. Land-based powers, north and south, contesting control, with their positions changing as control was gained or lost.
2. As Europe gradually increased in organization it gained superiority, and then internal European competition opened the way for the pattern that follows.

In Figure 4 you see a pattern that combined a major intrusion on the east-west axis with multiple vertical projections from Europe into Africa and the Levant. It persisted from the 18th well into the 20th century.




Figure 4 - Two-way Split, 1700-1935

- Note: 1. The horizontal intrusion (essentially British) was securely based on fixed points of control—two points of access with intermediate stations.
2. The vertical projections were competitive and, except at intervals, were not aimed at eliminating the horizontal intrusion.
3. As trade expanded quantitatively in the 19th century, the horizontal intrusion became an unrestricted international route firmly maintained by British naval power.

But, with these well-known historical strategic patterns behind us, we come to a question mark. What are we looking at now? The pattern in Figure 4 is plainly not the present picture.

First of all, what are the facts of the moment? (See Figure 5.)

1. There are no vertical projections south from Europe.
2. There is no horizontal intrusion based on fixed points of control.
3. Control of the accesses is divided.

4. There is an inserted naval power (United States) whose home base is remote that has no fixed points of control but has local alliance supports from European associates.

5. There are potentially important pressures on the periphery—Soviet-Communist from the northeast, Egyptian-Arab from the south.

6. There are now 15 sovereign states directly concerned with what happens in the Mediterranean. In many cases they pursue contradictory interests.




Figure 5 - 1945-1970?

With these facts before us, let me repeat my questions.

What is the strategic significance of the Mediterranean now?

Or, if you haven't a ready answer to that, what strategic pattern do you think is most likely to emerge in time?

Perhaps another question should be added: what pattern should the free world try to make emerge, or what pattern would be most favorable to its interests?

In answer to the first two questions, there is no clearly indicated pattern; and there are no sure grounds for prediction as to what will emerge. The third question can wait.

We are apparently in the early stages of what may be a long period of uncertainty. Former strategic guidelines no longer seem to apply. New strategic values are indeterminate. This, I believe, is the reality we now have to face. Strategic exploitation—the action aspect—can only be addressed to potentials, not to an unmistakably defined situation. That is, seapower must be applied to encourage and build up the potentials that would result in a favorable pattern; and equally to neutralize, or if need be to resist, developments that would be adverse. This is admittedly an uncomfortable situation for the planners of policy and the designers of strategy. It lacks the much-desired clarity that military thinking prefers. It is highly susceptible to unpredictable change. It calls for contingency arrangements and flexible responses.

However, such situations are normal in human affairs. Although they create strains, arguments, and trial-and-error moves, there are ways of living with them successfully. We know, for example, that in each of the historical cases, there was an initial long period of uncertainty. Then, a possible pattern was revealed to some discerning eye. Then, political-military minds began to see opportunities opening. Then, by shaping and concentrating resources on the exploitation of these opportunities, what had at first been only one of several potential patterns was converted into a dominating strategic significance. Objectives were now obvious, and the pattern could be exploited with confidence. We are no worse off than any of our predecessors. We can at least use our wits much as they did.

So, let us go on to the next item—a look at the alternative potentials. To get at these, we must consider the forces that are at work, that is, the interests that are involved, for it will be the actions that nations take to advance these interests that will tend to turn a potential into an established fact.

I have said, "Action to advance interests." But the matter is more complicated than that. It involves choosing which out of many interests should be pressed steadily and vigorously, and which can be safely given a lower priority.

In this connection it is worth noting that nations have many interests, and the order in which they value them is important. It is no unusual thing for a state to put a high value on a short-term political goal and by doing so to foreclose on a long-term goal—say of economic development—of greater real value.

But, to get back to the point: free world and related interests.

There are 15 sovereign states directly concerned with the Mediterranean. There are external interests—commercial, political, security—which include the trading states of Europe, Great Britain, the United States, and the Soviet Union. The United States represents a recently inserted economic and military influence, the Soviet Union a recently developed pressure on the periphery.

This complex of interests is grouped in a variety of ways, the mere listing of which is enough to show the difficulty of finding a stable common interest even for the associated states of the free world.

Some are linked with each other and with the U.S. in NATO.

Some are bilaterally associated with the U.S.

Some are loosely linked in an Arab political system.

Some are loosely associated with some Communist grouping.

Some are isolated operators.

Some have an identical interest because they control approaches to the Mediterranean, although they may have nothing else in common.

Some have an identical interest in an open sea route through the Mediterranean-Western Europe generally for the movement of oil, Great Britain for military movement as well.

Obviously, all of the interests implied here cannot be satisfied. In several instances, they cannot even be compromised. Although a common security interest drew some of these states together after World War II, we know that this is a common interest that can easily be eroded by short-term national interests. We have seen this happen in the cases of the Arab League and CENTO. We may be facing a similar erosion in the case of NATO.

In order to be significant, however, interests have to be actively pursued. And this raises the question of a state's capacity to carry on sustained action in the face of opposition.

Measured by modern standards of power—economic and military—the greater number of the Mediterranean states are secondary or lesser actors on the contemporary world stage. Measured between themselves, the long-established states of the European littoral can organize and apply more power—economic and military—than can the states of the African and Levantine littoral. Yet, taken one by one, nearly every Mediterranean state has some basis for believing it can act on what it takes to be its national interest with some hope of success. For some states, the basis is a local military superiority; for some it is control of a needed raw material, or of a vital strategic point. For others it is association with a more powerful neighbor. For all it is a comparative freedom to exercise political leverage—leaving room to maneuver, even in the face of obviously superior strength. If the freedom of action of any of these states is limited, it is limited much more by the other states of the region than by any actual American or any threatened Soviet presence.

But, turn to another set of facts—this time economic—and a different picture appears; one in which the basis of a common interest can be seen.

Some states, chiefly on the European littoral, are industrially organized; that is, they tend to be processors of finished goods. The rest tend to be producers of raw materials—oil, minerals, fibers, animal products, and so on. At the same time, all have set up an identical policy goal—economic development.

The European states aim at expanding their industrial base and at increasing their annual economic growth rates. The others aim at creating an industrial base and at increasing domestic consumption. And, in addition, the means by which all these states have pursued these goals have become more and more interlocking and mutually dependent. This could be demonstrated statistically, but there is no space for charts and figures. The point to be emphasized is that the pursuit of these goals over the past 15 years has resulted in an immense and steadily mounting movement of goods—raw and finished; led to sensitive dependence on the regularity and reliability of these movements for the maintenance and improvement of what has been widely defined as national well-being; and, although it is not generally talked about, steadily tended to give a higher priority to economic than to political goals. And, it should be added, well over 75 percent of this trade movement has been—as far as the Mediterranean is concerned—seaborne movement.

What does this add up to? Let's do a summary before we move on to the question of applying seapower. This interim summary will try to bring together the complex of interests and the potential strategic patterns to see if some useful generalizations can be made.

First, in respect to strategic potentials. The following are worth consideration:

1. No one of the states located in or near the Mediterranean has the means of enforcing a strategic pattern in its own exclusive interest. You cannot, for example, seriously foresee a true *Mare Nostrum* situation being developed.
2. No local combination of states can, in the near future, develop the means and the sustained impetus to establish a strategic pattern in an exclusive group interest. For example, you cannot easily envisage a Horizontal Split (as shown in Figure 3) being enforced by the Arab states of the southern littoral, nor the European States reestablishing vertical projections (Figure 4) and regaining political-military authority in North Africa or the Levant.
3. It is equally hard to accept as realistic the notion of the United States, or any other external state, developing a dominating influence based on the control of approaches and interior fixed points.

4. In contrast to these negative statements, there is a potential for splitting into eastern and western sections. A Soviet-Communist breakthrough into the Mediterranean Basin could produce this pattern, even though the intrusion was mainly political and economic. Such a development has several channels available—into the Adriatic, by way of Turkey, by way of a Levant state. Without treating this as likely, it must nevertheless be recognized as a rational contingency.

5. But, finally, there is a totally different possibility to be considered—the possibility that the numerous states most directly concerned may find the present indeterminate situation preferable to one in which a rigid strategic pattern has been established by a superior force and is hence open to continual exploitation by that power.

Let me examine this last point in more detail. I repeat that, in spite of divergent political aims, all the states directly concerned have a common economic objective; and that the pursuit of this goal depends in great part on the unrestricted movement of goods in and through the Mediterranean. Neutral, and even Communist-linked states, share this purpose as do many non-Mediterranean countries. No one of these states, even while they may be threatening one another with fire and sword, can safely wish for anything like a return to the days when the English, French, and Dutch fought naval wars on the simple principle of "the other has too much trade and we are resolved to take it from him."

It is possible, accordingly, to conceive that the strategic significance of the Mediterranean for some time to come may be shaped rather by the shared economic than by the disputed security considerations of the states directly concerned. At any rate, let us take this as a tentative conclusion and move on to the last major point—the application of seapower—or, putting it in other words, the maritime exploitation of the present situation in the interest of the free world.

Too many distinctions are a bad thing, but one more is needed here for the sake of clarity. Seapower can be a confusing and misleading term. It will be useful to separate it from naval power.

Seapower is the means by which a nation, or a group of nations, exploits the opportunities provided by movement on the seas. Its components are: merchant shipping, ship and repair yards, port facilities, access to motive power (coal, oil, nuclear), skilled personnel, and, lastly, the means to defend this movement.

Naval power is the means to defend; that is, the military component of seapower. Its primary function has been convoying and dealing with opposing naval forces, and maritime policing. Naval power, however, early developed other functions as a specialized element in a nation's military strength. These consisted of military transport, logistic support of land forces, amphibious operations, and, more recently, an air strike function, the projection of force far inland from the sea. More recently still an ICBM strike capacity has been developed.

There have always been competing claims on naval resources between its function in relation to seapower and its specialized military roles. This competition became so intense in the two last major wars as to be a basic constraint on strategic planning. And so it would be again in any prolonged conflict.

In considering the application of the seapower of the free world to the ambiguous situation in the Mediterranean, there are a few points worth stating in advance.

If we put on one side, for the moment, the naval component of seapower, the other equally essential components are chiefly provided by the members of NATO, other free world states, and by some neutral states. The United States contribution is small. These components are dispersed among a great many nations. Their operation is basically uncoordinated, and they cannot be readily brought under integrated control for strategic use. In short, free world seapower in the Mediterranean is a diffused strength. In spite of this diffusion, however, it has operated over recent years as the basis for the sustained economic development of its associated possessors. And it is a power that is possessed in a superior degree by the free world.

In marked contrast, the naval component, as far as the Mediterranean is concerned, is a highly concentrated form of strength. Its major elements have been provided by the United States, importantly supplemented by NATO contributions and supported by NATO facilities. The circumstances that brought this about are too well known to need repeating here. But, note that this component has been primarily thought of as exercising specialized military functions. It was organized as naval power in the strictly military sense to support a NATO flank, to act in a deterrence role, and to provide combat ready force. These were all related to a shared European-American security interest—security being commonly understood as the deterrence of Soviet-Communist aggression by the presence of a capacity to resist if deterrence failed. It is clear that naval power organized for these tasks was not effectively structured for the role of defending sea movement. Fortunately, sea movement was at no time threatened, though it was impeded at one moment by the nationalization of the Suez Canal.

Meanwhile, and in contrast, the seapower of the free world developed a special value in relation to the common economic interests of the free world states. Although European political influence in Africa and the Levant was steadily reduced, the expansion of economic exchanges built up new interrelations. These have generally survived political—and even some military—differences of opinion. And the binding influence has been the seapower of the free world—diffused and undirected as it has been.

Now, in the mid-1960's, although the strategic significance of the Mediterranean is as undetermined as at any time since World War II, it is possible to see a different focus for the application of seapower than the one that has prevailed for some years.

For example, to many analysts, especially to Europeans, the Soviet-Communist threat has receded from a possible to a very remote contingency. But, even more significantly, there has been a shift in the priorities given to national interests—economic growth and development being increasingly rated higher than security. With economic goals as a basic common interest, the focus for the use of seapower needs restatement. The objective should now be described as: (1) maintaining efficient and unrestricted sea movement, and (2) protecting sea movement against every form of interruption. This includes major or minor war, and especially unilateral national actions that block sea routes or create other impediments to movement. With such a focus, naval power would be clearly required to play its part as the defensive component of seapower. The specialized military functions it has been exercising in the Mediterranean would tend, in this context, to become a reserve function for contingency use.

Seapower, however, is not the possession of any one free world state. It is a composite power. Its value and its effective use depend on the maximum coordination of a large number of components, including the present U.S. naval component.

There has never been a clearer case for collaboration, whether for peace, cold war, or major conflict. The purpose is a widely shared one. There would be nothing unequal in a relationship geared to the use of seapower—unlike the relationships in an alliance geared to security. For in fact, the United States depends day in and day out on the composite seapower of the free world in as full a sense as the states of the free world and even many neutral states depend on the naval contribution of the United States. In many respects, the so-called neutral states are the most dependent of all; the smooth working of seapower is most critical for their economic well-being.

The mutuality of the dependence has tended to be obscured—even forgotten by the parties to it (and the United States must definitely be included in this forgetfulness)—by the fact that the naval component is obviously out in front for all to see, while the other equally vital components are dispersed, generally thought of only in other connections, and at all times work in slow, intangible ways. But, try for a minute to spell out the consequences of a breakdown in the operation of seapower. Imagine any one of its numerous components removed. The impact would be quickly felt in the work-a-day world, and any question of serious strategic exploitation would be impossible. The critical importance of even the present loose collaboration within the free world becomes apparent.

Now for the last point—the application of seapower.

Given what has already been said, the question we are asking ourselves is this: For what purposes and in what ways should the free world naval power be used in the Mediterranean in order to ensure that the seapower of the free world will continue to support free world interests?

In the most fundamental sense, the objective is to maintain unrestricted sea movement as essential to the economic well-being and hence to the political stability and military strength of the states of the free world. To put the key objective in these terms is to say that the major threats would take the form of interference with sea movement. Such threats could range from absolute stoppage to small impediments. I suggest that the general types of interference are as follows:

1. A general war involving the United States and Soviet Russia and their allies and associates. This would come as close to an absolute interruption as we need bother about.

2. A local conflict between two or more Mediterranean states. The interruption would be less than absolute, but would have a real impact on the economies of neighboring states.

3. Specific interferences resulting from the policies of individual states.

I shall want to discuss the application of naval power in each of these type situations. But before doing so, we'd better review what the free world has in the way of naval power in the Mediterranean. It is a composite power—a hard core of U.S. naval force structured chiefly for air and amphibious strikes and partially for antisubmarine tasks; joined with this are NATO contributions of smaller units—well adapted for the active defense of sea movement—and support facilities. The feature to concentrate on here is the mutual support required of every component. If all the elements are present and integrated, this composite force represents a power superior to anything that can be brought against it in the Mediterranean. But its value and its usefulness depend on all the components being continuously available. With this in mind, come back to the three types of threat.

General War. The obvious common interest of the free world—an interest that is profitable for neutrals also—is to deter a general war. This role in the Mediterranean has primarily fallen to the U.S. naval component; but make no mistake, the effectiveness of this material contribution would have been much reduced if it had not been for broad policy support by the free world.

Since we are looking at the future, let us assume for the moment that the deterrence role has failed. What then is the role of naval power—now acting as the defensive arm of seapower? The extent to which it might have to play a specialized military combat role is unpredictable. The Mediterranean could either be central or marginal in a general war, depending on the overall strategic pattern that developed. If central, obviously the military functions of naval power would take precedence. If marginal, the maintenance of sea movement would take precedence, and such naval forces as were organized for military combat roles would most likely be drawn away to the central theaters of action.

This brings up a crucial point. It is hard to imagine the Soviet Black Sea squadrons abandoning their defensive tasks and turning up in the Mediterranean as an offensive surface fleet. It is only too easy, however, to foresee Soviet-Communist submarine forces being committed to a strategic destruction of sea movement and creating for the free world an inescapable seapower defense task of considerable proportions. And this, it must be faced, is not a task to which the United States could contribute much as far as the Mediterranean is concerned. Yet the requirement for escort vessels, minesweepers, repair facilities—all available in quantity—would be basic, and the weight of furnishing these essential components would fall on the free world states of the region.

Parenthetically, if the general war were a Far Eastern one, with the Mediterranean free world not involved, while naval power in the Mediterranean would have only a remotely contingent combat function, the maintenance of sea movement would continue to be essential. Again the major burden would fall on the Mediterranean states.

Local Conflict. This could occur in as many varieties as there are states in the Mediterranean with conflicting political goals. But there would be common elements in all such conflicts. First, the actions of the states involved, by restricting general sea movement, would be contrary to the interests of all other states; second, any such conflict—given the uneasy nature of international relations—would contain a potential for expanding to major war. States not involved would accordingly have a common interest in confining, shortening, and resolving the conflict. This interest could be shared for the time being even by states with longer-term political differences.

Again, what is the applicability of naval power? While it cannot do much to prevent such conflict from breaking out, it can, if objectively and judiciously used, have a considerable value in limiting and bringing conflict to an end.

In no conceivable local conflict could the contestants assemble the means seriously to resist the pressures that the noninvolved states could bring to bear on them through the use of seapower. The techniques, of course, could be selected from a range of possible actions scaled from the withdrawal of trading facilities (economic sanctions) through blockade and policing of sea routes to intervention with quick-striking forces. The operational value of this pressure would be that it was exerted by multinational composite seapower in defense of the common interest of the many against the few whose actions were contrary to that interest. It would not be open to the charge—so disagreeable to modern opinion—of a single superior national force coercing smaller nations. The international political value of proceeding in this way, and on this ground, is very great indeed. But, for the kind of use of seapower suggested here, the burden would fall on the contribution of the regional states to the free world naval power. While the combat-ready U.S. contribution would be available, its role would be chiefly to deter intervention from the outside and to act as a reserve force. Since the effectiveness of the local policing forces would be increased by this implied reserve power, note again the essential interplay between the various components.

Specific Interferences. The obvious illustration of the kind of thing I have in mind here is the Egyptian closing of the Suez Canal to Israeli and Israeli-bound shipping. Equivalent interruptions can take a variety of forms—embargoes, customs, delays, nationalization of facilities, exercise of extended sovereignty over territorial waters, etc. Such actions would be deliberate policy decisions and would invariably affect a wide circle of bystander nations. But, above all, whether large or trivial, they would impede or restrict the sea movement which it would be to the general interest to keep as freely flowing as possible.

The free world, as an association of maritime and maritime-linked nations, has a continuing primary interest in unrestricted sea movement. It is not going too far to say that the use of its composite naval power to enforce the freedom of such movement would be a rational long-term free world policy and strategy. What would be the techniques and the requirements for applying naval power for this purpose?

The matter of means is simple. Even now, in spite of shortcomings, the combined civil and military seapower of the free world is adequate to maintain sea movement in the Mediterranean and its approaches. Given a relatively inexpensive buildup in the smaller naval categories, its superiority is not likely to be seriously challenged within the lifetime of any of us. And, especially in the Mediterranean, no one state—scarcely any imaginable group of states—could long withstand the pressure of such power.

Note one thing, however, with respect to means. The kind of naval contribution now made by the United States is out of scale for the sort of pressure envisaged. It is primarily geared to combat and not to what would essentially be a policing-enforcement function. Nor could the United States be expected readily to contribute the kind of forces needed—given other claims on its resources. The sort of contribution required belongs naturally to those states of the free world whose interests are centered in the Mediterranean.

The effective use of means is not, however, a simple matter. On the contrary, it would be difficult and delicate and would call for a great deal of political coordination. Since the power involved is a composite one, it could only be used to support a strategy that is agreed and for a purpose that is commonly shared. This power could not be employed to support the exclusive interest of any one member state—whether that interest was United States or Portuguese, Spanish or British, Turkish or Greek. Any idea that the composite power might be so used would immediately have the effect of breaking the combined strength up into its several national components, no one of which—not even that of the United States—would have a usefulness equal of that of the composite force. However, there is more involved than this. We are talking about a use of seapower that has many of the features of a police operation. That is, we are considering its use in situations where individual action runs counter to the interest of the many. This is familiar enough

in domestic society and is normally dealt with by government using its police power.

International society is admittedly not quite the same thing, although the concept of legal coercion is not entirely absent from international law, especially in maritime affairs. And, here we would have a comparable situation. There would be no question of a powerful state coercing a weaker. It would be a matter of a group of states using their combined power to insist that their common interest in sea movement—an interest, by the way, that is indirectly shared by others—shall not be interfered with. The power, in short, would be applied in a police sense to enforce on a recalcitrant state compliance with a general interest.

Pressure, even force, brought to bear on a local conflict in the name of defending a broad international interest, is a respectable position in international society. It is frequently done through the United Nations in the name of "removing threats to the peace." Its merits in connection with "removing threats to sea movement," exercised judiciously by a large group of maritime states on behalf of international society, is worth close study.

Admittedly, it would be no easy matter to develop an agreed seapower policy and strategy, or to direct and control its application in specific circumstances. Yet the free world has acquired some experience in such things. And the particular collaboration suggested here for the Mediterranean should be less difficult to work out than the infinitely more complex case of the security of Western Europe and the Atlantic area. For one thing, the objective can be clearly stated, readily understood, and commonly shared: it is to maintain essential, unrestricted sea movement against all threats and at all times. For another, the costs of developing and maintaining the means to support this purpose would not be out of proportion for any one contribution. And, finally, no question of inequality of role or influence could easily arise between the contributors. All of the components—merchant ships, naval units, maritime facilities—are equally vital in the structure of seapower and equally critical to the effectiveness of its application. Differences in the kind and scale of the elements contributed are unimportant when their mutual dependence is so easily recognized. Equality of influence is further emphasized by the fact that removal of an element—a Portuguese facility, a Spanish base, an Italian, Greek, or Turkish naval squadron—would lower the usefulness of free world seapower as much as would the withdrawal of the U.S. Sixth Fleet.

I am, of course, speaking of the year-in, year-out strategic application of seapower, and not of the deterrence-security function of naval forces. Yet, looked at objectively, the value to the free world interest of a specialized, combat-oriented naval force in the Mediterranean may be less in the long run than the influence of an adequately equipped, collaboratively organized, and discreetly applied seapower.

Reitzel: Naval Command Course: Seapower in the Mediterranean
BIOGRAPHIC SKETCH

Professor William A. Reitzel was educated at Haverford College and New College, Oxford. He has been Professor of English and Professor of Social Sciences, Haverford College; Director, Historical Society of Pennsylvania; Deputy Director, Yale Institute of International Studies; and Deputy Director, International Studies Group, Brookings Institution. The Professor has held the Nimitz Chair of Social and Political Philosophy at the Naval War College and has been a lecturer at all of the Service Colleges since 1947.

During World War II Professor Reitzel was a Commander in the U.S. Naval Reserve. He served in the European Theater; he was Special Naval Observer, liaison officer with the Free French Committee, and Secretary of the Naval Post Hostilities Committee in London. He also served as an Intelligence Officer in North Africa, was the Assistant Principal Salvage Officer in the Mediterranean, and was Flag Secretary and Political Liaison Officer in the Mediterranean and Germany.

Professor Reitzel served with the Central Intelligence Agency from 1948-50 and was a member of the Advisory Group to the National Board of Estimates, Central Intelligence Agency, from 1954-57. He was also the Senior Civilian, Naval Long-Range Study Project at Newport, R.I., from 1960-65.

For the Yale Institute Professor Reitzel was author of various memoranda and *The Mediterranean, Its Role in U.S. Foreign Policy*. While at the Brookings Institution he was editor and author of various Policy Problem Papers; in addition he published five annual volumes of *Major Problems in U.S. Foreign Policy* and a book entitled *U.S. Foreign Policy*. He was also the project leader for *History of the United Nations Charter* and a staff participant in *Administration of Foreign Affairs* for the Bureau of the Budget and *Administration of Foreign Policy* for a Senate Committee. At the Naval War College the Professor was author of *Background to Decision-Making* and a lecture series on "Logic, Organization, and Administration of the Planning Process."