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Martin Bormann

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However, such particularization tends to weigh the reader down and detract from the message of the book. For one who desires a detailed, comprehensive, perceptive, historical analysis of the development of nationalism in the Balkan States, it would be difficult to find a better study. For the person who wants a short insight into the development of nationalism in the Balkans and its challenges to the Soviet influence and domination, chapters I and II, the afterword, and the postscript on the Czech tragedy are highly recommended reading.

J.W. GRUNENWALD
Commander, U.S. Navy

McGovern, James. *Martin Bormann*.
New York: Morrow, 1968. 237p.

"Recent reports of my death were greatly exaggerated." The foregoing statement, attributed to Mark Twain following a serious illness, could well apply to the subject of McGovern's book, *Martin Bormann*. The number-two Nazi during the final years of the Hitler regime, Bormann was as much of an enigma to his contemporaries as he is to those who are still trying to resolve what happened to him during the last few hours of the fall of Berlin.

The author served in Germany, first with the State Department and then with the Central Intelligence Agency from 1949 through 1954. In 1953 the CIA undertook an investigation of what had happened to Bormann because of an alleged neo-Nazi conspiracy exposed by the British at that time. The author coordinated the investigation through the Berlin office of the CIA. The CIA report was essentially the genesis of this book. It is obvious that the material presented is the result of extensive and careful research. Fortunately, it is easily read and not cluttered with the mass of often digressive footnotes that are found in many books of this type; the background and research materials are covered on a chapter-by-chapter basis in

the rear of the book. Mr. McGovern has given the reader a few new insights into the megalomaniacal atmosphere permeating the seat of power during the last months of the Third Reich. His treatment of the other Nazi leaders is limited but adequate for pointing out how Bormann manipulated the Nazi hierarchy, projecting himself into the position of the second most powerful man in Germany. For the student of Nazi Germany, Mr. McGovern's book should certainly be included among the required readings. In the final chapters of the book, the author cites facts, testimony, and some interesting hypotheses on what happened to the enigmatic Martin Bormann. This reviewer is pleased to report that the author is not a member of the school that claims Bormann is alive, well, and living in Argentina.

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Mnacko, Ladislav. *The Seventh Night*.
New York: Dutton, 1969, e. 1968.
220p.

The tragedy that befell Czechoslovakia in August 1968 was but the latest in a long history of nightmares that the people of that land have experienced. The author of this book has been witness to those occurring in the past three decades. He was 14 at the time of Munich. This betrayal and the subsequent German invasion of his land were etched so deeply in his mind that he turned to communism as the answer for his country—not the realistic communism of Stalin, Khrushchev, and Brezhnev, but some idealistic interpretation of Marx and Lenin that hopefully will lead to that utopian free society in which conflicts do not exist. One can observe how easy it is for the mind steeped in the Communist dialectic to justify the inconsistencies of its political life; the author reflects on such ambivalences as the 1948 coup and consolida-