

1970

Communist China's Policy Toward Latin America

Lucian C. Martinez
U.S. Navy

Follow this and additional works at: <https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review>

Recommended Citation

Martinez, Lucian C. (1970) "Communist China's Policy Toward Latin America," *Naval War College Review*: Vol. 23 : No. 3 , Article 12.
Available at: <https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol23/iss3/12>

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Naval War College Review by an authorized editor of U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons. For more information, please contact repository.inquiries@usnwc.edu.

COMMUNIST CHINA'S POLICY TOWARD LATIN AMERICA

The threat of "wars of national liberation" fostered by China looms larger in the minds of many people than is warranted by the results to date of such efforts. This article relates China's frustrating failure to increase her influence in Latin America, and in doing so it reduces to realistic proportions China's emotional appeal to the underdeveloped nations of the world.

A research paper prepared

by

Commander Lucian C. Martinez, U.S. Navy

School of Naval Command and Staff

INTRODUCTION

Latin America presents Communist China with a large and, from the Chinese view, potentially fruitful target for the expansion of Peking-style communism. This area has been particularly attractive for China inasmuch as it provides an opportunity to score gains in three important aspects of Chinese Communist foreign policy. First, winning diplomatic recognition from the Latin American countries could provide valuable political support for the Peking regime's efforts to become accepted as a major world power. Secondly, the geographical position of the Latin American countries gives them added importance. Chinese inroads in this area would provide valuable footholds in the background of their "implacable"

imperialist enemy—the United States. Finally, the confused and weakened state of many of the Latin American Communist Parties gives promise, for the Chinese, of gaining allies in the Sino-Soviet conflict.

While a broad view has been taken of the area encompassed by the term "Latin America," the emphasis in this paper is essentially on the Spanish-speaking republics, plus Brazil. The other political units—nations and dependencies—of the area have been considered only insofar as they are part of the statistics from which certain generalizations have been made. Cuba, it may be argued, is no republic, but it has been included because of its importance to Peking, both as an early target and later as a competitor of the People's Republic of China.

I—COMMUNIST CHINA AND LATIN AMERICA

Communist China's association with Latin America commenced within weeks after the People's Republic of China (PRC) was proclaimed on 21 September 1949. A delegation of leaders of the Communists' trade union movement in Latin America became the first representatives from that area to visit Peking when they attended a meeting of the World Federation of Trade Unions in the Chinese capital in December 1949.¹ Even before that time, as early as 1947, Mao Tse-tung had indicated an interest in the area, suggestively declaring "that he knew 'the peoples of Latin America are not slaves obedient to U.S. Imperialism.'"²

There were further contacts between Latin American and Chinese delegations at several other international conferences, including a "peace conference" convened in Peking in October 1952.³ This was the "Peace Conference of the Asian and Pacific Regions" which was attended by "representatives from all of the eleven Latin American countries bordering on the Pacific."⁴ There were also a few visits to Peking by various Latin American groups, non-Communist as well as Communist, and a limited amount of trade between the two areas.⁵ These contacts did not, however, develop into any significant relations during the years immediately following. China's slowness in actively pursuing closer relations with Latin America undoubtedly was due to her preoccupation elsewhere. One observer has suggested that "problems related to domestic (i.e., political) and economic consolidation kept China out of Latin America until the late 1950's."⁶ To these internal factors should be added a very important external preoccupation during the period—the Korean war. It is also likely that Peking attached greater importance to extending its influence to areas closer to home, notably Asia,

during the early years of the PRC. Thus, Latin America was not of very high priority at that time.

Initial Approaches. By 1956 the Chinese Communist leaders began to give increasing attention to Latin America and included the countries of that area among those whose struggles for national liberation had struck a sympathetic chord in Peking. Mao Tse-tung, speaking to the Eighth Congress of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) in September 1956 declared that "we must give active support to the national independence and liberation movement in countries in Asia, Africa, and Latin America."⁷ This CCP Congress was the first to be attended by delegations from Latin American countries. Spokesmen for these delegations responded by recognizing the PRC as the colcader, with the Soviet Union, of the Socialist camp in the struggle for international peace and security.⁸

China was thus able to lay the groundwork for acquiring sympathizers in Latin America. The next step was to expand these contacts through greater recognition of China's role both as a world power and as the leader in the struggle against colonialism. While there was little official contact between the two areas, there were informal relations. By 1960 the CPR had established "informal contacts and non-diplomatic relations . . . with all of the 20 republics south of the Rio Grande" as well as with Cuba.⁹

Goals. The aims which the PRC has sought to attain in Latin America are not unique. Rather, they are part of Peking's effort to expand her influence throughout the world and "to reassert China as a leading world power whose voice will be heard and heeded on all major world issues."¹⁰ A Russian analysis of the foreign policy of "Mao and his group" states these goals in stronger terms by asserting that the policy "is

aimed at establishing China's hegemony on a world wide scale."¹¹

Pursuit of this national objective in their contacts with Latin America must be keyed to Peking's limited resources. The main goal is to establish leadership of the revolutionary movements in the area, directing their efforts against Soviet influence there. A second goal is to gain "enhanced prestige and recognition" for the Chinese Communist regime among Latin American officials and "opinion-molding sectors of the population."¹² The development of trade relations has been in furtherance of this goal inasmuch as little progress has been made in the area of diplomatic relations. Finally, the PRC sees in Latin America a fruitful battleground in the continuing struggle against its "implacable foe"—the United States.

An effort to win the loyalty of the approximately 100,000 "overseas Chinese" in Latin America apparently has been undertaken, but this represents, in all probability, a means of achieving the above aims, rather than a specific end in itself. There is no evidence that Peking has made any great headway among these Chinese communities, although "many resident Chinese in Cuba have proven loyal supporters of the Castro revolution and have also been receptive to Chinese Communist influence in Cuba."¹³ However, not much is known about the CPR's relations with Chinese communities throughout the rest of Latin America. The longstanding relations maintained by these countries with the Nationalist Chinese Government would tend to give the latter an advantage in the battle for the "hearts and minds" of the overseas Chinese in that area.

Recognition by Cuba. The PRC presently has diplomatic relations with only one Latin American country—Cuba. No other Latin American government has even recognized the Peking regime. Through the establishment of

such relations with the Fidel Castro government, Communist China gained its first beachhead in the Western Hemisphere. Until September of 1960, Cuba had maintained diplomatic relations with the Nationalist Chinese Government on Taiwan, and there had been few contacts with the Communist government on the mainland. By the middle part of the year, however, Castro had established unofficial relations with Peking.

In July, following the cancellation by the United States of sugar imports from Cuba, Havana and Peking signed a trade agreement which provided that China would purchase an annual average of a half million tons of sugar for the next 5 years in order to save Cuba "from an economic crisis originating from the rupture of economic relations with the United States."¹⁴ The political overtones of the agreement were emphasized by the fact that the Chinese sent a high-ranking official—their Vice Minister of Foreign Trade—to sign the agreement.

A delegation from the Chinese Communist Party attended the Cuban People's Socialist Party Congress in Havana in August 1960. In the same month, a bureau of the New China News Agency (NCNA) was established in the Cuban capital. This action paved the way for the establishment of diplomatic relations between the two countries, with the negotiations being handled by the head of the NCNA bureau.¹⁵

In September, Castro announced recognition of the People's Republic of China, relations were broken with the Nationalist Government of Chiang Kai-shek, and formal diplomatic relations between Havana and Peking were established later in the month. The Chinese Communist regime had gained a "legitimate" foothold in Latin America.

Inroads and Failures. Recognition by Cuba remains Peking's sole diplomatic gain in the area, although it appeared

for a time that further progress might be made. Following its success with Havana, the PRC directed its attention toward Brazil. The Chinese apparently considered this sprawling giant to the south a target of special interest, in view of its size and importance.

The Chinese "sought to influence selected leaders to expand contacts . . . by direct state-to-state relations."¹⁶ Visits to China were arranged for Brazilian non-Communists: leftist writers, politicians, labor and peasant leaders, most of whom were received personally by either Mao Tse-tung or Chou En-lai.

In August 1961, the Brazilian Vice President, Joao Goulart, traveled to Peking to complete negotiations on a Sino-Brazilian Trade Agreement. During the welcoming ceremonies, T'ung Pi-wu, PRC vice chairman, indicated his government's desire for closer ties to Brazil, declaring, "The better our two big countries cooperate and the deeper the friendship between our two peoples, the greater will be the role we may play in international affairs." Goulart replied "that not only would his visit 'contribute to closer relations between Brazil and China' but that 'we can and certainly will be good friends!'"¹⁷ These words took on greater emphasis with the sudden resignation of the Brazilian President while Goulart was on his trip to China and the latter's inauguration as President in September 1961.

Under Goulart's administration "the official attitude toward the PRC was moderately friendly."¹⁸ The Chinese set up their first trade mission in Latin America, as well as a branch of the New China News Agency.¹⁹ By February 1964 there were rumors that Brazil would become the second Latin American country to recognize the Chinese Communist government. Even an official denial of these rumors did not close the door completely to such a move:

A [Brazilian] Foreign Ministry spokesman described today as "speculation" a report that President Joao Goulart was preparing to recognize Communist China within three months. He added that there was "nothing positive" in the report . . . "*This does not mean that we may never recognize Red China,*" the spokesman added.²⁰

The Brazilian military, fearing Communist infiltration into the administration and disliking Goulart's leftward swing, overthrew the Government the following April. In the aftermath of the coup, raids were carried out on suspected Communist centers. On the basis of evidence allegedly discovered during the raids, the Chinese trading mission was accused of having engaged in paying various Brazilian officials while carrying out their infiltration activities. A ledger showing the payoffs reportedly was found by the police.²¹ As a result, the trade mission and NCNA offices were closed down. Nine Chinese, including two NCNA representatives, were arrested, sentenced to jail, and subsequently deported.

The efforts of these Chinese officials apparently went far beyond trade and propaganda. "Among other things they were charged with plotting assassinations of public officials and planning to provide sizeable amounts of cash to Brazilians plotting an armed struggle against the military."²² The Chinese were formally charged with crimes against Brazilian national security, specifically: "conspiracy against the regime, envisaging the implantation of Chinese communism in Brazil." One observer comments that some of the evidence used as justification for the arrests "may have been weak," but concludes that there were sufficient indications of the suspicious nature of their activities.²³ The Chinese Communist

government objected vigorously to the arrest of their representatives and to the accusation of their involvement in subversive activities. The net result was a severe setback to Peking's drive for influence in Brazil.

Three years later a similar situation occurred in Mexico, and once more the Chinese were involved. The Mexican Government reported foiling "a plot financed from Communist China that had sought to establish a 'popular Socialist' regime in Mexico." The persons arrested reportedly were preparing subversive actions throughout the country. Although no Chinese representatives were among those arrested, the Mexican branch of NCNA was reported to be "the channel through which Peking was sending \$1,680 a month to finance armed rebellion."²⁴

A bookstore owned by a pro-Chinese former leader of the Mexican Communist Party allegedly was the center of the subversive activities. The Mexican Justice Department reported that "12 tons of books, films, and printed materials, including the writings of Mao Tse-tung, were confiscated . . . some of the materials contained instructions on guerrilla tactics."²⁵

Once more, Communist China protested the accusation that their representatives were involved in subversive activities. Peking pointed out, perhaps with some justification, that the bookstore in question was a legitimate commercial outlet in Mexico for Chinese publications. Consequently, it was to be expected that books and other publications printed in China would be found there. Furthermore, Chinese publications had been on sale in Mexico for more than 10 years.²⁶ The NCNA chief correspondent in Mexico also protested vigorously against "shameless vilifications and serious political provocations" against China contained in the Mexican Government's statement. He went on to charge that the real aim was "to prevent the spreading of Mao Tse-tung's thought

in Mexico."²⁷ As in the Brazilian case, Peking's protests were ignored.

One commentator has suggested that the timing of the arrests and the wide publicity given to them indicated that the Mexicans had deeper motives than merely unmasking a Peking-directed plot against the state:

The Mexican Government is making a demonstration of it as a warning to the Communist activists of Latin America who are now passing through here to Cuba for a meeting of the "Organization of Latin American Solidarity." Castro is gathering the revolutionaries and the Mexican Government is merely letting them know that they better be careful.²⁸

Regardless of the Mexican Government's motives, the disclosure of Chinese involvement was another setback for Peking.

Other allegations of Chinese involvement in subversion in Latin America appear from time to time. For example, a report from Venezuela: "The Defense Ministry announced today the capture of 12 pro-Communist guerrillas and the confiscation of Chinese propaganda material."²⁹ Reports such as these can have only adverse effects on the PRC's efforts to improve state-to-state relations with Latin American countries.

On the diplomatic front, the PRC has met with setbacks of its own making. In late 1966 the Peking government rejected a Mexican-sponsored United Nations plan for the designation of a nuclear-free zone in Latin America. The Chinese based their rejection on their refusal to have any dealings with the U.N. or any of its activities. This move "caused surprise and anger among Latin American governments" which believed that the proposal would contribute greatly to world peace. Mexico, as well as other supporters of the proposal, had

expected China to favor it, "or at least be noncommittal, if only in the hope of winning Latin American goodwill in its bid for membership to the United Nations."³⁰

Peking's shortsighted rejection of the Latin American bid for the denuclearization of their area undoubtedly hurt its program of gaining friends among those governments. At present, the only official PRC presence in Latin America, other than Cuba, is a trade mission in Chile.

Summary. Communist China has expressed interest in and had unofficial dealings with Latin America almost from the inception of the PRC. Peking's move into the area, however, did not begin in earnest until well into the 1950's. The exchange of ambassadors with Cuba is the one diplomatic success among those countries. Other efforts to win goodwill at the governmental level generally have met with limited or no success. Even relations with Cuba have not been uniformly smooth and, indeed, have produced serious difficulties. Nevertheless, the PRC has continued its drive for influence in the area at two levels: overtly, through culture and trade, and covertly, through ideological penetration of the area's Communist Parties.

II—CULTURE AND TRADE: INSTRUMENTS FOR INFLUENCE

Communist China has used the instruments of culture and trade to facilitate its penetration of Latin America. The purpose is to exploit cultural and economic contacts for the establishment of closer relations with the Latin American countries.

Peking has made a great effort to familiarize the people of Latin America with China and her accomplishments by means of cultural exchanges and propaganda.

Cultural Exchanges. The Peking regime has relied to a great extent on a people-to-people program which they call "people's diplomacy." One writer has described this as

... the by-passing of normal diplomatic channels in favor of contacts made through various unofficial organizations concerned with trade, labor, cultural relations and so on, as well as through "friendship societies" especially established to make such contacts . . . In practice "people's diplomacy" means the reception in Peking of a constant procession of delegates from every walk of life . . . as well as the dispatch of a variety of delegates abroad.¹

The Chinese People's Association for Cultural Relations with Foreign Countries, established in 1950, has primary responsibility for supervising and directing these cultural exchanges.² This organization is headed by Chu Tu-nan, who has been actively involved in China's efforts to establish closer ties with Latin America.

During the decade following the establishment of the PRC, invitations were extended to prominent individuals in Latin America to visit China. Conducted political tours were set up for Latin American delegations which were composed mainly of intellectuals, journalists, trade unionists, and professional people. Not all of those invited to visit the PRC were Communists. A considerable number of "left wing intellectuals, professional men, and politicians have enjoyed Peking's hospitality in recent years. Student and labor groups have also received red-carpet guided tours of selected areas of China."³ Among the visitors have been various governmental officials and groups. "From mid-1956 to the end of 1959, officials or groups of officials from nine

countries in Latin America visited China, including such personages as the ex-President of Mexico, the former Vice President of Chile and the former President of the Chamber of Deputies in Bolivia."⁴

From 1956 on, Latin Americans began to visit China in great numbers. A total of 37 delegations visited China in 1958, and 2 years later the number had increased to 168.⁵ The individuals composing these delegations numbered in the hundreds. Although students have been among the visiting delegations, there is a lack of reliable information on how many have remained to attend schools in Communist China, but it is believed to be few in number.⁶

Not all of the visitors have been favorably impressed with what they saw in the PRC. One of the first students to visit China "was horrified at the conditions he found," and departed "after being denounced as a 'reactionary'" by the Chinese. A more important critic, an influential Chilean senator, expressed disapproval of the lack of religious liberty under the Communist regime.⁷

By and large, however, the visitors have left China with favorable opinions of the PRC. Many of these travelers, on their return, write articles and books and give talks about China. In general these are not only without criticism but almost uniformly praise the PRC or at least show, as one writer has put it, "a grudging admiration for it."⁸ Many of the parliamentary members who visited China have "started to advocate 'normal relations' with Peking" upon returning home.⁹

China started sending cultural groups to Latin America in 1956. The first of these was the Peking Opera, led by Chu Tu-nan, which made a highly successful tour of Chile, Brazil, Argentina, and Uruguay. The role of the opera itself was to present traditional Chinese art to the audiences. But, there were many opportunities to propagandize. Chu was received by high government officials in

the countries visited. The achievements of the PRC were extolled in press conferences, and propaganda materials were distributed.

The opera troupe was followed 2 years later by a group of acrobats which toured the same four countries. During this tour, the delegation engaged in somewhat more overt propaganda efforts. Exhibitions of Chinese paintings and photographs were arranged to coincide with the appearances of the acrobats. Visits were made to local government and civic leaders. Efforts were made to maneuver these people "into expressing, on a personal basis at least, views favorable toward the establishment of trade and/or diplomatic relations with mainland China."¹⁰

These representatives of traditional Chinese artistry were followed in ensuing years by delegations of scientists, students, journalists, trade unionists, et cetera. Since Castro's assumption of power in Cuba, China's cultural efforts in Latin America have become more pronounced. During the period 1961-62, some 50 major delegations were sent to 18 countries, and "at one time or another Peking had some kind of exchange with practically every Latin American nation."¹¹ The pace slackened in later years with a marked decline in Chinese cultural presentations and exhibits. The only recent activity of this kind was a 1967 exhibition in Mexico of reproductions of Chinese paintings, photographs of factories, and propaganda posters.

In addition to sending delegations to Latin America, Peking also encouraged cultural groups from those countries to visit China. A Chilean folk art exhibit and a Mexican art show traveled to the PRC under the sponsorship of the Chinese People's Association for Cultural Relations with Foreign Countries. Subsequent visits were made by a Colombian song and dance group as well as other Latin American artists and writers.¹²

The exchange of visits helped to pave the way for the more traditional propaganda efforts. These visits provided a basis for familiarity with the PRC and, hopefully, assured greater receptivity for China's more overt propaganda programs.

PRC Propaganda. Peking has relied heavily on propaganda as a means of acquainting the Latin Americans with its version of the achievements of mainland China under the Communist regime. Chinese propaganda also has played up internal problems in Latin American countries, such as peasant uprisings and guerrilla activity, as well as disagreements between those nations and the United States. Direct anti-American and anti-Russian attacks are also emphasized. The PRC utilizes several media to tell its story; these include the official New China News Agency, radio broadcasts beamed to Latin America, various publications, and binational or "friendship" associations.

New China News Agency. A major spokesman for Chinese propaganda is the New China News Agency (NCNA), or *Hsinhua*, which "carries the official voice of Peking to foreign readers and is the most often cited source in foreign correspondents' stories about China."¹³ It has been described quite aptly as a "link" in the chain of communication between the people of China and the outside world. Despite its name, NCNA's activities are not limited to news gathering and dissemination. Its responsibilities include trade and cultural relations, and it has engaged in diplomatic activities. It serves as an unofficial "channel for contact with leftist or communist groups," and in some countries, as a vehicle for providing funds to pro-Peking organizations. Included in the latter are financially weak but politically sympathetic newspapers. The NCNA undoubtedly has an intelligence collection mission, also. In this

role, it can be a primary source of information for the PRC leaders, particularly in Latin America where China has such limited official representation.¹⁴

NCNA officially arrived on the Latin American scene following visits there by a group of Chinese journalists in 1959 and another in 1960. The agency opened a bureau in Havana and hired local newsmen as stringer correspondents in several other countries. NCNA also set up a cooperative arrangement with the Cuban press agency, *Prensa Latina*. Subsequently, bureaus were established in Chile and Mexico, but the latter one is now closed. During the past decade, offices in several other countries have been opened, some of which have since closed.

NCNA news releases are disseminated in some countries by pro-Peking groups. In Bolivia, for example, the releases are issued in mimeographed form by the Chinese-line Bolivian Communist Party.¹⁵ NCNA's representation in Latin America (excluding Cuba) at the end of 1967 is shown in table I.

TABLE I—NCNA REPRESENTATIVES IN LATIN AMERICA—1967

Argentina	SU/DU
Bolivia	C/D
Chile	B/D
Colombia	S/D
Panama	DU
Peru	S
Uruguay	S/D
Legend: B - Bureau or office	
C - Correspondent	
S - Stringer	
D - Distribution of news services	
U - Unofficial	

Source: U.S. Information Agency, "Communist Propaganda Activities in Latin America—1967," Unpublished report (Washington: 30 April 1968).

Radio. Shortwave broadcasting is the principal mass medium open to the PRC for disseminating its propaganda. Since

1957 Radio Peking has been beaming Spanish language broadcasts to the Latin American countries. From a total of 7 hours weekly in the first year of operation, these broadcasts rose to 21 hours weekly by 1959 and subsequently to 28 hours, where they have remained for several years. The Chinese interest in Brazil was underscored by the addition of Portuguese language broadcasts, which kept increasing until they equaled the Spanish language effort in 1966. The Portuguese language broadcasts were cut in half the following year with the initiation of broadcasts in two Chinese dialects. The weekly totals of Chinese broadcasts to Latin America in recent years are shown in table II.

TABLE II—CHINESE BROADCASTS TO LATIN AMERICA
(Hours per week)

Languages	1965	1966	1967
Spanish	28	28	28
Portuguese	10%	28	14
Cantonese	--	--	14
Mandarin	--	--	14
Total	38%	56	70

Source: U.S. Information Agency.

The principal purpose of the broadcasts is to promote China and the Chinese brand of communism as well as to foster anti-Americanism. These broadcasts give extensive coverage to political and social movements in Latin America, but the reports, although fairly accurate, are not presented objectively.¹⁶

Publications. The written word is yet another aspect of China's propaganda effort in Latin America. Written materials include not only those published and distributed within Latin America, but also many imported from mainland China itself.

After a tour of Latin America in 1959 by Chinese journalists, a Spanish edition of the pictorial *China Re-*

constructs, printed in Montevideo and Havana, began to circulate widely in Latin America.¹⁷ Other Chinese periodicals followed soon after its appearance. The most important of these has been the Spanish language edition of *Peking Review*, a weekly magazine. In recent years it "has been a repository of Chinese anti-Russian attacks," although it also "reports about developments on the mainland and prints anti-Western attacks."¹⁸

The pro-Peking Communist Parties in Latin America are generally the principal channels utilized by the PRC to disseminate its publications. The latter are sold freely, however, in certain countries with liberal press laws, such as Chile, Uruguay, and Mexico. PRC magazines can also be received by subscribers in a number of countries.¹⁹

Books and pamphlets in Spanish on Chinese culture, the writings of Mao Tse-tung, and speeches by Chinese leaders are distributed throughout Latin America. In most countries there is at least one Chinese-oriented bookstore. Uruguay has been the principal distribution point for such materials.²⁰

China's Spanish language book output has greatly increased since the commencement of the polemics with the Soviet Union. The target audiences for these publications differ, however, from that of the mass-appeal weekly and monthly periodicals. The books are directed primarily at "university students and professors, secondary and normal school students and instructors, and intellectuals in general."²¹

Pro-Peking indigenous newspapers and periodicals are an indirect voice for the PRC. These are found in all of the principal Latin American countries, with the exception of Mexico. In some countries where the publications are officially banned, they are issued clandestinely.

Binational Associations. Accompanying the PRC's efforts to impress the

Latin American countries with achievements of the Communist regime by means of exchange programs and propaganda was the establishment of bi-national associations in Latin America. These so-called friendship associations or cultural centers and institutes are authorized by the host governments and have the common purpose of promoting friendship with Communist China.

These groups began to appear in the 1950's, and by 1960 there were about 25 societies in nine countries (Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Cuba, Ecuador, Mexico, and Uruguay). Among the older and larger ones were the Chilean Chinese Cultural Institute (1952), the Mexican Society for Friendship with People's China (1953), the Chinese-Brazilian Cultural Society (1954), and the Argentine Association of Chinese Culture (1955).²² By 1967 the associations in Argentina, Brazil, and Ecuador had been disestablished.

To coordinate the activities of the various agencies maintaining contact with Latin America, a Chinese-Latin American Friendship Association (CLAFA) was established in Peking in 1960. The organization's unstated objective was "to do its best to support the struggles of the Latin American peoples and to promote friendship, unity, and cultural and economic exchange." An old friend of Latin America, Chu Tu-nan, was appointed president of the association and was given seven vice-presidents, a council of 116 members, and a standing committee of 30 to assist him.²³

Many of the Latin American visitors to China after March 1960 made the trip under the auspices of this new organization. As noted earlier, the number of Latin American delegations visiting China increased significantly in 1960. This rise, in all likelihood, reflected the efforts by CLAFA to promote increased travel between the two areas.

In promoting "unity" with Latin America, CLAFA seeks to foster an

identity of views between those countries and China about the relevance to the former of the Chinese experience. During the celebrations of the PRC's 11th anniversary in the autumn of 1960, delegations from 15 Latin American countries signed statements of "solidarity." One of these, the "Declaration on National Friendship Associations of the Latin American Countries and China" testified to their common view that the PRC's struggle "against imperialism and feudal backwardness" and its efforts to build a new China "is of extraordinary significance to all Latin America."²⁴

Trade. Trade for the PRC has been motivated by political as well as economic factors. Most of the trade has been one-sided, however, consisting primarily of Chinese purchase of various commodities such as wheat, cotton, copper, and nitrates, which Latin America is eager to sell.

For more than a decade prior to 1964, trade between the two areas (Cuba excepted) was at a low level, although there had been some limited transactions between the PRC and Chile, Argentina, and Uruguay.²⁵ In 1960 it appeared as though the PRC was interested in moving into the Latin American markets. Peking stated, in a propaganda broadcast in October of that year, that China wanted that area's "rich industrial raw materials and mineral products." In exchange, China would send products whose "high quality . . . has won them a very good reputation."²⁶

Despite these words, there was little expansion of trade with Latin America. A Sino-Brazilian trade agreement was signed in 1961, and the Brazilians agreed to the establishment of a permanent Chinese trade mission in their country. These commercial relations suffered a setback 3 years later when the Chinese trade representatives were jailed following a military coup.

In 1964, however, there was a "dramatic upswing in the value of Latin American products sold to China." The turning point was a Chinese Commercial Exhibition held in Mexico City from December 1963 to January 1964, under the sponsorship of the Chinese Council for the Promotion of Foreign Trade, the organization which is responsible for "promoting trade abroad and setting up exhibitions in foreign countries." During the exhibition, China placed orders for Mexican cotton and wheat worth \$58 million.²⁷

At about the same time as these transactions, the Chinese announced their intention to purchase large quantities of Argentine grain. By 1964 approximately \$50 million of wheat had been sold to China at slightly above the current world prices, and China also purchased beef from Argentina.

Chile has also had substantial commercial dealings with Communist China. A Chinese trade mission was established there in 1962 and, except for Cuba, is the only one in Latin America. The PRC has placed several orders for copper and nitrates and offered at one point to purchase an additional 1 million tons of nitrate, but this amount exceeded the Chilean production capability.²⁸

It is difficult to determine the exact value of trade annually between China and Latin America. While trade agreements and large-scale purchases such as those cited in the preceding paragraphs receive great notice, other transactions probably are carried out with less attention. An official French report commenting on Sino-Mexican trade had the following to say on this point:

In the past, Mexican exporters have realized important sales in China through the intermediary of Swiss firms, but it has not been possible to distinguish these from other Mexican exports to Switzerland. In 1963, for example, when exports to China were officially

valued at "less than 50,000 dollars," an informed observer reported that at least 35,000 bales of Mexican cotton with a minimum value of 5 million dollars had been sold to China.²⁹

It is not unreasonable to postulate that other Latin American countries have had similar dealings with China through a variety of intermediaries.

Aside from economics, the PRC is politically motivated to develop commercial ties with Latin America. It has been suggested that with China's official diplomacy limited to Cuba, "Peking's aim has been to develop trade relations with various Latin American countries in lieu of diplomatic ones."³⁰ PRC trade representatives have played political roles at times. As previously noted, the Chinese delegation in Brazil was accused of involvement in subversive activities. The Chinese commercial representative in Chile, likewise, has been suspected of attempting "to develop Chinese relations with elements in the Socialist-Communist alliance, the *Frente para Accion Popular* (FRAP)."³¹

Thus far, however, the PRC has realized minimal political benefits from its commercial relations with Latin America. Trade ties have not led to diplomatic recognition. It has been necessary for Peking to go beyond official state-to-state relations in attempting to gain a measure of influence in Latin America.

III—CHINESE MODEL FOR LATIN AMERICAN COMMUNISM

Latin American Communist Parties, from their beginnings until a decade ago, looked to the Soviet Union for ideological guidance, i.e., "the party line," as did nearly all Communist Parties throughout the world. For them the only communism was Russian communism. In the late 1950's two new

elements were introduced into the relationships between the national Communist Parties in Latin America and the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU). These new factors were Communist China's push for influence in Latin America and the success of Fidel Castro's revolution in Cuba and its subsequent conversion into a "socialist republic." The result of these events has been a fragmentation of leadership and international loyalties within the various Latin American Communist Parties. In addition to its drive to establish a presence in Latin America, the PRC is striving for ideological leadership of the Communist Parties as well as of the non-Communist revolutionary movements of the area.

China's Ideological Campaign. The Chinese Communists have long aspired to leadership over the Communist movements of the underdeveloped countries. Their country "offers itself in Asia, Africa, and Latin America as the would-be leader of the 'have-not' nations against the 'haves.' It woos poor and underdeveloped countries . . ." At one point it appeared they hoped to have these areas, in effect, assigned to them as "spheres of ideological influence." Chinese writers published articles boldly proclaiming the PRC's qualifications for such leadership. One observer, commenting on these articles, has concluded that "... the Chinese Communists were telling the Russians not only that they wanted a change in Soviet strategy" in these countries, "but also that the Russians should turn over the revolution in these areas to Peking."²

As early as 1956 the Chinese had begun to solicit the support of the Latin American Communists. Latin America delegates to the 20th Congress of the CPSU in Moscow "were invited for a prolonged stay to China, where they were received by Mao Tse-tung and Liu Shao-chi." The meeting with the Chinese leaders particularly impressed

the visitors. One member of the Latin American delegation contrasted this with the treatment in Moscow where he was not "received even by the most obscure member of the Central Committee" of the CPSU.³

China's ideological approach to the Latin Americans is two sided. On the one hand, the PRC espouses the cause of world communism and the struggle against imperialism. On the other, the Chinese Communists insist that they are "better Marxists than the Russians, more fitted to lead the Communist world, and ultimately to lead it to total victory."⁴

The Chinese have also made a bid to win the support of small leftist groups, outside of the Communist Parties, collectively dubbed by an analyst of Latin American politics as the "Jacobin left." These groups share the characteristics of "being xenophobically nationalistic, favoring social revolution at whatever cost, and being either disparaging toward political democracy or violently opposed to it." These leftists are generally young, with all "the rashness of youth," have no traditional ties to the Soviet Union, and little influence among the people. They are willing to side with opponents and "to engage in the kind of guerrilla activities and urban terrorism which the Chinese advocate."⁵

University students are another segment that are an attractive target for Peking's ideological offensive. Latin American universities for decades have been centers of leftist thought with a long tradition of student participation in political activities. In recent years the leanings of the students have been toward the Communists.⁶ The Chinese have had some success with the student groups. One writer, commenting on Peru's establishment of universities in remote regional centers, has observed that "where student federations have been established they are already dominated by Peking-line communist sympathizers."⁷

The two dominant themes in China's ideological campaign are revolution and racism. The latter is particularly appealing, from the Chinese viewpoint, because it has the added benefit of being directed at the Soviets.

Revolution. It has been long part of the Chinese Communist dogma that the "inevitable world-wide victory of socialism can come only through revolutionary struggle."⁸ They have scorned the efforts of some Communist Parties to assume power by nonviolent, legal means and have accused the Soviet Union not only of failing to support revolutionary movements, but of actually selling them out in order to arrive at an accommodation with the United States. The result, according to Peking, is that more revolutionaries are adopting the Chinese philosophy on the seizure of political power by armed force.

The "peaceful transition" and "Parliamentary road" swindles peddled by the revisionists have become increasingly discredited among the people. More and more revolutionaries have come to understand through their own experience in struggle that revolutionary armed struggle is the only sure road to victory for the Latin American people's revolution.⁹

The Chinese have declared that certain conditions must exist before "the revolution can break out," and these conditions most probably will occur in "the backward regions," of which Latin America is one. Premier Chou En-lai, in an interview, stated that Communist China has given primary consideration to the underdeveloped countries because they represent the most likely areas for revolutions to take place. He asserted that:

... there are regions where an objective revolutionary situation

exists, due to the frenzied oppressions of imperialism and the troubles which it creates everywhere. This state of things will certainly hasten still more the advent of future revolutions. This is why such regions must secure our main attention.¹⁰

He had already pointed out quite clearly that Latin America was one of those "regions where an objective revolutionary situation exists." In a speech made during a tour of African countries in mid-1965, Chou declared that Latin America, as well as Asia and Africa, was "ripe for revolution."¹¹

In 1965 Chinese Defense Minister Lin Piao issued a major policy statement in which he urged underdeveloped countries to wage a "people's war" against the capitalist countries. He stated that the "whole cause of world revolution hinges on the revolutionary struggles of the Asian, African, and Latin American peoples" and that it is the "internationalist duty" of the socialist countries to support these struggles.¹²

These statements by Chinese leaders appeared to indicate that China was willing to support revolutionary movements in the underdeveloped areas. They struck a responsive chord among the extreme radicals in Latin American countries where "pro-Peking groups dream of winning power the way Mao Tse-tung did—through a revolution carried out by armies formed from peasants."¹³

If the Latin American revolutionaries expected Peking to take an immediate active part in their armed struggles as a result of these statements by providing material and organizational support, however, they were doomed to disappointment. Lin had also made clear in his statement that revolutions were not exportable and could be won only by the people of the countries in which they were undertaken.

Racism. The Chinese Communists have interjected racism into their ideological campaign in Latin America, as well as in Asia and Africa, in attempting to mobilize the brown and yellow races against the whites. One writer has commented that the "deliberate use of racism as a major political weapon" is "perhaps the most ominous element in China's current strategy."¹⁴ He charges that Peking has changed the class struggle to a race struggle:

The Chinese have abandoned Marx's teachings about the opposition of labor and capital and have replaced it with a racist doctrine that seeks to set the non-white people of Asia, Africa, and Latin America against the white people of the Soviet Union, Europe, and North America.¹⁵

Communist China's reliance on racism is heavily influenced by its desire to exclude the Russians from any new groupings of Communist Parties or revolutionary movements in Latin America, Asia, and Africa. As nonwhites themselves, the Chinese believe that they are in a favored position to gain the leadership of the revolutionary struggles of the colored peoples of the world.

Impact of Sino-Soviet Split. The conflict between the Chinese and the Soviets over the leadership of the world Communist movement, particularly in the underdeveloped areas, has had the effect of weakening the Latin American parties. The Chinese have attempted to subvert the leadership of parties loyal to Moscow. The PRC's aim, at first, may have been merely to gain the support of the Latin American parties against the Soviet Union and not necessarily to pressure them to change their policies. As one writer has commented, "All it asked of them was their vote in the councils of world communism."¹⁶ Failing in this, Peking sought to split the

parties and to unite the pro-Chinese factions with other radical leftist groups in true "Marxist-Leninist" movements. The objective is to replace the Soviets as the dominant influence in Latin American communism.

Serious defections from the "orthodox," i.e., Moscow-oriented, Communist Parties have occurred. Long-smoldering differences within these parties have resulted in the creation of separate Peking-line parties in several Latin American countries. In the other countries, the orthodox parties have experienced severe factional splits. The ideological basis for the dispute among the Latin American Communist factions generally has paralleled the worldwide Sino-Soviet split over the proper strategy to be followed in the underdeveloped countries. The Chinese "convictions concerning the absolute necessity of violence and continuous struggle, clash bitterly with the Russian doctrine of 'peaceful co-existence' parroted by the orthodox Latin American parties."¹⁷

Splinter Parties. The first open split along Sino-Soviet lines in Latin America took place in Brazil. A pro-Peking Communist Party was formed in early 1962 by a sizable faction which broke away from the Soviet-aligned Brazilian Communist Party. The dissidents, led by a group who had been expelled from the official party, set up a rival organization, the Communist Party of Brazil, apparently with financial support from the PRC.¹⁸ This antedated Peking's decision to split Communist Parties on a worldwide basis. The leaders of the new party prided themselves on grasping the significance of the Sino-Soviet conflict when most of "the 'revolutionary' communists did not yet understand" its importance.¹⁹

A similar split occurred in Peru when the "first officially recognized pro-Chinese splinter party in Latin America" was founded, allegedly by a majority of the members of the Central

Committee and of representatives of most of the regional committees of the orthodox Peruvian Communist Party.²⁰ This group held an unauthorized party conference in January 1964 and summarily "expelled" the party leadership. Since then there have been two organizationally separate parties, one pro-Chinese and the other pro-Soviet, although both use the same name.

Peking has officially recognized only one other pro-Chinese splinter party in Latin America—a faction of the Colombian Communist Party. This group formed the Communist Party of Colombia/Marxist Leninist, which has since devoted a large part of its energies to attacking the pro-Soviet party.

Splits of varying significance have occurred in several other Latin American Communist Parties. Such splinter groups have been formed in Chile, Ecuador, Bolivia, Paraguay, Mexico, and the Dominican Republic, but Peking has failed to give formal recognition to the new factions. Nevertheless, the Chinese have given their blessing and, undoubtedly, financial support to these groups and have held them as examples to be emulated. According to Peking,

These parties or organizations emphasize the need to build the party according to Mao Tse-tung's thought. This newborn force is the hope of Latin America and the road it has pledged itself to follow—the road of Mao Tse-tung—represents the correct orientation for the Latin American revolution.²¹

The fragmentation of these parties has not benefited the Communist movement, as a whole, in Latin America. The Chinese have been more interested in gaining ground in the Sino-Soviet contest through the loyalties of Communist Parties than in promoting the anti-imperialist struggle. The Latin American parties are generally small and in-

effectual, and internal dissension, if continued, can only lead to further decline.

Survey of Latin American Communist Parties. The one success for Communist China in its efforts to win the support of Latin American Communist Parties has taken place in Peru. As previously noted, pro-Chinese elements overthrew the pro-Russian leadership and seized control of the regular party. Peru remains the only Latin American country where a pro-Chinese faction is the principal Communist group.

A summary of the alignments of the Latin American Communist Parties as of January 1967 is presented in table III. The membership shown is an estimated total which includes all Communist factions in each country. Each party is characterized according to the positions taken by its leadership. The designation "pro-Soviet" does not mean that there are no dissident factions in the party, but merely indicates that it adheres to the policy positions taken by Moscow. "Open split" means that there are two or more parties, at least one of which is pro-Soviet and one pro-Chinese. The term "Independent" is applied to Cuba to indicate that it is critical of both Moscow and Peking rather than neutral in the sense of avoiding trouble with either of them.²²

Competition from Castro. The contest for the leadership of Latin American revolutionary movements is not limited to the two giants of international communism. Castro's Cuba has become a formidable rival for the loyalties of these groups. Pro-Castro elements, both within and outside of the Communist Parties are active in most of the Latin American countries. The Cuban leader has given "increasingly open support to the dissident or radical communist groups" which are "willing to follow his exhortations to violence."²³

Failure to effect close cooperation

TABLE III—SURVEY OF LATIN AMERICAN COMMUNIST PARTIES

Country	Membership	Legal Status	Sino-Soviet Dispute
Argentina	60,000	Illegal	Pro-Soviet
Bolivia	13,500	Legal	Open split
Brazil	20,000	Illegal	Open split
Chile	30,000	Legal	Pro-Soviet
Colombia	10,000	Legal	Open split
Costa Rica	450	Illegal	Pro-Soviet
Cuba	60,000	In power	Independent
Dominican Republic	1,300	Illegal	Open split
Ecuador	1,500	Illegal	Open split
El Salvador	200	Illegal	Pro-Soviet
Guatemala	1,000	Illegal	Pro-Soviet
Haiti	unknown	Illegal	Pro-Soviet
Honduras	1,300	Illegal	Pro-Soviet
Mexico	5,250	Legal	Open split
Nicaragua	200	Illegal	Pro-Soviet
Panama	500	Illegal	Pro-Soviet
Paraguay	5,000	Illegal	Open split
Peru	5,000	Illegal	Open split
Uruguay	15,000	Legal	Pro-Soviet
Venezuela	10,000	"Suspended"	Neutral

Source: U.S. Dept. of State, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, *World Strength of the Communist Party Organizations* (Washington: U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1967), p. 1-6, 8.

with the Cubans has been a bitter disappointment for the Chinese. At one time they nurtured the hope of making Castro a disciple of Peking-style communism.²⁴ They saw a similarity between the Cuban revolution and their own, and Castro's emphasis on the use of force throughout Latin America was particularly appealing to the Chinese. But Peking's relations with Havana suffered a severe setback in early 1966. The Cuban Premier accused Peking of attempting to subvert Cuba's Armed Forces and civilian officials by disseminating anti-Soviet propaganda through the PRC's Havana Embassy. When the Chinese drastically cut their rice sales to Cuba in reprisal, Castro accused them of economic blackmail and likened their efforts to previous attempts by the U.S. Embassy "to interfere in the internal affairs of Cuba." The revelation that Peking "had indulged in 'imperialist practices' in its relations with little Cuba" severely damaged its "prestige

with the Latin American left."²⁵

Castro has not, however, gone over completely to the Soviets. He maintains a neutral stand in the Sino-Soviet conflict and has publicly chided both disputants for the bitterness of their quarrel. This middle ground stance is reasonable. Castro's doctrine of violent revolution is ideologically close to the Peking line, but, pragmatically, he recognizes his dependence on the Soviets for military and economic aid. His heart may be in Peking, but his wallet is in Moscow.

IV—CONCLUSIONS

The People's Republic of China has made little headway in the political field in Latin America. There have been some limited inroads, but no major progress toward the development of formal state-to-state relations with the Latin American nations. Communist China's recognition by Cuba and the subsequent exchange of ambassadors between the

two countries remain Peking's only diplomatic gain. It certainly was not a triumph for Chinese diplomacy. Rather, the establishment of diplomatic relations between these two countries came as a result of a Cuban political decision, i.e., Castro's determination to move closer to the Communist orbit.

Peking's efforts to lay the foundations for political penetration through the media of cultural exchanges and trade have not shown any significant results. There have been minor gains and spectacular failures. In the final analysis, however, efforts to win goodwill at the governmental level have had little success.

Communist China has been more successful in its relations with Communist organizations in Latin America than with the governments. But even in this area, Peking has netted only partial successes. No regular Communist Party has shifted to the Chinese side. At best, the PRC has attracted the loyalties, or at least the vocal support, of factions of varying sizes from the established parties. In only one country, Peru, does a majority of the Communists follow the Chinese line. The splintering of Communist Parties has resulted in weakening the entire Communist movement in Latin America.

China's main goal, leadership of the revolutionary movements in the area, is not likely to be achieved. Its espousal of the revolutionary road to power will continue to be attractive to those elements who are dissatisfied with the more moderate policies of the pro-

Soviet party leaders. But the ability to inspire revolutionaries does not necessarily lead to increased influence for Peking. As long as the Soviet Union remains the strongest and richest Communist power—a situation unlikely to change—Communist China's chances of winning the unqualified support of Latin American Communist Parties will be exceedingly slim. Peking is unable to compete with the Russians in providing material aid to the Latin American revolutionary movements, for the sad fact of Chinese Communist life is that, despite its "big power talk," the PRC "is still the biggest underdeveloped country in the world and for some time will have little to spare for others."¹

BIOGRAPHIC SUMMARY



Comdr. Lucian C. Martinez, U.S. Navy, did his undergraduate work at Florida State University in journalism, completed 30 graduate hours in political science at that institution, and holds a master's degree in international affairs from The George Washington University. As an intelligence officer he has had numerous intelligence assignments, including duty with the Commander 7th Fleet, the Office of Chief of Naval Operations, the Naval Advisory Group, Vietnam, and the Headquarters, U.S. European Command. Commander Martinez is a graduate of the Naval War College, School of Naval Command and Staff (Class of 1969), and is currently assigned to the staff of Commander, U.S. Naval Forces, Japan.

FOOTNOTES

I—COMMUNIST CHINA AND LATIN AMERICA

1. Robert J. Alexander, *Communism in Latin America* (New Brunswick, N.J.: Rutgers University Press, 1957), p. 68.

2. Shen-yu Dai, "Sugar Coated Bullets for Latin America," *Current Scene*, 23 December 1961, p. 2.

3. Harold C. Hinton, *Communist China in World Politics* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1966), p. 192.

4. Dai, p. 2.

5. *Ibid.*
6. William R. Garner, "The Sino-Soviet Ideological Struggle in Latin America," *Journal of Inter-American Studies*, April 1968, p. 251.
7. Mao Tse-tung, quoted in Dai, "'Sugar Coated Bullets' for Latin America," p. 2.
8. *Ibid.*, p. 2-3.
9. Shen-yu Dai, "Peking and the 'Third World,'" *Current History*, September 1965, p. 147.
10. Charles Taylor, "China's Foreign Policy," *International Journal*, Summer 1966, p. 311.
11. "Mr. Mao Tse-tung's Foreign Policy—a Russian Analysis," *Asian Recorder*, 15-21 July 1968, p. 8419.
12. Rollie E. Poppino, *International Communism in Latin America* (New York: Free Press of Glencoe, 1964), p. 175.
13. Daniel Tretiak, "China and Latin America," *Current Scene*, 1 March 1966, p. 2.
14. U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on the Judiciary, *Red Chinese Infiltration into Latin America*, Hearings (Washington: U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1965), p. 42.
15. "The New China News Agency," *Current Scene*, 1 April 1966, p. 4-5.
16. Tretiak, p. 3.
17. Joao Goulart, quoted in Dai, "'Sugar Coated Bullets' for Latin America," p. 1.
18. Hinton, p. 201.
19. Tretiak, p. 8.
20. "Brazil Denies Plans for Ties," *The New York Times*, 13 February 1964, p. 8:3. Emphasis added.
21. Edward C. Burks, "Brazil's Red Hunt Aims at Congress," *The New York Times*, 7 April 1964, p. 12:3.
22. Tretiak, p. 9.
23. *Ibid.*
24. "Mexico Arrests 13: Links China to Plot," *The New York Times*, 20 July 1967, p. 1:5, 14:3.
25. "Mexico to Arrest More as Plotters," *The New York Times*, 21 July 1967, p. 12:2.
26. "China and Mexico," *Survey of China Mainland Press*, 17 August 1967, p. 35.
27. "China and Mexico," *Survey of China Mainland Press*, 3 August 1967, p. 37-38.
28. James Reston, "Mexico City: the Neighbors Have Problems, Too," *The New York Times*, 23 July 1967, sec. IV, p. 8:3.
29. "Venezuelan Guerrillas Seized," *The New York Times*, 20 September 1966, p. 9:1. Emphasis added.
30. Henry Raymond, "Peking Opposes Latins' Atom Ban," *The New York Times*, 2 October 1966, p. 27:1.

II—CULTURE AND TRADE: INSTRUMENTS OF INFLUENCE

1. J.L. Cranmer-Byng, "The Chinese Attitude toward External Relations," *International Journal*, Winter, 1965-66, p. 70.
2. For a listing of other Chinese agencies involved in cultural exchanges, see Joseph J. Lee, "Communist China's Latin American Policy," *Asian Survey*, November 1964, p. 1124fn.
3. Kermit K. Brown, "Cultural Activities and Exchange," U.S. Congress, House, Committee on Foreign Affairs, *Communist Activities in Latin America, 1967*, Hearings (Washington: U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1967), p. 61.
4. John K. Fairbank and John M.H. Lindbeck, "United States Aid to Latin America in Chinese Studies," *Asian Survey*, November 1961, p. 32-33.
5. W.A.C. Adie, "China, Russia, and the Third World," *The China Quarterly*, July-September 1962, p. 207.
6. Brown, p. 61.
7. Adie, p. 209; Victor Alba, "The Chinese in Latin America," *The China Quarterly*, January-March 1961, p. 55.
8. Tad Szulc, *The Winds of Revolution* (New York: Praeger, 1965), p. 187.
9. Dai, "Peking and the 'Third World,'" p. 148.
10. Dai, "'Sugar Coated Bullets' for Latin America," p. 3.
11. Lee, p. 1123.
12. *Ibid.*, p. 1124.
13. "The New China News Agency," p. 1.
14. *Ibid.*
15. Letter from Howard R. Simpson, Faculty Adviser and Consultant (USIA), Naval War College, to author, Newport, R.I.: 3 February 1969.


16. Alba, p. 54.
17. *Ibid.*
18. Daniel Tretiak, "Latin America: the Chinese Drive," *Contemporary Review*, November 1964, p. 576.
19. Letter from Mr. Simpson.
20. Brown, p. 71.
21. *Ibid.*, p. 59
22. Fairbank and Lindbeck, p. 32.
23. Lee, p. 1126.
24. Dai, "Peking and the 'Third World,'" p. 148.
25. Dai, "'Sugar Coated Bullets' for Latin America," p. 2.
26. Pauline Lewin, *The Foreign Trade of Communist China* (New York: Praeger, 1964), p. 73.
27. Tretiak, "Latin America: the Chinese Drive," p. 571-572.
28. *Ibid.*
29. France, Secretariat General du Gouvernement, *Notes et Etudes Documentaires: Problems Chinois*, 5 (Paris: 1968), p. 37. Translation by author.
30. Tretiak, "China and Latin America," p. 2.
31. Tretiak, "Latin America: the Chinese Drive," p. 572.

III—CHINESE MODEL FOR LATIN AMERICAN COMMUNISM

1. Harry Schwartz, *China* (New York: Atheneum, 1965), p. 135.
2. Donald S. Zagoria, *The Sino-Soviet Conflict 1956-1961* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1962), p. 267.
3. Ernst Halperin, "Peking and the Latin American Communists," *The China Quarterly*, January-March 1967, p. 118-119.
4. Charles P. Fitzgerald, *The Chinese View of Their Place in the World* (London: Oxford University Press, 1964), p. 63.
5. Robert J. Alexander, "Impact of Sino-Soviet Split in Latin America," U.S. Congress, House, Committee on Foreign Affairs, *Sino-Soviet Conflict*, Hearings (Washington: U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1965), p. 252-253.
6. James M. Daniel, "Latin America," Cyril E. Black and Thomas P. Thornton, eds., *Communism and Revolution* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1964), p. 361-362.
7. Alistair Hennessy, "University Students in National Politics," Claudio Veliz, ed., *The Politics of Conformity in Latin America* (London: Oxford University Press, 1967), p. 124.
8. William E. Griffith, *The Sino-Soviet Rift* (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1964), p. 22.
9. "Latin American Revolutionaries Resolved to Take Road of Chinese Revolution," *Survey of China Mainland Press*, 3 January 1968, p. 39.
10. K.S. Karol, *China: the Other Communism* (New York: Hill and Wang, 1967), p. 451.
11. Lawrence Fellows, "Chon, in Tanzania, Calls U.S. a Rully," *The New York Times*, 6 June 1965, p. 1:7.
12. Seymour Topping, "Peking Declares Vietnam Is Focus of anti-U.S. Fight," *The New York Times*, 3 September 1965, p. 1:6.
13. Schwartz, p. 136.
14. *Ibid.*
15. *Ibid.*, p. 119.
16. Halperin, "Peking and the Latin American Communists," p. 116.
17. Garner, p. 254.
18. Ernst Halperin, "The Decline of Communism in Latin America," *The Atlantic*, May 1965, p. 70.
19. Roris Goldenberg, *The Cuban Revolution and Latin America* (New York: Praeger, 1965), p. 343.
20. The Chinese-oriented Communist Party of Brazil, although organized prior to the Peruvian party, was not "officially" recognized as such until later in 1964. Halperin, "Peking and the Latin American Communists," p. 142fn.
21. "Latin American Revolutionaries Resolved to Take Road of Chinese Revolution," p. 39.
22. U.S. Dept. of State, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, *World Strength of the Communist Party Organization* (Washington: U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1967), p. vi.
23. *Ibid.*, p. iii.
24. Tretiak, "China and Latin America," p. 4.
25. Halperin, "Peking and the Latin American Communists," p. 151.

IV—CONCLUSIONS

1. Seymour Topping, "Castro Too Turns on Peking," *The New York Times*, 13 February 1966, sec. IV, p. 3:1.



Passivity is fatal to us. Our goal is to make the enemy passive.

*Mao Tse-tung, Chairman of Communist Party,
Time, 18 December 1950*