

Naval War College Review

Volume 22
Number 7 September

Article 4

1969

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Recommended Citation

Stahnke, Paul K. (1969) "The New Left and its Implications for Strategy in the Seventies," *Naval War College Review*: Vol. 22 : No. 7 , Article 4.

Available at: <https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol22/iss7/4>

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The New Left And Its Implications For Strategy In The Seventies

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INTRODUCTION

Serious analysis of current history is never an easy task. It is doubly difficult in this period of accelerated change in which today's crises often become merely footnotes in tomorrow's history. However, this paper attempts rather brazenly to judge the place in history of the current generational revolt which has, within the past few years, become a major, and often distorted, feature in the media and a preoccupation of the public generally.

The significance of the "generation gap" becomes an intimate and unavoidably subjective question to any father (and this writer is one threefold), further complicating any analysis. How-

ever, the question cannot be avoided in considerations of the shape of the future. Its implications are manifold, but this paper will focus primarily on those likely to affect U.S. strategy in the next decade.

In the process more questions will probably be raised than answered, but the vague outlines of the changing parameters within which any international strategy will have to operate are already apparent. These, with some embellishments, become the tentative conclusions of this paper, but not until after the origins, motivations, objectives, and endurance of the New Left are explored in some—and probably controversial—detail.

I—CONSENSUS THROUGH CONFLICT

Historians have again renewed a debate begun at the turn of the century by the "progressive historians"—Turner, Beard, and Parrington—on whether American society is molded by consensus or torn by conflict.¹ Following the collapse of the illusory American consensus of the "Great Society" in the latter days of Lyndon Johnson's Presidency, the "conflict historians" appear to have won the day, and, indeed, much scholarly work is being devoted currently to rehabilitating the abolitionist and populists and even the forgotten loyalists of the Revolutionary period.

While, for example, Louis Hartz, a "consensus historian," notes that even American conservatives today hail the revolutionary heroes in contrast to France where "the royalist still curses the Jacobin."² R.R. Palmer points out that the French emigrés returned to France after the Restoration while the Americans did not:

The sense in which there was no conflict in the American Revolution is the sense in which the loyalists are forgotten. The 'American consensus' rests in some degree on the elimination from the national consciousness, as well as from the country, of a once important and relatively numerous element of dissent.³

America has been hard on dissenters, but not usually as hard as on the loyalists. Even one of the leading anti-consensus historians, Christopher Lasch, agrees that "conflict theory can't explain what made the national society cohere. It can't explain the absence of a radical tradition in America."⁴ There have, of course, been radical movements in the United States, the persistent myth of "endless normalcy" notwithstanding, but they failed to establish a tradition principally because their basic

tenets—usually modified, to be sure—eventually became accepted in the American mainstream. The populists declined as a movement when they had nothing worthwhile left to fight for; Norman Thomas started his public career as a flaming radical and ended it as a benign elder statesman, adviser to both Democratic and Republican Presidents. America was and remains a pluralistic society in which a subtly changing consensus has evolved through conflict. Martyrs to lost—and often good—causes can be found in America's past, but, on the whole, dissent has been remarkably tolerated and has played a vital role in the shaping of America's history.

Professor Hofstadter, while characterizing the consensus theory as having only "transitional merits," describes the American process as involving "a subtler, more intangible, but vital kind of moral consensus that I would call comity. Comity exists in a society to the degree that those enlisted in its contending interests have a basic minimal regard for each other . . ." Hofstadter reviews the waxing and waning phases of comity in American history and concludes, not unexpectedly, that it is presently in a waning phase.⁵

While Hofstadter cited the intolerance the Negroes now feel about having been excluded from the "covenant of comity" as the basis of America's present crisis, a subtler, and perhaps more profound, element is the distinctive new "life style" being developed through a remarkable consensus among the younger generation of Americans, both black and white, which has given rise to the so-called "generation gap."

Despite historical evidence that even the most turbulent periods of the past were held together by a degree of comity, the current time of trouble, both domestic and foreign, causes deeper feelings of concern over the future of American traditions and institutions than at any time in living

22 NAVAL WAR COLLEGE REVIEW

memory. Perhaps it only seems so because yesterday's troubles tend to fade in memory; perhaps it is that current problems have crept upon us so insidiously and are so vaguely defined (when compared to such sharp and immediate crises as the Great Depression or World War II); perhaps it is in part that so many of our current problems have a highly personal quality—e.g., the chasm in understanding between the generations, the race question, the threat of nuclear annihilation or the slower poisoning of the environment by the effluence of our affluent society, the impersonalization of human relations, the breathtaking speed of technological change.

Something is "bugging" us all, not just the well-publicized "under 30's" who magnify the discontents and concerns of their fathers while discovering a few of their own. Although even the poor (with some notable exceptions) are better off materially than ever before, many Americans find the sought for and now realized comforts and accumulation of material possessions vaguely unsatisfying and even disturbing. America is in the initial stage of the technological age and wonders whether it will produce only tools of physical and spiritual destruction.

Discontent in America is being expressed in various ways, including a predictable, though well-contained, reaction to the right. However, its purest—because it is less censored or inhibited—form is discernible among the young who, in their language, have not yet been seduced by the Establishment. The seriousness or persistence of the young in their revolt against the system can perhaps be questioned. The young have always revolted against their parents and society, and many a well-established middle-aged parent solaces himself when confronting his bearded, long-haired son that this phase too will pass as did bed-wetting, puberty and acne. However, these rumblings of

discontent take on a more serious meaning when one looks through youth's clearer, though still naive, eyes at the troubled vision of the quantum jump our ill-prepared society and its institutions are taking into the technological age.

The question of whether the young will, with maturity, settle down to accepting the world as it is really has no meaning when all knowledgeable projections indicate that the very institutions of the present system will have to change radically or disappear in the face of the strains of technological change. It has become a truism to say we live in an age of accelerating change, but it remains difficult to comprehend that yesterday's world will become unrecognizable tomorrow.

In this context the young can be viewed as the still-bumbling initiators of a new "life style" that may convert us all into a new comity in which a relative peace once again becomes established between man and a completely new environment. Although, to take an extreme, hippie philosophy is not likely to become a commonly accepted life-style, the admonition to "make love, not war" takes on a deeper meaning in a world that is rapidly developing so many paths to self-destruction.

II—YOUTH'S DARK VIEW OF THE FUTURE

It is impossible to accede to a fundamentally new environment without experiencing the inner terrors of a metamorphosis. The child is terrified when it opens its eyes for the first time. Similarly, for our mind to adjust itself to lines and horizons enlarged beyond measure, it must renounce the comfort of familiar narrowness. It must create a new equilibrium for everything that had formerly been so neatly arranged in its small inner world. It is

dazzled when it emerges from its dark prison, awed to find itself suddenly at the top of a tower, and it suffers from giddiness and disorientation. The whole psychology of modern disquiet is linked with the sudden confrontation with space-time.

... Teilhard de Chardin¹

The Inner Distress. George Kennan, who recently became a serious and controversial critic of the student left, has noted the rapid shifting of student concern "from the Negro of the rural South to the Negro of the urban North, and then to Vietnam, and then to the disciplinary regime of the college campus" and finds this strongly suggestive "that the real seat of discomfort lies not in the objects that attract these feelings but in some inner distress and discontent with contemporary society that would find other issues to fasten to as points of grievance against the established order, even if the present ones did not exist."²

The depths of inner distress among the young is startlingly revealed in the articulate and emotional letter response to an article by Mr. Kennan entitled "Rebels Without A Program" initially published in *The New York Times Magazine* of 21 January 1968.³ Their comments tended to bear out Kennan's judgment of them as "tense, anxious, defiant and joyless."⁴ But they also possess a certain elegance, much passion, and deep sincerity. The most eloquent summation of student left views was given by a young Harvard undergraduate:

We are turned to bitterness by the impotency of our action. We cannot follow because we are not validly led. We cannot lead because we are not heard. We are unique in the history of this country. The Vietnam 'situation'

has been so indecisive and agonizing and has gone on so long that we are the first generation in history that is able to view itself as sausages endlessly being fed into a meat grinder. At graduation we face the certainty of some kind of death, moral if not physical... Is it any wonder that we 'do not go gentle into that good night'?⁵

The Vietnam situation and personal susceptibility to the draft clearly weigh heavily on their minds, but lack of patriotism should not automatically be imputed. A Columbia student is probably representative of the majority of students, even the dissident left, when he says, "I should not fear giving up my life for my country when I would feel that I were truly fighting for my country."⁶ Most have taken to heart the lessons they learned about the great democratic principles on which the United States was founded—some would say too literally and too seriously—but they see, in the words of a Rochester University student, that "cloaked in the armor of law, order, reason and God, we engage in worldwide repression all the while ignoring the pressing demands of our own society... American youth asks for a change in the way this society thinks. Priorities simply must be changed."⁷

However, the deeper, more general distress—i.e., what really "hugs" them—creeps through in a Notre Dame student's lament that "we see social regimentation, conformity, and a hard mentality in American society."⁸ They see the brave new world as faceless and fearsome and strangely different from all the lessons they have learned in school and books and from the voices of the Establishment. So, they are as terrified as the child who opens his eyes for the first time. A Princeton graduate student comments:

24 NAVAL WAR COLLEGE REVIEW

We have a technology that has been husily liberating man from his sense of doing meaningful work and a society so vast and technologized that many feel they will be deprived of all individuality unless they offer total resistance . . . My great hope is that some people will find fulfillment by refusing to have the robots do everything for them and rediscovering artisan skills and the art of tilling the soil without the interference of machinery.⁹

Will they, as the child who first was frightened of the visible world, adjust and thrive in "the system" as it is? The student left (and the New Left generally), in its present articulateness and mood, is a fairly recent phenomenon, and one can only speculate on what will happen as they pass the rather fictional landmark age of 30. There is, however, considerable evidence that "the system" will probably change more rapidly than they (of which more later). One University of California graduate of 2 years gave his answer in high irritability: ". . . the older many youths of my generation get, the more they see of American society, the more radical they become."¹⁰

The World of the Future. In the lifetime of all Americans over 30, visions of the future—apocalyptic or otherwise—have moved from escapist literature to scientific projections of a reality that is upon us. Teilhard de Chardin, Arthur Koestler, Peter Drucker, Herman Kahn, Marshall McLuhan, Daniel Bell, and many others provide an impressive library on the subject. Much of the writing has the impact of a strange dream, yet few will deny the reality from which it is projected or the radical changes in nature and meaning of life that it portends. Professor Brzezinski observes that "the world is on the eve of transformation more

dramatic in its history and human consequences than that wrought either by the French or the Bolshevik revolutions."¹¹ But, he is not dramatic enough. The changes we are beginning to experience are really incomparable with any previous period in recorded human history, although if measured only in terms of human trauma the latter part of the Middle Age in Europe provides an apt comparison.

It is essential to have some appreciation of the quantum jump into a new world whose technological and material possibilities are now realistically predictable, but whose spiritual values are much less easily imagined. Without a comprehension of the uniqueness of this historic period, most of the thoughts and actions of the young become mere juvenile antics and the "generation gap" of today no more significant than those that have traditionally existed between young and old. There are those, of course, who seriously argue the traditional case, most recently Lewis S. Feuer who was a prominent member of the University of California faculty during the 1964-66 Berkeley turmoil. Professor Feuer in his review of student rebellions in the United States and elsewhere, finds them ultimately to be a species of generational conflict in which the sons attack the authority and power of the fathers.¹² The argument would sit comfortably if it were not for the fact that so many of the articulated laments of the sons are on matters equally disturbing to the fathers. And, to the surprise of both, common yearnings for the "good old simple life of the past" transcend the generation gap, for both father and son are disturbed and frightened of the future.

Visions of the future range from those of Jacques Ellul who despairingly believes that we will almost certainly be destroyed by technology¹³ to Teilhard de Chardin who sees some saving metaphysical union of matter and spirit.¹⁴

Kahn who simply provides a heuristic "framework for speculations" without value judgments and emphasizes problems, not solutions.¹⁵

Brzezinski has taken some of these predictions and speculated on their effects on the quality of life. His most important concern is on the effects in America that the radical changes of the "technetronic age," as he calls it, will likely bring to institutions and value systems. He notes that work will become a privilege for the most talented and that "the achievement-oriented society might give way to the amusement-focused society, with essentially spectator spectacles (mass sport, TV) providing an opiate for increasingly purposeless masses."¹⁶ Occupation of time becomes a problem and hedonism no longer a dirty word. But even the search for pleasure becomes difficult since "in the technetronic society social life tends to be so atomized . . . that group intimacy cannot be recreated through the artificial stimulation of externally convivial group behavior. The new interest in drugs seeks to create intimacy through introspection, allegedly by expanding consciousness."¹⁷

This description rings familiar to any observer of the current U.S. scene, and, indeed, Brzezinski suggests that America is the first country to have entered the technetronic age, with others still far behind, and concludes that "the technetronic society [will be] as different from the industrial as the industrial became from the agrarian."¹⁸

Caution must be exercised, however, in this area of speculation—"scientific" or intuitive—not to form too solid an image of the future. Technological change will be considerable but, as Daniel Bell says, "what matters most about the year 2000 are not the gadgets . . . but the kinds of social arrangements that can deal adequately with the problems we shall confront."¹⁹ Work may, as Brzezinski says, become an occupation of the elite, but

the possibility exists of making an elite of all citizens. Without too much imagination, one can see the means available for elimination of all physical want, for broadening and deepening education of higher quality humans, for restructuring American society and institutions to meet the requirements of the postindustrial age, and to resolve the problems of poverty and ignorance in the rest of the world, thus eliminating a major source of present international tension.

The significance of man's current control of technology is not in the physical product itself but in the fact that at the deepest level of human experience man, as we have known him, is on the verge of becoming something else by virtue of his new knowledge which permits him, for the first time in his history, to be the central agent in his universe. With traumatic suddenness man is suddenly confronted with a world which, because of his own technological achievements, removes him from the adversary posture against nature which has existed since his origin on this planet. His environment is no longer "just there" and needing to be confronted on its own terms; he can now control the environment to an ever-increasing extent.

Even in this early dawn of the technological age, one of the most significant and troubling results has been a widespread questioning of the meaning of life, particularly by the young. For historic man this question has had a very simply answer. The adversary, nature, was always there, cold and immovable except perhaps by external gods. Man's purpose was first to survive and second to try to dominate nature. Now that he is on the threshold of dominating nature, man suddenly sees a new threat, namely his own knowledge, which has the potential for destroying him as well as for creating a new Garden of Eden.

26 NAVAL WAR COLLEGE REVIEW

Man is therefore no longer required to be work oriented in the traditional sense. His "work" in the future will not be the task of survival in the face of nature but in constructing a world society in which he and all men can enjoy the fruits of past achievements in an atmosphere in which life continues to have meaning. He will, in fact, have to *create* his own future and, probably, a new technological man. Frightening though the thought may be (but also challenging), he will have to assume some of the attributes ascribed to his gods.

The younger generation in America sense the significance of this turning point in the history of man more clearly than their elders. While their fathers grew up in a period in which the roots of the technological revolution were already firmly implanted, their vision of its potential was dimmed by the Great Depression. While actually representing an inability of human institutions to adjust to changing requirements, the 1930's appeared to be a regression almost to the primordial level of struggle against nature. It is no wonder that the majority of the fathers remain traditionally work oriented. But it is also no wonder that their sons, raised in the relative opulence of the postwar period, see less value in the traditional struggle. The most articulate, and therefore probably the more intelligent, among them see correctly no problem in achieving gratification of their material wants. That battle is almost won. In consequence, the old spiritual values, centering around the individual struggle for material success, no longer have meaning to many of them in this new environment—and they search for something new to replace them.

Transitional America and the New Left. Americans, more than any other people, believe in the virtues of "progress." Through experience in developing its virgin land and through the more

recent ceaseless pounding of the advertising industry, the world for Americans traditionally has appeared to be better day-to-day as the everlasting miracles of new detergents for whiter washes or fancier, faster automobiles are produced. Though Madison Avenue may still believe the pertinency of this message, many Americans have begun to doubt. Even on the more basic issues, the almost automatic optimism about an ever more perfect Union and justice and happiness for all, albeit based largely on historic myth, has begun to evaporate. In a world in which man is beginning to appreciate his possibilities as the control agent, the social blemishes of civil rights repression and the persistence of pockets of poverty, which had in the past been swept under the rug to sustain the historic American myth, are reexposed for closer scrutiny. Faith in the ability of the American socioeconomic dynamic to resolve these problems is being questioned.

Awareness of the imperfections of our social system is aided by the mass availability of higher education which, together with increasing urbanization of our population, provides massive reinforcements to the formerly isolated urban intellectuals—a group traditionally least tolerant of the complacent belief in the spontaneous goodness of American social change. Brzezinski notes the difficulty the new social rebels find in developing a concrete and meaningful program and that 19th century ideologies provide no answers. "It is symptomatic," he says, "that the 'New Left' has found it most difficult to apply the available, particularly Marxist, doctrines to the new reality." He does see, however, a parallel between the New Left and the efforts in the 19th century to develop an ideology appropriate to the industrial age. "Not fully comprehending its meaning, not quite certain where it was heading—yet sensitive to the miseries and opportunities it was bringing—many Europeans strove

desperately to adapt earlier, 18th-century doctrines to the new reality."²⁰ Marx convinced millions that he had developed the appropriate synthesis applicable to the industrial age; the ideologies of the technological age still remain to be developed.

III—THE NEW LEFT

Our work is guided by the sense that we may be the last generation in the experiment with living. But . . . the vast majority of our people regard the temporary equilibrium of our society and world as eternally functional parts. In this is perhaps the outstanding paradox: We ourselves are imbued with urgency, yet the message of our society is that there is no viable alternative to the present.

. . . . from The Port Huron Statement¹

Origins. The New Left is an idea, a feeling, a sense of "existential humanism" mostly young, mostly new, mostly American but with international links. It is in search of an ideology, but mostly of morally acceptable modes of achieving radical social change. To the extent that it is revolutionary, its aims are more cultural than political. It has organizations, but no unity within or among them. Politically, it rejects all existing ideologies—whether to the left or to the right—and is, at least in its present mood, more akin to anarchism.

Its members are identified more by words and actions than by membership cards. Its active "membership" is variable in number and changeable in participants. Most estimates indicate active membership at about 10 percent of the college student population.² In its recent survey of "Youth in Turmoil," *Fortune* suggests that the activists are drawn from a nucleus of 40 percent of college students (over 3 million) who

"appear to hold attitudes about national performance and purpose, business, and many other matters that are quite at variance with those held by the college majority and by most adults."³ However, numbers are not a principal concern in this paper. Whatever its actual active membership, the New Left has had the strength to trouble a President and contribute to his decision not to run for reelection, has helped oblige a political reassessment of our role in Vietnam, has forced universities to reassess their roles in the community, and has generally disturbed and puzzled most persons over 30. Though ephemeral in formal organization, it can be identified as a movement (i.e., "The Movement," as many of the young would have it) by an attitude, a *leit-motiv* which is, roughly, a critical questioning of all established values and institutions, freewheeling talk about (if not experimentation in) unorthodox ways of social and personal relationships, a search for alternate and more meaningful objectives in life.

Its origins, as suggested in the previous chapter, are closely related to the disquietude prevailing at the dawn of the technological age. Being a recent and still diffused phenomenon, its history is brief and confused; however, the major intellectual and ideological springs common to the mainstream of the New Left are discernible.

Philosophically, they are deeply influenced by existentialism—even though few of them could give an adequate description of what existentialism is. This does not necessarily betoken ignorance—for definition is difficult and, at best, vague.⁴ Existentialism is the antithesis of classical philosophy or scientific method which is solely based—or so it is believed—on reasoning and empirical evidence. However, the philosophy of existence suggests that there are views of reality which cannot be completely reduced to scientific formulations. Jean Wahl

28 NAVAL WAR COLLEGE REVIEW

describes Kierkegaard, the forerunner of modern existentialists, as proposing the notion that

truth lies in subjectivity; that true existence is achieved by intensity of feeling. To consider him merely as a part of a whole would be to negate him . . . By dint of knowledge, Kierkegaard says, we have forgotten what it is to exist. His principal enemy was the expositor of a system, i.e., the professor.⁵

Today's student left, and perhaps a majority of the others, would wholeheartedly agree with this proposition.

In its emphasis on subjectivity, existentialism also opens the philosophical path toward greater individual control over one's own destiny. Hamlet (and therefore Shakespeare) was most certainly an existentialist, and to be or not to be has again become the question. Alternate possibilities and choice are implicit in Hamlet's statement. The same tone prevails in the Port Huron Statement, and the quote opening this chapter is illustrative. In philosophical terminology the New Left accepts Kierkegaard's insistence on the idea of "Possibility" while rejecting Hegel's idea that "the world is the necessary unfolding of the eternal Idea, and freedom is necessity understood."⁶

Politically, the origins of the New Left are somewhat less cloaked in ambiguity. In reviewing the origins of the political and social ideas of The Movement, this paper will, somewhat arbitrarily, focus primarily on the Students for a Democratic Society (SDS) because this organization embodies within it most of the ingredients characteristic of the New Left. Civil rights groups and the Black Nationalists have different origins and narrower objectives and will not be examined in detail. However, they—particularly the extremists among them—share in much of the brief heritage of The Movement.

According to Jacobs and Landau, whose now slightly outdated documentary analysis of "The New Radicals" remains the most authoritative history through 1965, The Movement had international overtones from the start. It began in England in 1957 with the publication of two new left-wing political journals by a group of university intellectuals. Most were disillusioned ex-Marxists and were reacting to the traumatic events of 1956 on both sides of the Iron Curtain. At about the same time, concern for racial justice, revulsion against the excesses of the McCarthy period, and a general rejection of the symbols of American affluence were growing in the United States. Some of the young responded with the "beat" mood, others with less cultish and more politicized responses. Pacifism became a serious movement, and campus political activity generally experienced a new growth. New political journals were started, first at the Universities of Chicago and Wisconsin, later at Columbia, Harvard, and subsequently at many other universities. The editors were primarily students and young faculty members, many with Marxist backgrounds. But old Marxist dogma was decidedly out of fashion, and the period was one of search for a new ideology. In fact, there was much discussion about the use of the word "left" with many arguing that it, as well as "socialism," was so discredited as to be useless.

As new waves of younger students entered the universities, the old radical debates and animosities with roots in the thirties were thrust further into the background. These new students were more concerned with American problems and how to solve them than in "foreign" ideologies. So, by 1960, this new generation was throwing itself against American society, literally and figuratively. The activists among them began to attack concrete issues and to identify themselves by distinctive styles of dress and hair. First the civil rights

movement and later the Vietnam issue became unifying forces in The Movement. But structure and ideology were sidestepped. Indeed, Castro and Che Guevara rose as new heroes of the student radicals, whom they saw as romantic men of action, without ideology and with sole interest in bettering the life of the Cuban people.⁷

The End of Ideology? An important question, still remaining to be answered, is the extent to which the New Left has structure and ideology. Are the radical young just high spirited and slightly confused children fighting the traditional battle against their fathers, or are they in the vanguard of a process which will eventually result in a synthesis establishing a new set of values (i.e., ideology)? The question is of direct significance to U.S. strategic considerations in the decade to come, both in its domestic and international aspects, because its answer will establish, more clearly than we can now see, the parameters within which strategy can work. We are already beginning to see these parameters changing. How much they will change over the longer run is uncertain as is the influence which the New Left in its present or future form will have on it.

Before coming to an examination of that question, it is useful to review briefly the debate, which is still raging, over whether the West, especially the United States, has solved its basic political and economic problems and therefore serves as a model for all peoples, especially the underdeveloped countries. The question is: Has Western pragmatism triumphed over "ideology?" While definitions of "ideology" vary to suit the debater, its meaning in this context is fairly clear—it is Marxism, or derivatives thereof, as compared to whatever the United States has as a value system, which is not usually considered an ideology. However, looking at the debate at another level, the

debate is also directly related to the questions now being raised by the New Left about the pertinence of the American system to present and future problems. This aspect of the debate is of greatest interest here.

The "end of ideology debate" started at an international conference convoked by the Congress for Cultural Freedom at Milan in September 1955. In his summary of the conference, Edward Shils reported agreement among the participants in the thesis that the West was moving successfully both at home and abroad, while "the Soviet Union, and Marxism, . . . has lost its appeal . . . We no longer feel the need for a comprehensive explicit system of beliefs."⁸ Raymond Aron, a participant in the Conference, concluded "that the battle of ideologies belongs to the past."⁹ Seymour Lipset, also present at Milan, was somewhat more equivocal when he wrote several years after the event that "ideology and passion may no longer be necessary to sustain the class struggle within stable and affluent democracies, but they are clearly needed in the international effort to develop free political and economic institutions in the rest of the world."¹⁰

In his book, *The End of Ideology*, Daniel Bell took the question mark off the phrase and asserted "the exhaustion of Utopia" in the West.

For ideology, which once was a road to action, has come to be a dead end . . . In the Western world, therefore, there is today a rough consensus among intellectuals on political issues: the acceptance of a Welfare State; the desirability of decentralized power; a system of mixed economy and of political pluralism.¹¹

This, Bell asserts as fact. However, he acknowledged the frustrations, particularly among young intellectuals,

30 NAVAL WAR COLLEGE REVIEW

which the end of ideology had brought. "In the search for a 'cause,' there is a deep, desperate, almost pathetic anger . . . The young intellectual is unhappy because the 'middle way' is for the middle-aged, not for him; it is without passion and is deadening."¹²

Regardless of the reason and logic of the "middle way," the younger generation refused to be deprived of passion—and, if necessary, ideology. C. Wright Mills, the sociologist cum social critic and pamphleteering moralist—and "intellectual father" of the SDS and other elements of The Movement in the United States—stepped into the breach in 1960 to assert that the age of ideology is not dead in the West. Indeed, he felt, it had urgent need of revitalization.

In an article entitled "On the New Left," first published in two left-wing British journals and subsequently reprinted by the SDS and others, Mills attacked both liberalism and the old "utilitarian" left. He called for the young intellectuals to recognize themselves as the new agency of social change. Liberal rhetoric is characterized as a reasoning collapsing into reasonableness—with all the sharp edges of controversy removed. "The end-of-ideology," he said, "is a slogan of complacency, circulating among the prematurely middle-aged, centered in the present, and in the rich Western societies. In the final analysis, it also rests upon a disbelief in the shaping by men of their own futures." He found the same attitude among the leaders in the Soviet Union.¹³ Mills, however, saw a trend away from such complacency in both East and West. "The end-of-ideology is on the decline because it stands for the refusal to work out an explicit political philosophy. And alert men everywhere today do feel the need for such a philosophy."¹⁴

The Port Huron Statement of the SDS in 1962 was largely influenced by the Mills article. It, too, rejected

Marxism and its metaphysical belief that the working class had a historic mission to transform capitalism into socialism. The statement represented the initiation of a search for an ideology, not the documentation of one—either old or new. It was intended to provide a general, broad critique of American society, suggesting guidelines for radical politics. It described the present age as one of "muddling through" by stagnated minds closed to the future and a "pervading feeling that there simply are no alternatives, that our times have witnessed the exhaustion not only of Utopias, but of any new departures as well."¹⁵ This view is rejected in favor of an effort "in understanding and changing the conditions of humanity in the late twentieth century, an effort rooted in the ancient, still unfulfilled conception of man attaining determining influence over his circumstances of life."¹⁶ "Participatory democracy" was proposed as the main vehicle through which "power rooted in possession, privilege, or circumstance" would be replaced by power and uniqueness rooted in love, reflectiveness, reason, and creativity.¹⁷ The statement noted that politicians today respond "not to dialogue, but to pressure" and concluded with a vision of a future world of reasonable men all agreeing on the right paths through reason and not power relationships.¹⁸

Following in the Mills tradition, Mario Savio, leader of the Berkeley revolt, redefined the position of the Establishment as representing a belief in "the end of history." In an impassioned speech on the steps of the university administration building, Savio lamented the bleak scene of a society providing no challenges, "but an important minority of men and women coming to the front today have shown that they will die rather than be standardized, replaceable, and irrelevant."¹⁹

The end of ideology debate continues, but the question has become

largely academic. What is clear from the debate is that it represents still another area of conflict between those who have radically differing visions of the future of the world and the value systems to which it should adhere. Although the end of ideology debate was not the cause of the student revolt, it coincided with the rise of the New Left and has provided an important point of attack on the Establishment.

The question "Is ideology irrelevant and dead in the West?" is not answered; it is merely redefined. Both the New Left and the liberals appear to be agreed that the ideological struggles of the thirties in the United States are completely irrelevant today. Marxism is also moribund in Europe and nearing that point in Japan. New ideologies have not risen, although the New Left is passionately searching for one. In the meanwhile, the young radicals content themselves with anarchistic action as a substitute; but the more thoughtful among them do so with high purpose and moral conviction that whatever it is that the West holds as its value system is not working adequately to maintain comity and social justice within the state or peace and economic progress in the world.

Growing Anarchism in the New Left.

One of the most interesting anomalies in the current generational strife is the degree to which the utopian longings of many in the New Left approach those of the traditional GOP conservative. Both are opposed to "big government" and the impersonal bureaucracy that it connotes; both favor political decentralization and revival of the "good old" values of communalism; both long for "a return to the soil" in a sense that would again create a whole man, conscious of his individuality and able to identify personally with the results of his actions. This conjunction of dreams clearly supports one form of argument that ideologies are dead. The

conservatives in America, and even some of the radical right, have far more in common with the New Left than either side would want to admit. This is not to say that William Buckley, Jr. or Everett Dirksen would be accepted by the New Left if only they changed their style of dress, but it does not suggest that the common villain is the liberal Establishment.

At the extremes, the radical right and left have an anarchistic tendency in common which grows out of their opposition to the established order. Paul Goodman, an apostle of the New Left, in highly concentrated venom recently wrote:

... our system of government at present comprises the military-industrial complex, the secret paramilitary agencies, the scientific war corporations, the blimps, the horse's asses, the police, the administrative bureaucracy, the career diplomats, the lobbies, the corporations that contribute party funds, the underwriters and real-estate promoters that fatten on Urban Renewal, the official press and the official opposition press, the sounding-off and jockeying for the next election, the National Unity, etc., etc.²⁰

Except for inclusion of the military and police, the statement is one the radical right might well applaud. With somewhat more reserve, they might even agree generally with Goodman's statement that "in the last decades of the eighteenth century, in many respects the Americans lived in a kind of peaceful community anarchy, spiced by mutinies that were hardly punished."²¹ They would only begin their parting of ways with Goodman's judgment that "the only pacifist conclusion... is the anarchist one, to get rid of the sovereignties and to diminish among people, the motivations of power and grandiosity."²²

32 NAVAL WAR COLLEGE REVIEW

The New Left, on the other hand, sees charm and possibilities in the anarchistic approach—if only in the short run. To many of them the Establishment is too powerful, unwieldy, and set in its ways to even consider reforming. It must be destroyed and replaced by a more gentle system, not yet defined with any precision. Herbert Marcuse, the honorary high priest of the New Left, gives further impetus to the anarchistic drive when he notes that “self-determination will be real to the extent to which the masses have been dissolved into individuals liberated from all propaganda.”²³

Newspapers almost daily report increasing examples of anarchistic behavior by students, on campus and off, of which the “Confrontation at Chicago” during the 1968 Democratic Party Convention was only the most dramatic example. The confrontation tactic contains its own dangers and, possibly, death warrant. Marcuse himself doubts that “one can combat a society which is mobilized and organized in its totality against any revolutionary movement.”²⁴ Nonetheless, he, as the majority of the New Left militants, sees that any change in present society would require a total rejection, in other words, “perpetual confrontation,” of the society.

Total confrontation, however, requires some form of organization which anarchistic tendencies make difficult. There is some evidence, in fact, that whatever national organization existed at the time of the Chicago confrontation has fallen apart. Jerry Rubin, a founder of the Youth International Party (Yippies) said in January 1969 that “the age of innocence” was over for his group and that Government harassment had “bottled up resources, sapped energy and demoralized the spirit.”²⁵ But other evidence indicates that the protest movement has merely shifted (temporarily perhaps) from

national politics to issues on local campuses.

IV—THE NEW LEFT AND FOREIGN POLICY

... I am convinced the process of *disarming* each other can go on; and that if one powerful nation would give it up, other nations might well look for an opportunity to do the same.

..... Bayard Rustin¹

Foreign Policy Objectives. To the extent that it is a reform or revolutionary movement, the New Left has developed a greater coherency in thought on requirements for cultural change than it has on political reality. To some extent the choice is deliberate, particularly for those who see no alternative to revolutionary destruction of existing political institutions. This posture makes sense if the objective is revolution within the state. If the United States were an island unto itself, the development of a more peaceful, less aggressive, more loving society might be more immediately possible—perhaps even along the lines of the “participatory democracy” desired by the SDS. But the United States is not such an island, and, quite aside from the problem of controlling aggressive instincts within the American community, the difficulties of establishing international trust, confidence, and peace are even more complex.

To the extent that the New Left has involved itself in foreign policy questions, it has focused rather narrowly, and very emotionally, on issues such as Vietnam and the Dominican Republic. It appears to have nowhere seriously considered the complexities of international interactions, particularly the problem of reducing mutual distrust among the major powers in a balanced fashion. Concern about a huge and

powerful monolithic Establishment striking anonymously and indifferently at the individual American has been transferred to that of this same giant crushing the little peace-loving people of Vietnam or elsewhere.

The New Left and the Establishment are, in fact, in agreement in their distaste for war and aggression. The problem is, as in other aspects of the generation gap, that the New Left doesn't believe the official pronouncements; or, if it admits to the latter's sincerity, believes that the mechanism of the "political-military complex" is so well oiled that it moves with a will of its own. The SDS has been the prime spokesman of the New Left on foreign policy matters, and one returns to the Port Huron Statement for evidence of this mechanistic theory:

To a decisive extent, the means of defense, the military technology itself, determines the political and social character of the state being defended . . . Decisions about military strategy . . . are more and more the property of the military and industrial arms race machine, with the politicians assuming a ratifying role instead of a determining one.²

The statement went on to review the changes that technology has brought to warfare in quite realistic fashion but repeatedly stressed the sacrifices this entails for civil liberties and social welfare. "Insufficient attention [is given] to preserving, extending, and enriching democratic values . . ."³ It emphasized the needs of the developing states and the inability (or unwillingness) to fulfill them because of primary interest in protecting U.S. foreign investments and reactionary dictators as well as in maintaining a "negative anti-Communist political stance."⁴

On the positive side, the SDS outlined an eight-point program for U.S. foreign policy:

1. The United States' principal goal should be creating a world where hunger, poverty, disease, ignorance, violence, and exploitation are replaced as central features by abundance, reason, love, and international cooperation.

2. We should undertake here and now a fifty-year effort to prepare for all nations the conditions of industrialization.

3. We should not depend significantly on private enterprise to do the job.

4. We should not lock the development process into the Cold War: we should view it as a way of ending that conflict.

5. America should show its commitment to democratic institutions not by withdrawing support from undemocratic regimes, but by making domestic democracy exemplary.

6. America should agree that public utilities, railroads, mines, and plantations, and other basic economic institutions should be in the control of national, not foreign, agencies.

7. Foreign aid should be given through international agencies, primarily the United Nations.

8. Democratic theory must confront the problems inherent in social revolution.⁵

Although some of these points are subject to argument, many are incorporated in official policy, and none are revolutionary. But, significant by omission is any recommendation on how to deal with the Communist threat except, implicitly, to take it less seriously.

The above was written primarily by Tom Hayden, then SDS President, in 1962. Carl Oglesby, a subsequent SDS President partially answered the question of how to deal with the Soviet Union in late 1965 by proposing, in effect, that all the United States needs

34 NAVAL WAR COLLEGE REVIEW

do is stop doing bad things such as aggressive intervention in foreign states, and the world will be a better place:

Some will make of it that I overdraw the matter. Many will ask: What about the other side? To be sure, there is the bitter ugliness of Czechoslovakia, Poland, those infamous Russian tanks in the streets of Budapest. But my anger only rises to hear some say that sorrow cancels sorrow, or that *this* one's shame deposits in *that* one's account the right to shamefulness.⁶

George Kennan's comment on this attitude, reflected extensively in the student letters cited in chapter II, is that the conscience of the young is reserved solely for American acts and that "beyond our borders, people are at liberty to commit every sort of heastliness without any perceptible engagement of the American conscience."⁷

This attitude of looking only for "international crimes" by the American "leviathan" has strong psychological roots in the father-son aspects of the generational battle but is understandable also if one accepts the principal immediate goal of the New Left to be domestic reform. In the latter case, anything that is done to discredit the Establishment is progress toward the immediate goal. After that battle is won, the world can be dealt with more realistically. However, whichever the incentive, the tone has become shriller in recent years, and the New Left has increasingly turned to Communist propaganda to support its criticism of U.S. foreign policy. It is not just the Viet Cong flags displayed at anti-Vietnam rallies or Jerry Rubin Yippie leader, appearing at a House Un-American Activities subcommittee hearing wearing "Viet Cong pajamas, a Latin American guerrilla's beard and bandoleer, a Black Panther heret, an

empty holster and a homemade VC flag draped over his shoulders Superman style."⁸ In the grossness of gesture, these suggest more than a degree of youthful prankishness. Much more symptomatic is the glorification of Castro, Che Guevara, Mao, Ho, and others as popular folk heroes, accepting them in terms of their own propaganda and turning a blind eye to the assaults these leaders have committed against the very democratic values the New Left desires to revitalize.

The change in tone from the relatively conservative statements of Tom Hayden in 1962 is reflected in a position discussion paper for the SDS National Council Meeting in August 1966 prepared by Paul Booth, a former national secretary. It reflects the increasing preoccupation of the New Left with Vietnam and the emotionalism connected with that issue. Here, while all U.S. action is dismissed as "the flaming symbol to the world of the American arrogance," anything unfavorable about the Viet Cong and the North Vietnamese actions is dismissed as "LBJ's devil theory" while "Chinese Communism is a virile alternative to the pattern of oligarchic and military dominance in the Third World."¹⁰

Echoes from Abroad. A New Left foreign policy based on the principle of goodness and trust could only be realistic if there were a reasonable expectation that the rest of the world would agree to play the same rules. There are signs that seething rebellion of the young against the Establishment in many other industrial states remarkably resembles that in the United States in origins, methods, and objectives. Visions among the young of a brave new world of universal love and nonaggression, created by a youthful new international movement, becloud reality. Yet, this idealistic vision is not completely unreal if one analyzes international trends in more conventional language.

The two superpowers, the United States and the Soviet Union, have established a "balance of terror" which, despite its theoretical instability, has worked fairly well in the past 24 years. Because of the nature of modern armaments, war (in its traditional form) is no longer the instrument of foreign policy it once was. The absurdity of war—at least between the superpowers—has never been clearer to mankind, even to hard-bitten diplomats and soldiers. The Cuban missile crisis set subtle new rules to international conduct which, if man acts rationally, can eventually establish a new world order in which terror is replaced by confidence and a degree of trust, albeit verified. Arms limitations can be but a first logical step toward disarmament. After that an optimistic projection could come close to the world imagined by many young idealists in the United States and elsewhere.

Dean Rusk, in talking about a dialog between the generations in which he felt both can contribute something, suggested that "it may be that there is something better than collective security as a basis for organizing the peace, and if so, let's find it."¹¹ In looking for an alternative, if indeed there is one, a quick glance at what is happening in other countries among the young might be useful.

In reviewing the "class struggle between old and young" in Europe, Bo Elmgren, of the Swedish Social Democratic Party, cited three major goals of European youth:

- demands advocating struggle against commercialism,
- work for a better spirit of solidarity between human beings instead of competition, and
- increased chances for the many to influence the decisions.¹²

point is clearly the "participatory democracy" of the SDS.

The French student revolt of 1968 represented a denunciation of the French Establishment and a rejection of capitalist structures and the parliamentary system. Jacques Sauvageot, of the National Union of French Students (UNEF), saw the goal as the establishment of "workers' control" in the tradition of the French Revolution, again a form of "participatory democracy."¹³ Beyond this Sauvageot felt the French struggle for "student power" and "workers' control" to be a part of the larger, worldwide struggle against "imperialism," particularly the American variety. "Our solidarity with struggles in the third world cannot be overemphasized."¹⁴ Concerns about a "technocratic society" are frequently mentioned, and in an interview with Jean-Paul Sartre in May 1968, Daniel Cohn-Bendit ("Danny the Red") talked of the "uncontrollable spontaneity" with which the French movement was progressing "toward a perpetual change of society."¹⁵

Erik Blumenfeld, a prominent German politician and member of the Bundestag, has noted that a "traumatic fear of the overpoweringness of the future" appears to be a deep underlying cause for youthful demands to the older generation in Germany that the past be eliminated. He finds that the "politicization" of the European Student body results from a sense of resignation before the narrowness of given possibilities.¹⁶

The frustration of living in a Europe slipping into a hackwater, both politically and technologically, is an added frustration of European youth which is not present in the United States. Another observable difference is the continuing prominence of Marxist thought and terminology among European student radicals. However, as in the United States earlier, Marxism is becoming increasingly irrelevant. A reasonable

These aims differ only in the form from those of American students. The last

36 NAVAL WAR COLLEGE REVIEW

explanation of this lag is that there has been far greater continuity in European Marxism than in the United States. In Europe, the ideological debates of the 1930's were continued into the 1940's, and 1950's, while Marxist thought did not survive World War II as a serious force among the intellectuals in America.

The New Left: An International Movement? Philip Hanson has proposed that "the militant, student-based left . . . looks increasingly like an international movement and not a mere coincidence of separate national movements with different aims and origins."¹⁷ Others have made similar observations, and the worldwide rise in expressions of student power appears to have too many points in common to be purely coincidental.

It would be excessive and hasty, however, to conclude that the New Left is an international movement (or conspiracy, as some would have it) led in an organized fashion by some central guiding organization. All evidence points against this possibility. One of the principal characteristics of The Movement is its spontaneity, disorganizations, and near-anarchism. Nowhere has it been possible even to organize a unified national movement, much less an international one. There is no commonly accepted doctrine of values; in fact, it would appear that we may really be at the "end of ideology" since the New Left has not yet been able to come up with one.

The chaos in the New Left contrasts markedly with the well-organized and disciplined international Communist movement of the past. Certainly, the Communists will try to take advantage of the New Left's disruptive potential in the West; however, this same force is also adversely affecting their own interests; *viz.*, the revolt in Czechoslovakia, for which the young provided much of the spirit, and evidence of rising unrest

among the young in the Soviet Union itself.

The global challenges to the power elites can best be explained as originating from a universal discontent with the world as it is. This unrest is given peculiar impetus by the increasing realization, by the young in particular, that the technological revolution, if properly utilized, can place in man's hands the control of his environment and destiny. Hence, the common emphasis by the American and European New Left on social justice for the third world.

To the young in the capitalist West, the Communist East, and the underdeveloped South, the power elite have, in their preoccupation with traditional games, not demonstrated competence to confront the world of the future. These young are now better educated than ever before (ironically, because of the efforts of the power elites they now combat) and want "participation" in decision making.

V—INFLUENCE OF THE NEW LEFT ON STRATEGY

Today, it seems to me, there are signs that the lessons of the past are being forgotten. A trend toward isolationism has appeared not only in the United States but in other Western nations.

. . . . Dean Rusk¹

The New Left as a Continuing Phenomenon. If the New Left, particularly in the "student revolt" phase, is a purely transitory phenomenon, embodying the usual generational revolt, it may deserve the attention of parents and educators but not necessarily that of the society as a whole. All evidence, however, points to a greater scope and permanence. Youth is in the vanguard of the new technological society, and the New Left as its most vocal representative is trying to find new values to

cope with a radically different world. This new sense of the future has permeated the ranks of the young deeper than just the top echelons of the activists, as is apparent in the silent support most college students have given to campus revolts by the more active.

The depth of the inner distress is further shown by increasing evidence that the more anarchistic aspects of the Movement are permeating the high schools and even elementary schools. The more sensational aspects of the high school revolt, such as rising drug use, rowdiness, and alleged sexual promiscuity, have received most publicity. If it were just this (albeit quite enough), such actions could be considered merely as further evidence of a breakdown in family discipline and an affluent society gone wild. It is, in fact, superficial evidence of a breakdown in the system, but more profound than we like to imagine.

These high school "children" are, however, moving—almost unbelievably—toward the stage of "revolutionaries who have to be home by 7:30."² High school students are now organizing their own "underground" publications with such titles as "the magazine of the second American Revolution." This particular publication, put out by high school students in lower Manhattan, states in its "declaration of intent" that "our chief goal is to promote the idea of revolution in the United States . . . We feel that our only obligation is to promote the social upheavals that we feel are necessary for the welfare of man. WE WANT THE WORLD AND WE WANT IT—NOW!"³

While this publication may still represent only a small minority view among high school students in the country, there are an increasing number of such attitudes and publications cropping up elsewhere. It is a trend not to be ignored and suggests that if the current crop of 20 to 30 year olds are judged excessively impatient with the Establishment,

one had better learn to expect even more militancy from their younger brothers.

The question still remains, however, as to whether the campus radical, active or passive, will radically change his views once he dons a business suit and joins the corporation of his choice. Some studies done in Japan suggest preliminarily that the young Japanese radical privately retains much of his earlier views into his middle years but doesn't continue to fight the system.⁴ The uniqueness of Japanese society reduces the relevance of these studies to the United States, and no analyses in depth have yet been made on this question in the United States. However, past experience and common sense would lead one to conclude that it would be highly unusual for a man to abandon completely the basic philosophic predispositions he acquired in youth.

Some of the changed attitudes of young people are subjectively evident to employers. In a speech delivered to the 16th Annual Management Conference at Chicago in early 1968, David Rockefeller concerned himself with the generation gap and its meaning for business. He felt the gap was significantly larger than it had been in his and his father's time and noted that one of the principal characteristics of youth today is that of individualism, to "do your own thing" rather than conform to a preordained order. He found it is the most promising students who tend to be in the forefront of protest movements. These are the ones business wants most to recruit, but are also the ones who cast the coldest eye on business. He quoted a participant in the Harvard Business School internship program as commenting on his experience in industry: "It is about time businessmen learned that college students are not all that concerned about the profit motive." As an antidote, Rockefeller proposed that business do some rethinking in order to create an

38 NAVAL WAR COLLEGE REVIEW

environment more challenging and creative for the young person and at the same time to show him that the profit motive, properly employed, can help achieve the goals our young people say they want.⁵

Rockefeller's observations are borne out in the area of Government employment as well. Impatience with traditional apprenticeship in career services is characteristic of young recruits. They want to do their thing—NOW! And in Government, as in business, they find much to criticize, whether rightly or wrongly, about a lack of openmindedness, intellectual honesty, and commitment to social progress.

In earlier chapters this paper has attempted to outline some of the underlying reasons for the current social unrest which is most visibly displayed among students. One can expect, as indeed is being seen, a sharp increase in student activities in a society where, for a variety of reasons, accepted political and social values are being fundamentally questioned. The motivations for disquietude are not likely to disappear when the student leaves college. Although the actions of the young graduate may become less blatant, he is less likely to conform to the Establishment than did his father. His commitment to a search for a more satisfying life style in his rapidly changing environment is too deep and basic. Moreover, he has greater opportunities for independence of action than did his forefathers, since economic status symbols have lost much of their meaning in a society of abundance.

Effects on International Relations. In the short term, the rise of the New Left has frustrated U.S. foreign policy in several ways, both directly and indirectly. Most direct has been its influence on Vietnam policy. Domestically, the agitation of the young radicals has reinforced the growing impatience of the general public with the war, made

the draft a contentious issue, and encouraged insubordination within the military. Internationally, Vietnam has become a popular rallying point for New Left organizations in all countries and has led to a more concentrated abuse against American "imperialism" worldwide than has ever before been experienced, thereby adversely influencing many other American objectives.

Indirectly, the New Left, in its agitation for domestic reform in the United States, has helped focus public attention on the ills of its society and encouraged the trend toward neoisolationism. It has cast doubt among foreign countries on the viability of American institutions. Its presence in other countries as a volatile political force has also been a force for isolationism, particularly in countries in which there is an American military presence. Japan is a prime example where student militancy over the past 10 years against the American alliance has had the effect of reducing the public commitment of Japanese politicians to the alliance.

The longer term effects of the new political and cultural forces brought into being by the New Left are likely to be both more profound and more difficult to predict. Perhaps most significant will be the effects of the new philosophy on both style and content of action of those presently under 30 as they begin to move toward positions of leadership. Seymour Lipset has given particular importance, in this context, to "the role of political generations." He notes that many analysts of politics and cultural styles have indicated that people tend to form a defined frame of reference in late adolescence and early manhood within which they fit subsequent experiences.⁶ Consequently, concern about unemployment statistics is greater among those with adolescent recollections of the depression, as is emphasis on the need for collective security against aggression, Fascist or

Communist, than among those who have not experienced such trauma.

By this analysis, World War I bred a generation of isolationists, while the bitter experiences leading to World War II produced a crop of internationalists. On the other hand, the new generation of college students finds little present relevance, for example, in the past evils of Stalinist communism.

Although finding no conclusive evidence on the effects of "political generations," Lipset suggests that the effect could be, as the new generation moves into power, the creation of an elite no longer believing in the system which it continues to operate. The consequent weakening of the elite could lead to its overthrow as in 1917 Russia.⁷

The model which Lipset suggests would require considerable rigidity of the Establishment, something more likely in a tradition-based society as was Czarist Russia than the United States where evolutionary change has been a tradition. It is therefore more probable that American institutions will change or be modified as the new elite moves into power. Indeed, evidence of dynamic change, the pace of which is being forced to some extent by the New Left, is all about us.

Implications for Strategy in the Seventies. "No more Vietnams!" is a cry which will haunt all strategic thinking for at least the first few years of the new decade. Its implications for U.S. foreign policy are obvious. The specter of a new isolationism disturbs all those who saw the results of an older isolationism in the 1930's. They are, however, probably overdramatizing as much as are the neoisolationists. The present period is not comparable to the 1930's. At that time the United States was a world power but preferred not to realize it in a world where this was still possible. Presently it is the most powerful nation on earth, is conscious of this fact, and cannot forget it even if it tried.

Every action or inaction by the United States has international implications, and isolation is simply impossible—doubly so because modern technology has created a far more interdependent world than existed 30 or 40 years ago.

Nonetheless, constraints against other Vietnams will be real. Quite aside from the wisdom—or lack thereof—of the manner and extent of U.S. involvement in Vietnam, another "American War" fought on the same format will be domestically impossible and, probably, internationally unwise.

Yet the continuing threat of communism cannot simply be ignored if the United States wishes to preserve a world in which its way of life can prosper. The answer may lie in a search for new forms of collective security (or, more accurately, truly *collective* security) or alternatives thereto. The former could lead to a greater multilateralization of defense efforts, while possibilities of alternatives to collective security would have to depend to a large extent on what happens in the Communist world.

It may be that the present Establishment has, because of the memories it carries from adolescence, concentrated

BIOGRAPHIC SUMMARY



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40 NAVAL WAR COLLEGE REVIEW

too much on a confrontation policy against the Communists, not seeing all the opportunities both for relative advantage and reduction of tensions provided by the radical changes in the Communist world over the past 10 or 15 years. In such phobias (if they are indeed that) as well as in all other matters, the new generation has given ample notice that it will show no filial piety.

Because the present "generation gap" is larger and deeper than those in the past, a stiffer questioning of old shibboleths on which strategic planning has been based in the past can be expected as the young, whether identified with the New Left or not, move into decision making roles. In the ensuing debate such

old truths as remain true should survive. The newer truths, honed on experience and responsibility, can lead to better policy making. No generation has a monopoly on knowledge and understanding.

The major problem, in domestic as well as in foreign policy, is whether change can be rapid enough to avoid the chaos and, even, revolution which the current questioning of all values of our society threatens. The "Now Generation" is impatient, often unreasonable, but politically potent. It can drive the United States down paths destructive of all values it and all Americans claim as their heritage and destroy the comity which has been the often thin thread holding the Union together.

FOOTNOTES

I—CONSENSUS THROUGH CONFLICT

1. Richard Hofstadter, *The Progressive Historians* (New York: Knopf, 1968). Hofstadter reviews the writings of Turner, Beard, and Parrington in the light of the sociological environment in which they lived.
2. Louis Hartz, *The Founding of New Societies* (New York: Harcourt, Brace & World, 1964), p. 82.
3. Robert R. Palmer, *The Age of the Democratic Revolution: the Challenge* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1959), p. 189-190.
4. Christopher Lasch, quoted in John Leo, "U.S. Historians Swing Pendulum from Consensus to Conflict," *International Herald Tribune* (Paris), 3 January 1969, p. 5:3.
5. Hofstadter, p. 452, 454-455.

II—YOUTH'S DARK VIEW OF THE FUTURE

1. Pierre Teilhard de Chardin, *The Phenomenon of Man* (New York: Harper, 1959), p. 225.
2. George F. Kennan, *Democracy and the Student Left* (New York: Bantam Books, 1968), p. 134.
3. *Ibid.*, p. 3-18.
4. *Ibid.*, p. 125.
5. *Ibid.*, p. 25.
6. *Ibid.*, p. 26.
7. *Ibid.*, p. 52.
8. *Ibid.*, p. 63.
9. *Ibid.*, p. 29, 32-33.
10. *Ibid.*, p. 35.
11. Zbigniew K. Brzezinski, "America in the Technetronic Age," *Encounter*, January 1968, p. 16.
12. Lewis S. Feuer, "Conflict of Generations," *Saturday Review*, 18 January 1969, p. 53.
13. Jacques Ellul, *The Technological Society* (New York: Knopf, 1964), p. 436.
14. Teilhard de Chardin, p. 285-290.
15. Herman Kahn and Anthony J. Wiener, *The Year 2000* (New York: Macmillan, 1967), p.

16. Brzezinski, p. 17.
17. *Ibid.*, p. 19.
18. *Ibid.*
19. American Academy of Arts and Sciences, Commission on the Year 2000, *Toward the Year 2000* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1968), p. 6.
20. Brzezinski, p. 20.

III—THE NEW LEFT

1. Paul Jacobs and Saul Landau, eds., *The New Radicals* (New York: Random House, 1966), p. 151. The Port Huron Statement, reprinted in part in this book, came out of the 1962 convention of the Students for a Democratic Society (SDS) at Port Huron, Mich., and established the basic guidelines for this organization in ideology and action. It is primarily the work of Tom Hayden, then President of the SDS.

2. Jacobs and Landau offer the following sanguine comment: "How many people are in the American Movement? Certainly it is possible to count those who are members of the organizations within the Movement, but that would be to misunderstand one of the basic facts of its nature. The Movement is organizations plus unaffiliated supporters, who outnumber by the thousands, and perhaps even hundreds of thousands, those committed to specific groups. The Movement's basic strength rests on those unaffiliated reserves, who are just as much a part of it as the organization youth." *Ibid.*, p. 4.

3. Louis Banks, ed., *Youth in Turmoil* (New York: Time-Life Books, 1969), p. 9.

4. See Jean Wabl, *A Short History of Existentialism* (New York: Wisdom Library, 1949). Professor Wabl, a well-known French philosopher and poet, presents one of the clearest expositions of existentialism, but even he is better able to identify existentialist statements than to define the term.

5. *Ibid.*, p. 304.

6. *Ibid.*, p. 6.

7. Jacobs and Landau, eds., p. 9-13.

8. Edward Shils, "Milan Conference," *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*, February 1956, p. 39.

9. Raymond Aron, *The Opium of the Intellectuals* (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1957), p. xviii.

10. Seymour M. Lipset, *Political Man* (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1960), p. 417.

11. Daniel Bell, *The End of Ideology* (Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press, 1960), p. 370, 373.

12. *Ibid.*, p. 374-375.

13. Jacobs and Landau, eds., p. 104.

14. *Ibid.*, p. 106.

15. *Ibid.*, p. 151.

16. *Ibid.*, p. 152.

17. *Ibid.*, p. 155.

18. *Ibid.*, p. 161-162.

19. *Ibid.*, p. 230-234.

20. Leonard I. Krimerman and Lewis Perry, eds., *Patterns of Anarchy* (Garden City, N.Y.: Anchor Books, 1966), p. 135.

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IV—THE NEW LEFT AND FOREIGN POLICY


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42 NAVAL WAR COLLEGE REVIEW

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V—INFLUENCE OF THE NEW LEFT ON STRATEGY

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As the excited passions of hostile people are of themselves a powerful enemy, both the general and his government should use their best efforts to allay them.

Jomini: Precis de l'Art de la Guerre, 1838