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# The Fast Carriers the Forging of an Air Navy

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controversial. Whether one agrees with Mr. Baker's contention or not, the book is well worth reading, particularly for those who are interested in trends in Government domestic financial policies.

C.H. NORDHILL,  
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Falk, Richard A., ed. *The Vietnam War and International Law*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1968. 633p.

This volume of readings and documents, prepared under the auspices of the Civil War Panel of the American Society of International Law and edited by the panel's Chairman, Professor Richard Falk of Princeton University, contains an excellent sampling of the nonpolemical writings of U.S. international lawyers who are either critics or defenders of the legality of American participation in the Vietnam war. In the year since its publication, this collection already has become the leading reference work for persons interested in the short- and long-range legal aspects of the conflict in Indochina.

The book is divided into four sections. Part I, which contains eight selections ranging from those by Emmerich de Vattel and John Stuart Mill to those by Roger Fisher and Wolfgang Friedmann, offers the reader a broad view of the legal issues involved, but in a setting largely independent of the Vietnam war. Part II consists of seven selections developing the opposing interpretations of fact and law that touch upon whether, and in what respects, the U.S. involvement in Vietnam is lawful or not. The principal contributor to this section, with two lengthy articles, is John Norton Moore, the most articulate and convincing exponent of the legitimacy of U.S. participation. In part III, eight selections continue the focus upon Vietnam, but they enlarge the perspective of concern to present assessments of the world order consequences ensuing from the various stages of U.S. involvement.

Here the volume's editor, the leading critic of American involvement in Vietnam, permits himself 2 days in court. Finally, part IV represents a more useful compilation of documentary sources, including the Geneva Accords, the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution, and the Legal Adviser's Memorandum of Law on "The Legality of United States Participation in the Defense of Vietnam." In sum, this book should be in every library for use by anyone interested in the most important foreign policy and international law issue to confront the United States during this decade. It is to be followed shortly by a second volume of readings which should be just as valuable.

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Reynolds, Clark G. *The Fast Carriers: the Forging of an Air Navy*. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1968. 498p.

There are many historians and some professional naval officers who assume that Samuel Eliot Morison has written almost all that can be said about the naval side of World War II. Most of the historians and naval "buffs" are not really competent to judge whether his conclusions are completely sound or, more importantly, if he might not have lost track of why the Pacific war was won. Professor Clark Reynolds, of the University of Maine and earlier the U.S. Naval Academy, is a professional historian who believes that Morison might have missed the point. He suspects that this occurred because the Harvard historian spent his time at sea during the war among the "black shoe Navy" types and did not get to know the naval aviators ("the brown shoes") who fought their own war in ships quite different from the cruisers *Baltimore* and *Brooklyn* or the battleships *Tennessee* and *Washington*.

Reynolds highlights his own conclusion thusly:

General Tojo told General MacArthur after the war that the three major factors in the defeat of Japan were the far-ranging operations of the Fast Carrier Task Force, the leapfrogging and neutralization of major bases (made possible by the fast carriers), and the destruction of Japan's merchant shipping by American submarines.

Reflecting the views of the carrier admirals, the author is not convinced that MacArthur's campaigns in the Admiralties, Bismarcks, New Guinea, and the Philippines were strategically sound or necessary once the Japanese were stopped in the Solomons. Admiral Nimitz' drive to the Marianas was needed for advanced naval bases and long-range bomber fields, but from there a strategy of blockade and interdiction of supply lines (by submarine and carrier forces) and bombardment from the Marianas might well have finished Japan. Had this strategy been pursued, the war might have been shortened—and Morison's series as well.

While most of the naval and amphibious actions of the Pacific war are chronicled, Reynolds focuses constantly on the fast carrier groups and their admirals. His heroes are Admirals M.A. Mitscher, J.H. Towers, Frederick C. Sherman, and J.J. Clark. Chester Nimitz is admitted to this pantheon because he finally recognized the value of the fast carrier forces and allowed the air admirals proper representation within his councils. Morison's hero, Admiral Raymond A. Spruance, is downgraded seriously because he did not understand carrier warfare, risked the fast carriers unwisely at times, and lost opportunities for even greater victories because he was a naval "formalist" who insisted on maintaining the integrity of the old battleline and its battleships. Admirals W.F. Halsey and J.S. McCain are looked on as bumbling strategists and tacticians who survived because of charismatic leadership qualities and more materiel than the Japanese could sink. Reynolds' judgments, often quite blunt, un-

doubtedly reflect the several dozen interviews he had with the air admirals and his research in their manuscripts and diaries. To some, Reynolds will seem a bit "flip" or irreverent because of the familiarity with which he refers to the admirals. They become "Ted" (F.C.) Sherman, "Baldy" (C.A.) Pownall, or "Joeko" (J.J.) Clark. But they were known to one another by these sobriquets, and they were recognized in the fleet by such names. At times I did have trouble separating "Ted" Sherman from Forrest Sherman or "Ziggy" (C.A.F.) Sprague from T.L. Sprague, but normally the nicknames helped to identify the characters.

The author departs most strikingly from the conclusions of Morison when he deals with Admiral Raymond A. Spruance, Commander of the 5th Fleet. Looking back to the admiral's prewar years at the Naval War College, Reynolds concludes that his training and teaching there had made him a naval "formalist." He never doubted that the Japanese main fleet would eventually be brought to bay and destroyed in a Jutland-type gun battle. Because of this premise, Spruance always operated carriers and battleships together with the doctrine that called for deploying the battleline with carriers on tap to protect it. This was done in the Gilberts, Marianas, and Leyte Gulf campaigns. From the viewpoint of Vice Admiral Mitscher or Rear Admiral F.C. Sherman, whom Reynolds classified as naval "meleecists" in contrast to "formalists" (both terms describe British sailing Navy tactical schools), such doctrine was totally wrong; for it hampered the mobility and striking power of the carriers. Most seriously, it defeated the opportunity for the carriers to destroy the Japanese Fleet in the Battle of the Philippine Sea.

Because he is concerned with fast carrier warfare, Reynolds also gives plenty of space to British and Japanese naval aviation and carriers. What he

demonstrates is that warfare from carriers took a continuing supply of well-trained aviators and that the Japanese squandered this precious resource on too many wrong occasions. The inevitable supremacy of the U.S. Navy, made manifest in the Battle of the Philippine Sea (19-21 June 1944), was demonstrated in the battle off Cape Engano (25-26 October 1944). Here the Japanese sent four empty carriers and two hermaphrodite battleship-carriers against a potential 1,000 U.S. Navy planes. The history and development of fast carrier aviation in the British Navy is told in several chapters. As in the case of the Japanese story, he uses a judicious mixture of interviews, memoirs, and secondary works to establish his points.

Finally, Reynolds recognized that allocation of resources and development of tactical doctrine are the works of naval leadership. In several chapters he moves inside Adm. E.J. King's headquarters at Main Navy or into Adm. C.W. Nimitz's staffs at Pearl Harbor and Guam. He describes the infighting that was necessary to get air admirals assigned to high levels of authority and responsibility. Here Admirals John Towers, Forrest Sherman, and Arthur Radford are given proper recognition for insisting that aviator advice was absolutely necessary in the staffs, ashore or afloat, when they began planning operations that would involve the use of carriers. More importantly, as Reynolds demonstrates, their advice was meaningful when followed. It is quite evident that the importance of naval aviators in the top leadership positions today is traceable to a few "chargers" of the 1942-45 years.

The depth of research and variety of interesting materials used in this book are admirably described in a long bibliographical essay. McGraw-Hill is to be congratulated for investing 81 pages in bibliography, appendices, chapter notes, and a first-class index. The photos are ample and well selected. Overall, Pro-

fessor Reynolds deserves a snapping "well-done" from the Nohle and Ancient Order of Tail-hookers.

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Tremblay, Vladimir G., ed. *The Development of the Soviet Economy*. New York: Praeger, 1968. 296p.

This report by 12 specialists on the Soviet economy is the outgrowth of the papers presented at a conference in Munich in October of 1966 on "The October Revolution: Promise and Realization" under the auspices of the Institute for the Study of the U.S.S.R. The 12 authors are fairly representative of Western scholarship on Soviet affairs and come from France, Germany, the United Kingdom, and the United States, each being a recognized authority on a particular aspect of the Soviet economy. Every paper was subject to criticism by other experts and profited by this procedure. The studies differ in scope and format, ranging from policy alternatives and the dynamics of economic growth to specific sector analysis. They achieve their aim of a comprehensive 50-year survey of the Soviet economy. A select few are briefly summarized below.

Stanley H. Cohn's paper on the performance and growth of the Soviet economy marshals all the best of the evidence on the question from many sources. Comparisons indicate that growth has occurred, but not enough to justify adoption of the Soviet system by other countries. This, as other papers also show, is particularly true of agricultural productivity which in most economies has outstripped total productivity increases. Eugene Zaleski's paper on Soviet planning distinguishes between types of planning, showing that the Soviets have had largely administrative planning, but with variations. The conclusion of the author is that the economic policy with regard to armaments, inflation, agriculture, and the propor-