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The Vietnam War and International Law

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controversial. Whether one agrees with Mr. Baker's contention or not, the book is well worth reading, particularly for those who are interested in trends in Government domestic financial policies.

C.H. NORDHILL,
Commander, U.S. Navy

Falk, Richard A., ed. *The Vietnam War and International Law*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1968. 633p.

This volume of readings and documents, prepared under the auspices of the Civil War Panel of the American Society of International Law and edited by the panel's Chairman, Professor Richard Falk of Princeton University, contains an excellent sampling of the nonpolemical writings of U.S. international lawyers who are either critics or defenders of the legality of American participation in the Vietnam war. In the year since its publication, this collection already has become the leading reference work for persons interested in the short- and long-range legal aspects of the conflict in Indochina.

The book is divided into four sections. Part I, which contains eight selections ranging from those by Emmerich de Vattel and John Stuart Mill to those by Roger Fisher and Wolfgang Friedmann, offers the reader a broad view of the legal issues involved, but in a setting largely independent of the Vietnam war. Part II consists of seven selections developing the opposing interpretations of fact and law that touch upon whether, and in what respects, the U.S. involvement in Vietnam is lawful or not. The principal contributor to this section, with two lengthy articles, is John Norton Moore, the most articulate and convincing exponent of the legitimacy of U.S. participation. In part III, eight selections continue the focus upon Vietnam, but they enlarge the perspective of concern to present assessments of the world order consequences ensuing from the various stages of U.S. involvement.

Here the volume's editor, the leading critic of American involvement in Vietnam, permits himself 2 days in court. Finally, part IV represents a more useful compilation of documentary sources, including the Geneva Accords, the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution, and the Legal Adviser's Memorandum of Law on "The Legality of United States Participation in the Defense of Vietnam." In sum, this book should be in every library for use by anyone interested in the most important foreign policy and international law issue to confront the United States during this decade. It is to be followed shortly by a second volume of readings which should be just as valuable.

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Charles H. Stockton Chair of
International Law

Reynolds, Clark G. *The Fast Carriers: the Forging of an Air Navy*. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1968. 498p.

There are many historians and some professional naval officers who assume that Samuel Eliot Morison has written almost all that can be said about the naval side of World War II. Most of the historians and naval "buffs" are not really competent to judge whether his conclusions are completely sound or, more importantly, if he might not have lost track of why the Pacific war was won. Professor Clark Reynolds, of the University of Maine and earlier the U.S. Naval Academy, is a professional historian who believes that Morison might have missed the point. He suspects that this occurred because the Harvard historian spent his time at sea during the war among the "black shoe Navy" types and did not get to know the naval aviators ("the brown shoes") who fought their own war in ships quite different from the cruisers *Baltimore* and *Brooklyn* or the battleships *Tennessee* and *Washington*.

Reynolds highlights his own conclusion thusly: