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THE RUSSIAN MARITIME THREAT

An Approach to the Problem

by

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Logistics Research Project

In this first of 10 articles, in this issue dealing with the maritime problem, the author seeks to fix the maritime element of national power into a valid and comprehensible politico-strategic framework. The commitment of limited resources to maritime programs can only be made after a realistic appraisal of need. Even then, individual programs will be subjected to the stress and strain of the U.S. democratic political process.

Introduction. The Soviet Union is now actively exerting strong worldwide political pressure by means of economic and military aid backed and screened by a strong, modern, and highly visible naval force. Whereas a few years ago the Soviet Navy was predominantly defensive and generally confined to northern oceans and coastal waters, it now operates freely and extensively in the Mediterranean, the Indian, and the South Atlantic Oceans.

Its electronic reconnaissance and aggressive fishing exploitation, which have been obvious for years, have been extended as far as Australia. Its fast

growing merchant marine is more and more a major world economic factor.

This all adds up to the skilled aggressive use of maritime power for economic political ends and constitutes a major threat to the position of the United States and its allies.

No study of this Russian maritime threat can ignore the interaction of policy, strategy, and military capability. In other words, strategy is subordinate to policy but limited by capability. But the limits on strategy imposed by capability must, in turn, be reflected in policy.

This reaction induces the two further related considerations of time necessary to convert a potential capability into actual power and the relations and distinction between short-range and long-range policy and plans.

Moving from this important but abstract level into the area of specific military-economic plans and programs requires thorough sophisticated systems analysis with special consideration for side effects and marginal utility.

But here we need further inputs--relative values of objectives sought, military values, and logistic planning factors. Much research is needed in all these areas.

Any results achieved without rigorous attack on these matters are trivial--interesting speculation at best--but perhaps dangerous since they may deceive people into thinking that they know what they are doing when in reality they do not.

The rise of Russian maritime power in the last decade can be fully appreciated only if it is examined in a disciplined framework which involves an interweaving of fact and theory.

* * *

The problem it presents is a clear illustration of a "difficulty" as described by T.D. Weldon.¹ He points out that there are two basic types of problems--one, the "puzzle" and the other, the "difficulty." A puzzle is a problem to which there is a specific correct solution. A difficulty, in contrast, cannot be solved in specific final terms; it can only be surmounted, reduced, or at times ignored.

Our major political-military problems are "difficulties"; some of their aspects, however, may be "puzzles," and their solution can help in dealing with the overall difficulty. A useful approach to the problem of Soviet maritime development requires an awareness of this distinction.

This issue of the *Review* discusses some of the interrelated elements of this "difficulty" and places them in the context of history primarily to establish a sound perspective and a foundation for subsequent further development. As this elaboration and development takes place, we can expect individuals and special study groups to reach conclusions which will be useful both for public enlightenment and Congressional and Executive action.

Obviously, the college will be particularly interested in the military, and especially the naval, aspects of the question, but always with the appreciation that military proposals are dependent upon political aims and that the resources they call for will always be limited by economic considerations.

Three fundamentals, each with important corollaries and subordinate factors, dominate the analysis of the implications of Russian maritime development.

First: This development of maritime power shows that the Russians have a firm grasp of the fundamentals of strategy and are determined to apply them in the pursuit of national interests.

Second: The United States of America has shown conclusively, not only that it has enormous economic potential, but also that when its people attain a clear sense of purpose and act with a high degree of national and conceptual unity, this economic power can be rapidly converted to comparable military power.

Third: There are, however, differences of opinion in the United States and among its allies as to:

A. The implications of the increase in Russian power.

B. The policies we should adopt to counter the threat.

C. The specific measures and the allocation of resources to support these policies.

Thus, the development of conceptual unity then becomes essential to deal with the problems posed.

Russian Maritime Power. With this brief background, let us pass on to the hard practical facts of Russian maritime power.

Of the many articles on this published during the last year, none is more comprehensive than "The Changing Strategic Naval Balance U.S.S.R. vs. U.S.A." This report, issued in December 1968, was prepared at the request of the Chairman of the House of Representatives Armed Services Committee by a group of distinguished senior retired officers and military scholars under the chairmanship of Adm. Harry D. Felt, USN, (Ret.), using unclassified material published prior to October 1968.

Subsequent information indicates that the report understated rather than overstated the situation.

Largely as a consequence of this study, on the opening day of Congress, 3 January 1969, Committee Chairman Rivers introduced a bill authorizing \$3.8 billion in 1970 for naval shipbuilding.

The evidence of rapidly growing power is clear. The Russians now have a large, balanced modern navy and they are using it to good effect. A few illustrations suffice to show how they now stand.

The five *Kresta* class cruisers mount a complex of weapons systems including surface-to-surface missiles with a range of 450 miles, surface-to-air missiles, and conventional guns.

The *Kynda* class destroyers have both surface-to-surface and surface-to-air missiles. The Russians apparently think that the combinations of these types can challenge U.S. carrier task groups in all oceans.

The 150 *Osa* and *Komar* short-range, guided-missile patrol boats displacing 200 tons carry the *Styx* missiles that sank the Israeli destroyer *Elath*. These can constitute a dangerous threat to

coastal operations of major forces.

The new *Moskva* helicopter carriers can handle about 30 helicopters and mount surface-to-air missiles. These combine with a large variety of landing craft and the newly expanded naval infantry to provide excellent amphibious capability.

This surface force is supplemented by escort vessels, coastal minesweepers, minelayers, icebreakers, oceanographic vessels, and electronic intelligence ships.

The weapons systems of the modern Soviet Navy are accurate and flexible and are mounted on well-designed ships which can keep the sea.

The Soviet submarine force constitutes a major element of power consisting of about 250 attack submarines and 100 missile submarines. The former constitute a grave threat to our vital oceanic lines of communication. The missile submarines, because they carry both long-range underwater-launched nuclear missiles and shorter range surface-to-surface missiles with terminal guidance, are a threat both to the cities of the United States and to the carrier task forces at sea.

This balanced, versatile modern force is supported by a well designed and balanced mobile logistic force capable of underway replenishment and mobile base support. It includes all types of service craft, oceangoing tugs, and, most importantly, six modern ships for missile supply and maintenance of nuclear-powered submarines.

It is important to realize that *the combat ships and major logistic ships were designed and built by Russian shipyards*. Furthermore, most of these ships are under 20 years of age, whereas most of the U.S. naval ships are over 20 years old.

Since naval ships form only one element of maritime power, a brief comparison of the U.S.S.R. and the U.S. merchant fleets is instructive.

Of the approximately 1,400 Soviet ships of 10.4 million tons, about 80

percent are less than 10 years old.

In contrast, of about 1,100 U.S. ships of 14.8 million tons, about 80 percent are 25 years or more in age. In 1968 the Soviets had 456 vessels on order while the United States had only 51.

In 1966 the Soviet Minister of Merchant Marine wrote:

The fleet has been joined by hundreds of new and improved vessels of various types . . . the creation of a Soviet Merchant Marine has made it possible to free the nation from dependence on foreign vessels for maritime shipping. Today the Soviet Union can deliver cargo to any point on earth using high-speed Soviet ships.²

This large merchant marine is made even more effective as an arm of strategy and policy by being under disciplined authoritarian control. Furthermore, since Russia is not an "affluent society" there seems to be no great problem in manning the merchant and fishing fleets.

In sharp contrast, the U.S. merchant marine is in a deplorable condition in almost every respect. The situation is dominated by the seemingly all-powerful labor unions whose whipsaw tactics of the last 40 years destroyed our coastal shipping and forced the development of the large fleet of "flags of convenience." American-owned but foreign-manned ships cannot be relied upon to operate effectively in emergencies.

The American shipowners who operate in a fiercely competitive climate under a variety of complex and inconsistent regulations and subsidies are at odds among themselves. In spite of good accommodations, very high wages, short hours, fringe benefits, and early high-pensioned retirement, it is very difficult to recruit seamen for the U.S. merchant marine.

The economic competition with our maritime allies, which produces difficult problems of differential rates and allocation of routes and access to coastal

ports, further complicates the situation. Finally, the officials of the Executive Branch of Government, the members of Congress, and economists are sharply divided as to how best to handle the question of the merchant marine.

The contrast in fishing fleets is equally striking. There again, the Russians have built a very large, modern fleet while the United States has depended on frequently inadequately financed private ownership. Here again, the fishermen are aging while our young men prefer life ashore. Here again, the Russians have a great reconnaissance capability, while our fishing craft have no such organization or, indeed, capability.

The technical-industrial-economic base of Russian maritime power is sound and very large. The Russians have shown that they can design, build, man, and operate a large, modern, comprehensive maritime force. They supplement this by purchasing many merchant and fishing ships abroad. Most importantly, their system of economic control allows them to allocate resources toward maritime expansion without the constraints of short-time commercial profit.

A further implication is especially significant: it has been estimated that the Russians can build 20 to 30 nuclear submarines a year in covered shipyards protected from satellite reconnaissance. This contrasts with the current U.S. capability of building 10 to 12 a year in shipyards open to public view. Senator Pastore's comment is pertinent. "It is now clear . . . that the Department of Defense has grossly underestimated the rate at which the Soviets are improving their nuclear submarines."³

The large and growing Russian merchant and fishing fleets and their capabilities both for reconnaissance and missile launching, plus the increased high-seas cruising of the Russian surface and submarine fleets, significantly decrease the value of the system of stra-

legic warning that the United States has previously counted on.

Finally, in recent years Russia not only has become a major seapower, but has used this newly acquired power to support an expansionist foreign policy by various means such as:

A visible presence in the eastern Mediterranean accompanied by continued surveillance and overt harassment of the U.S. 6th Fleet.

Deployment of a naval task force from Vladivostok to the Indian Ocean and a visit to the Persian Gulf.

Maintenance of a submarine group in the Central and South Atlantic Ocean.

All of this supports military assistance and economic aid to Syria, the United Arab Republic, and Algeria and its general aid policy in India and in Africa.

The facts of the development and recent use of Russian maritime power illustrate certain important elements of military theory, to wit: conceptual unity, the understanding of strategy as the art of comprehensive direction of all forms of power toward the attainment of political-economic objectives, and the use of military power as the shield for the advancement of other forms of power.

First, let us discuss conceptual unity before going on to the basic theory of strategy.

Conceptual Unity. As was previously stated, the most important task when confronted with a problem on the scale of Soviet maritime expansion is to establish a conceptual unity for tackling the difficulty.

This has its special philosophic irony, for the Soviet system of collective leadership is based on the theory that all the elements of conceptual differences in the party and government leadership be thrashed out in private; that objectives and operational plans be specifically based on the concepts so developed; and thereafter the entire appara-

tus of government and propaganda proceed harmoniously toward the attainment of the objectives set.

While there seem to be some obvious flaws in the practical working out of this system, particularly in the relations with other Communist nations, the Soviet maritime growth is a brilliant illustration of its success.

The degree to which this Soviet ideal can be maintained, as the forces of change work within the Russian people, is perhaps the single most important uncertainty in forecasting Soviet attitudes and development. Nevertheless, recent events show that in situations of major national interest, the Russian leadership can effectively exercise this discipline.

In contrast to the U.S.S.R., in the United States the basic concepts as to national interests and objectives are seldom specifically clarified. Instead, public debate finally brings about an uncertain agreement as to specific policies and measures. But even when these measures are formally adopted, they are not always loyally supported. Instead, there is continuing and frequently inconsistent legal wrangling. The same holds true to an even greater degree within an alliance.

In the specific case of the merchant marine, we are faced with the prospect of a permanently ineffective system because it cannot be left to unregulated private enterprise, nor can it be effectively operated by the Government. There is no conceptual unity among the vested interests involved.

The authoritarian system can treat the merchant marine: (1) as part of a coherent overall transportation system; (2) with the navy, the fishing fleet, and oceanographic research, as a coherent maritime system; (3) as an arm of government economic-political-military policy.

It seems clear, therefore, that the United States national and alliance strategy must be so designed as to stand up

to Russian strategy in spite of having a weak, incomplete, and ineffective maritime system. If by good fortune we can develop unity of concept and build an effective reliable system, so much the better. But it would be very unwise to assume that this can be done within the next 20 years.

Strategy. Russian power is developed from a combination of nationalism, natural and human resources, and ideology. It is organized and guided by a comprehensive political-economic-military theory which produces a coherent overall national strategy. Unguided by this theory and this strategy, the power potential, nationalism, and ideology are no threat to the United States; but so guided, they now constitute a clear and growing threat.

To meet the threat, we must have an equal understanding of strategy, power, and force and how they must be interwoven to accomplish national objectives in a world of continued conflict.

In his book, *Strategy*, Liddel Hart developed a theory of strategy as follows:

We can now arrive at a shorter definition of strategy as 'the art of distributing and applying military means fulfill the ends of policy.' For strategy is concerned not merely with the movement of forces--as its role is often defined--but with the effect. When the application of the military instrument merges into actual fighting, the disposition for and control of such direct action are 'tactics.' The two categories, although convenient for discussion can never be truly divided into separate compartments because each not only influences but merges into the other.

As tactics is an application of strategy on a lower plane, so strategy is an application on a lower plane of 'grand strategy.' While practically synonymous with the policy which guides the conduct of war, as distinct from the more fundamental policy which should govern its object, the term 'grand strategy' serves to bring out the sense of policy in execution. For the role of

grand strategy--higher strategy--is to coordinate and direct all the resources of a nation, or band of nations, toward the political objective of the war--the goal defined by fundamental policy.⁴

The element of policy stressed was clearly brought out in the Naval War College publication, *Sound Military Decision*, which said:

Understanding between the civil representatives of the State and the leaders of the armed forces is manifestly essential to the coordination of national policy with the power to enforce it. While military strategy may determine whether the aims of policy are possible of attainment, policy may, beforehand, determine largely the success or failure of military strategy. Therefore, it behooves policy to ensure not only that military strategy pursue appropriate aims, but that the work of strategy be allotted adequate power, and be undertaken under the most favorable conditions.⁵

These thoughts, together with the Rosinski concept of strategy's being the art of control, provide the foundation for the conceptual unity and coherence required by the situation under consideration here:

It is this element of control which is the essence of strategy: Control being the element which differentiates true strategic action from a haphazard series of improvisations. . . . strategy must be selective in order to achieve economy of force. Comprehensive control of a field of action means a concentration upon those minimum key lines of action or key positions from which the entire field can be positively controlled. This is well illustrated by the concept of control or command of a sea area.⁶

The concentration of thought on control naturally leads to a reexamination and better understanding of the objectives whose attainment is the purpose of the attempt to exercise control. The concept of continuing control prepares the mind for shifting the emphasis from weapon to weapon or from tool to tool in accordance with changing situations or with the changing capabilities

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or application of the weapon or weapons systems involved. Thus, the intellectual concept of strategy as "comprehensive control" naturally leads to the intellectual concept of flexibility. But "flexibility" itself must be understood lest it degenerate into mere hesitancy, uncertainty, and vacillation. The essence of true flexibility lies in the continuing clear appreciation of the aim, the purposes, the objective.

Karl Deutsch, in *The Nerves of Government*, touches on an important application of the concept of flexibility with respect to an objective. Drawing on a study of Russian chess strategy, he notes the emphasis given to the value of leading an opponent "to commit his pieces to a particular position," and hence "to commit his mind to . . . a particular kind of strategy." Having done this, the player then makes a "radical switch" in his own play and "confronts the opponent with a new set of problems" for which neither his position nor his strategy is prepared.

Deutsch carries this strategic concept over into the conduct of international and conflict relations, noting the positive advantages to be gained by encouraging an opponent to make an early commitment of his resources with the intention of "turning this commitment later to the opponent's disadvantage." The flexibility to switch one's own strategy at a critical point confronts the already committed opponent with an enormous burden of decision under pressure of time and with the distribution of his resources "impaired or disrupted."⁷

It needs only be added, for the argument of this study, that this aspect of strategic thinking implies a clear grasp of the twin elements of flexibility of mind and action and control of resources.

Strategy is always concerned with objectives. But merely to state the objective is not enough. The objective must be analyzed, not only to clarify

the purpose for which action is to be taken, but also to show what constitutes its satisfactory attainment. Here we encounter one of the chief problems of strategic thinking: how is the objective influenced by the course of events? How does one distinguish steadfast adherence to a firm purpose from dogmatic pursuit of an outworn or irrelevant objective? Since both political objectives and political control are essential in strategy, we must consider the situation in two aspects.

First: What situation and areas must be controlled by our use of power in order to attain our objectives?

Second: By what means will the actual use of this power itself be controlled by the political arm of Government?

The first aspect is, in fact, the strategic concept, the plan of action. The second is also essential, for the uncontrolled use of power can easily be both self-defeating and disastrous. This means strict political control of all military action exercised through the elaborate worldwide command control system made possible by modern electronic technology.

In other words, strategy to be effective requires that the potential violence of concrete, tangible military force be related to the intangible elements of national interests and national values. Yet, how do we define or describe national interests and national values in terms which provide a firm base for a sound strategy?

Obviously, this is a highly intuitive process which means that it is an individual matter in which opinions differ strongly. Here we find the major sources of those elements of paradox, contradiction, and equivocation which today are so apparent and so disturbing. This brings us to an examination of power and force.

Power and Force. Power is the ability to do, to act, or to influence. It is

The analysis of the political interests and the evaluation of the available national power in the light of the world situation provides the foundation for the harmonious development of policies and objectives—political, military, and economic.

The National Interest = The general and continuing ends for which a state acts.

The National Interests = The particular interpretation of the National Interest for particular conditions or situations.

Principles = The enduring modes of behavior or relatively established guides to action that characterize nations.

Objectives = Derived from both Interests and Principles and are a specification of previous generalizations for particular circumstances.

Policies = Specific courses of action designed to achieve objectives.

The distinction between policies and objectives is that between means and ends.

For a detailed discussion of these matters see Appendix A of the Brookings Institution study "United States Foreign Policy 1945-1955."

composed of varying elements of physical or psychological force. Raymond Aron has categorized national power as: (1) geographic or spatial environment; (2) resources human and material; and (3) the capacity for collective action.

Military power is vital, but not the only, component of national power. Military forces are of no value unless they can be tactically employed.

Today, clear definitions of "victory" do not seem possible. Instead, the officer in tactical command of an operation must accept tactical restraint and at time tactical defeat for a higher strategic or political purpose. Nevertheless, even while operating under such restraint, as a commander he has the task of maintaining the morale, the discipline, and the combat effectiveness of his forces unimpaired.

The concepts of the use of military power require careful analysis. Not only is it a means of directly accomplishing a specific political purpose by overt force, it also may be used as a temporary shield which allows political purposes to be accomplished by other means. In

either case, the only reason to use military power is to accomplish a political purpose. Therefore, the first and primary duty of high military command is to understand the political purpose for which military force is being exercised.

Statistical comparisons of weapons and forces is at best only the first step in making an appraisal of military power. The modifying factors are numerous and important. They can change rapidly. Among them are such factors as basic quality, operational readiness and availability, suitability for use, time and space factors, logistic support systems, flexibility, and mobility. These are all interlocked and interdependent.

The understanding of power and force and their effective use is critical to the understanding of strategy. Again, we come to the basic problem of capabilities and limitations and through these to the problems of public, as well as military, discipline and morale.

Basic Assumptions and the Process of Change. With the foregoing fundamen-

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tals in mind, we should realize that strategic realism requires the challenge of assumptions, the analysis of interests and objectives, and the appraisal of expectations. This apparently trite statement should have special meaning for the political leaders of the Western World.

The problem is too comprehensive for a conventional military "estimate of the situation" since it includes interlocking political-economic-sociological-military factors. In the the military estimate, states of assumptions and objectives can and should be made explicit. But in this "difficulty," while some assumptions can be made explicit, others will remain implicit and conditional and thus are hard to handle. For instance, while assumptions as to the use and usefulness of nuclear weapons can be stated explicitly and alternate plans prepared for each major assumption, assumptions as to the development and effectiveness of the U.S. merchant marine and naval forces are difficult to spell out explicitly. The political-economic ramifications are so complex, and the lead time for significant improvement is so great, that the preparation of alternate plans is not practicable.

Thus, it is clear that the way in which one views trends in modern human conflict will profoundly influence the determination of the specific measures to respond to the growth of Russian maritime power.

For example, one could assume that the nuclear balance of terror guarantees that Russia and the United States will not engage in direct conflict.

Similarly, one might assume that in the next two decades the United Nations will attain the conceptual unity and the legal and military power to enforce world peace and that the great power will operate with greatly reduced sovereignty under conditions of general and complete disarmament.

Or, again, one might well assume that the conflict, turmoil, and struggles for

national advantage will continue for the next few decades approximately as they now are.

In the first two cases, one would then perceive the contest as wholly political and economic with a very minor and essentially secondary military element.

In the third case, one sees the unfolding situation as one in which the contest for political and economic ends is one in which a vital military component may well be decisive.

Summary and Conclusion. In summary, the Russian maritime threat can be seen as having four major components:

1. The Marxist-Leninist ideology which provides specific, well-defined political sociological goals about which there is a high degree of conceptual unity in spite of struggles for personal power and disagreements as to methods.

2. The understanding of strategy and of the equivocal use of force as a means of attaining political and social-economic objectives.

3. The driving force of Russian nationalism based on a huge homeland with great natural resources and a hardy, competent people. This provides well-defined national interests.

4. The industrial, technological base which is the by-product of that homeland; the intelligence and courage of its people; the willingness and ability to adopt the production of other national societies.

We in the United States and in the Western lands cannot hope to counter this expansionist Russian maritime threat simply by military means. Our military power can never be more than a screen which permits the component elements of a free civilization to generate and maintain the political economic stability and the social welfare of our peoples. This fact points up the skill with which the Russians have made a practical application of the Marxist-

Leninist theory of force together with the maintenance of an equivocal threat.

The equivocal nature of this threat upsets the decision process of our governments and of their peoples at a time when the internal conflict of our society is demanding the application of resources in a way as to make it more difficult to allocate resources to the protection of the society in which this conflict is taking place.

For example, a strong military posture in the NATO alliance is of little value if the values of Western civilization are destroyed by sociological economic disintegration within the American nation.

Conversely, however, if the spread of education in Russia stimulates a powerful desire for the concepts of freedom, the Russian political economic aggression shielded by newly developed maritime power will do little to advance either Communist ideology or Russian nationalism.

From the foregoing we can draw certain conclusions.

The Russian maritime power is great, it is increasing, and it is being skillfully used to threaten the major interests and policies of the United States and its allies.

Perhaps, by Russian miscalculation, the threat at some time may be so unequivocal as to exert a unifying influence in our domestic wrangles and may also unify our allies. But, in most cases, we can expect the threat to be equivocal enough to divide both domestic and international opinion.

Russian grand strategy plays on this diversity by following the Leninist tactic of zigzag, attacking the decision processes of the opponents, and applying equivocal threats. This, plus the fact that the processes of change are operating to an undetermined degree within Russia itself, multiplies the number of assumptions to be made and makes long-range political-military fore-

casting a hazardous, uncertain intellectual exercise.

Accordingly, the development of strategy to meet the Soviet maritime expansion calls not only for a precise concept of what strategy really is and what purposes it is designed to serve but also for an analysis and allocation of resources in the form of force structure, weapons and support systems required to exercise the nature and degree of control demanded by the strategy. Translating this into practical form, our national strategy must be expressed in terms of the nature and degree of control we must maintain in order to serve our national interests and attain our objectives.

This control must be exercised over both areas and situations. National strategy will include economic and political matters. Military strategy will primarily be a question of geographic areas and military situations within them.

In other words, looking at the areas and situations throughout the world, we must ask ourselves some hard questions and answer them explicitly.

What must we control? Why? What is the nature and degree of control? When initiate control? How long maintain this control? How, in general, exercise this control? What opposition to expect?

In certain areas such as the continental United States and the 50 states, the answers will be relatively simple. But as we move away from these and their contiguous waters and airspace, the answers become more difficult.

The central facts in such analysis are:

First: Not all areas and situations are equally important.

Second: The nature and degree of control will vary greatly according to circumstances.

Third: In all cases the need for control will depend on our interests and objectives.

Only when we have answered these questions can we make the decisions as to weapons systems and force structures

which, with the other elements of power, can exert the power necessary to our purpose. This process will always require a search for alternatives in which we balance our need for control against our social, political, and economic capabilities.

This is inherently a long, demanding, but always imperfect process which requires a discriminating blend of sophisticated quantitative systems analysis and intuitive professional judgment. Furthermore, the immediate political military analysis is only part of the overall national analysis which eventually involves our whole social-political-economic system.

We should not expect our American political system or that of our allies to formulate and execute a major economic military political plan with the same degree of coherence and consistency as can the Russian authoritarian system. The conceptual differences within our system are so great that every major complex plan affecting competing interests is bound to represent a compromise. Even if a good long-range plan of such nature can gain legislative approval, subsequent appropriations and budget allocations can be expected to fluctuate so as to affect the balance of the plan. This is particularly true when various political developments throughout the world change the perceptions of the threat to change.

The best we can hope for is to initiate a relatively few and relatively

simple, but very expensive, major Government measures which will improve our maritime forces and stimulate or encourage private enterprise to undertake complementary programs. The Navy's role in gaining support for such goals is to prove its capacity for constructive self-criticism, to show a willingness to discipline its thinking, and to identify and concentrate on the essentials of the problem.

BIOGRAPHIC SUMMARY



Rear Adm. Henry E. Eccles, U.S. Navy (Ret.), graduated from the U.S. Naval Academy, Class of 1922. He holds a master of science degree from Columbia University, is a graduate of the Naval War Col-

lege, and is currently serving as a consultant for logistics at the War College.

He has had a variety of duty in submarines, destroyers, cruisers, battleships, and in 1946-47 commanded the U.S.S. *Washington*. Prior to his retirement in 1952, he was Assistant Chief of Staff for Logistics, Commander Allied Forces, Southern Europe. His publications include: *Military Concepts and Philosophy*; *Basic Logistics*; *Command and Control*; *Command Logistics*; *Cuba-October 1962*; and numerous articles for professional journals.

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FOOTNOTES

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