

1969

Naval Policy Between the Wars: the Period of Anglo-American Antagonism, 1919-1929

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Recommended Citation

Wheeler, G. E. and Roskill, Stephen W. (1969) "Naval Policy Between the Wars: the Period of Anglo-American Antagonism, 1919-1929," *Naval War College Review*: Vol. 22 : No. 3 , Article 13.

Available at: <https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol22/iss3/13>

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book is Mr. Gardner's conviction that "Our prospects never looked brighter and our problems never looked tougher." *No Easy Victories* is essential reading for every professional who, through narrow specialization, is in danger of losing his perspective on life.

D.A. MORTON
 Commander, U.S. Navy

Harris, Elliot. *The "un-American" Weapon*. New York: Lads, 1967. 211p.

In his opening chapter, the author presents the thesis that the use of psychological operations "to capture men's souls and covertly control their will" is foreign to Americans' national creed, and, thus, it is considered by many U.S. citizens to be "un-American." For this reason, he believes that U.S. governmental officials have been reluctant in the past to exploit psychological warfare to its fullest in the formulation and implementation of national strategy. He goes on to state that the national attitude in this regard must change and that the nation must "drain its psychological and political warfare reservoirs" if it is to win its struggle with the Communist world. Unfortunately, Mr. Harris offers little in the way of useful analysis to support his thesis in the remaining chapters of his book. He elects to rely on a rather disjointed historical account of various psychological operations conducted in the Vietnamese and Korean campaigns and during World War II to prove his point. Although this is an interesting and relatively factual documentation of the efforts made by both sides in psychological operations during these conflicts, its relevance to the author's central theme is somewhat questionable. Despite this general shortcoming, the book does offer some useful insights. One concerns the growing importance of POW's as a target population in psychological operations. Another points up the relative vulnerability of Western nations to what the author

describes as the "fatigue factor" (difficulty in maintaining support of the body politic during a protracted conflict) inherent in prolonged limited war, and how the Communists have capitalized on this phenomenon in the conduct of their "psy-op" program. The book also serves as a valuable source of both themes and techniques that have been used in psychological operations in the past.

L.J. FITZGERALD
 Lieutenant Colonel, U.S. Army

Roskill, Stephen W. *Naval Policy between the Wars: the Period of Anglo-American Antagonism, 1919-1929*. London: Collins, 1968, v. 1.

This is the first of a projected two-volume study of British naval policy in the years 1919-1939. The author is well known for his superb three volumes dealing with the British naval effort in World War II, *The War at Sea*, and for his interpretive histories, *White Ensign* and *The Strategy of Sea Power*. This present work is thoroughly documented from manuscript sources, government documents, and the applicable materials in print. It also possesses a splendid bibliography, useful tables of comparative naval statistics, and lists of First Lords of the Admiralty, Sea Lords, Secretaries of the Navy, Chiefs of Naval Operations, and various British and U.S. fleets commanders. As a retired Captain, R.N., Roskill writes from the viewpoint of both a participant and historian. He starts with a description of the Admiralty and the top level of command in the Royal Navy and compares this with its American counterpart. He also traces out the budgetary process in each country as it applies to naval authorizations. With this foundation, the history of Anglo-American naval relations is traced, largely in 2-year increments, through the decennium 1919-1929. Special chapters are devoted to the war

116 NAVAL WAR COLLEGE REVIEW

of intervention in Russia (1918-1920), the Washington Naval Conference of 1921-1922, and the Geneva Naval Conference of 1927. There are also four scattered chapters that deal with "the naval aviation controversy."

The book is particularly valuable because of its focus on the internal struggle, within the British Cabinets and Admiralty Boards, for funds to advance the Royal Navy after the World War. In justifying new programs, the Royal Navy had to present its view of the world; to an American reader, this information is enormously useful. Probably because the Royal Navy was not as effective in carrier warfare as it should have been during World War II, Roskill pays considerable attention to the unsuccessful fight carried on to retrieve the Fleet Air Arm from the Royal Air Force. From this contest can also be traced the failure in training and properly equipping those air units that did operate with the Royal Navy. The author supplies a great deal of information about U.S. naval aviation to show the effectiveness achieved by America in integrating aviation into the fleet.

If there is a major criticism of the book, it would be the author's lack of focus on naval policy that the title anticipates. Roskill describes naval hills, funding, conferences, the Singapore naval base, naval aviation, and personalities galore; but he does not really tell us what was British naval policy in this period. It may be that they had none. About the closest he comes, in widely separated chapter fragments, is to say that the British Navy was based on a one-power (United States) standard; was not supposed to fight the U.S. Navy; and had to review annually its requests for funds against the "Ten-Year Rule"—the assumption that the British would not be at war in the next ten years.

G.E. WHEELER

E.J. King Chair of Maritime History

Servan-Schreiber, Jean J. *The American Challenge*. New York: Atheneum, 1968. 291p.

The American Challenge represents a detailed and thought-provoking thesis of what the author, M. J.J. Servan-Schreiber, describes as the American technological and managerial penetration of Europe. He is extremely concerned over the growing influence of American industry in Europe, saying that "Fifteen years from now it is quite possible that the world's third greatest industrial power, just after the United States and Russia, will not be Europe, but American industry in Europe." This book guides the reader through a careful investigation of the American industrial venture into Europe during the last decade. It analyzes the factors that have previously occasioned, and continue to contribute to, the growth and success of American industry in Europe. The author then projects an image of an America of the 1980's and its impact on the world. He sees a widening of the gap between American industry and the rest of the world as the result of advancing technological innovations and social changes. He declares that it is essential now that Europeans wake up to this American industrial challenge and treat it as a more serious threat than the ever potential thermonuclear war between the Great Powers. M. Servan-Schreiber submits a very critical evaluation of what he calls the present archaic "state of the union" of French and European industry. He points out the weaknesses of the business practices and techniques of Europe and proposes a solution to counterattack the challenge of American industry before Europe becomes an American satellite.

The American Challenge is not a denouncement of American industry with its advanced practices and capabilities in Europe; on the contrary, the author professes great admiration for these American industrial character-