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The "un-American" Weapon

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book is Mr. Gardner's conviction that "Our prospects never looked brighter and our problems never looked tougher." *No Easy Victories* is essential reading for every professional who, through narrow specialization, is in danger of losing his perspective on life.

D.A. MORTON
Commander, U.S. Navy

Harris, Elliot. *The "un-American" Weapon*. New York: Lads, 1967. 211p.

In his opening chapter, the author presents the thesis that the use of psychological operations "to capture men's souls and covertly control their will" is foreign to Americans' national creed, and, thus, it is considered by many U.S. citizens to be "un-American." For this reason, he believes that U.S. governmental officials have been reluctant in the past to exploit psychological warfare to its fullest in the formulation and implementation of national strategy. He goes on to state that the national attitude in this regard must change and that the nation must "drain its psychological and political warfare reservoirs" if it is to win its struggle with the Communist world. Unfortunately, Mr. Harris offers little in the way of useful analysis to support his thesis in the remaining chapters of his book. He elects to rely on a rather disjointed historical account of various psychological operations conducted in the Vietnamese and Korean campaigns and during World War II to prove his point. Although this is an interesting and relatively factual documentation of the efforts made by both sides in psychological operations during these conflicts, its relevance to the author's central theme is somewhat questionable. Despite this general shortcoming, the book does offer some useful insights. One concerns the growing importance of POW's as a target population in psychological operations. Another points up the relative vulnerability of Western nations to what the author

describes as the "fatigue factor" (difficulty in maintaining support of the body politic during a protracted conflict) inherent in prolonged limited war, and how the Communists have capitalized on this phenomenon in the conduct of their "psy-op" program. The book also serves as a valuable source of both themes and techniques that have been used in psychological operations in the past.

L.J. FITZGERALD
Lieutenant Colonel, U.S. Army

Roskill, Stephen W. *Naval Policy between the Wars: the Period of Anglo-American Antagonism, 1919-1929*. London: Collins, 1968, v. 1.

This is the first of a projected two-volume study of British naval policy in the years 1919-1939. The author is well known for his superb three volumes dealing with the British naval effort in World War II, *The War at Sea*, and for his interpretive histories, *White Ensign* and *The Strategy of Sea Power*. This present work is thoroughly documented from manuscript sources, government documents, and the applicable materials in print. It also possesses a splendid bibliography, useful tables of comparative naval statistics, and lists of First Lords of the Admiralty, Sea Lords, Secretaries of the Navy, Chiefs of Naval Operations, and various British and U.S. fleets commanders. As a retired Captain, R.N., Roskill writes from the viewpoint of both a participant and historian. He starts with a description of the Admiralty and the top level of command in the Royal Navy and compares this with its American counterpart. He also traces out the budgetary process in each country as it applies to naval authorizations. With this foundation, the history of Anglo-American naval relations is traced, largely in 2-year increments, through the decennium 1919-1929. Special chapters are devoted to the war