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The Essence of Security

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science and technology in the protracted conflict environment.

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McNamara, Robert S. *The Essence of Security*. New York: Harper & Row, 1968. 176 p.

The author's stated objective in this brief work is an exposition of principles and philosophy he employed in directing the activities of the Defense Establishment. This has been accomplished with the brevity, clarity, and directness expected of Mr. McNamara.

The organizational framework of this book reflects both his conceptual attitude toward national security and the Department of Defense (DOD) under his directorship. U.S. security is viewed as an integration of three broad areas. The first area of consideration is the contemporary world and the abrasive interests of the chief adversaries. This discussion presents little new or startling; it is a synopsis of conflicting interests in Southeast Asia, the Middle East, South America, and an expression of deep concern over an inadequately trained mobilization base for NATO. It is apparent that Mr. McNamara views Europe as having primary claim on U.S. military resources.

In the second part of his work--*The Tools of Power*--the author makes a case for mutual deterrence. He exposes the folly of serious United States-Soviet ABM competition and supports realistic strategic arms limitations agreements in what he calls a "race toward reasonableness." Mr. McNamara substantiates the logic in which the shift from the 50-megaton syndrome to a strategy of flexible response, especially in support of commitments to other countries, was founded. He closes his arguments in this part with a discussion of the innovations that have taken place in the management of the DOD during his tenure as Secretary. These include his concept of analyzing weapons programs, force re-

quirements, military strategy, and foreign policy as a rationale for the development of the annual 5-year defense force structure. This reviewer might add, parenthetically, that the author has opted to emphasize his successes in applied management and overlooked those projects that have yet to earn this description, e.g., the F-111.

In part three Mr. McNamara opens with an observation on "gaps and bridges" in which he identifies the technological gap in Europe as being primarily managerial and makes the point that the basic problem is one of education. The Europeans are taken to task for failing to meet their broad educational needs. The United States, he chastises similarly for neglecting the education of its underprivileged. He cites projects that the DOD has initiated to assist in filling the U.S. gap, noting that while social progress is not a primary DOD responsibility the foundation of security is a stable social structure, and DOD should contribute where feasible. This philosophy is extended to the international scene in the author's closing words, "Just as collective security is the only sensible military strategy in a half-free and half-totalitarian world, so collective developmental assistance is the only sensible economic strategy in a half-fed and half-furnished world. Collective security and collective development are but two faces of the same coin." The implication is that as a rich nation we are not indebted to the poor nations, but we owe it to ourselves to see that the developing needs of these less developed countries are met.

This reviewer suggests that every U.S. military officer "owes it to himself" to read this brief trilogy on national security, regardless of individual characterization of Mr. McNamara as Secretary of Defense. The message rests both in the substance of the work and the perspective of the author.

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