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## The Intermediaries: Third Parties in International Crises

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Oran R. Young

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destroy Nasser. He feels that this obsession drove the Prime Minister into the conspiracy with the French and Israelis which all but destroyed the reputation for integrity that Britain had developed on the international scene. Even so, the reader feels that Nutting criticizes his former leader with heartfelt regret and the greatest of sympathy. In fact, he emphasizes the poor state of health of the Prime Minister and credits this, and the tremendous pressures of office, as the causes for Eden's acting entirely out of character.

In reading *No End of a Lesson*, one cannot help but be impressed by the sincerity and conviction of the author. Along with the Prime Minister and Selwyn Lloyd, the Foreign Secretary at the time, he had more direct knowledge of the affair than any other Englishman. He felt that he could not be a party to the collusion between his Government and France and Israel, which called for Israel to instigate a war against Egypt to allow the two European powers to seize the Suez Canal. According to his account, he made every effort to resist this course of action, including stating to Lloyd that he would have to resign if this course were adopted. When this course was decided upon by the Prime Minister, Nutting did just that, although for security reasons his resignation was not made public until after the attack. It is obvious that he deeply regretted giving up his political career and that placing loyalty to purpose above loyalty to his associates and party was not an easy decision. Yet the element of bitterness or desire to chastise is not evident. Nutting maintains his objectivity very well, considering his personal involvement. This is an unusual book written from an unusual vantage point. It is highly recommended to the general reader and particularly recommended to the student of international affairs.

G.R. HERSHEY  
Lieutenant Colonel, U.S. Marine Corps

Rustow, Dankwart A. *A World of Nations*. Washington: Brookings Institution, 1967. 306 p.

This book is written for the serious student of international relations and not for the uninitiated. Doctor Rustow is presently with Columbia University, but he compiled a good deal of the material for this volume while with Brookings Institution in the early 1960's. The author's central thesis is a conceptual analysis of the political problems of newly developing countries, using the nation-state and the modernization theme as the basis for his examination. The traditional "right to be irresponsible" of the nation-state combined with the technology and communications of modernity form an explosive mixture, tantamount to a suicide pact, especially for the newly emerging nations of Africa and Asia. Rustow contrasts the recent political experience of the late-modernizing countries of Asia, Africa, and Latin America with the earlier history of the countries of the West. He analyzes with theoretical perspective the quest for the authority, identity, and equality that are the central political aspects of modernization. He discusses the rival appeals of democracy and communism to peoples in the throes of late modernization. Finally, the book concludes with an examination of some of the current notions about forms of government in general, and some of the typical patterns of leadership in modernizing societies in particular. There is an appendix in which nations are rated according to linguistic unity and government authority. These tables and others on contemporary democratic systems, current population sizes, and dates of independence may be of value for research purposes.

J.V. COX  
Lieutenant Colonel, U.S. Marine Corps

Young, Oran R. *The Intermediaries: Third Parties in International Crises*.

Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1967. 427 p.

This volume seeks to delineate the role of third parties in conflict resolution of the international crises. To this end the author examines historically and explores empirically the intermediary roles of the U.N. Secretariat and the ways in which such roles might be usefully expanded. This is not a study in the theory of games, nor is it primarily concerned with a definition or examination of the theoretical underpinnings of conflict resolution in international crises. Essentially, the author reaffirms his belief in the utility of the investigatory and other information-gathering techniques hitherto exploited by the U.N. Secretariat and in the communications capabilities of the Secretariat in "a roster of superpower crises." The author bases his confidence in the acceptability of U.N. Secretariat intermediation on the United States-U.S.S.R. détente, on multipolarity, and on the political evolution of the third world.

The study might have been rendered more rewarding had greater effort been directed to defining the theoretical parameters of the problems and establishing firmer and less tautological premises than assertions such as: (page 24), "Only when the developments in an intranational crisis generate significant effects in the international arena does the crisis become an international crisis. If a number of important systemic components were to undergo crises simultaneously, this in itself would probably constitute a system-wide crisis." In like vein, somewhat less helpful among the conclusions (page 394), is the statement: "Whatever the international system may look like in the future, therefore, it certainly does not seem safe at this time to assume that severe crises, and especially great-power crises, are likely to become obsolescent or infrequent." The reviewer would have welcomed an effort directed

toward a close theoretical as well as a tense empirical study of the nuanced forms of intermediation running from good offices, mediation, conciliation, arbitration, to judicial settlement. It is unrewarding to observe that these concepts may in part involve legal analysis. What is significant is that the practical politician and the diplomatist are constantly faced with sharp and irreducible problems in these areas when serving as an intermediary. Failure to grapple with the crinaceous theoretical underpinnings and practical distinctions deprive the study of much of its potential contribution and impact. While the author is concerned with the empirical analysis of acceptability, he could have directed his attention as well to the phenomena of rejection and to various theoretical as well as historical and practical solutions afforded by aleatory and vaticinary formulae. Strangely enough, the author also completely ignores the theoretical and deeply practical problems of motivations and goals of the third party intermediary. What are the circumstances under which the third party would take the initiative of intermediation, and what are the parameters of acceptability and rejection on his part in the event that the initiative is taken by the parties locked in crisis? These issues of central, and in the case of U.N. intermediation, of critical importance remain untouched. Inevitably the reader comes away with the impression that the analysis of the role of the intermediary has been fragmentary and one-sided. Examination of the contributions of others in the fields of pacific settlement and peacekeeping is required, not as a hallmark of scholarship, but as an indispensable ingredient in the shaping of tough and viable proposals in areas of great sophistication.

With regard to the optimism with which the author views the communications and, in particular, the information-gathering roles of the Secretariat and of the Secretary-General, the study

might have usefully examined the roles of competitive national information-gathering processes. The sums which the United States and the Soviet Union each devote to such purposes far exceed any amounts which could ever become available to U.N. Secretariat officials. It is, of course, also evident that the States' preappointment screening and continuing postappointment surveillance of allegiance of U.N. Secretariat personnel necessarily degrade the level of confidence of opponents in the impartiality or, indeed, even the effectiveness of the information-gathering and communications functions of the Secretariat. It is hard to ask either the United States or the Soviet Union to accept data acquired in this fashion in preference to the information obtained in a far more sophisticated and infinitely more expensive manner through national intelligence services. It is doubtful that in the area of international intelligence operations the Gresham's Law model would be pertinent. In a subsequent edition of the book, the author could usefully examine the concepts that have emerged out of the Mexico City confrontations conducted under the auspices of the United Nations and that have thrown a searching light on the problems of peaceful settlement and intermediaries. Also, the recent efforts of the United Nations Institute for Training and Research (UNITAR) in the area of conflict resolution may prove to be of critical importance in the developing scenario of international conflict resolution.

J.H. SPENCER

Chair of International Law

Zagoria, Donald S. *Vietnam Triangle*. New York: Pegasus, 1967. 286 p.

Mr. Zagoria contends that study of the public pronouncements of any Communist Party or leader—when compared to the public pronouncements of other Communist Parties and/or leaders—yields important and indispensable clues to the tactical debates taking place

within the Communist world. He admits that this technique, popularly known as Kremlinology, is poorly understood by laymen and academic specialists alike; that he has not been able to devote as much time to source material as the subject warrants; and that the technique alone is not sufficient to understand Communist policies and politics. With this background and the added caveat that he doubts that the United States, as a nation, has the wisdom, skill, and manpower to cope with civil wars, Mr. Zagoria utilizes his own blend of Kremlinology (within the framework of the struggle between Communist China, the Soviet Union, and the United States) to substantiate his foregone conclusions. The author naturally traverses much familiar ground and reads the signposts that offer the best support for his objectives. He contends that Russia sold out the Vietminh in 1954 to Mendes-France for the price of French abandonment of the European Defense Community and that subsequent Soviet policy toward Vietnam has been to limit the amount of assistance provided North Vietnam, the controlling factor being possible endangerment of the Soviet-United States detente. He also believes that both the United States and the People's Republic of China view each other's individual actions in the wars of national liberation as zero sum games, and that Mao Tse-tung has won the battle but will lose the inevitable war for leadership within Communist China. The winner of the war will be either hard-line militarism or softer line economism, and in either case the winner will be drawn closer to Russia. He also holds that while Hanoi has some control over the National Liberation Front (NLF), this organization has a personality of its own. Mr. Zagoria states that Hanoi has given some indications that it is willing to bargain and contends that the famous "Four Points" are not preconditions to negotiations. He believes that the United States