

## Naval War College Review

---

Volume 21  
Number 5 May

Article 18

---

1968

# The Infamous Wall of Berlin

J. G. Boniface  
*U.S. Navy*

Munro MacCluskey

Follow this and additional works at: <https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review>

---

### Recommended Citation

Boniface, J. G. and MacCluskey, Munro (1968) "The Infamous Wall of Berlin," *Naval War College Review*: Vol. 21 : No. 5 , Article 18.  
Available at: <https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol21/iss5/18>

This Book Review is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Naval War College Review by an authorized editor of U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons. For more information, please contact [repository.inquiries@usnwc.edu](mailto:repository.inquiries@usnwc.edu).

tions truisms in discussing foreign aid. His argument for a centralized U.S. aid administration, headed by a Cabinet officer, is interesting and merits further study.

F.W. ULBRICHT  
Captain, U.S. Navy

Killen, John. *The Luftwaffe: a History*. London: Muller, 1967. 310 p.

Mr. Killen has produced an interesting and most readable account of the Imperial German Air Force. The central theme of this historical essay concerns the men and their aircraft that made up the *Luftwaffe* during the period from World War I until its destruction in World War II. In this book the author paints a vivid picture of the great air battles of these two great wars and of the ambitions, hopes, and fears of the men who fought them. The brilliant successes and costly failures of these men and their leaders are examined in an interesting and informative manner. It is comforting for the reader to find that the judgments and decisions of the highest ranking officers were many times distorted by greed, jealousy, and blinding ambition. Had this not been so, the results of World War II might have been different. An excellent orientation on the strategic planning and strategic direction of the air war is given, as well as a very interesting account of the rationale used by the decisionmakers not to build a large strategic bomber force. The book is well written and will provide the general reader with an entertaining and excellent orientation on the German Imperial Air Force and its participation in the two World Wars. It does not cover the subject in sufficient depth, detail, or continuity to be of value to the researcher or historian.

J.C. MIZE  
Colonel, U.S. Army

Kolkowicz, Roman. *The Soviet Military and the Communist Party*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1967. 429 p.

The author investigates the relation-

ship between the two dominant institutions of the Soviet Union: the Communist Party and the military establishment. He analyzes areas of common interest and interdependence as well as sharp clashes of ideas and objectives through a study of (a) the military's influence in the Party and government; (b) the military's role in the economy and society in general; (c) the historical perspective in the relationship; and (d) recent changes in the internal and external affairs of the Soviet Union. The military establishment, as an institution, wishes to achieve a degree of autonomy in the form of professional and institutional freedom, to pursue its own institutional values, and to remain aloof from politics and the larger society. The Communist Party, on the other hand, must maintain a delicate balance between two conflicting motivations: the desire for hegemony within the state and the need to maintain a strong military-political posture before the rest of the world. This is a study of civilian control of the military, Communist style. The author concludes that the military is achieving greater professional and institutional freedom and that the Party leaders are submitting to some of the military's demands away from détente toward a firmer line. The book is well documented; its research is extensive. The appendices include patterns of political associations of the military leaders, their rise to power, short biographies of the Stalingrad Group, and cycles in Party-military relations. Mr. Kolkowicz has made a comprehensive, many-faceted, scholarly analysis. Its reading by military officers is strongly recommended—with the objective in mind of "Know thine enemy."

R.A. BEAULIEU  
Commander, U.S. Navy

MacCluskey, Munro. *The Infamous Wall of Berlin*. New York: Rosen, 1967. 191 p.

As the author has stated in the

Foreword, the purpose of the book is to describe the political and military background of the Berlin Wall and its implications. It traces the important events related to the Berlin problem from the London Protocol of 1944 to the present. It deals with the roots of the Berlin issues, the four-power control of the city, the Allied airlift, the dividing wall, conditions in East Berlin, Soviet aims in Berlin, and the free world's stake in the controversy. The book is written in a straightforward, clear, and uncomplicated style. It is especially well documented, with much of the material having been obtained from Government historical records, U.S. Department of State sources, and the files of the German Government. Some 14 appendices citing the full texts of, or pertinent excerpts from, official statements, protocols, and agreements disensed in the narrative have been included, along with numerous charts and illustrations to assist the reader. Following review and analysis of significant historical events, the author argues that it would be a mistake to underestimate the significance and impact of the Wall. Annexation of East Berlin closed the last gap in the barbed wire fence stretching from Lubeck in the north to Hof in the south, and made it possible for Ulbricht to disregard the feelings of the imprisoned Germans and put his program of Bolshevism into effect. While Ulbricht's psychological position is about the same as it was over a decade ago, his Communist state is enjoying the nearest thing to a boom yet seen in the Communist world. Whether or not the Wall has strengthened or weakened the spirit of West Berliners is uncertain. The majority know that they will have to live with it but can never cease to cry out against it and to hope that someday, somehow, the monstrous creation must come down. From the Soviet Government's point of view, the question of Berlin's status is an immediate issue, but not the

real issue. It is only one step in the Communist plan for world domination. Before the Wall, West Berlin was a showcase for Western technology and an escape channel for millions of inhabitants of the East sector and Eastern Zone. Today it is but a lonely light-house of freedom in a dark totalitarian sea. Furthermore, Moscow is acutely aware that the potentialities inherent in the integration of West European nations are tremendous, and without the Federal Republic, European integration would be impossible. Therefore, the Federal Republic has become the primary target of Soviet political maneuvers in Berlin. Actually, what the West is being asked to acknowledge in Berlin is an agreement with Russia to partition all of Germany into three separate parts: the Federal Republic, the Soviet Zone, and the "free city" of West Berlin. A separate peace treaty could then be made between the U.S.S.R. and its German satellite. Finally, the author concludes that if the Communists did not push their ideological world domination program, there would be no Wall and no Berlin crises. The Wall, he believes, stands as a hideous monument to Communist failure because it was built, not to protect the East German people from their enemies, but to keep them forcibly confined in a state of totalitarian captivity. Aside from this argument, or thesis, of the writer, the book offers little that is new in its historical review of events but is an excellent reference source for the study and review of events pertinent to the very volatile and important German issues today.

J.G. BONIFACE  
Captain, U.S. Navy

Nobécourt, Jacques. *Hitler's Last Gamble*. New York: Schocken Books, 1967. 302 p.

Published in France in 1962 under the title of *Le Dernier Coup de Dés de Hitler*, this book is the result of a