

Naval War College Review

Volume 21
Number 5 May

Article 16

1968

The Luftwaffe: a History

J. C. Mize
U.S. Army

John Killen

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Recommended Citation

Mize, J. C. and Killen, John (1968) "The Luftwaffe: a History," *Naval War College Review*: Vol. 21 : No. 5 , Article 16.
Available at: <https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol21/iss5/16>

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tions truisms in discussing foreign aid. His argument for a centralized U.S. aid administration, headed by a Cabinet officer, is interesting and merits further study.

F.W. ULBRICHT
Captain, U.S. Navy

Killen, John. *The Luftwaffe: a History*. London: Muller, 1967. 310 p.

Mr. Killen has produced an interesting and most readable account of the Imperial German Air Force. The central theme of this historical essay concerns the men and their aircraft that made up the *Luftwaffe* during the period from World War I until its destruction in World War II. In this book the author paints a vivid picture of the great air battles of these two great wars and of the ambitions, hopes, and fears of the men who fought them. The brilliant successes and costly failures of these men and their leaders are examined in an interesting and informative manner. It is comforting for the reader to find that the judgments and decisions of the highest ranking officers were many times distorted by greed, jealousy, and blinding ambition. Had this not been so, the results of World War II might have been different. An excellent orientation on the strategic planning and strategic direction of the air war is given, as well as a very interesting account of the rationale used by the decisionmakers not to build a large strategic bomber force. The book is well written and will provide the general reader with an entertaining and excellent orientation on the German Imperial Air Force and its participation in the two World Wars. It does not cover the subject in sufficient depth, detail, or continuity to be of value to the researcher or historian.

J.C. MIZE
Colonel, U.S. Army

Kolkowicz, Roman. *The Soviet Military and the Communist Party*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1967. 429 p.

The author investigates the relation-

ship between the two dominant institutions of the Soviet Union: the Communist Party and the military establishment. He analyzes areas of common interest and interdependence as well as sharp clashes of ideas and objectives through a study of (a) the military's influence in the Party and government; (b) the military's role in the economy and society in general; (c) the historical perspective in the relationship; and (d) recent changes in the internal and external affairs of the Soviet Union. The military establishment, as an institution, wishes to achieve a degree of autonomy in the form of professional and institutional freedom, to pursue its own institutional values, and to remain aloof from politics and the larger society. The Communist Party, on the other hand, must maintain a delicate balance between two conflicting motivations: the desire for hegemony within the state and the need to maintain a strong military-political posture before the rest of the world. This is a study of civilian control of the military, Communist style. The author concludes that the military is achieving greater professional and institutional freedom and that the Party leaders are submitting to some of the military's demands away from détente toward a firmer line. The book is well documented; its research is extensive. The appendices include patterns of political associations of the military leaders, their rise to power, short biographies of the Stalingrad Group, and cycles in Party-military relations. Mr. Kolkowicz has made a comprehensive, many-faceted, scholarly analysis. Its reading by military officers is strongly recommended—with the objective in mind of "Know thine enemy."

R.A. BEAULIEU
Commander, U.S. Navy

MacCluskey, Munro. *The Infamous Wall of Berlin*. New York: Rosen, 1967. 191 p.

As the author has stated in the