

Naval War College Review

Volume 21
Number 5 May

Article 12

1968

Revolution in the Revolution?

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Recommended Citation

Estes, T. S. and Debray, Regis (1968) "Revolution in the Revolution?," *Naval War College Review*: Vol. 21 : No. 5 , Article 12.
Available at: <https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol21/iss5/12>

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Dayan, Yael. *Israel Journal: June, 1967*.

New York: McGraw-Hill, 1967. 113 p.

Israel Journal: June, 1967 is an interesting chronicle of Miss Dayan's attachment to an Israeli Army division for 1 month during the summer of 1967. It was during this month that the 1967 Arab-Israeli War was waged and won by Israel, and this work reflects Miss Dayan's myopic view of that microwar. Since the war was very short (not Miss Dayan's fault, fully the first one-third of the book is devoted to searching for archeological finds (arrowheads), hovering in the extreme periphery of the Division Commander's entourage picking up bits and pieces of the Israeli war plans, and taking rather shallow descriptive glimpses at soldiers soon to "write history in the sands of the Sinai." The other two-thirds of the work covers the war itself and Miss Dayan's personal experiences following the conflict. Miss Dayan's war consisted of her division's attack and capture of the Egyptian strongpoint of Abu-Agelia-Um-Katef, and mopup operations in the Sinai en route to the Suez Canal. Since the total contact time and combat involved was in the neighborhood of only 2 days and extremely limited in scope, one should be cautioned against selection of this book for an encompassing view of that highly successful (for Israel) war. In general, this book is recommended as light reading, and because of the journalistic style utilized, should prove to be enjoyable reading as well. For even the amateur in tactics, the book will prove to be a disappointment and is not recommended as professional reading in this context.

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Debray, Régis. *Revolution in the Revolution?* New York: Monthly Review Press, 1967. 126 p.

This abstruse work unfolds what is purported to be "the first compre-

hensive and authoritative presentation of the revolutionary thought of Fidel Castro and Che Guevara." If the reader is patient and pursues not only Castro's and Guevara's thoughts, but apparently many of Debray's as well, he will find in Part II the key around which this exhaustive (and exhausting) little tome is written:

The Latin American revolution and its vanguard, the Cuban revolution, have thus made a decisive contribution to international revolutionary experience and to Marxism-Leninism.

Under certain conditions, the political and the military are not separate, but form one organic whole, consisting of the people's army, whose nucleus is the guerrilla army. The vanguard party can exist in the form of the guerrilla foco itself. The guerrilla force is the party in embryo. [author's italics]

This is the staggering novelty introduced by the Cuban Revolution.

In Part I, Debray leads the reader through the history of socialist revolutions in various countries and describes in minute detail the characteristics that led to success or failure against a bourgeois state. The main thrust of this major part of the book seems to be that what was "correct" in other times and places is not necessarily applicable in Latin America, where the Cuban revolution points to the right direction. Armed revolution cannot succeed in the cities; the masses will rally around the small, successful guerrilla groups that stay in the hills (*never go to the cities even for medical treatment*); the guerrilla *focos* must become the political vanguard; the people must be made aware of the activities of the guerrilla force through propaganda; the development of guerrilla warfare must take

precedence over the strengthening of existing parties or the creation of new ones; "insurrectional activity is today the number one political activity"; and all this supported by numerous references to, or quotations from, the writings of Marx, Lenin, Mao, Giap, Castro, and Guevara. After drawing the "Principal Lessons for the Present" in Part II, in the "staggering novelty" quoted above, Debray takes the reader into the future in Part III and asserts in the first few lines: "When Che Guevara reappears, it is hardly risky to assert that it will be as the head of a guerrilla movement, as its *unquestioned political and military leader*." [author's italics] And the next several pages are devoted to a reaffirmation of how and why political "focos" must follow military "focos." In Debray's words: "it is a matter of a new dialectic of tasks" -not the normal "opening of an insurrectional front by first opening a political front 'Marxist-Leninist' or nationalist, according to classical rules." Debray concludes that "a state of emergency" has existed in Latin America since the Cuban revolution and "the invasion of Santo Domingo." Now everyone must unite in armed struggle against U.S. imperialism, including "the Marines who shoot at anything that moves." The need is a practical organization of the armed struggle on the basis of Marxist-Leninist principles.

Debray was captured by Bolivian forces while in the company of the guerrillas led by Che Guevara, who later was killed in a skirmish. One can wonder whether Debray is taking advantage of the opportunity to test some of his statements in the light of the ill-fated Cuban experiment in Bolivia. Certainly the reader does so as he compares what he reads with what he knows has happened. This is a useful reference book for the student of insurgency, socialist revolution, or communism in general; it serves as an analysis of how Marxist-Leninist princi-

ples can be adapted to meet local requirements.

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Halle, Louis J. *The Cold War as History*.
London: Chatto & Windus, 1967.
434 p.

In his Preface the author, admitting that we are still too close in time to the cold war to give a complete perspective, states his "aspiration to do for the cold war . . . what Thucydides did for the Peloponnesian War . . ." Within bounds,

he achieves his aspiration by an engrossing, almost fascinating, interpolation—identifying the issues, prime decisions, and turning points of the cold war. There are areas, however, wherein the author extrapolates rather than interpolates and, carrying history into prediction, seriously weakens his thesis. He traces the historical background of the conflict, and in two short chapters—"The Behavior of Moscow as a Reflection of Russia's Historic Experience" and "American Behavior as a Reflection of Experience Opposite to That of the Russians" he condenses into 20 pages the essential causes of the cold war. In fact, the first three chapters can be described as inspired in the strongest meaning of that word. A short quotation may sum up his conclusions reached in this preamble: "Americans have not, in recent times, appreciated the limitations of American power as Russians have always appreciated the limitations of Russian power; and just as failure has been the making of the Russians, so success has threatened to be the undoing of the Americans." Other conclusions fall out in rapid succession throughout the volume, concerning such matters as the influence of the military on American foreign policy (criticized); American ignorance of Far Eastern history (condemned); Russian expansion (denied); McCarthyism (abhorred); Truman/Acheson foreign