

1968

Israel Journal: June 1967

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Recommended Citation

Venezia, H. and Dayan, Yael (1968) "Israel Journal: June 1967," *Naval War College Review*: Vol. 21 : No. 5 , Article 11.
Available at: <https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol21/iss5/11>

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Dayan, Yael. *Israel Journal: June, 1967*.

New York: McGraw-Hill, 1967. 113 p.

Israel Journal: June, 1967 is an interesting chronicle of Miss Dayan's attachment to an Israeli Army division for 1 month during the summer of 1967. It was during this month that the 1967 Arab-Israeli War was waged and won by Israel, and this work reflects Miss Dayan's myopic view of that microwar. Since the war was very short (not Miss Dayan's fault, fully the first one-third of the book is devoted to searching for archeological finds (arrowheads), hovering in the extreme periphery of the Division Commander's entourage picking up bits and pieces of the Israeli war plans, and taking rather shallow descriptive glimpses at soldiers soon to "write history in the sands of the Sinai." The other two-thirds of the work covers the war itself and Miss Dayan's personal experiences following the conflict. Miss Dayan's war consisted of her division's attack and capture of the Egyptian strongpoint of Abu-Agelia-Um-Katef, and mopup operations in the Sinai en route to the Suez Canal. Since the total contact time and combat involved was in the neighborhood of only 2 days and extremely limited in scope, one should be cautioned against selection of this book for an encompassing view of that highly successful (for Israel) war. In general, this book is recommended as light reading, and because of the journalistic style utilized, should prove to be enjoyable reading as well. For even the amateur in tactics, the book will prove to be a disappointment and is not recommended as professional reading in this context.

H. VENEZIA

Lieutenant Commander, U.S. Navy

Debray, Régis. *Revolution in the Revolution?* New York: Monthly Review Press, 1967. 126 p.

This abstruse work unfolds what is purported to be "the first compre-

hensive and authoritative presentation of the revolutionary thought of Fidel Castro and Che Guevara." If the reader is patient and pursues not only Castro's and Guevara's thoughts, but apparently many of Debray's as well, he will find in Part II the key around which this exhaustive (and exhausting) little tome is written:

The Latin American revolution and its vanguard, the Cuban revolution, have thus made a decisive contribution to international revolutionary experience and to Marxism-Leninism.

Under certain conditions, the political and the military are not separate, but form one organic whole, consisting of the people's army, whose nucleus is the guerrilla army. The vanguard party can exist in the form of the guerrilla foco itself. The guerrilla force is the party in embryo. [author's italics]

This is the staggering novelty introduced by the Cuban Revolution.

In Part I, Debray leads the reader through the history of socialist revolutions in various countries and describes in minute detail the characteristics that led to success or failure against a bourgeois state. The main thrust of this major part of the book seems to be that what was "correct" in other times and places is not necessarily applicable in Latin America, where the Cuban revolution points to the right direction. Armed revolution cannot succeed in the cities; the masses will rally around the small, successful guerrilla groups that stay in the hills (*never go to the cities even for medical treatment*); the guerrilla *focos* must become the political vanguard; the people must be made aware of the activities of the guerrilla force through propaganda; the development of guerrilla warfare must take