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The Six Day War

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Churchill, Randolph S. and Churchill, Winston S. *The Six Day War*. Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1967. 250 p.

This book about the June 1967 Arab-Israeli War was authored by the son and grandson of the late Sir Winston Churchill. An initial chapter sketches briefly, and with significant omissions, the 3,500 years of Jewish and Palestine history before 1967. Written from a pro-Israeli viewpoint, the book then takes the reader step by step through the military campaign on each front. It is well illustrated with detailed maps showing clearly the dispositions, routes, and significant actions of the majority forces on both sides. A tedious appendix analyzes in detail the television and radio coverage of the war in Britain. To a large extent, the book is based upon interviews with involved Israeli civilians and military, at all levels, and some Egyptian prisoners. It brings together in one place many facts and comments which seem to give a much clearer picture of the sequence of the war than was possible at the time because of the rapidity of events or because they simply were not fully reported before. In fact, critical surprise has been expressed in some Israeli quarters that so much has been told here. Other quarters could be surprised too. Speaking of international efforts to open the Strait of Tiran, the Churchills claim that by then the problem of the Straits had become a minor issue. They state four conditions which had been fulfilled, any one of which had been regarded as a cause for war by Israel. It should be interesting for those who were still seeking a solution during the first 5 days of June to read that the decision to strike had been reached by 1 June, that war was inevitable after 30 May, that "it was just a question of timing." Subsequent events add significance to the statement attributed to David Ben-Gurion that "... for the Arabs, what is military defeat? It's the loss of an Army. In ten years they'll have another

Army. For us, military defeat means probably death for every single one of us." The narrative is fast-paced journalism; it is interesting and reads easily and rapidly. Some conclusions stated in the aftermath will strike the reader as premature or even erroneous, even now. But for a quick overview of the war and its immediate buildup and first-flush expectations afterward, it serves as a very handy book indeed.

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Cottam, Richard W. *Competitive Interference and Twentieth Century Diplomacy*. Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1967. 243 p.

Dr. Richard W. Cottam, a Professor of Political Science at the University of Pittsburgh, calls for a change in the current method and style of U.S. foreign policy from what he describes as a series of ad hoc decisions and policies to a system of long-range focus and coherence. He believes that the diplomatic community must concern itself with the great sociopolitical movements in the world, increasingly resorting to a type of nonshooting warfare, characterized as competitive interference, that goes deeply into the internal affairs of a country through counterinsurgency and political, economic, and psychological manipulation. This shift to acceptable interference, as an alternative to thermonuclear war, is carefully detailed and described. Although the study touches upon such popular topics as competition between CIA and Department of State, and the Vietnam War, the casual student of international affairs is likely to find the book taxing and dry, for it is a theoretical study—indeed almost a manual. It is based largely upon the author's experience in the Foreign Service as an area specialist in Washington and at the American Embassy in Iran.

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