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
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COLD WAR OPERATIONS: THE POLITICS OF COMMUNIST CONFRONTATION



PART VII: THE INTELLIGENCE ORGANIZATION

by

Professor Lyman B. Kirkpatrick

(A series of eight lectures by Professor Lyman B. Kirkpatrick of the Political Science Department, Brown University, given at the United States Naval War College during the 1966-67 term as a part of the Electives Program. These lectures are selected from those in a course entitled *Cold War Operations* which Professor Kirkpatrick presents at Brown. This is the seventh lecture. The eighth and last lecture will be published next month.)

In Communist cold war operations the Soviet intelligence system is dominant. The Soviets control the European satellite intelligence organizations. The Chinese have a comparatively modest external intelligence organization.

The Soviet intelligence system is one of the largest in the history of man. This is based on a proportional as well as on a real factor. The Russian Communists

are paranoid from the point of view that they are suspicious of everybody and everything. This has been one of the factors which has governed the development of their intelligence systems with the consequence that they show an insatiable thirst for information. They are convinced of the inevitability of conflict, and therefore they want intelligence on everything and everybody. It

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also reflects their sense of inferiority.

It was reported recently that the Norwegians were concerned because Soviet submarines had been up some of the fjords. This is quite consistent with the tremendous emphasis placed by Russian intelligence on Scandinavia and the fact that they apparently regard it as one of their vulnerable flanks. Otherwise it would be hard to explain such espionage cases as Colonel Wennerstrom, the Swedish officer who had been recruited and operated for them over the years, and case after case of espionage in Sweden and elsewhere in Scandinavia. Colonel Wladislaw Tikochenski, Chief of the Polish Military Mission in Berlin until 1965 and an individual who had been very closely and intimately connected with Polish intelligence, has reported on Polish difficulties in Scandinavia and particularly in Sweden. He attributed this to the large number of Polish espionage operations in Sweden directed by the Russians.

As far as China is concerned, political isolation is a factor in the limited size of their foreign intelligence service. They do not have many foreign missions from which to mount operations. Without official missions abroad it is much harder to engage in intelligence work, and consequently the Chinese are limited. China's primary areas of interest are Southeast Asia, Japan, and the Korean Peninsula. They also, undoubtedly, are extremely active along the Soviet frontier. Both China and Russia have indicated that there is a constant passing of agents back and forth across the line, running all the way from intelligence agents to action type of operatives.

A recent case in the Netherlands concerned a member of a Chinese trade mission who tried to defect. There was a struggle between the Chinese and the Dutch security service (which incidentally is extremely good) with the result that the defector ended up the loser inasmuch as he was killed. The

Dutch refused to allow the rest of the mission to return to China; the Dutch Charge in Peking was put under house arrest.

The Hague is one of the centers for Chinese intelligence in Western Europe, but there are very few such centers in the Western World.

In the Eastern European intelligence services, especially the Polish and Czech services, there is a Russian adviser in each of the major departments. In any operation in which the Russians are interested they will give specific directions and guidance on requirements for the intelligence needs of the U.S.S.R. This is well illustrated by Communist intelligence operations in Latin America. The Soviets have a large mission in Mexico City. It is generally assumed that a good portion of the Soviet operations out of Mexico City are directed north at the United States. The Polish and Czech intelligence operations from Mexico are directed much more towards Central America and parts of South America. It is believed that this is part of a division of labor.

The East German intelligence service, a satellite service to the Russians, is active primarily against West Germany. There have been occasions when there have been as many as 100 East German agents arrested in 1 month in West Germany.

In mentioning the magnitude of the Communist intelligence effort, it should be noted that intelligence now encompasses a very broad field of information and information collecting systems. The Soviets pay a great deal of attention to overt collection—the press, radio, periodicals, business reports, personal observation. They must receive a fantastic volume of material in this area from this country alone. When General Walter Bedell Smith was the Director of CIA he was asked at an Overseas Press Club lunch what he thought the biggest problem for Russian intelligence was, and his quick answer was, "Getting through all

the material." Several years ago Yale University did a study of what was available in our press on military and other types of sensitive materials. The conclusion was that 90 percent of needed information on our order of battle and disposition was available in the open press.

The monitoring of communications for information is intensive. The Soviets are skilled in this. Their methods are sophisticated. The technical collection area—the use of audio-surveillance devices, microphones, and telephone taps—is another field in which the Russians are skilled. It is now nearly 15 years since a cavity-type microphone was discovered in the Great Seal of the United States in the Embassy at Moscow. It was a simple and easy operation. The seal apparently was sent to be cleaned and painted, and the Russians put something in it that looked like a little frying pan, a copper pan with a rod on it. It was a cavity-type microphone with which from a distance of about 100 or 150 feet they could pick up everything that was said in the room. That is now obsolete compared to the sophistication of devices today. No longer is it necessary to have anything in a room. It is quite possible to listen to a conversation in any room from a hundred yards away if a window is available. There is in operation today a beam-type audio-surveillance system which can pick up any conversation inside a room if there is no drape or venetian blind to break the sound wave.

The Russians have probably bugged every single mission in the Soviet Union. The discovery of microphones in the U.S. Embassy in Moscow in 1964 was made only because of major reconstruction. Every room was covered by nets of microphones skillfully emplaced at the time the building was built or remodeled. This type of audio collection is constant, not just in Moscow, but everywhere in the world. The Russians are skilled at it, and their equipment is

of the best. They put a surveillance device in the Dutch Embassy in Moscow in a radiator pipe in order to avoid its being discovered by the usual type of minesweeping technique. In this area their counterintelligence is effective. They watch diplomatic traffic, and any time a known audio expert or technician arrives they will turn off the microphones, making them more difficult to find.

The technical collection by the Soviets is extensive. Their intelligence trawlers operate all over the world. Even in Cuba prior to the advent of Castro they were moving ships in and out in the area of Guantanamo and elsewhere loaded down with technical surveillance devices. They are very aggressive in this entire type of collection—collection on fleet maneuvers and all other activities.

While we would regard espionage as being a fairly minor portion of our collection, the Soviet espionage system is so vast and their insistence particularly on the clandestine collection of classified documents is so large that I would hazard a guess that they probably have somewhere between a hundred thousand and a quarter of a million agents working for them on a worldwide basis. This sounds astronomical, but based on the number of personnel that they have in staff capacity and using a rule of thumb as to how many one staff officer can handle in the way of agent networks, it certainly must amount to this total number.

In their intelligence systems they also engage in political warfare and the handling of front organizations. They use the public media. They use agitation. They are very good in deception. Their Disinformation Bureau is run by a major general in Moscow—and that incidentally is a precise interpretation of the title of this organization, "Disinformation Bureau"—who is very active and aggressive. In a period of 3 years there were 14 forgeries of U.S. documents put out by this particular organi-

zation with a fairly good result as far as they were concerned in disrupting and discrediting and at least raising questions about certain U.S. activities. Periodically the Soviet intelligence service will engage in assassination and murder if this is essential to its program. A fairly sizable staff of trained men is kept in being for this purpose.

We know a great deal more about their program as a result of the defection of Kholkhov about 5 or 6 years ago. He had been assigned to Munich to assassinate an NTS leader. He defected because murder was too strong for his stomach; so the KGB used Bogdan Stashinsky to do the same job.

In appraising the quality of the Soviet intelligence system, we have to recognize that they had two generations of revolutionaries who had lived and operated clandestinely from which to recruit. Clandestinity was a way of life for the original Bolsheviks. The organization of their intelligence service must have benefited from these people who were skilled or they would not have survived. It is essential to recall that Soviet intelligence operates simultaneously four or five separate parallel systems. They may all be collecting on the same targets. The paramount system is the KGB, the State Security Committee's organization. It is first for several reasons. It not only has external espionage in its charter, but it has internal security, and this gives it the permissive right to place its personnel in any other department or agency. It has periodically purged the GR, or the Fourth Department of the General Staff, which is the military intelligence directorate.

Roughly, two out of every three Soviet officials abroad are in intelligence or working for the KGB. Penkovskiy estimated that 60 percent of all Soviet officials abroad are intelligence. While it perhaps is presumptuous of me to disagree with a former Soviet official, I would think he was conservative. I would think it was closer to 80 percent

of all Soviet officials abroad.

The GR, the military intelligence system, is second in size to the KGB. It operates independently with its own system of communications, controls, and directions. The third system would be through the Party mechanism. Intelligence in Party work is deemphasized today. During Stalin's regime it was considered essential that every Party report and act as an intelligence network. The KGB will use all the other departments and agencies that have any representatives abroad if it serves their purpose or if it fits into a particular target.

The original Communist intelligence organization, organized in 1917 after the revolution, was the CHEKA, under a skilled operator named Felix Dzerzhinskiy. This was originally a counter-revolutionary organization. It was directed at eliminating the Whites and everybody else opposed to the Bolshevik revolution. In 1921 the Foreign Department of the CHEKA was organized. This was the original governmental directorate for operations against other countries. Simultaneously with this, the Comintern, the Third International, also had a foreign intelligence apparatus operating out of Moscow through its OMS, Foreign Operations Department. So there was a parallel system in the very early days after the Bolshevik Revolution. The CHEKA was changed in 1922 to the GPU or the State Political Administration. Twelve years later, in 1934, the GPU became the NKVD which is translated as the People's Commissariat for Internal Affairs. This was purged along with the military intelligence system in 1937 during the Stalin purges. In 1941 the NKVD was split into the MGB, which is now the KGB, responsible for external espionage and for high-level internal security and the MVD, or the Ministry of Internal Affairs, responsible for policy in internal affairs not directly associated with state security. In 1962

the final change, the one which leaves it as it is today, changed the name of the organization—the reasons are quite obvious—into the Ministry of Public Law and Order, getting away from the names associated with the repressive type of internal security. Today we have as primary intelligence organizations of the Soviet Union the KGB (the State Security) and the GR (the military intelligence structure).

These organizations will use as cover any post in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Cover arrangements must be approved by the Central Committee of the Communist Party. The Russians will also use any post in the Ministry of Foreign Trade or the Ministry of Culture that is feasible. These are the three biggest organizations with representatives abroad. Penkovskiy estimated that Intourist, the travel organization, is 100 percent KGB as is the All Union International Trade Association. Intourist provides guides for travel inside the U.S.S.R.

The Soviets use women for provocation and recruitment of unwily foreigners inside the U.S.S.R. The number of cases where a Western officer has suddenly found an attractive Russian girl who seemed willing and then has been presented 2 or 3 days later with a set of photographs of his sexual activities by the KGB is legend. This is their favorite technique for blackmailing personnel from other countries.

Tass, their very large and from a news point of view rather good wire service, is also extensively used when it is appropriate for their intelligence organization.

The Patrice Lumumba Friendship University in Moscow is a major recruitment area for African students. The students are legitimate. The University is used to screen. If they can recruit them they do before they go back. Some of them cannot be recruited and tell of the recruitment attempt. The present Director of the Patrice Lumum-

ba Friendship University is Colonel Fomin who is known as a senior KGB officer.

The external operations of the Soviet intelligence service, like most of the established intelligence services of the world, are mounted through their Embassies. The Russians presently have about 53 Embassies, four Legations, and their Mission in the United Nations. The Soviets have about 5,500 officials overseas, and at least two-thirds of them were positively identified (that is identified beyond question) as Soviet intelligence, either GR or KGB. The personnel in their intelligence services can occupy any and every position in an Embassy ranging from telephone operator or chauffeur to the Ambassador. In most instances, of course, the Ambassador would not be actively engaged in intelligence operations. But if it was a key and important area, he might be there because of his experience and the fact that they wanted a very senior official in the country to guide the work of their intelligence collection, their front activities, their Party activities, and so on. The Soviets have great flexibility in the use of their personnel. Two years ago the Central Committee made the decision that military attaches should no longer be the Residents, the name given to the chief of their operations in a given country. Generally the Resident in a Soviet Mission is Counselor of Embassy. In almost all instances his identity is known to the counterintelligence or counterespionage services of the other major powers.

These are the staff personnel in the Soviet intelligence system. Very seldom will they be engaged in any more than directing the operations. They will almost always be involved in trying to recruit agents, but they will even do this through third persons or cutouts if they happen to have the right caliber of persons available.

Typical of how the KGB operates is an attempted penetration of CIA. The

CIA was using a Russian exile as a contract employee. He was engaged in writing propaganda material and doing other work like that. He had no contact with classified material. He was at home in his apartment in Washington one night, and there was a knock at the door. He went to the door, and there stood his brother who he had not seen since he left the Soviet Union. They had a warm reunion, Russians being very sentimental.

After they had brought themselves up to date on their careers, the Russian brother said first, "We want you to come back to the Soviet Union. Everything's fine back there, and we would like to have you return." His American brother declined this with thanks and said that he was not interested. The Russian replied, "Well, don't make up your mind now because I'd like to have you meet and talk to some of my friends." So they parted that night, and the American brother agreed to meet with him again.

As soon as the door was closed he called up his case officer and told him what had happened. CIA security immediately called the FBI, and they gave him directions to go ahead and attend the meeting that his brother had arranged. His brother asked him to meet him on Wilson Boulevard in Arlington. It is a busy shopping street so there would be lots of activity. This is the usual type of Soviet meeting. They were going to meet in front of a store where it would be noisy and people would be wandering around so they would not attract attention.

It was a well attended meeting. There was the American brother, the Russian brother, and the Russian brought with him one of the staff of the Soviet Embassy in Washington who was quickly identified as the Second Secretary. It was under surveillance by both the FBI and CIA who had cameras appropriately placed so that motion pictures could be taken of the meeting, and the American

brother carried a concealed miniature audio device so that they could record the conversation. The gist of this meeting was, again, another effort to persuade the American brother to go back to the Soviet Union. A second pitch was then made which was to ask him to work for Soviet intelligence. It was not so identified. It was just, "You want to work for your mother country. You are doing things now that we would be interested in knowing about."

They had two or three meetings of this nature, all of them under careful surveillance, and finally the Russians saw that they were not getting anywhere. At the second meeting it was noted with considerable interest that Fomin, who was the Soviet Resident in Washington, the KGB officer in charge of their intelligence collection, was also present. So after about the third meeting the Russians gave up on the operation and the Russian brother returned to the Soviet Union. Two of the Soviet officials who had attended the meeting were declared persona non grata by the State Department and they also went back to Russia.

This is fairly typical of their method of operation. Sometimes they are a little more crude. A Czech effort was exposed in the summer of 1965. They attempted to recruit a Czech American, an American citizen working for the State Department, to place inside a bookcase of one of the senior officials in the State Department an audio device. He was directed by the State Department and the FBI (whom he kept fully apprised at all times of what they were doing). They told him to accept the device and put it in the bookcase, which he did. They kept it activated long enough for the check-out message to come through, and they changed it so the Czechs could not activate it. They are occasionally even more clumsy in making approaches. Their targets are the Pentagon and military classified material, the CIA, FBI, and the Atomic Energy Commis-

sion. The bulk of their operations against these targets will be directed by the KGB operation out of their Embassy.

There are possibly two parallel networks in the United States. I doubt if the American Communist Party, being as ineffective as it is, is used at all as an intelligence mechanism aside from its mandatory requirements to report all information which might be of value. The American Communist Party probably sends to Moscow a great supply of material, most of it clippings out of newspapers, the minutes of their meetings, and so on.

The KGB also has illegal networks. Every area division or branch in both the GR and KGB will have an illegal network, or will be trying to build an illegal network, in every country. Perhaps confusing is the use of the word "illegal." The operations out of the Soviet Embassy or out of any official Mission in the semantics of intelligence are "legal" missions. These are "legal" because the personnel are there legitimately; they have been admitted to the United States by our State Department, and they are here officially as representatives of their government. These people will be allowed to stay until they do something that results in our declaring them *persona non grata*. The "illegal" networks are people sent here under false identity, directed to build a long-term, deep-cover type of network, and given very specific and selected assignments by control in Moscow.

The best example of the illegal network was the case of Colonel Rudolph Abel. Colonel Abel was arrested in New York, sentenced to Atlanta Penitentiary, and served a number of years before he was finally exchanged for Francis Powers. Colonel Abel was a KGB colonel. He was not military in any sense of the word and never served in any of the Soviet military services. It is a KGB rank. Colonel Abel was an exceptional intelligence officer. He

never broke. He never divulged any information. He was a man of most remarkable talents from every point of view. The background of Abel is typical of the type that they put in their illegal apparatus. He was born in Moscow in 1902. He was recruited at the age of 27 for what was then the GPU. He was given a mission to go to the United States under deep cover in 1946 and made his way here by the way of Canada. It took him nearly 2 years to go through Canada, then to the West Coast of the United States, and then gradually migrating to the East until in June 1950 he finally settled in New York.

Note the patience of this system. It is not a case of hurry up and get there, we want to hear from you day after tomorrow. It is a case of go, dig deep, and get in there where you can operate. The system by which they build deep cover is one that is disarmingly easy. They have in their files in Moscow lists of street addresses in this country which are clean from the point of view that Abel, being 54 years old, would give an address for his birth that no longer existed. It would be a building that had been torn down, and there would be an office building there or something else, but it had had a residence at the time he was born. The second step is made easier by our birth certificate system in this country. Anyone of us can call or write the county in which we were born and send a dollar and ask for a birth certificate. The Russians, by keeping track of who dies, and particularly of Americans who may die overseas, use this system for obtaining birth certificates for their illegal agents, using the birth certificates to apply for a passport. They will then have established an identity.

Abel had three identities that he used. He arrived in New York in 1950. In December 1953 he was well established at 252 Fulton Street in Brooklyn. It was an apartment-type building where he had a studio and his radio equip-

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ment. He painted for a hobby. He became well known to several neighbors as an obliging fellow who could fix radio equipment. They knew he was rather talented as an artist. He was well read, and he used to do calculus in his spare time as a hobby. Now I emphasize these to show that he was a self-contained individual. The life of a deep-cover agent is a lonely one, and anybody who cannot adjust to it emotionally is not going to succeed.

Abel probably would still be operating if he had not made one mistake and if he had not had an alcoholic assistant. Abel made all of his own concealment devices. These were placed in such places as subway entrances and under park benches. He had a magnetic device for putting under a post office box, particularly the type of storage box that postmen use to leave their bags. It was a magnet which clamped underneath. The pickup agent would reach under and collect the message. It was secure at all times unless somebody upset or repaired the box. One of Abel's concealment devices was a nickel—a 1948 Jefferson nickel that he had hollowed out for putting in microfilm. One of his sub-agents was careless and used it to buy a newspaper. The newsboy in Brooklyn dropped it on the street, and it split. There was no microfilm in it at that time, but he was interested in this split nickel, and he took it to the FBI. This was a clue that there was somebody operating illegally in that area and using that type of concealment device.

Abel's assistant was Lieutenant Colonel Hayhanen who was of Finnish origin. He used the same cover preparations. His was a little more cloak and daggerish. Hayhanen went from Leningrad to Finland in the trunk of a car. He established residence in Finland, picked up a passport, and went back to Russia in the trunk of a car. He was given an assignment to New York to be one of Abel's principal assistants, and he arrived in 1952. In every single mission

Abel gave him he failed. He was told to find Sergeant Rhodes, an Air Force sergeant who had been recruited by the Russians in Moscow. He could not find Rhodes in Red Bank, N.J., so he called Rhodes' sister in Colorado and scared her half to death. She got excited and got in touch with the police. Hayhanen was given a mission to go and pick up \$5,000 in cash which Abel had buried in Bear Mountain Park. He did but kept the \$5,000. He was given a mission to go to Newark and establish a photographic shop to give himself cover. Hayhanen rented a store and started to set up. But he and his wife got into such drunken brawls that they attracted attention from all the neighbors, and Abel had to call him off. Finally, in 1957, Abel sent him back to Moscow.

Hayhanen took the plane to Paris, and he walked into the U.S. Embassy and said, "I'm a Soviet intelligence officer and I want to seek asylum." The general assessment there was that he was a drunk and a bum. The people in the Embassy were afraid of provocation, and this man did not seem to be the type that would be a Soviet intelligence officer. He was told to leave and come back the next day. Despite the fact that he was inebriated at the time, the Embassy decided it was worth taking the chance. The story of his trip back to the United States is harrowing. As he and the escort officer went through French customs and immigration on the way to the plane, Hayhanen started to send semaphore messages to his wife. French customs officers were curious, so his American case officer made like they were both fairly well inebriated after a farewell party, and the Frenchmen dismissed them as a couple of drunken Americans. The brandy started to wear off on the plane, and Hayhanen decided he disliked two elderly ladies sitting in front of him so he started to kick their seat. The stewardess asked him to stop. His escort officer was doing his best to get him to stop. The steward-

ess got the captain who told him that he had to behave. He refused, so the captain got a wrench, came back and told the escort officer, "If you don't stop your friend from doing that, I'm going to use this on him because he's endangering the safety of this plane." When they landed in Newfoundland there was concern that the captain of the plane might turn Hayhanen over to the Canadian authorities. The captain was cut in on what was going on and recruited a doctor to give him a tranquilizer to quiet him down, so he slept peacefully from Gander to New York.

As a result of Hayhanen's testimony, Abel was arrested on 21 June 1957. When he was arrested in the Hotel Latham in New York he had code books, and he had other incriminating evidence. The case was nearly lost on false arrest charges, but Hayhanen was kept sufficiently sober to be able to testify, and a conviction was obtained. Hayhanen lived just about a year longer and died of sclerosis of the liver.

If Abel had not been apprehended and had operated over a more extensive period of time, he would undoubtedly have been running several networks in different areas, both through his own recruitment efforts and by directions from Moscow to pick up people they had recruited in Russia. This was a KGB illegal network, and there probably are GR illegal networks as well as other KGB.

The Soviet system has the benefit of a multitude of files. Files are kept by the Party. Files are kept by intelligence organizations. They keep files of all people of interest. This would include anybody in any foreign intelligence service, a great number of military personnel, government officials, and any people that they thought could be recruited in one way or another.

The KGB and the GR are run directly out of the Central Committee in Moscow. The GR is the largest of the directorates of the General Staff. The

illegal directorate is its first subunit. A rear admiral, for example, was the last known head of the illegal directorate. The second, third, and fourth directorates are geographic, the second being Europe, the third Anglo-American, including Latin America, and the fourth being Middle and Far East. The fifth directorate is diversion, sabotage, and terror. This would be the directorate that they would use for assassinations or for any type of military operation. According to Penkovskiy they keep about 200 trained saboteurs on the staff at all times. They do not use sabotage frequently in peacetime, but it is a part of the tools of the trade that are absolutely essential for them to have in being. The sixth directorate handles border controls. The information direc-

BIOGRAPHIC SUMMARY



Professor Lyman B. Kirkpatrick, Jr., was educated at Princeton University; he is presently Professor of Political Science at Brown University.

Prior to World War II, Professor Kirkpatrick worked for the U.S. News Publishing Corporation and during the War served in the Office of Strategic Services on the Staff of Gen. Omar Bradley's 12th Army Group as intelligence briefing officer. At the end of World War II he returned briefly to the U.S. News as editor of *World Report* and then went to the CIA where he served in a variety of positions, including Division Chief, Assistant Director, Executive Assistant to the Director, Inspector General, and, from 1962 to 1965, Executive Director. In 1965 he left the CIA to become Professor of Political Science at Brown University.

For his service in World War II, Professor Kirkpatrick received the Legion of Merit, Bronze Star, European Theater Ribbon with five battle stars, and both the French and Belgian Croix de Guerre. In March 1960, Professor Kirkpatrick was chosen by the National Service League as one of the ten outstanding career officers in the Federal Government.

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torate evaluates, processes, and publishes intelligence.

The information from both the KGB and the GR go to the Council of Ministers in the Government and to the information control section of the Party. In the operations section there is a scientific and technical division and they have, of course, a major communications section. And then they have the usual support type facilities—communications, archives, supplies.

A word about their training schools. The average Soviet intelligence staff officer is well trained. He will have been recruited out of the Komsomol—the youth organization. He may be sent to the Military Diplomatic Academy which has 98 to 100 in each class from the intelligence services. He also could be sent to the International Relations Institute which is the school for the Foreign Ministry. Fifty percent of the students in this school come from the Komsomol and 50 percent from the Party or the KGB. He could go on then to the Military Institute of Foreign Languages. The Soviets place stress on language training. There are other types of training schools that you would expect to find in intelligence service: a school for junior officers, a training school for illegals, and a sabotage school.

Before any Soviet intelligence officer is sent abroad, he will spend some time with units in the Soviet Union. In the

KGB they will spend a considerable portion of time, maybe as much as 5 to 7 years, on fairly low-level types of internal security missions throughout the Soviet Union. There is a KGB office in each Republic responsible for internal security. The young officer on his first assignment may be sent to do surveillance work, or to be somebody's chauffeur, or to watch the Party apparatus or the governmental apparatus. He will go through this type of work initially for two reasons: one, to season him, and secondly, because it is good schooling for the type of surveillance he is going to be under when he goes abroad. The Soviets are very sensitive to the counter-intelligence organizations throughout the world. They pay a great amount of attention to the FBI in this country and worry a great deal about its type of coverage.

Finally, the principal problem for the Soviet intelligence system might be in the area of estimates. We do not know too much about the processing of intelligence at the highest level in the Russian Government or the making of estimates. It is fairly certain that they err in this particular field, and it is not through any lack of information but through analysis. They probably have as much hard information on their potential enemies, particularly the United States, as it is possible to humanly collect.

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A commander should have a profound understanding of human nature, the knack of smoothing out troubles, the power of winning affection while communicating energy, and the capacity for ruthless determination where required by circumstances. He needs to generate an electrifying current, and to keep a cool head in applying it.

B.H. Liddell Hart: Thoughts on War, xi, 1944