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The Role of the Chinese Army

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Philippines, and the inference from the title is that the root of the problem lies in this ruse of the Filipino. The stating of the problems contradicts this idea. True, some of the difficulties that beset that nation result from World War II, but the remainder are in no apparent way related to either the wartime occupation by the Japanese or the prewar control by the United States, Of the problems related in graphic detail, the most serious, in the reviewer's judgment, are the extraordinary graft, corruption, brutality, and general lawlessness in the Philippines. The first two would appear to be the most urgent and important because of their magnitude and scope. Both seem to be on the increase and are flagrant among the elected as well as the appointed officials at the highest levels. The enumeration of these problems, their causes, and their seriousness is indeed complete. The lack of an assurance by the Author that there is any move or feeling to combat these ills is frightening. This apparent apathy on the part of the people casts a pall over the reader as he contemplates the future of this independent nation.

Despite the lack of connection hetween the basis for the title and the body of the book, Mr. Farwell has, in a complete and serious manner, recounted the myriad problems confronting the Philippines today.

> F.C. GILMORE Commander, U.S. Navy

Frankland, Mark. *Khrushchev.* New York: Stein and Day, 1966. 213 p.

The author states in the Preface that writing a biography of a living statesman is difficult, but writing of a living Soviet statesman "must be very tentative indeed" because of lack of reliable reference and source materials. Mr. Frankland has, however, done a creditable job in producing a readable and informative book. Not much can be written about Khrushchev's pre-World War II days. Starting with his appointment or election as First Secretary of the Ukranian Central Committee in 1938, the author traces Khrushchey's career from his rise to the top of the Soviet hierarchy after Stalin's death to his eventual downfall in 1964. He reveals in some detail three dilemmas which he claims Khrushchev never really understood, let alone resolved. The first was the Party's claim to total authority, which conflicted with the need for freedom of initiative as the economy and social structure became sophisticated. Another was the conflict between the U.S.S.R. and the remainder of the Communist world, where the Soviet Union's domination diminished as communism spread. And, finally, Khrushchev's policy of peaceful coexistence with the West conflicted with his conviction that communism had to defeat capitalism. Khrushchev did understand that a need for change existed and that the change was heavily dependent on the successful development of the Soviet economy; this phase of the problem he never succeeded in solving. The author is severely critical of his subject in many instances but also gives credit where he deems it warranted. The biography appears to this reviewer to be unbiased and of help, at least in some small measure, in trying to understand the actions of one Soviet statesman.

> B.V. AJEMIAN Captain, U.S. Navy

Gittings, John, *The Role of the Chinese* Army, London: Oxford University Press, 1967, 331 p.

As the author himself states, this is not a military history, and it certainly does not deal with Chinese Communist military strategy. The main emphasis of the book is on the changing character of the People's Liberation Army since 1949, the fluctuating position which it occupies in the scale of national priorities, its relationship with the Commu-

nist Party, and its economic and social roles. The author achieves his stated purpose, but at the sacrifice of clarity. In essence, the book is a surface skimming of major shifts and changes and developments within the People's Liberation Army. It suffers from poor organization of the subject matter, shifting back and forth in time as the author discusses the relationship of the People's Liberation Army with other aspects of society. However, in spite of the organizational weakness and the fact that the book was not designed to be a study in depth, this is a very valuable addition to the literature on China for the student. The author reiterates again and again that self-reliance is, and has been, a major theme of the Chinese Communists even before their advent to power. There is a clear discussion of the evident friction within the People's Liberation Army between those desiring a more professional military establishment and those desiring a return to the revolutionary model of pre-1949. Since 1959 the revolutionaries have been in the ascendancy. Greatly underplayed is the current turmoil in China, which seems to have fractured the People's Liberation Army as well as the rest of Chinese society. The importance of these recent developments cannot be underestimated. It is the People's Liberation Army which, in the final analysis, supports the tottering regime of Mao Tsetung. If the People's Liberation Army disintegrates, then so too might the whole Communist apparatus in China. While many aspects of the Chinese Communist military establishment are treated rather superficially, in the absence of any previously published research in this area this is a welcome start.

D.G. WORDEN Commander, U.S. Navy

Hanh, Thich Nhat. Vietnam: Lotus in a Sea of Fire. New York: Hill and Wang, 1967. 115 p.

This book, written by a Vietnamese

Buddhist monk, is short and exceedingly volatile. In his historical analysis of Western presence in Vietnam, the author is somewhat less than charitable to Christian missionary pursuits, a particular target of his criticism being the Roman Catholic Church. In reflecting further on Vietnamese history, Nhat Hanh establishes that Buddhism is the national religion and that for over 2,000 years the destinies of the nation and of Buddhism have been intertwined. He likens the Vietnamese people and Buddhism to a drop of mercury which can be decomposed into many smaller parts as a result of pressure being applied to it. The author points out that like mercury, however, the Vietnamese people and Buddhism will quickly run together once the pressure is removed. Buddhism is portrayed as "a great spiritual force in search of self-realization amid the chaotic disorders of a society in its utmost stages of disintegration because of the war and political intrigue." Thich Nhat Hanh describes the internal strife within the Buddhist movement and points out the inhibiting effect of this situation on Buddhism's fulfilling its obligations toward society.

The regarding of Ho Chi Minh as a uational hero for having led the Vietnamese people against the French is, according to the author, an attitude prevalent in the minds of the Victnamese people in general. The popular assessment of Bao Dai as a puppet of the French is compared to the view that President Ngo Dinh Diem and successor regimes have been puppets of the United States. The author states that when President Diem was overthrown in November 1963 the prestige of Buddhism had reached its apex but was unable to maintain a sustained position of leadership. The Vietnamese traditional resentment toward Western imperialism is particularly highlighted in the depiction of the Vietnamese peasant as regarding the American soldier with the same animosity that he held for the