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# On The Idea of Collective Security

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by

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The basic idea of collective security is that all states should join forces to protect the independence and territorial integrity of each state. Its effective translation into practice has never taken place, even though the objective of bringing this about is a persistent theme in the 20th century, and is especially prominent in 20th century English and American thought on international politics.

At present, the prospect of translating the idea into practice generally is hedged about with qualifications. These

qualifications reflect disappointment with the League of Nations and the United Nations: neither international organization, in spite of early optimism on the part of many people, has proved to be a truly effective collective security system. Hence, contemporary evaluations of collective security often strike a very sober note.

Two examples of this kind of evaluation—one by an eminent political figure, one by a well-known political scientist—are worth quoting here. The first statement was made a few years ago by the

late Dag Hammarskjold, when he was Secretary-General of the United Nations. Mr. Hammarskjold said: "... a universal collective security system which can enforce peace is not yet within reach . . ." And then again:

We should recognize the United Nations for what it is—an admittedly imperfect but indispensable instrument of nations in working for a peaceful evolution toward a more just and secure world order. At this stage of human history, world organization has become necessary. The forces at work have also set the limits within which the power of world organization can develop at each step and beyond which progress, when the balance of forces so permits, will be possible only by processes of organic growth in the system of custom and law prevailing in the society of nations.<sup>1</sup>

The second statement was made by Professor John Stoessinger in his widely used textbook, *The Might of Nations*. He said: "... it may be necessary to admit that the attainment of collective security will take much longer than was first assumed. . . ."<sup>2</sup>

These statements, although not very optimistic in tone, question neither the desirability nor the eventual reality of a genuine collective security system. In both there is an underlying sense, first, that the idea and its translation into practice are essentially products of historical progress; second, that the only real difficulty with the idea has been that men failed to appreciate, earlier in this century, how slowly and with what difficulty the translation into practice might take place. But the prospect is held out that such a translation is destined to take place at some remote future time.

I think that this evaluation of the idea of collective security avoids some of the real issues. Among other things, its appearance of being "realistic," by projecting the realization of a true collective security system far into the future, deflects attention from the central problem. That problem, which

has afflicted the idea from the time of its origins, is the problem of exactly how collective force is to be mobilized and brought to bear. It is to an exploration of that problem that my remarks are directed.

## I

The idea of collective security, as we have come to know it, is essentially modern. It is often thought of as simply a "concept" in the study of modern international relations. But my thesis is that the idea should be understood, historically, as the product of a certain transformation within liberal political thought. The transformation in question took place early in this century under the combined impact of developments such as the spread of democracy, the belief in "progress," and the reaction to the carnage of World War I. It took place primarily in England and secondarily in the United States. And it consisted, in essence, of the attempt to translate the main principles of the liberal theory of internal politics into principles equally applicable to international politics.

A systematic elaboration of this general thesis requires, first, a sketch of the original liberal theory of politics. That theory owes much, if not everything, to two great English political thinkers of the 17th century: Thomas Hobbes and John Locke. The former, in his *Leviathan* (1651), and the latter, in his *Two Treatises of Government* (1689), criticized earlier conceptions of politics—whether medieval or classical—and attempted to replace them with a new, sounder one.

The liberal theory starts from the explicit recognition of a very old problem: how can men be joined together in political society in such a way as to possess both freedom and security? In order to answer this question adequately, according to Hobbes and Locke, one has to begin from the

beginning; one has to begin by examining, in a dispassionate way, just what it is that all men naturally seek. And that proves to be the bare necessities of life: food, clothing, shelter, and physical protection against destruction. Furthermore, men are impelled to seek these necessities by a powerful force within them: the powerful and virtually irresistible desire for self-preservation. Thus, if we take the need for food, we find that the objectively discernible requirement (that men must eat in order to live) is connected to the objectively and subjectively discernible fact that they are driven to seek food by a natural force within them.

The question is what the political significance of that connection might be. The answer is supplied by a second line of inquiry, which seeks to discover what will happen to men, given their powerful, natural desire for self-preservation, if they are gathered together in the absence of political government. Will they recognize that the desire to preserve themselves is shared by all men and that each must refrain from attacking another? Will they be able, in conditions of relative scarcity of food and other necessities, to confine their appetites to what is essential? Or will men, in such conditions, fall to grabbing what is available and even attack other men in order to get what they consider necessary?

The answer given to these questions by Hobbes and Locke is that anarchy is all too likely. This sense of the "natural" condition of individual men, when they are wholly without government, is strikingly stated by Hobbes:

During the time men live without a common power to keep them all in awe, they are in that condition which is called war; and such a war, as is of every man, against every man. . . . In such condition, there is no place for industry, because the fruit thereof is uncertain; and consequently no culture of the earth; no navigation, nor use of the commodities that may be imported

by sea; no commodious building . . . no letters; no society; and which is worst of all, continual fear, and danger of violent death; and the life of man, solitary, poor, nasty, brutish and short. . . .<sup>3</sup>

The third line of inquiry then follows very logically from the conclusion of the second: if men are in such a sorry state when they confront each other in the absence of government, what are the prospects for the creation of government? On what conditions can it be created, which will take account of men's natural propensities?

The main point of the answer to these questions is that it can do no good to deny to men the *right* to preserve themselves. On the contrary, since men's desire to preserve themselves is so natural and powerful, only by somehow building upon it is government likely to be securely grounded. Hence, the first and indefeasible principle that men have a natural right to take any measure to preserve themselves in the absence of government—must be carried over into the construction of government.

Now in order to incorporate this principle into the *construction* of government it is necessary to make the protection of men the main *object* of government. For why else, according to Hobbes and Locke, would men submit to a government? But if this is granted, the problem remains of how to conceive of the founding of government. The answer here is that men must understand the founding of government as essentially a "contract"; or to use the more technical expression which Hobbes and Locke sometimes employ, the founding of government must be understood by men as resulting from participation in the "original" or "social" contract.

The basic terms of this "social contract" are essentially very simple. On the one hand, all men agree among themselves to give up the individual right to protect themselves to a duly

appointed government. On the other hand, a government is duly appointed only when it has as its primary purpose the protection of the life, liberty, and property of every man against possible intrusions from other men, whether such men are within or without the political society. All men in principle lend their physical and moral support to the operations of the government. But only the government normally may use force, and the only justifiable use of force by the government is to protect the citizens in the possession of their lives, liberties, and properties. All men authorize the government to make and to execute laws to ensure such protection. But only such laws, and only such an execution of the laws, as remain within the original concession of powers to the government are legitimate.

These terms of the "social contract" indicate, in effect, that government—by which is meant a separate body of men possessed of the power to rule—is absolutely essential to end the anarchic condition which prevails among men when they are simply in their "natural" condition. But they also indicate that the sole legitimate government is one which not only has the protection of the citizens as its highest object, but one which is capable, in fact, of providing such protection. Thus even Hobbes, who has sometimes been called a defender of "absolute" government, makes it very clear that a government which cannot provide such protection is no longer, in fact, a government; and that men are then wholly absolved from any further duty to obey it.

One further word concerning the form of government is important to our investigation. Although in later times the liberal theory of politics has often come to mean a "democratic" form of government, no such restriction is found in the thought of the founders. On the contrary, both Hobbes and Locke make it quite clear that a perfectly legitimate government may take one of three

forms: monarchy, aristocracy, or democracy. What is critical is not the form, as such, but the explicit and agreed upon object of the government—the protection of all men.

Fourth, and finally, Hobbes and Locke raise the question of the condition which prevails *among* governments. Here, an analogy to individual men living without a common power above them is the key concept. For just as such men have no fixed law to appeal to, no government to apply that law, and no common force to back up the application, so governments now stand to each other in a "natural" condition. The graphic words of Hobbes are once again to the point in explaining this idea:

In all times, kings, and persons of sovereign authority because of their independency, are in continual jealousies, and in the state and posture of gladiators; having their weapons pointing, and their eyes fixed on one another; that is, their forts, garrisons, and guns upon the frontiers of their kingdoms; and continual spies upon their neighbors; which is a posture of war. But because they uphold, thereby, the industry of their subjects, there does not follow from it that misery which accompanies the liberty of particular men.<sup>4</sup>

What we see here is not that governments are always in fact engaged in actual physical conflict, but that in the absence of a single, higher power such conflict is always potential. And because such conflict is potential, one of the great tasks of government is to develop and maintain the economic and physical power necessary to self-defense. The preferred means of doing this is the internal development of the society's resources. A secondary means is the conclusion of treaties of alliance.

But one should not mistake the nature of such treaties. They do not end the condition of "independence" of each of the contracting parties. Nor do they in any significant way resemble the one and only "social contract," for that

contract is, as we have seen, essentially a contract among individual men to relinquish their powers so that they may be exercised by a central government.

## II

The rudiments of the liberal theory of politics, as I have just sketched them, became the common intellectual property of most educated West Europeans and Americans during the 18th and 19th centuries. During this time men certainly were aware that the theory did not provide a guarantee of peace among governments. In fact, proposals to overcome that difficulty were advanced from time to time—largely by scholars or philosophers—but they never received much support. Then, early in the 20th century, especially in England and America, the specific idea of collective security began to gain fairly wide support among informed citizens, scholars, and even political leaders.

How and why this came about will be discussed shortly, but, for the moment, I want to dramatize the great shift in opinion which was involved by calling attention to two kinds of reaction to schemes for producing and guaranteeing peace among governments.

One such well-known scheme was proposed by the Abbé de St. Pierre. An early version, *Perpetual Peace*, appeared in 1712. The scheme then was expanded and developed, in various publications, over the following 25 years. The crux of the Abbé's proposal was the organization of a "league" of European rulers. Each ruler would be obliged, first, by the terms of a general treaty, to submit disputes to arbitration. Second, each ruler would be obliged to join in the use of force against any other ruler who refused to do this. In brief, the threat of collective force would be used to compel each ruler to settle disputes by arbitration.

According to St. Pierre, mutual interest in the preservation of peace, as

provided for in the fundamental articles of the "league," was the great lever which would operate on all governments. Rulers would "consent" to participate, said the Abbé, because "all states will always be intimately concerned to maintain" these fundamental articles "for their own security; so that the most powerful and the least powerful will have a great and constant interest in preventing any of the associates from abandoning the method of arbitration."<sup>5</sup>

It is instructive, now, to look at the two kinds of reaction to the proposal of the Abbé de St. Pierre. The first consists of brief appraisals by two eminent men of the latter part of the 18th century, one a political leader, Frederick the Great of Prussia; and the other a political thinker, Jean-Jacques Rousseau. Frederick's appraisal was brief and satiric: "The thing is most practicable; for its success, all that is lacking is the consent of Europe—and a few similar trifles."<sup>6</sup> And Rousseau argued that the Abbé's scheme confounds the operation of the completed scheme with the means of bringing it into operation: "This good man saw clearly enough how things would work, when once set going, but he judged like a child of the means for setting them in motion." Rousseau then argues that not "consent," but only large-scale use of force could bring a League of Europe into being and concludes: "That being so, which of us would dare to say whether the League of Europe is a thing more to be desired or feared? It would perhaps do more harm in a moment than it would guard against for ages."<sup>7</sup>

If we now turn our attention to England, in the early part of the 20th century, we discover a very different sort of reaction to such schemes. Thus, in 1920, Sir Sydney Low, an author and student of modern history, said that the Abbé gratified all thoughtful persons of his own time by "his elaborate project . . . for a League of Nations,

which is an *anticipation* of a great many of the moral reflections and conclusive arguments we are putting forward today."<sup>8</sup> (Emphasis supplied.) At about the same time Viscount Grey, British Foreign Secretary from 1905-1916, published an essay on the idea of a League of Nations. This essay, which was translated into many languages and widely distributed around the world, contains a reflection upon the fate of previous schemes for a League to preserve peace by means of collective action. It had been their fate, says Lord Grey, to be rejected as "impractical," or to be treated as mere "abstract resolutions." However, Lord Grey argues that a change in conditions is coming about; that nations, as well as individuals, can—and must—learn from "experience"; and that the lessons learned from the calamity of the Great War must cause nations to "rise to greater heights, or else sink lower and drop eventually into the abyss." In short, the project for a League of Nations "to secure the peace" will not "remain impossible because it has not been possible hitherto."<sup>9</sup>

The contrast between the views of Lord Grey and Sir Sydney Low, on the one hand, and Frederick the Great and Rousseau, on the other hand, is admittedly a crude index. Nevertheless, it does suggest that between the latter part of the 18th century and the first part of this century an immense shift of opinion had taken place among informed and experienced men concerning the practicability of a scheme of collective security. What remains is to make more precise, first, the nature of, and second, some of the probable reasons for, that shift in opinion.

### III

The shift in opinion concerning the practicability of a scheme of collective

security rests upon a fundamental re-interpretation of the "realism" of the liberal theory of politics. That "realism," it will be recalled, consisted of building up the principles of government on a foundation of what men naturally seek: the protection of their lives, liberties, and properties to the greatest possible degree. But it will also be recalled that the theoretical as well as practical conclusion of such "realism" is that government, as such, is indispensable to end the actual or potential anarchy among individuals; and that every independent government remains in a "natural" state with respect to other such governments.

The early 20th century proponents of the practicability of the idea of collective security usually begin by positing the general validity of the liberal theory of politics with respect to *internal* politics. Thus, they emphasized such notions as these: All men do have a right to the protection of their lives, liberties, and properties. But, over time and through harsh experience, men have learned that only a settled government—not simply an alleged "community of interest"—can actually provide such protection. This means that individuals must submit to a "rule of law," a rule which is based on the distinction of three powers of government: the legislative, the judicial, and the executive. Furthermore, each of the three powers of government is crucial if the protection of the individual is to take place. The legislative power, which ultimately is responsible to the mass of individual citizens, establishes exactly what the laws shall be. The judicial power interprets those laws. And finally, the executive makes sure that the laws are enforced.

Nor is that enforcement left merely to operation of moral principles to which the individuals have subscribed. On the contrary, says Lord Grey, "the sanction that maintains law is the *application of force* with the support of the

great majority of individuals behind it."<sup>10</sup> (Emphasis supplied.) Or if we look into a work titled *Towards International Government* (1915), by a well-known scholar, John A. Hobson, we find him arguing as follows: It is a "fundamental error" to assume that there is "an absolute antagonism between moral and physical force" or that "in any act of human conduct the latter can be dispensed with." Hobson then concludes: "There is no display of moral force in any act of human conduct which does not make some use of physical force as its instrument."<sup>11</sup>

Now it is precisely this emphasis upon the indispensability of "physical force" as a "sanction" for "law" which is viewed, by supporters of the idea of collective security, as being a great and realistic step forward. That part of the argument goes as follows: Hitherto, governments have, of course, been bound, in principle, to obey international law. And during the 19th century great advances have been made in the development of that law—for example, in the conclusion of numerous treaties which oblige states to use methods of arbitration and conciliation to resolve disputes among them. But now men are coming to realize that mere agreement to use such procedures is not enough. They are coming to realize, in fact, that there is an analogy between the operation of law on individuals and its operation on governments. The analogy is not, says Lord Grey, a "perfect" one, but it is a relevant one. And what it suggests is this: Just as individuals in civilized countries have learned, through experience and over much time, that law, to be effective, must be backed up by potential—and at times, actual—force, so governments, in the modern world, must now learn that same lesson. They must learn, that is, to join their respective forces in order to provide a real "sanction" for international law, or at

least that part of it which obliges governments to settle their disputes by peaceful methods.

But then the problem comes down to the one so acutely singled out by Frederick the Great and Rousseau: How do you obtain the consent of governments to join in applying such force? And the answer supplied by men such as Lord Grey is most interesting because it is, essentially, an appeal not to the principle of abstract dedication to law, but to the principle of enlightened self-interest.

The formulation of this version of the principle of enlightened self-interest is succinctly stated by James Bryce, one of England's ablest students of politics, in these terms: "Every state that enters this League [the proposed League of Nations] will do so because it *expects to gain much more in security* against an unprovoked attack than it will lose by undertaking not itself to make such an attack, but by joining in the promise to *protect by arms* each of its fellow members."<sup>12</sup> (Emphasis supplied.) Note that nothing is said about dedication to the "principles of international law" or to "international justice," as the prime motive for states entering into the collective security system. Note also the implied and strict parallel of individuals and states: each gains more than it gives up by agreeing to submit to law backed up by collective force. Note, finally, that the "promise" to join in the use of force to "protect" a "fellow member" is strictly contingent on the prior assurance of a right to *be* protected.

But a sobering implication then follows: to the degree that such protection seems unlikely to be forthcoming, to that same degree a state is entitled to take other measures for its security. Everything hinges, then, on how effective the principle of enlightened self-interest will be in the absence of a true government. Or stated in the old-fashioned language of the early liberal



theorists of politics, the question comes to this: Can even the principle of enlightened self-interest produce a truly effective "collective security" system by means of a "social contract of nations?"

The answer given to this question by the men I have just been quoting is pretty clear. For example, Mr. Hobson even entitled one of the chapters of his book "The Social Contract of Nations." The argument of the chapter indicates that such a contract is, indeed, a practical possibility, and that its effect would be to establish a general system of sanctions—including the use of force—thus assuring international peace. I do not mean to suggest, however, that Hobson or others thought that this could easily come about. On the contrary, these men were at pains to point out that only as peoples *and* their governments became fully aware of the immensity of the stakes would they find it to their collective "interests" to enter into such a contract. Furthermore, these men repeatedly stress the "moderateness" and "realism" of what they advocate by explicitly denying that the "Social Contract of Nations" is intended to abolish the "independence" of the separate nations' governments, let alone establish a "Federal World State." What they do argue, then, is that the principle of enlightened self-interest, once adequately understood, will lead to a "contract" sufficient to guarantee international peace, but not so sweeping as to dissolve the participating governments.

#### IV

Having arrived at this point, we are now in a position to compare this brand of "realism" with that of the early modern liberal theorists. The issue, as I see it, can be reduced to this contrast: Hobson *et al* concluded, with Hobbes and Locke, that the submission of individual men to government was the critical condition for producing general

peaceful relations among them. And yet, quite contrary to their predecessors, these 20th century Englishmen also concluded that generally peaceful relations among states are practically possible without the submission of such entities to a single government, let alone the dissolution of the separate states, and the subsequent direct submission of all individuals to such a government. We thus are confronted with what appears to be a rather paradoxical set of views: that which is, in the case of individuals, the *indispensable* condition of peace becomes, in the case of governments, a *dispensable* condition.

How, then, are we to account for this paradox? I cannot provide anything like a complete answer here. But what I shall try to do, in my remaining remarks, is to indicate some broad outlines of an explanation.

I think we have to begin by looking a bit more closely at the underlying difference in the "realism" of Hobson *et al*, on the one hand, and Hobbes and Locke, on the other hand. In both cases, as we have already seen, the realism is rooted in the principle of enlightened self-interest. And yet, the understanding of that principle, above all as it pertains to the nature and function of political institutions, proves to be different in important ways.

To Hobbes and Locke the principle of enlightened self-interest stands perilously close to the principle of unbridled indulgence in self-interest pure and simple. It stands perilously close in the sense that men not only find it difficult to make such a distinction, in the absence of government, but almost impossible to act upon the distinction even when made. Indeed, in such a situation men are generally impelled not only to confound the two, but also to deny that they are doing so. The critical importance of political institutions may then be stated as follows: The maximum condition for preventing men from mistaking mere self-interest for enlightened

self-interest is the continuous presence and effective operation of an "objective" third party: a known government, applying known, settled laws to all conflicts among citizens. Conversely, the maximum condition for encouraging men to confound the two kinds of self-interest is the continuous absence of such a third party. In short, no amount of mere exhortation to men to make and to act on the basis of the distinction can serve as a substitute for the actuality of *effective* political institutions.

This line of thought, when applied to the condition of relations among independent governments, yields this conclusion: The distinction between the two kinds of self-interest in the foreign policies of various governments can be made in principle. But in the continuous absence of an "objective" third party--in the absence, that is, of truly effective super-governmental political institutions every government is free, and even entitled, to fall back on its own interpretation of that distinction. In this situation the tendency of every government to be unwilling to submit its judgment to that of any other government is a reflection of--not a repudiation of--its own primary obligation: to protect the lives, liberties, and properties of its own citizens. Hence, no amount of exhortation to governments or their citizens to act on the basis of some other government's--or even some group of governments'--definition of enlightened self-interest is likely to be effective.

Now what is the difference between this view and that of Hobson *et al*--a difference, that is, which can account for the seeming paradox we noticed earlier? Superficially, the difference does not appear to be great. In fact, I believe that it is considerable, and that it is traceable to the subtle effects of these 20th century Englishmen's understanding of democracy.

The fact is that much of the discussion and advocacy of the idea of collec-

tive security, during the period in question, is closely tied to a certain perspective on democracy. In its broadest terms, that perspective is of a climactic struggle taking place between the "progressive" forces of "democracy" and the "outmoded" forces of "autocracy." The expectation is, in general, that the defeat of Germany and its allies in the World War is a prerequisite to the further spread of "democracy." But more particularly, the expectation is that the spread of democracy is itself a basic condition for the effective institutional operation of a collective security system.

The connection between democracy and collective security was pointedly and typically stated, in 1919, by Professor L. Oppenheim, a world-famous authority on international law from Cambridge University. In his conclusion to a series of lectures on *The League of Nations and its Problems* Professor Oppenheim raises this crucial question: "Can it really be expected that, in case of a great conflict of interests, all the members of the League will faithfully carry out their engagements?" He does not pretend to predict that this will necessarily happen, but he does argue as follows:

... If really constitutional and democratic government all the world over makes international politics honest and reliable and excludes secret treaties, all the chances are that the members of the League will see that their true interests and their lasting welfare are intimately connected with the necessity of fulfilling the obligations to which they have submitted by their entrance into the League.<sup>13</sup>

And by fulfilling their obligations Professor Oppenheim means, above all, willingness to join in the use of force against aggressors--willingness, that is, to apply those sanctions without which the rule of law is ultimately ineffective.

Professor Oppenheim, perhaps significantly, does not clarify exactly what he means by "constitutional and demo-

cratic government." But he is very sure, throughout his lectures, that it is intrinsically superior to all other forms of government because of its internal as well as external mode of operation. What we need to know more precisely, however, is just what the mode of operation is and how it comes to be the model for the operation of the institutions of collective security.

For help in clarifying these points we may turn once again to the views of men such as Hobson, Bryce, and Grey. I think, to begin with, that these men were fairly conscious of tracing their general understanding of government back to the early liberal theory. But I also think that they were less conscious of the degree to which government had come to mean, for them, a specific understanding of democracy. What I am suggesting here is that, while retaining the general images of the earlier liberal theory, they tacitly revised its premises concerning the effectiveness of political institutions and then carried over these revised premises into their conclusions concerning the practicability of a collective security system. I want, now, to elaborate on this thesis.

## V

Hobson *et al* were perfectly aware that there were various forms of government, in earlier times and in their own times. But they, like Professor Oppenheim, were convinced that one form—democracy—was gradually spreading everywhere, even if slowly and with great difficulty in some areas of the world. Furthermore, a close reading of their statements about the purposes and modes of operation of government reveals a tendency for these to be stated in terms of a specific sense of "progress." That sense is, on the one hand—and as we have already seen—that individual men who are truly "civilized" have gradually learned to submit to government. But it is also, on the other

hand, a sense that government itself is evolving toward a perfected model—the model of democratic self-government. The basic problems of relevance to our present investigation are: (1) the nature of the executive power within this general idea of democratic self-government; and (2) its application to collective security.

The early liberal theorists had argued, as we have seen, first, that the executive power must be exercised by an objective, third party, external to the individual parties to a conflict; and second, that it must possess overwhelming force relative to them. But the conception of government as being, in principle, democratic self-government, which was propounded by Hobson *et al*, involves a fundamentally ambiguous understanding of the executive power.

In the first place, the power of "public opinion" to act as a mutual restraint on all the citizens in their relations with each other is now introduced as a quasi-executive power of government. It is intended, that is, to reduce the more forceful operations of government to a minimum. Second, the use of force, as such, is subtly reinterpreted. Instead of being clearly located in an external, third party, it is now understood as being shared among the citizens and then collectively brought to bear through the essentially ministerial activity of a group of political leaders. This view of the operation of the executive power is implied by Lord Grey when he argues as follows concerning conflicts between individuals within a society:

These [conflicts] are settled by law, and any individual who, instead of appealing to law, resorts to force to give effect to what he considers his rights, finds himself at once opposed and restrained by the force of the State—that is, in democratic countries, by the combined force of the other individuals.<sup>14</sup> (Emphasis supplied)

The special quality of this brand of

“realism” concerning the operation of political institutions may now be stated in terms of interdependent propositions: (1) Submission to government is indeed necessary, but such submission is ultimately only participation in self-government. (2) An executive power, including the use of force, is indeed necessary, but such a power is ultimately only an aspect of participation in self-government. (3) The executive power is thus, in principle, *in* all of the citizens yet effectively operative *upon* them. (4) The actual application of force is essentially only a ministerial activity, and the decision to use it against recalcitrants is essentially only a manifestation of mutual restraint.

The application of this conception of government in general, and of the executive power in particular, to international politics is the crucial point concerning the idea of collective security. The application is understood as being no more than an “extension” of what is historically and theoretically valid within societies to relations among governments. Thus we find Hobson arguing explicitly for an “International Executive” and doing so in these terms:

This League of Nations must be regarded as the beginnings of an attempt to make a fresh advance in the evolution of human society which in its political side has grown from the primitive family or tribe to the modern national State or Empire. Indeed, its feasibility ultimately rests upon the fact that it evokes and posits no new or untried human powers, no new or untried political forms, but simply *applies upon a larger scale those same powers and forms which have been successfully applied upon the smaller scale.*<sup>15</sup> (Emphasis supplied)

An explanation of the seeming paradox to which I called attention above—the paradox that that which is, in the case of individuals, the *indispensable* condition of peace becomes, in the case of governments, a *dispensable* condition—is now possible. The explanation is that to Hobson *et al* neither indi-

viduals nor governments really “submit” to government in the sense of submission to an external, third party, possessed of an exclusive right to exercise the executive power. Or stated in more positive terms, both individuals and governments ultimately are understood as participating in self-government, including participation in the executive power which is brought to bear as a sanction. When seen from this perspective, the idea of collective security is nothing more than democratic self-government writ large in the international arena; and the principle of an “International Executive” is no contradiction in terms, but the fullest expression of the right and power of individuals and governments to enforce the law upon each other.

## VI

This extension of self-government to the international arena rests, in the final analysis, on a revised understanding of the nature and effectiveness of the principle of enlightened self-interest. The early liberal theorists had concluded that the “enlightenment” implied in the idea of enlightened self-interest consists essentially of a recognition that it is absolutely necessary to give up one’s individual powers in exchange for the protective rule of a properly appointed government. But the 20th century advocates of the idea of collective security seem to have felt that this conception of government was essentially retrograde. In fact, they seem to have felt that it suggested submission to “autocratic” rule rather than participation in democratic self-government. But their dedication to the latter conception of government, and their expectation that it could be made the practical basis of a collective security system, presupposes a much greater degree of autonomy for the principle of enlightened self-interest than the early liberal theorists had been willing to admit. Conversely, it presupposes a

corresponding depreciation of the need for a truly external executive power. In effect, then, Hobson *et al* tended to challenge a fundamental premise of the original liberal theory while claiming simply to extend its application to intergovernmental relations.

I do not mean to suggest, by this statement, that the challenge was direct and explicit, for it was not. Rather, it took the form of viewing the early liberal theory from the perspective of the belief—which we saw so clearly stated in the passage from Hobson—that there is an observable “evolution of human society.” This belief, which is also often formulated in terms of a belief in “progress,” was widespread in the latter part of the 19th century and the early part of the 20th century. It is, of course, impossible to enter here into a detailed discussion of this belief. It is sufficient, for my purposes, to observe that its political manifestation, during the period in question, was a great confidence in the virtually inevitable spread of democracy. This confidence, in turn, was derived from the observation of a number of developments: the growing number of democracies in the period after the American and French Revolutions; the growing—if very uneven and difficult—development of democratic features even in regimes which were still basically autocratic; the increase in rates of literacy and the spread of education; the creation of all sorts of nongovernmental “associations,” organized on broadly democratic lines; the increase of trade relations among states; the great spread of science and technology; the absence of any general European war for about a century; the development of procedures of arbitration and conciliation among governments; the holding of The Hague Conferences toward the end of the 19th century, and so on.

Taken together, these developments seemed clearly to add up to secular “progress.” And most important for our

purposes, they seemed, to many men early in this century, to suggest that man’s ability to act in a relatively autonomous fashion according to the principle of enlightened self-interest had simply increased because of a “natural” evolution in human society. In other words, that evolution itself seemed to be the historical vehicle, as it were, by which enlightened self-interest had been carried to a new level of effectiveness—the highest in human experience.

It is true that the belief in “progress,” so characteristic of the immediate prewar period, suffered a rather rude assault when the war did break out. And it suffered an even ruder assault when the stalemate at a high level of mutual carnage seemed to have no end. Nevertheless, what is most significant for our



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purposes is the way in which the belief in "progress" came to be reinterpreted in the light of the war. The reinterpretation consisted of shifting the emphasis from the notion of a gradual evolution to that of a climactic struggle between, in the words of Professor Oppenheim, the "principle of democratic and constitutional government and the principle of militarism and autocratic government."<sup>16</sup> And the fact that the "democratic" governments eventually were victorious lent further support to the view that the struggle had been a step—if an unexpected and terrible one—on the road of "progress." In short, instead of calling into question the basic premises of the idea of necessary progress, the reality of the war simply brought about a revision in judgment concerning, first, the rate of progress, and, second, the institutional means by which it was to be realized in the relations among governments.

The revision in judgment concerning the rate of progress was based on a realization that the war had caused great destruction and political and economic dislocation. The revision in judgment concerning the means by which to achieve political progress at the international level was based on that sense of being more "realistic" about the role of forceful sanctions which has already been discussed. As such, this latter revision was but a modest modification in the prewar belief in the relative autonomy of the principle of enlightened self-interest. Thus, when Hobson *et al* exhorted citizens and leaders during the war to establish a system of collective security, they assumed, in the first instance and as a condition for the creation of the necessary institutions, the capacity of men to be controlled by the relatively autonomous power of that principle. Similarly, when such exhortation was carried over into discussions of the specific provisions of the proposed League of Nations Covenant, the expectation was that enlightened self-interest,

rooted in reflection upon the devastation and horrors of the War, would serve to produce a practically effective dedication to the proposed scheme of collective sanctions. And after the establishment of the League's institutions, much of the debate concerning the key provisions on collective security turned upon the relative merits of means by which to encourage governments to act on the basis of an enlightened view of their self-interest.

## VII

The belief that progress in the understanding of government had taken place and could be translated into practice in the form of a truly effective collective security system underlay all these discussions. Furthermore, that belief set the tone for much subsequent discussion of the idea of collective security, and survived over half a century of disappointments. In this sense, the belief in "progress," although tempered, seems to persist in a powerful way.

Whether that belief is justified, in the final analysis, is a long and difficult question—too long and difficult to be treated here. But I would like to emphasize two points in closing. First, the belief in question presupposes that transformation in the liberal theory of politics which lies at the very basis of the idea of collective security. Second, the transformation itself is today either largely taken for granted, or not even recognized as having taken place.

I do not claim, however, that a clear perception of that transformation will, in and of itself, resolve the larger question as to whether progress in the understanding of government has, in fact, taken place. But I do claim that such a perception may contribute to a more critical discussion of the alternatives we face. It may do so, among other ways, by causing us to look afresh at the political principles which we generally claim to accept but which may no longer be adequately understood. It

may do so by causing us to confront, in particular, the fact that Hobbes and Locke had reached what is to most of us an uncomfortable, even painful, conclusion: that no "social contract among nations" is possible. It may do so, finally, by encouraging us to question

whether the original line of argument concerning the connection between the principle of enlightened self-interest and the necessity for effective political institutions has been disproved by the history of the past 250 years.

## FOOTNOTES

1. Quoted in Albert A. Forgac, *New Diplomacy and the United Nations* (New York: Pageant Press, 1965), p. 143-144.
2. John G. Stoessinger, *The Might of Nations* (New York: Random House, 2nd ed., 1965), p. 261.
3. Thomas Hobbes, *Leviathan* (New York: Dutton, 1950), ch. 13.
4. *Ibid.*
5. Quoted in F.H. Hinsley, *Power and the Pursuit of Peace* (Cambridge, Eng.: University Press, 1963), p. 39-40.
6. *Ibid.*, p. 45.
7. J.J. Rousseau, "A Lasting Peace Through the Federation of Europe," in Elizabeth York, *Leagues of Nations* (London: The Swarthmore Press Ltd., 1919), p. 240, 247.
8. Sir Sidney Low, "A British View," *The Nations and the League* (London: T. Fisher Unwin Ltd., 1920), p. 153.
9. Viscount Grey, "The League of Nations," in B.J. Mather, ed., *The League of Nations* (London: Oxford University Press, 1919), p. 19-21.
10. *Ibid.*, p. 28.
11. J.A. Hobson, *Toward International Government* (London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd.), 1915, p. 88-89.
12. Viscount Bryce, "Introduction" to Mather, ed., *The League of Nations*, p. 16.
13. L. Oppenheim, *The League of Nations and Its Problems* (London: Longmans, Green and Co., 1919), p. 79.
14. Grey, *op. cit.*, p. 27.
15. Hobson, *op. cit.*, p. 85.
16. Oppenheim, *op. cit.*, p. ix.



It is the greatest possible mistake to mix up disarmament with peace. When you have peace you will have disarmament.

*Winston Churchill: To the House of Commons, 13 July 1934*