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Counter-Insurgency Operations; Techniques of Guerrilla Warfare

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In the Introduction, Mr. Bernard Fall indicates that as an Austrian writer and reporter, Mr. Knoebl exerts a not insignificant influence in Europe and that he deserves an audience in America. The reviewer would agree, with a caution to the reader to exercise to the fullest his sense of proportion and balance to compensate for the author's lack of these characteristics in his reporting. Certainly, it is not possible in one short book to cover comprehensively the war in Vietnam. Nevertheless, Mr. Knoebl has given a reporter's view of a wide range of incidents and attitudes that renders this interesting book well worth the reader's time.

R. L. DODD
Commander, U.S. Navy

Mackintosh, Malcolm. *Juggernaut*. New York: Macmillan, 1967. 320 p.

In this history of the growth of the Soviet Armed Forces since their foundation in 1918 some interesting facts are presented, especially the evolution of strategy that prevailed until the purges of 1937. The military leaders up to that time had worked out a realistic military tactics doctrine that, if it had been followed, would have vitalized the Soviet Armed Forces. The purges under Stalin soon reduced whatever originality and forcefulness existed in the Armed Forces to an utter collapse of morale. All continuity in military thought and training was replaced by total control by fear, and this cost the Soviets dearly in 1941. The military was completely subordinated to Stalin and his rule by terror, which lasted until his death in 1953. The main portion of this book deals with World War II and Russia's valiant effort to protect her homeland. Loaded with names, dates, and descriptions of even the most insignificant of battles, this has the effect of greatly attenuating the interest of the reader.

The author hastily wraps up the post-Stalin era in a few pages that present nothing new to the student of the Naval War College. The Soviets' reappraisal of their military doctrine was due to their successes in the development of long-range missiles and nuclear weapons. However, they were faced with the dilemma of deciding just how valuable conventional forces would continue to be in any future world war. Here the author credits President Kennedy's emphasis on such a capability as the catalyst that caused the Soviets to react to the need for increasing their conventional forces. The sources utilized seem fairly accurate, although the reader is cautioned to recheck any figures on the strength of the Soviet Armed Forces with other material. Mr. Mackintosh concludes, rather ineptly, that the hopeful element for the future is "if the peoples of Russia had the final say in Soviet policy, a new world war . . . would not be their way of achieving their national aims." He ignores the real issue here and that is: What chance do the Soviet people have of obtaining this voice?

W. K. CALLAM
Lieutenant Colonel, U.S. Air Force

Paget, Julian. *Counter-Insurgency Operations; Techniques of Guerrilla Warfare*. New York: Walker, 1967. 189 p.

This book studies three successful counterinsurgency campaigns conducted by the British Army in Malaya, Kenya, and Cyprus during the last 20 years. The author, Lt. Col. Julian Paget of the British Army, has made an analysis of each campaign in order to search out factors and principles to be deduced from lessons learned. These he has isolated and identified as necessary for proper prosecution of present and future counterinsurgency campaigns.

He has taken the position that successful counterinsurgency operations are conducted in three phases: "*Phase One*, a period wherein there is increasing lawlessness of some element of the population which is in conflict with the Government. *Phase Two*, essentially a defensive phase in which the insurgents hold the initiative. *Phase Three*, the final stage in which the Security Forces have gained the initiative and bring pressure to bear upon the insurgents. At this point, the emergency may be ended and a political solution to the problem is possible." In each of the cases that the author has explored he has traced the development of the guerrilla activities through the three phases and has concluded by offering general observations and deductions. Consistently, he has emphasized the importance of civil-military cooperation involving a close relationship among the civil administration, the Armed Forces, and the police. In his final chapter, "Fighting the Insurgents," Lieutenant Colonel Paget has extracted from the experiences he has investigated the major essentials for counterinsurgency operations, methods for defeating the insurgents, and means for wooing and permanently winning the hearts and minds of the population. Scholarly and well written, this book on a very timely and important aspect of present and future warfare should prove instructive and helpful to students and practitioners of military art today.

R. N. PETERSON
Commander, U.S. Navy

Roy, Jules. *Journey through China*.
New York: Harper & Row, 1967, c.
1965. 299 p.

Journey through China is an intensely interesting account of the observations and experiences of a French

Army officer-turned-journalist during a 2-month visit to Communist China in 1964. The main purpose of the visit was to gather material for a history of the Chinese revolution. Coincidentally, one perceives, the author also sought affirmation of his empathy for the Chinese. He was bitterly disillusioned and disappointed on both counts. Much of the book is devoted to the delays, denials, frustrations, and quarrels in his dealings with the bureaucracy. The author wanted to visit archives, view documentary films, interview participants in the Great March, et cetera. Instead, under the constant and suffocatingly close escort of Chinese officials, he saw only what the Government wanted him to see — certain factories, cooperative farms, and public museums — and interviewed only persons who knew nothing of, or would not speak of, the great events of the revolution. Mr. Roy was obliged to abandon his basic aim under these circumstances. However, throughout the book, he has liberally threaded a capsule history of the revolution (based on sources other than this visit) with frequent guilt-laden references to the humiliations inflicted upon China by the West in the century following the Opium Wars. But, fundamentally, instead of being handed another documented history of the revolution, the reader is treated to a caustic psychosocial analysis of the Red China of 1964.

In the China described to him as liberal and happy, the author saw a "vast, miserable segment of humanity working itself to death." He found it "fearful and terrifying." Although he frequently lauds the material achievements of Red China and the decidedly improved living standard of the masses, he nevertheless laments the reenslavement of the people to a new master. He is particularly derisive of the awe and