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Juggernaut

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In the Introduction, Mr. Bernard Fall indicates that as an Austrian writer and reporter, Mr. Knoebl exerts a not insignificant influence in Europe and that he deserves an audience in America. The reviewer would agree, with a caution to the reader to exercise to the fullest his sense of proportion and balance to compensate for the author's lack of these characteristics in his reporting. Certainly, it is not possible in one short book to cover comprehensively the war in Vietnam. Nevertheless, Mr. Knoebl has given a reporter's view of a wide range of incidents and attitudes that renders this interesting book well worth the reader's time.

R. L. DODD
Commander, U.S. Navy

Mackintosh, Malcolm. *Juggernaut*. New York: Macmillan, 1967. 320 p.

In this history of the growth of the Soviet Armed Forces since their foundation in 1918 some interesting facts are presented, especially the evolution of strategy that prevailed until the purges of 1937. The military leaders up to that time had worked out a realistic military tactics doctrine that, if it had been followed, would have vitalized the Soviet Armed Forces. The purges under Stalin soon reduced whatever originality and forcefulness existed in the Armed Forces to an utter collapse of morale. All continuity in military thought and training was replaced by total control by fear, and this cost the Soviets dearly in 1941. The military was completely subordinated to Stalin and his rule by terror, which lasted until his death in 1953. The main portion of this book deals with World War II and Russia's valiant effort to protect her homeland. Loaded with names, dates, and descriptions of even the most insignificant of battles, this has the effect of greatly attenuating the interest of the reader.

The author hastily wraps up the post-Stalin era in a few pages that present nothing new to the student of the Naval War College. The Soviets' reappraisal of their military doctrine was due to their successes in the development of long-range missiles and nuclear weapons. However, they were faced with the dilemma of deciding just how valuable conventional forces would continue to be in any future world war. Here the author credits President Kennedy's emphasis on such a capability as the catalyst that caused the Soviets to react to the need for increasing their conventional forces. The sources utilized seem fairly accurate, although the reader is cautioned to recheck any figures on the strength of the Soviet Armed Forces with other material. Mr. Mackintosh concludes, rather ineptly, that the hopeful element for the future is "if the peoples of Russia had the final say in Soviet policy, a new world war . . . would not be their way of achieving their national aims." He ignores the real issue here and that is: What chance do the Soviet people have of obtaining this voice?

W. K. CALLAM
Lieutenant Colonel, U.S. Air Force

Paget, Julian. *Counter-Insurgency Operations; Techniques of Guerrilla Warfare*. New York: Walker, 1967. 189 p.

This book studies three successful counterinsurgency campaigns conducted by the British Army in Malaya, Kenya, and Cyprus during the last 20 years. The author, Lt. Col. Julian Paget of the British Army, has made an analysis of each campaign in order to search out factors and principles to be deduced from lessons learned. These he has isolated and identified as necessary for proper prosecution of present and future counterinsurgency campaigns.