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
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# COLD WAR OPERATIONS: THE POLITICS OF COMMUNIST CONFRONTATION

**Professor  
Lyman B. Kirkpatrick**

## **Part IV — The Communist Control System**

(A series of eight lectures by Professor Lyman B. Kirkpatrick of the Political Science Department, Brown University, given at the United States Naval War College during the 1966-67 term as a part of the Electives Program. These lectures are selected from those in a course entitled *Cold War Operations* which Professor Kirkpatrick presents at Brown. This is the fourth lecture, and the others will be published in the next four issues.)

In the world today there are roughly 50 million Communists and 88 Communist Parties. Party organization is fundamental to their operations everywhere in the world. There is a well-established control system binding the Communist Parties of the world together. Parallel controls may be exerted in any given country through the great number of Communist organizations. It must be emphasized that we are not just talking about 88 Communist Parties in the world, we are talking about scores of front organizations and scores of other devices, governmental as well as non-governmental, used to achieve their objectives. In all of this, organization is the key to their success.

The basis is the Party. The Parties all over the world are generally set up on the same scale or the same model as the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, variations being adopted either for national means or for circumstances. Circumstances will differ if the Party is legal or illegal and the degree of freedom with which it can operate. Circumstances also include the number of Communists in the country involved and the size of the hard-core cadre on which the Party is based. Although the Parties are all modeled more or less after the system of the Soviets, there are differences in almost every country. Changes are frequent and are adapted to the objective of making their work as effective as it can be. However, there are certain basic philosophies of Communist Party organization which are important to understand right at the start.

First and foremost, any Communist will explain to you with a certain degree of vehemence that Communists have a democratic system and that they follow democratic practices. To a certain degree this is correct. Their democracy is the ability of any Party member to discuss "freely" at any

Party meeting any of the issues with which they are concerned. It would take a fairly brave Party member to directly attack any of the policies of the Party, international, national, or local, but beyond question there is a degree of criticism that goes on in the Party meeting. There is a general freedom of discussion allowed, again varying with the Party and the conditions and with the leader. After discussion the Party unit will make a decision to follow the same policies or to suggest to the next higher level echelon that the policy be changed. Once this decision is made, the discussion ends. This is where the phrase "democratic centralism" originates. The "democratic" indicates discussion has been allowed. The "centralism" is that the word of the Party is final. Nobody will criticize the policies adopted by the Party or they will be charged with deviation. If they criticize or argue with Marxist philosophy, they will be charged with being revisionist.

One of the interesting practices Communists use in Party activities is the policy of criticism and self-criticism. It is described in the memoirs of many of the ex-Communists, particularly a book like Wolfgang Lenhardt's memoirs of his experience as a Communist. Lenhardt was a young German who was taken to Russia in the thirties and who grew up in the Soviet Union. He was trained throughout the entire apparatus, starting with the Komsomol, going into the Comintern, and then finally being specifically trained to return to Germany as a Communist functionary, which he did and then defected. He wrote his book *Child of the Revolution* which is a description of their system. Lenhardt described his first experience with criticism and self-criticism. He was summoned before a cell meeting in the training school in which he was working and was told

that he should be critical of himself for his errors. He then was put through an inquisition in which he learned that the smartest thing was to be critical of yourself and admit that you had made errors. At least it was the least painful way. This then became a common practice to him, sitting in on these sessions of criticism and self-criticism. This technique is used by Communist Parties to try to avoid complacency among the cadre, to discover areas of negligence, particularly in the ideological fields, and to examine their projects from a realistic point of view to see if they are succeeding or not succeeding.

Communist Parties would claim that self-criticism is also to prevent the development of the bureaucratic cast. In that it has obviously failed, because they have developed a bureaucratic cast. Finally, and far from least, is that this practice of criticism and self-criticism is used to engage more of the members in participation. As we all know, any organization, regardless of what it is, has the participating types and the nonparticipating types. So in their system they work from a point of view of insuring that everybody will participate. Here perhaps I should emphasize that we are talking about the Party cadre and hard-core activists, thoroughly trained, thoroughly skilled, and completely dedicated to their work. Even they, however, go through the processes of criticism and self-criticism.

With this as a basis for the theory of how the Party operates, let us run quickly through its organizational structure. The National Party Congress is the highest body in the system. It has supreme authority to ratify the actions taken by the Central Committee, the Party Conference which will be held between Congresses, or decisions taken by the General Secretary or the First Secretary of the Party. The agenda for any Party Congress is thorough-

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## BIOGRAPHIC SUMMARY



Professor Lyman B. Kirkpatrick, Jr., was educated at Princeton University; he is presently Professor of Political Science at Brown University.

Prior to World War II, Professor Kirkpatrick worked for the U.S. News Publishing Corporation and during the War served in the Office of Strategic Services on the Staff of Gen. Omar Bradley's 12th Army Group as intelligence briefing officer. At the end of World War II he returned briefly to the U.S. News as editor of *World Report* and then went to the CIA where he served in a variety of positions, including Division Chief, Assistant Director, Executive Assistant to the Director, Inspector General, and, from 1962 to 1965, Executive Director. In 1965 he left the CIA to become Professor of Political Science at Brown University.

For his service in World War II, Professor Kirkpatrick received the Legion of Merit, Bronze Star, European Theater Ribbon with five battle stars, and both the French and Belgian Croix de Guerre. In March 1960, Professor Kirkpatrick was chosen by the National Service League as one of the ten outstanding career officers in the Federal Government.

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ly and carefully prepared in advance. There should be no surprises at a Party Congress, certainly not to either the Politburo or the Central Committee. Prior to the Congress the Politburo and Central Committee have passed on and approved all actions to be taken at the Congress. In the event of a Congress of the Party of the Soviet Union, even the exact text of speeches will be approved in advance. The texts of the proceedings of the Party Congresses of the Soviet Union are published and available in 18 different languages for distribution all over the world.

It is the role of the Congress to ratify all actions that have been taken within the Party structure since the previous

Party Congress. The theory is that Congresses should be held at least every 2 years. This has not been the practice in many countries. The Soviet Union has gone several years between Congresses, particularly under Stalin's regime. The Chinese Party went 16 years without a Party Congress and obviously was going through some of its more serious organizational problems.

Next down on the hierarchy is the National Party Conference. This is a smaller group. It is not as large as the 4,000 delegates that attend Party Congresses in Moscow but is representative. It is a body which can take action or ratify actions taken in interims between Party Congresses. It is consultative to a greater degree than the Congress itself. It can make changes in the Central Committee up to 10 percent if it is necessary to elect new members because somebody died, resigned, or was removed by the Congress. It is a body which the 23rd Congress of the Soviet Union urged be held more frequently. The Russians apparently felt they were not holding conferences frequently enough to make up for the gap between the Congresses. These Congresses are expensive, bringing a great number of people together from all over the Soviet Union and the world. Each is elaborately staged, the proceedings translated into 55 different languages or dialects simultaneously and broadcast throughout the world or distributed by Tass.

The next group in the Party hierarchy, moving down, is the Central Auditing Committee. The easiest way to describe this is to say it is, in effect, the inspector general of the Soviet system with perhaps greater emphasis on finances than an inspector general in one of our services or organizations would have. There is an important aspect to it because we frequently don't equate financial responsibilities with

Communist Parties. They seem to be somewhat incompatible by their varied nature. But the Communist system requires a great deal of money, the passing of a great deal of money across international boundaries between Parties and through various apparatuses. Just as Marx did not succeed in legislating human nature, the Communists have not been able to legislate as far as money is concerned, either, and have had defalcations in use of Party funds just as any other organizations do. The Auditing Committee is important not only to try and keep the Party system relatively honest but, even more important, to prevent scandals which rock the Party system. In Germany not long ago one of the functionaries in the Hamburg Party decided that it would be just as nice to use Party funds to bet on horses as to pass them on to Party Organizations. This shook up the German Communist Party. The Central Auditing Committee is also used by the Party Secretary as a fact-finding group for his own purposes.

The body that really runs the Party is the Central Committee. This is elected by the National Party Congress. Candidates are screened carefully in advance by the Secretariat, passed by the Politburo, probably even screened by the Central Committee itself. We can rest assured that anybody elected to the Central Committee has a very clean security record, has no blemishes as far as the Party is concerned, and is one who can be trusted completely.

The Central Committee is the directing body of the Party between sessions of the Congress but, in effect, will make decisions which the Congress will inevitably ratify. It varies in size around the world from 16 members to about 250, with the Chinese and the Russians having the largest Central Committees. The Committee is composed so that full membership can always be present. If

the delegate to the Central Committee himself is not present, his alternate will be present, and his alternate can vote when the principal member is not there.

The Central Committee will meet every 3 to 6 months and sometimes more often in the case of a Party crisis. Its decisions are binding on all lower echelons and can be reviewed only by the Party Congress itself. It has such duties as convoking congresses and conferences, determining the basis for electing members, determining Party tactics, directing the work in non-Party organizations, and representing the Party in its relations with other countries. The latter has become a very important aspect in its control system. At the 23rd Party Congress Leonid Brezhnev reported that in 18 months members of the Central Committee of the Soviet Union's Party have had 68 meetings with over 200 delegates from other Parties throughout the world. Obviously some of this is a divide-the-work program because the General Secretariat could not possibly handle all of the meetings, so they spread it out among the Central Committee members and this becomes a method for inter-Party control.

Before any Soviet official is assigned overseas, his assignment must be approved by the Central Committee. This may be either a subcommittee of the Central Committee or it might be the Politburo, depending on the importance of the assignment. Obviously, before an appointment reaches the Central Committee for approval a great deal of staff work has been done in advance through the Secretariat. The Secretariat is responsible for insuring that a thorough security check has been made by the KGB and that the official concerned has a record which is completely clear. We can envisage quite graphically what would happen if the Politburo recom-

mended for assignment an official overseas such as Colonel Penkovskiy who later defected or started to work for the West. So the Central Committee's functions are managerial.

Many of the functions of the Central Committee will be delegated to the Politburo or Presidium or Executive Board or the Standing Committee — they change the names variously. The Politburo is the real key to power, being the small daily working body. It is generally composed of about 10 to 12 members. There is no standard pattern as to who these members are, but they will inevitably include the Prime Minister or President of the country concerned. Members will include the General Secretary or the First Secretary of the Party, perhaps one or two other secretaries, and frequently the Minister of Defense. The official charged with ideology is almost inevitably on the Politburo, and it is the working body.

Colonel Vladislav Tikochensky, formerly Chief of the Polish Mission in West Germany who defected in May 1965, the highest ranking Polish official to defect, indicated that the Politburo of the Polish Party met a minimum of three times a week and that their meetings generally lasted 6 to 8 to 10 hours a day. He went on to say that not only did they have lengthy meetings, but Gomulka, the General Secretary of the Party, is adamant about having anybody called out of the meeting. He said that at the time of the Cuban missile crisis, when the Communist world was badly shaken by President Kennedy's speech of 22 October, Polish intelligence was concerned that war might be imminent. Tikochensky tried to get the Foreign Minister out of the meeting and was unsuccessful. He finally extracted him only by sending in a message to the effect that he thought war might be imminent. This is indicative

of at least how one General Secretary runs the political bureau and the extent of its work. Undoubtedly, as in any political structure, it will vary from country to country, but it probably is endemic to the Communist system that lengthy meetings take place in which there is a great deal of discussion.

The bureaucracy of the Party is controlled by the Secretariat. The Secretariat runs all the actual day-to-day functions of the Party. The General Secretary or First Secretary controls the patronage, personnel, and the cadre or organization. He undoubtedly has the closest ties with the secret police of the state as distinct from the Party disciplinary organization, and consequently he is in a position, if his colleagues in the political bureau or the Central Committee allow him, to get complete control. It is interesting to note that this is the general pattern throughout the history of communism - that the First Secretary has tried to achieve dictatorial control. Khrushchev did not achieve it. He got close but was upset by his colleagues on first the Politburo and then the Central Committee. Stalin achieved it and after achieving it ruthlessly eliminated everybody who opposed him.

There can be several secretaries in a Party organization. There may be a second, third, or fourth secretary, depending on how the Party is organized. Each of them will be responsible for various phases of Party activities. In Poland, Gomulka, the First Secretary, is, of course, the key man and runs the Secretariat. His responsibilities are very broad, Party-wide. There are two other assistants who sit on the Politburo with him, one is charged with Foreign Policy and Security, and the other is charged with Military Affairs and Economic Affairs.

In the larger Party systems there are several departments, each of which will

report to one of the Secretariats. The cadre department, or personnel, is a key department, because it handles the selection, training, work assignments, promotions, and discipline of all Party members and maintains records. Let me emphasize here that these records are extensive and detailed, and great emphasis is placed on records. The Communists not only keep records in Moscow of all of the members and all of the people under consideration, but they also have records on the members of other Parties throughout the world. It staggers one's imagination to think of the mechanical aspects of handling these files.

The second department is an organization department. We would probably be more accurate to call this the statistical department, because it concerns itself with the statistics of organizational work and also with the development of new Party units. One of the most important departments is Agit Prop, or Agitation and Propaganda. This is an area on which the greatest stress is placed in all of the major Communist Parties, most particularly in China and in Russia. The agitation end of it is not just simply concerned with fomenting disturbances, but it is the mass action group in the Party. It has a highly trained cadre in every area of the world, in all of the Parties, a group that can be called out on the streets at any given time to put on any given type of agitation that is wanted, ranging from mobs throwing rocks at U.S. Embassies to activists stirring up riots and insurrection. This is accomplished by well-trained cadres recalled periodically to their centers for the latest techniques and devices. The basis is not on the masses, but on small cadres who know where to recruit the masses. They have leaders in the universities, in the factories, and in various other parts of society.

The Communist information and propaganda effort is on a vast scale. The printing establishments are elaborate and effective. The organization is based upon a small cadre of trained publicists, trained ideologists, and trained historians working together absolutely and totally indoctrinated with the Party philosophy and highly skilled in putting out propaganda so that it is appealing whether it is in Africa, Indonesia, or Latin America. The agitation and propaganda department in many of the Parties controls the Party training programs. The Communist training programs are intense, and the Party *apparatchik* who wants to get ahead is going to get all of the Party training he can. The trainees are subject to constant scrutiny and indoctrination. They are tested for vigilance, motivation, discipline, toughness, and dedication, and if they fail in any of these characteristics then they are relegated to relatively minor jobs. The philosophy is that there must be a reservoir of trained people, so the Agit Prop department is important.

The work of the financial department is self-evident. Party requirements for money are great. They have full-time workers raising money. They use their publications to raise money. A profitable publication such as *Humanite*, the French Communist daily in Paris, will occasionally have levies put on it for funds to be transferred either to the French Communist Party or perhaps to another Communist Party elsewhere in the world. The Party requires dues, and a high Party functionary might well have a levy put on his salary. The Party occasionally will raise money from non-Party organizations such as trade unions, women and youth organizations. One of their principal problems is the transferring of funds. The Party uses gold, which they will produce at a

cost twice the international rate, if necessary, in the Soviet Union, but their favorite monetary unit is the U.S. dollar, and they use this on a world-wide basis to finance their activities.

The next department is the mass organization department. It concerns itself with all types of activities where masses are involved.

The Communist Party of the Soviet Union has many other departments. A Women's Department plans exploitation of the women's groups. The Labor and Welfare Department places great emphasis on trade unions and labor unions and exploits social conditions. An Economic Department engages in the use of trade and finance to assist Party ends. Community Affairs works primarily at municipal levels. The Agricultural Department works with the peasants and farmers. Cultural and Education penetrates the intellectual areas, always one of their most fertile fields. It has a Sports Department and emphasizes sports and the quality of Soviet athletes. The Chinese are now challenging in the same area. The Youth Department is one of their most important. The Youth Festival held in Moscow in 1957 cost an estimated \$100 million. It was done beautifully. They put out the red carpet for the youth of the world that they brought there. They obviously paid expenses for many of the delegations. The hundred million dollars nearly approximates the entire annual budget of the U.S. Information Agency. A Minorities Department deals with minority groups. The Foreign Department determines foreign policy.

From the point of view of international communism, the Foreign Department is the most important of the Party. It handles the dealings with foreign Parties, both overt and covert. It handles the visits of foreign visitors to the Soviet Union. It works closely with the State Security Committee, and



it succeeded the Comintern as the central organization point for international communism as far as the Communist Party of the Soviet Union is concerned.

Communist Party units are organized on the same basis in lesser degree at all of the other levels in the Soviet Union. Each of the Soviet Republics will have a miniature of the national organization. Each of the provinces and districts will have a smaller embodiment of this. When there is a Party Congress, such as the 23rd Party Congress of March 1966, the system starts preparing for the Congress months in advance by holding discussions at the basic cell or branch level of issues that are to be raised or decided upon at the National Congress. The necessary material will be issued well in advance from Moscow through the Republics, regions, and districts and down to the branches so that discussions can take place.

One of the key issues at the 23rd Party Congress was how the international Communist apparatus should be controlled in the future. What should the Russians say about the Chinese? Should they exacerbate the split with China, or should they try to patch it up? So it was essential to educate all of the 10 million Party members of the Soviet Union as to these issues before their 4,000 representatives convened in Moscow. It was interesting to note one document which was circulated through Poland. This document was sent to all of the Party meetings throughout the Soviet Union and dealt with relations with China. It was published in the Hamburg newspaper *Die Welt*, and then the text of it was printed in *The New York Times*. This is the type of document discussed at all of these Party meetings before a National Party Congress.

A Party cell or branch can be organized in just about any segment of

society. It can be organized in a city block or a factory. There will be several branches or cells in any sizable factory. It can be organized in a cooperative or a collective farm. Generally speaking, the size of cells is limited for control purposes and discipline and to keep it a flexible unit. The Brazilian Party, for example, has no branch larger than 50 people. Once a branch is larger than 50 people, another branch is organized. Each branch or cell will have its own leader or secretary who will be responsible for seeing that meetings are held on a regular basis. Either he or a very trusted and dedicated individual will be the Political Commissar of the branch charged with the constant orientation and indoctrination. The unit will meet as often as once a week and, in some instances, more often. In China, particularly in the factories, the cells or branches meet on a daily basis, perhaps during lunch hour they are regaled by the radio giving them the latest word of Mao or other political indoctrination. Each unit studies theory, engages in criticism and self-criticism, is lectured on Party objectives until they are known perfectly. This is one of the strengths of the Communist system, constant working and constant training of the basic cadre.

According to Leninist philosophy and the accepted guidance of all Parties, there should be an underground Party in every country to take over in the event that something happens to the overt Party. In some countries, 12 to be exact, the Communist Party is illegal. In these areas Communists operate on an underground basis. Depending upon the degree and quality of the local security service, the underground Party may operate from outside the country. The Spanish Communist Party has its headquarters in France where the Communist Party is legal, where the French Surete is not terribly con-

cerned with communism and probably does not bother the apparatus of the Spanish Party unless it attracts attention or gets into difficulty. The underground Party, or the covert or illegal Party apparatus, will be a very much smaller version of the organization already discussed. It will probably have certain elements the general open Party would never have. It will combine maximum security with minimum discernible activity. It will work toward developing a cadre or apparatus. This is its primary responsibility, and this cadre or apparatus will have much more emphasis on action than on political affairs. It will have a section for guerrilla warfare. This will train small groups, all over the country if possible. It will cache arms, will prepare to act when directed. The illegal apparatus can never act on its own. It must get direction from the Party, and the Party would have to get approval from Moscow. The illegal Party will have sabotage groups. Thus the underground Party, by its very nature, will have all of the techniques available to it that we would normally associate with an intelligence service. It will have to have the capacity for making false documents, particularly where it is operating illegally in an area. It will have to have all the various "ratlines" for moving people and supplies and money across frontiers.

The Third International, or the Comintern, was the original international control system. In the Comintern all of the Parties were represented in Moscow. It issued directives to all of the Parties of the world. It became less effective in the 1920's and went out of existence when Stalin abolished it in 1943. It was abolished by Stalin because he had developed the Foreign Bureau of the Party in the Soviet Union to the degree where it could take over the entire Comintern apparatus

including personnel, networks, and organization.

The Cominform, which lasted from 1947 to 1956, never had the control mechanisms of either the Third International or the present Party. It was more an ideological clearing house and control apparatus. From 1956 on the international control system has operated primarily through the Party, through conferences of Communist Parties, through the Party Congresses, and through bilateral meetings. The Congresses and the conferences, as well as the bilateral meetings, are probably more important for what we do not know about them than what we do know about them. Communiques issued after such meetings are often completely unrevealing of anything that might have been discussed. If you examine the travels of the members of the Politburo and the Central Committee you will find that the Russians are constantly on the move on visits to Communist countries and Parties to give guidance and to negotiate aid and trade agreements.

The controls of international communism are not solely through the Party system, issued by the Foreign Bureau of the Party. The Soviet Embassy plays a role in the control systems throughout the world. Thus a second area of controls comes out through the Foreign Ministry which in the normal course of international relations will issue guidance to friendly powers as to the direction of Soviet policy and also will be the recipient of comments from other nations. A third area of control is through the intelligence system. This is an important aspect of the Communist control mechanism. The intelligence systems of all of the other Communist countries, with the exception of Albania and China, are, in effect, satellites of the Soviet intelligence system. In Scandinavia, for


example, the Poles are operating on what is practically a mass basis by direction of Moscow, because the Russians are extremely concerned with their Scandinavian flank, and the degree of intelligence activities up there is immense. The control is exerted to the degree that an intelligence operation by any one of the satellite services can be taken over by the Soviet liaison officer indicating that the operation should be transferred to the Soviet system.

There are other controls through front organizations. These vast organizations with millions of members are financed almost in full by Moscow. Moscow will exercise its controls through all of these organizations - trade unions, youth groups, cultural societies, and the women's groups.

Thus, when we speak of the Communist control system it should be emphasized that we are not speaking of any monolithic or unified type of organization. There is tight control in the Central Committee of the Communist Party in the Soviet Union. It guides, controls, and directs all these organizations throughout the world. Through various levels, through parallel organizations, through what must be either identical or very similar types of guidance and directives, the Communists have been able to achieve a high

degree of international unity. It is interesting to note that mistakes were made primarily when there was dictatorial or one-man rule much more frequently than when there has been either collective or Party rule. For example, some of the greatest confusion was caused when Stalin unilaterally abolished the Comintern without advising in advance the other Party members. The Hungarian Communist Party, for example, was so confused that it announced its own dissolution which, of course, had to be changed fairly quickly on orders from Moscow. Another occasion when orders were confused was Khrushchev's 20th Party Congress speech when he denounced Stalin. The Party organization and apparatus had not yet been geared up to give the guidance to the various Parties in the world in advance as to what was taking place. For a period of about 3 weeks all of the senior leaders in Moscow were meeting with Party delegates from all over the world to explain to them what de-Stalinization meant and the role that they should carry out.

The Communist control system is being exerted through governmental, Party, and other channels throughout the entire Communist apparatus. Despite occasional mistakes, the control system is remarkably effective.



Weigh the situation, then move.

*Sun Tzu, 400-320 B.C. The Art of War, vii*

# SET AND DRIFT



## OPNAV Politico-Military Policy Division Head Graduates from Correspondence Course of Naval Warfare



Capt. George P. Steele, U.S. Navy, was graduated from the Naval War College Correspondence Course of Naval Warfare in November 1967. In the endorsement forwarding a diploma to Captain Steele, Adm. T. H. Moorer, Chief of Naval Operations, stated:

1. Delivered with my congratulations and awareness that the award of this diploma represents some 1,700 hours of individual study and that you are only the third active duty officer ever to have qualified for this diploma.
2. WELL DONE!

When asked about the value of Naval War College correspondence study, Captain Steele made these comments:

Just a generation ago the objective of the U.S. Navy line officer was a rounded career. It was then entirely possible for an officer to serve in a variety of types of ships and become competent in many of the fields that are now regarded as specialties or sub-specialties.

Several wars and a technological age later, there is just too much to learn for any naval officer to become really proficient in all aspects of the line. Now the twin objectives are to become an expert in some phase of the profession and a knowledgeable generalist in the rest. It has been my opinion that one should work toward both of these ends at the same time, and this is the reason that I have pursued the Naval War College non-resident program.

The knowledge that can be acquired through the War College correspondence courses, I have found, can be of the utmost assistance in command of a small ship on independent duty. It is evident that the more general background information an officer has, the better he can serve on a staff or in a Washington office.

As has every professional officer, I have had to face many situations

drawing on every bit of my knowledge. It is my conviction that Naval War College nonresident courses furnish indispensable tools for use at such a time.

Captain Steele's experience and distinguished career make these words particularly meaningful. Graduated from the U.S. Naval Academy and commissioned an Ensign on 7 June 1944, he attended Submarine School at New London and was subsequently assigned to U.S.S. *Becuna*, making two war patrols against the Japanese.

Subsequent assignments include Staff, Commander Submarine Squadron 8; instructor at Submarine School; Executive Officer, U.S.S. *Harder* (SS-568); and Commanding Officer, U.S.S. *Hardhead* (SS-365).

On 5 December 1959 Captain Steele assumed command of U.S.S. *Seadragon* (SSN-584). In August 1960 *Seadragon* sailed for Pearl Harbor, Hawaii via the Northwest Passage and the North Pole. *Seadragon* thus became the first submarine to go under icebergs and the first ship of any kind to go through the Northwest Passage via the Parry Channel, which she did running submerged under ice.

After a tour as Tactical Training Officer on the Staff of the Deputy Commander, Submarine Force, U.S. Atlantic Fleet, Captain Steele became the first Commanding Officer of U.S.S. *Daniel Boone* (SSBN-629). While commanding *Daniel Boone* he made the first Polaris patrol in the Pacific Ocean, sailing from Guam on Christmas Day 1964.

In August 1966 Captain Steele reported to the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations as Head, Europe and NATO Branch, Politico-Military Policy Division, his present assignment.

**NCC Field Trip.** Naval Command Course students visited the Harvard

University campus and other points of interest in the Boston, Mass., area 10 and 11 January 1968 to supplement their studies in military management and international affairs.

This visit supplemented a 1-day field trip to the Harvard Graduate School of Business Administration earlier this year. It included the entire Harvard campus and cultural, historical, and geographical points of interest in Boston.

Lectures, discussions, and demonstrations enabled the students to further their knowledge of U.S. educational institutions, to provide them with an opportunity to meet and hear distinguished authorities in international affairs, to witness management practice teaching by the case study method, and to learn of the culture, history, and geography of New England.

**NATO Defense College.** "As the President of the first and oldest service college, I particularly want to greet the students of the newest," said Vice Admiral John T. Hayward, USN.

The Naval War College President was speaking to the students of the NATO Defense College in Rome, Italy, on 20 October 1967.

He added, "I am sure it (NATO Defense College) will contribute materially to the basic strengths of the free world."

Admiral Hayward noted that it would be foolish not to recognize the pitfalls in making prophecies concerning either technical progress or what the impact will be from a strategic point of view. He nevertheless accepted the challenge to give his ideas on the subject.

"In any discussion of the future, as in navigation, one must have a point of departure," he began. "We must talk about the world and the strategic situation as it exists today."

Strategy was defined first from a national viewpoint as "the use by a nation of its military, economic, political, and psychological forces in peace or war to attain its national objectives." It was pointed out that strategy is not confined to military forces nor to a state of war.

Admiral Hayward went on to describe weapons systems and deterrents past, present, and future, citing situations where technical innovation did have in the past and could have in the future its greatest strategic implication.

"It is apparent," he said, "that technical innovation covers the entire spectrum of the physical sciences. Acoustics, light, electromagnetic radiation, atomic structure, materials, atmospheric physics, all can have direct impact on the strategic situation and balance between nations."

It was noted that the degree of impact will be a function of the type of conflict, and the types of conflicts extend across a spectrum of their own, from the megawar to the cold war. Too, advent of new concepts and the uses of technical innovation in various conflicts require both the technology to make them possible and their acceptance by military institutions.

"So we see technical innovation and its impact across the entire spectrum of military problems. It is not all strategic nor all tactical. It is apparent if a nation is to have a usable strategy in this modern, complex world of today it better be very technically proficient," stated the Admiral. He reminded his audience that only a shortsighted person would limit his forecast to a specific technology. His interest should lie in the many technical fields and their interaction with each other. He also observed that the work in materials alone can change the whole world, with examples given such as silicons, fluorides and organometallics.

In conclusion, Admiral Hayward said, "It is in these areas (the physical sciences) one must look for impacts or weapon systems with strategic implications."

He has been invited to address NATO Defense College students again in March 1968.

**Holiday Recess.** During the recent 2-week holiday recess, when organized classes, committees, and lectures were suspended, Naval War College students were entrenched in paperwork. Naval War College librarians can attest to the amount of research and background work accomplished during the recess by students deeply involved in preparation of their theses and other research papers.

**Naval War College Management Education Program.** Prior to 1965 there was no formalized course in military management conducted by the Naval War College, although individual portions or lectures of other studies did cover subject matter that could properly be categorized as a subarea of military management. In 1965 the need was recognized for a formal course and, as a consequence, a 3-week study of military management was inaugurated for the School of Naval Command and Staff in the fall of 1965. The School of Naval Warfare initiated its study of military management in May of 1966, although on a more limited scale. The need for military management education was not confined to resident students at the Naval War College alone; it existed on a Navy-wide basis. Consequently, in the spring of 1966, the Correspondence School was charged with the mission of developing a Correspondence Course in Military Management, and efforts were initiated in that direction.

The present resident course in military management is being conducted

simultaneously for the Schools of Naval Warfare and Naval Command and Staff. The course is 33 units (about 40 student hours) in length and is presented as an integral part of the Fundamentals of Strategy Study. The purpose of the course is to delineate the economic and quantitative analysis concepts and procedures applicable to the military management decisionmaking process and to describe the Department of Defense and Navy Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and Resource Management Systems. In order to achieve this objective several teaching methods are employed, two of which are innovations not used in previous years. In addition to the regular lecture and reading programs, this year the military planning game and case studies were introduced as educational training techniques. There was also increased faculty participation in the lecture program.

In addition to the core curriculum, resident students are being offered two electives which support the Military Management Course. "Introduction to Military Operations Research" is given by the Chair of Physical Sciences. The second elective is "Managerial Planning and Control" which is conducted by Professor Zenon S. Zannetos of the Sloan School of Management, present incumbent of the recently established James V. Forrestal Chair of Military Management.

Of related interest is the fact that management education is also included in the Naval Command Course for senior officers from Allied nations. Prior to last year a very limited number of management lectures was presented in the logistics study, but in academic year 1966-1967 a short course was introduced which covered the basic techniques and concepts of management. The bulk of this course was given by consultants from the Har-

vard University School of Business. For this academic year the same course of action has been selected; however, the length of the course has been increased.

The recently issued Correspondence Course in Military Management is designed to familiarize the student with various concepts, principles, processes, applications, and techniques of modern military management. The objective is not to develop a mastery of technical skills, but rather to provide the student with a survey of the management field. Although the correspondence course is predicated upon the objectives and concepts of the resident U.S. course, because of its nature it also provides educational experience in the basic theories and concepts of management, such as organizational theory and behavioral science. It is estimated that each of the three installments will require about 60 hours of student effort. Since its introduction on 1 September 1967, over 140 students, 25 of them ranking Government civilian officials, have enrolled in the Naval War College Correspondence Course in Military Management.

The establishment of the Senior Officer Executive Management Course was approved by the Chief of Naval Operations in August 1967. Initial planning indicates that the course will be oriented primarily towards general management concepts and practices rather than emphasizing management as practiced within the Department of Defense. The prospective student body for this course will be 35-40 senior Navy and Marine Corps officers, primarily Flag/General Officer selectees. It is expected that the course will run for 3 or 4 weeks during the summer months.

In addition to the courses described above, a new after-hours voluntary course in data processing has been recently instituted. This course covers 47 2-hour sessions and is designed to


develop familiarity with computers, data processing systems, and programming in order that the student may be able to apply modern military management techniques in future assignments. About 20 students are enrolled in this program during this academic year.

In response to a recognized need, the Naval War College has developed a management education program during the past 2 years that is designed to meet the requirements of the officers of the Navy and Marine Corps. It is also recognized that such a program must be responsive to change when dealing with the dynamic field of management; consequently, continuous evaluations and modification, as necessary, are inherent within the Naval War College management education program.

**International Law.** On 21 November 1967, a set of Naval War College

“Blue Books” in international law was presented to the University of the Philippines, College of Law, Quezon City, Republic of the Philippines. The presentation, on behalf of the President of the Naval War College, was made to Dean Vincente Abad Santos by Capt. Robert Kaufman, USN, Chief of Staff, Commander, U.S. Naval Forces, Philippines.

The “Blue Books,” treatises on international law prepared by holders of the Charles H. Stockton Chair of International Law, are held by almost every law school library in the United States. In recent years an increasing degree of interest has been expressed by foreign law schools. And, in addition to the Philippines, the series has been presented to libraries in the United Kingdom, Canada, Australia, Ethiopia, France, Egypt, and Nigeria.



Today the expenditure of billions of dollars every year on weapons, acquired for the purpose of making sure we never need to use them, is essential to keeping the peace.

*John F. Kennedy: Speech at  
American University, Washington,  
June 1963*