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Soviet Foreign Aid

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a new effort at nonmilitary contact with Peking. Such a policy could act as a catalyst rather than as an obstruction to the stabilization of Peking's relations with the rest of the world. Washington should shift from a policy of trying to isolate Peking, which seems only to worsen U.S. problems, to a position where Americans acquiesce in the growth of contact between Communist China and other countries and "let them suffer the impact of Peking's abrasiveness." Red China's membership in the United Nations is urged so that she could no longer pose as a martyr, excluded by American imperialism. Thus, she would have to deal with other member states on world issues and learn to act as a full member of the international community. This would lead to eventual maturity and acceptance of the restraints on her revolutionary ardor. In summary, U.S. policy should be a balance of containment and contact—informational, commercial, cultural, and diplomatic—which will probably take years to achieve but would nevertheless be well worth the effort.

J. G. FIFIELD
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Goldman, Marshall I. *Soviet Foreign Aid*. New York: Praeger, 1967. 265 p.

The issue of foreign aid frequently draws considerable attention in discussions of foreign policy and Congressional budgetary debates. The tendency, alas, is to find most arguments about foreign aid expressed in terms of emotional allegiance or in the nomenclature of the balance sheet. It is refreshing to find a simplified and balanced review of the worldwide foreign aid picture presented by Mr. Marshall J. Goldman in *Soviet Foreign Aid*. As the title suggests, the analysis emphasizes the role played by the

U.S.S.R. as a granter of aid since World War II. However, the author also presents an interesting view of the interplay between Soviet efforts and aid offered by the United States, China, and the Communist satellites. Although the reader may question the accuracy of the data presented, the sources appear to be creditable. Employing existing literature, firsthand inspections, and discussions with government officials around the world, Mr. Goldman has etched out a fairly complete and unbiased picture.

The major effort is directed toward the impact of Soviet economic relations in the developing countries. Through case studies of individual nations, specific projects are investigated to disclose successes and failures which have occurred in the implementation of various aid policies. Spectacular achievements such as the Aswan Dam and the Bhilai steel mill are contrasted with the frustration and lack of success in the area of luxury hotels, sports stadiums, and oversized factories, and in the inadequacies in military equipment.

In the field of foreign relations the author develops the influence of Soviet aid on the policies of Communist, non-Communist, neutral, and nonaligned nations. Of particular interest is the analysis of Russian aid to Communist China and North Vietnam.

In conclusion, the author answers four basic questions: What has been the purpose of Soviet economic relations with the less developed world? What has Russian aid accomplished? What has it not been able to do? and, What are the implied lessons that the United States can glean from the Soviet experience? The scope of the book is broad without being confusing, and the reliance on narrative description rather than graphic or numerical analysis

contributes to interesting and informative reading.

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Kramarz, Joachim. *Stauffenberg*. New York: Macmillan, 1967. 255 p.

This is the story of Claus Graf (Count von Stauffenberg) who, by most accounts, was the architect of the 20 July 1944 attempt on Hitler's life. Although there were many others actively engaged in the challenge to Hitler's entrenched dictatorship, Stauffenberg seems to have been the link between all sections of this particular plot. Someone once noted that a properly documented biographical study of Claus von Stauffenberg would provide a valuable contribution to history, and this is the author's attempt to fill this need. Mr. Kramarz was handicapped by the lack of Stauffenberg's personal papers, since they were confiscated by the Gestapo immediately after his ill-fated attempt on Hitler's life. Consequently, much of his research was devoted to conversations and interviews with persons who had intimate knowledge of the events leading to the placement of the bomb by Stauffenberg in the room where Hitler was being briefed by his staff. The author notes that after the failure of the bomb plot many worthy Germans cast the blame for the disaster on Stauffenberg. This book is his attempt to restore Stauffenberg to what Kramarz believes to be his rightful place in German history.

The conclusion is that Stauffenberg acted in response to obligations, love of his country, responsibility of his profession, and conscience born of his Christian convictions. This book has only limited value to the general reader. Although the author has done much to recreate Stauffenberg's life and his part in the attempted coup d'état, the average American reader will probably feel that his time could have been put to

better use. In fairness, it must be admitted that this book, no doubt, fills a need for German readers who are more closely linked to their own history.

W. K. CALLAM
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Lerche, Charles O. *Last Chance in Europe*. Chicago: Quadrangle Books, 1967. 221 p.

Last Chance in Europe is an attempt to analyze the underlying reasons for the decline in friendly relations between the Europeans and Americans. The author endeavors to bring the primary attention of American policymakers back to Europe. Periods of neglect of European orientation, such as the current Vietnamese war, result in separation between American and European unity. Mr. Lerche had extensive experience in European affairs and points out that the political scene in Europe, as viewed from Europe, is vastly different from that viewed from Washington. The image of Europe held by Americans is 20 years behind the times. He perceives Europe as a great area of economic expansion and capacity, with strong materialistic overtones, coming again in the political field. The Iron Curtain has eroded, and Europe is no longer divided. The author foresees that the only road for American policy is the establishment of a political partnership between the United States and Europe. This replaces the present concept of American leadership in Europe. This partnership would revamp or replace NATO with a much more limited organization having independent foreign policies for its members.

This book is not recommended as required reading. However, it is interesting to find a proposed solution to the current European problems.

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