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China: the People's Middle Kingdom and the U.S.A.

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partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy. This work is dedicated to military professionalism, to the oft-repeated belief that military power is the ultimate extension of foreign policy, and to the thesis that decisive battle appears to be the only military solution that consistently fulfills the multiple requirements of strategy. The author notes that, from the perspective of peace, military strength is only one limited aspect of national strength, but from the perspective of war, military strength becomes a measure of national strength. He comments on the military advantage and quick decisiveness of a preventive war and provides a detailed analysis of the various types of military victories as an extension of national policies, noting that "victory" is the ambiguous political symbol for which men fight.

This work is filled with many valuable observations as to the role of the military. Acceptance of military professionalism has simplified the problem of integrating military considerations into national policy. In military operations the separation of policy and strategy is no longer possible, and tactical victory becomes the paramount objective when the vital interests of adversaries are vulnerable to direct attack. Interestingly, it is observed that there is no logic to conclude that an act of force will compel an adversary to do one's will; it may simply destroy him or eventually exhaust both antagonists. The concept and historical significance of a "just war" are traced from the writings of Machiavelli through to the Allied policy of "unconditional surrender" in the Second World War. In conclusion, it is noted that adequate military strength supported by the resolve to use it seems more conducive to national security than excessive emphasis upon highly superior force levels.

The writing style of the author is voluble and highly descriptive; however, the central points covered are frequently obscured through excessively erudite verbal gymnastics. The work is thoroughly annotated with footnotes and would be a valuable military professional reference volume were the style more direct.

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Fairbank, John K. *China: the People's Middle Kingdom and the U.S.A.* Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1967. 145 p.

This book contains a series of essays by Mr. Fairbank which were published separately in various periodicals. These have been updated to fit the current situation. The book is divided into three parts: "China's Revolution in the Light of Her Past," "The Taiwan Problem," and "Communist China and American Policy." The first part carries the theme that to know China is to be thoroughly aware of her history and concludes with the thought that "Peking's intractable mood comes out of China's history, not just from Lenin's book." In part II the author indicates that the American-Chinese relations are haunted by the ambiguous status of Taiwan; yet this problem is carefully and continuously ignored, at least in public. He indicates that a step toward clarification would be an explicit definition of American motives and some creative effort. The United States also needs the assistance of Taiwan in the study of the grave problems with which she is faced in the Chinese quarter of the globe. The third and largest section of the book decries the fact that the United States has avoided the entire China problem for the last 10 years in the hope that it would go away.

While a soft approach is not emphasized, Mr. Fairbank does advocate

a new effort at nonmilitary contact with Peking. Such a policy could act as a catalyst rather than as an obstruction to the stabilization of Peking's relations with the rest of the world. Washington should shift from a policy of trying to isolate Peking, which seems only to worsen U.S. problems, to a position where Americans acquiesce in the growth of contact between Communist China and other countries and "let them suffer the impact of Peking's abrasiveness." Red China's membership in the United Nations is urged so that she could no longer pose as a martyr, excluded by American imperialism. Thus, she would have to deal with other member states on world issues and learn to act as a full member of the international community. This would lead to eventual maturity and acceptance of the restraints on her revolutionary ardor. In summary, U.S. policy should be a balance of containment and contact—informational, commercial, cultural, and diplomatic—which will probably take years to achieve but would nevertheless be well worth the effort.

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Goldman, Marshall I. *Soviet Foreign Aid*. New York: Praeger, 1967. 265 p.

The issue of foreign aid frequently draws considerable attention in discussions of foreign policy and Congressional budgetary debates. The tendency, alas, is to find most arguments about foreign aid expressed in terms of emotional allegiance or in the nomenclature of the balance sheet. It is refreshing to find a simplified and balanced review of the worldwide foreign aid picture presented by Mr. Marshall J. Goldman in *Soviet Foreign Aid*. As the title suggests, the analysis emphasizes the role played by the

U.S.S.R. as a grantor of aid since World War II. However, the author also presents an interesting view of the interplay between Soviet efforts and aid offered by the United States, China, and the Communist satellites. Although the reader may question the accuracy of the data presented, the sources appear to be creditable. Employing existing literature, firsthand inspections, and discussions with government officials around the world, Mr. Goldman has etched out a fairly complete and unbiased picture.

The major effort is directed toward the impact of Soviet economic relations in the developing countries. Through case studies of individual nations, specific projects are investigated to disclose successes and failures which have occurred in the implementation of various aid policies. Spectacular achievements such as the Aswan Dam and the Bhilai steel mill are contrasted with the frustration and lack of success in the area of luxury hotels, sports stadiums, and oversized factories, and in the inadequacies in military equipment.

In the field of foreign relations the author develops the influence of Soviet aid on the policies of Communist, non-Communist, neutral, and nonaligned nations. Of particular interest is the analysis of Russian aid to Communist China and North Vietnam.

In conclusion, the author answers four basic questions: What has been the purpose of Soviet economic relations with the less developed world? What has Russian aid accomplished? What has it not been able to do? and, What are the implied lessons that the United States can glean from the Soviet experience? The scope of the book is broad without being confusing, and the reliance on narrative description rather than graphic or numerical analysis