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SOVIET CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS:

CONFLICT AND COLLABORATION AMONG COMRADES

The concept of continuing institutional conflict between the Communist Party and the armed forces can lead to entirely inaccurate conclusions about the relations between the civilian leaders and career military officers in the U.S.S.R. The top figures in both groups are all political professionals, and most of the so-called conflicts—both of historic and contemporary genre—transcend normal institutional lines. Although the peculiar Soviet version of the classic Great Russian politico-military model is characterized by an inherent potential for discord, it also includes unique provisions for perpetuating the present political system and for sustaining the thrust of the country's national and strategic objectives.

A research paper prepared

by

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INTRODUCTION

If the ruling class, the proletariat, wants to hold power, it must, therefore, prove its ability to do so by its military organization.—V.I. Lenin.[1]

Background. In 1957, at the height of the post-Stalin struggle for political power in the Soviet Union, Allen Dulles suggested that the Soviet military officers were participating in the selection of a new national leader and that they might even seize power themselves and establish their own type of dictatorship.[2] Although the events which Dulles alluded to did not develop as he predicted, the prospect of a military takeover of the Soviet Government apparently seemed plausible at the time.

In fact, the concept of continuing "instability, tension and conflict" between the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) and the Red army* remains alive and well today, having been nourished by a substantial amount of Western literature on the subject and by the vivid profile of Soviet military leaders on the international scene in recent years. Their

*The Soviet armed forces were known officially as the "Workers' and Peasants' Red Army," or Red Army, from 1918 until 1946, when the designation was changed to Soviet Army. The Red Fleet and the Military Air Fleet, although occasionally independent in theory, have nearly always been subordinated in fact to the Soviet ground forces. For simplicity, the term "Red army" will be used throughout this paper to signify the entire Soviet military establishment.

presence in Czechoslovakia and Egypt, at crucial times, comes to mind.

Embodied in the idea of continuing conflict is the notion that the Soviet military establishment forms some sort of opposition force—normally submerged, but sometimes visible—to the leadership of the CPSU and thus, by inference, constitutes "a perennial threat to the political stability of the Soviet state."[3]

That the *entente cordiale* between the CPSU and the Red army has not always existed is recognized as a historical fact on both sides of the Iron Curtain. But, aside from the manifest truth that in every country there is some essential incompatibility between professional politicians and career soldiers, it is also a fact of life that virtually every identifiable pillar of the Soviet state—the Government apparatus, the industrial managers, the state police, the literary elite, and the armed forces, et cetera—is continually in some form of real or perceived conflict with the party.[4] Yet, organically, all of these interest groups are composed of card-carrying party members.[5]

The Problem. Thus, the study of Soviet civil-military affairs involves a search for the answers to two key questions: First, are there, in fact, genuine and lasting institutional disagreements between the Communist Party and the Soviet military establishment? Second, what effect does the civil-military relationship, whatever its nature, have on the overall Soviet political system?

The conflict/instability thesis is usually supported by such premises as the problem of political interference in operational military matters, military resentment of the party's penchant for periodic purges, the party's denial of a professional identity for the military establishment, the party's fear of military participation in succession struggles, and perennial concern over the role of the military in policy formulation. The author proposes to review these premises to determine if sufficient evidence exists to support a different hypothesis which would describe the general Soviet civil-military situation as being not only a mutually satisfying relationship for both groups, but also a carefully designed and generally stable institutional arrangement for carrying out the aims of a major power in the arena of international political-military competition.

POLITICAL INTERFERENCE IN OPERATIONAL MATTERS

Evolntion of the Political Control System. The first duty of all revolutionaries who come to power is to stabilize their authority, by whatever means available. The problem of building a loyal and efficient military establishment is part of this task, and it boils down to a conflict between professional excellence and political reliability. To obtain efficiency, the leaders of the revolution must equip and professionalize their force. To insure loyalty, they must develop a satisfactory control system.

For the Bolsheviks, engaged in a desperate struggle for survival against foreign intervention and internal counterrevolution from 1918 to 1920, this problem was particularly acute. Coming to power in 1917 with a deep sense of hostility to the military establishment, they saw it--rightly so—as one of the key instruments of state oppression, and they were determined to destroy it. But in 1918 they were forced to create a Red army. In need of professional military expertise, the new Soviet Government was forced to rely on the command and staff level talent of the old Imperial Russian Army. Consequently, several hundred thousand former Czarist officers and noncommissioned officers were recruited or coerced into service.[6] This was a remarkable tour de force

since these same officers and NCO's had been a prime target for prerevolution rhetorical abuse from the Bolsheviks.

Although the former Czarist officers and NCO's were used, in most cases they were not trusted. The circumstances of fighting on 21 fronts, over enormous areas, and against a broad spectrum of opposition virtually forced the beleaguered Bolsheviks to devise a comprehensive system for overall command and control. The system which evolved consisted of a triple network of controls: political commissars, party cells, and security police. The names have changed over the years, but the basic administrative format which the Bolsheviks constructed during the Civil War remains the same. The commissars, who were originally civilians assigned to the various military units, are now regular officers with military rank and with the billet title of political deputy to the commander, or Zampolit.[7] Moreover, in every military unit there is a party cell headed by a party secretary whose job is to assist the Zampolit in his political education work.

Security police personnel are also in the military, but they report separately to the KGB organization, which spreads down to company level. Each regiment and separate battalion has two or three officers of counterintelligence assigned to it, each with his own network of agents and informers. Military intelligence, as distinct from counterintelligence, is a separate service, restricted principally to the collection of strategic or tactical military intelligence in foreign countries. Even the highest officers of the military's own Intelligence Directorate, the GRU, are always under KGB surveillance. In this regard, however, the military establishment is not different from the rest of Soviet society. The security police keep an eye on everyone, regardless of their position, title, or professional affiliation.

The political deputies operate through an independent chain of command, which extends from the squad level up through all higher echelons to the Main Political Administration (MPA). The MPA is technically within the Ministry of Defense, but actually it reports directly to the Central Committee of the Communist Party.

In theory, the authority of the commissar, or political deputy, has never extended to operational military matters; but this has often been more formula than fact. As we know from contemporary experience, the borderline between political guidance and operational control is, at best, nebulous to civilian leaders enamored by the mystique of military command and tempted to participate in decisions involving purely tactical matters.

Operational Conflicts. During the Civil War and World War II, there were some instances of conflict over tactical matters between military commanders and their political commissars. However, the most serious disputes usually involved commissars against other commissars (or other civilian political leaders) and commanders against other military officers, i.e., within institutional boundaries. The most notable case during the Civil War was that of Stalin, who was temporarily relieved of his duties[8] and publicly denounced by Trotsky, the leader of the Red army, for interfering with military operations at Tsaritsyn (later Stalingrad).[9]

The disagreement between Trotsky and Stalin, both of whom were essentially "civilians," illustrates one of the many curious cross-threads running throughout the fabric of the Soviet civil-military relations; tensions are by no means confined to intergroup conflicts. The most severe political infighting, over the years, has usually been within institutional boundaries, whereas many firm political alliances have transcended normal institutional boundaries.

Numerous intragroup squabbles and intergroup alignments which originated during the period of the Civil War were to have a lasting effect on Soviet civil-military relations. The Red army's officer corps at that time was by no means a homogeneous force, being composed of three distinct social categories: the revolutionary "Red Commanders" (graduates of 3-4 month training courses), drawn from the indnstrial workers;[10] the ex-NCO's and ensigns of the old Imperial Army, primarily from the peasant class; and the aristocratic former field and staff officers of the old Imperial Army. A professional rivalry inevitably emerged between the ex-officers and ex-NCO's of the Imperial Rnssian Army, particularly as the latter were eased into lower command billets. In addition, there were bad relations between the Red Commanders and the ex-Czarist officers. The Red Commanders—many of whom had served in the Imperial Army as enlisted men—viewed their former Czarist officers with suspicion and distrust. The ex-Czarist officers scoffed at the professional abilities of the Red Commanders, who were trained in the new military schools hastily organized during the war.[11]

The politico-military feuds reached their greatest intensity during the struggle with Poland in 1920. When the ill-fated Warsaw operation was undertaken, after some early vacillation and bickering among the high Bolshevik leaders, the plan of projecting the Communist revolution into Western Europe on the bayonets of the Red army failed ignominiously, due to military intercommand disagreements and shameful insubordination to higher level staffs.[12] Stalin, however, although criticized by both civilian and military leaders for obstructing the tactical operations, gained long-term political capital out of the episode by gathering under his wing a loyal coterie of young Red Commanders, including Voroshilov and Budenny.

Historians offer many reasons why the Bolsheviks eventually triumphed over their combined foes in the Civil War period. The classic explanations—raw peasant manpower, youthful enthusiasm and courage, professional expertise of the ex-Czarist staff officers, a superior terror machine, gross incompetency of the opposition, et cetera—only obscure the main point. The fact is that in spite of—or perhaps because of—the highly centralized politico-military leadership, the Red army was transformed into a formidable fighting force. Viewed in perspective, the party's control procedures over the Red army were not unreasonable under the circumstances. Indeed, it is very likely that the Red army would not have survived as a viable force without this firm guidance. Lenin acknowledged this during the war:

> Hundreds and hundreds of military experts are betraying us and will betray us; we will catch them and shoot them, but thousands and tens of thousands of military experts have been working for us systematically and for a long time, and without them we could have not formed the Red Army.[13]

Development of Unity of Command. In 1924 the Central Committee of the Party approved the introduction of a new "unity of command" program. In fact, what was established was still a dual form of command, but there was a difference in the division of responsibilities. Nonparty commanders received full administrative and operational autonomy, while the commissars remained responsible for political instruction and morale. Meanwhile, a party-member commander could serve as a combined commander-commissar, attending to both the military and political work of the unit, with only a political officer (politruk) to assist him. The new regulations clarified the situation somewhat, but not entirely. Although in theory all

commands were ordained unified, in practice some were obviously more unified than others.

Thus, the seeds were planted for the growth of a new rivalry, between party and nonparty commanders. By 1934, however, almost 70 percent of the officer ranks were party members. In the higher command echelons, party saturation was even more impressive. As the percentage of party members among the officer ranks increased over the years, the position of the political commissars became somewhat anomalous. The commissars, now relegated to the position of political deputies, lagged behind the professional military in education and technical efficiency. As a result, many, voluntarily or involuntarily, fell under the soldiers' influence. During Stalin's ruthless collectivization programs, the professionals became alarmed over the morale of the peasant soldiers. Some of the more influential military leaders were able to persuade Stalin to make concessions in favor of the peasant troops under their command and of their families. The political deputies, many of whom were of peasant origin themselves, supported the professional military leaders.

The purge of the military high command in the late thirties was followed by a restoration of the authority of the political commissars. A party decree, in August of 1937, made the commissars coequal with the professional officers in military and political affairs. The dual command system had obvious military disadvantages which were quickly brought to light during the early stages of the Russo-Finnish war. Consequently, a party decree of 12 August 1940 again abolished the political commissars' billets and returned to the system of political deputies.

After the Nazi invasion in June of 1941, the position of commissar was reinstituted, and 45,000 of the high- and middle-level party officials were sent into the armed forces to take over as political commissars.[14] This action was taken after large-scale surrenders during the early days of the war threatened a total collapse of resistance. The response of the party to the crisis was to strengthen the will of the officers and enlisted men to resist. "Death is preferable to capture" became the motto.

When the tide of battle turned, the party reverted to the unity of command principle. By October of 1942 the professional officer corps had clearly established in combat its loyalty to the regime. The post of political commissar was abolished again, and the party political organs in the armed forces were subordinated to the military commanders.

In recent years, in line with the unity of command concept, a crossflow of military and political training for all officers has been emphasized. The most capable officers are rotated through command, political, technical, staff, and rear service posts.[15] Marshal M.V. Zakharov, Chief of the Soviet General Staff, has written: "a Soviet military leader . . . is personally responsible [to the party and the Government] . . . for the constant combat mobilization readiness, for high military discipline, and for the political and moral state and education of the group . . . entrusted to him . . .. The Soviet Commander is both a military and a political leader . . .."[16]

Party Activity in the Military. During World War II the Red army was infused with hundreds of thousands of loyal Communist Party members. By the end of 1941 the Red army had about 1.3 million Communists. In 1942 the number of party members in the armed forces was increased to more than 2 million and by the end of the war about 3.4 million, or almost 50 percent of the entire party membership. In addition, during the first days of the war, 900,000 Komsomol members entered the armed forces.[17]

In the postwar years the party's

political activities in the military have tended to become more pervasive but—from the commander's point of view—less of a nuisance. Over the years the professional military officers have learned to live with the system. In fact, the situation is not without advantage for the commander. The party continues to support the principle of one-man leadership,[18] and commanders are specifically exempted from criticism by other party members in the military. Marshal V.D. Sokolovsky, a prestigious military figure, has stated:

> The Communist Party . . . in its activities systematically carries out work in strengthening the one-man command, viewing it as the most important condition of high military discipline of the personnel and of combat readiness of the Armed Forces. . . . The question about one-man command and its strengthening should always be the center of attention of commanders, political organs and party organizations.[19]

This policy is undoubtedly not considered to be in conflict with the program of the CPSU, which clearly states that "party leadership of the armed forces, and the increased role and emphasis of the party organizations in the army and navy are the bedrock of military development."[20] Indeed, the program is implemented by the broad scope of activities of the political control organs, which includes such tasks as transmittal of information concerning unit activities to higher levels within the apparatus; supervision of political education and indoctrination; regulation of advancement of officers so that only those who are desirable from the party's point of view are promoted to positions of authority; and maintenance of general loyalty to the regime through extralegal means such as intimidation, threats of dismissal, public humiliation, or outright coercion. The Zampolit prepares fitness reports on the political reliability—promotion potential—of the commander and all other officers. In some cases this has resulted in strained relations, but generally speaking, the ill feelings created by this situation are minor compared to the universal hatred and distrust of the KGB agents. The KGB agents watch both the regular and political officers, in search of deviations from the general party line.

The party charges the military political organizations with the specific duty of educating ". . . all Soviet soldiers . . . in the spirit of unqualified loyalty to the people, to the Communist cause, of readiness to spare no effort and, if necessary, to give their lives in the defense of their Socialist country."[21]

In addition to the political instruction programs, the central organization of the MPA also edits and publishes educational materials and supervises the establishment and maintenance of service clubs, movie houses, and libraries. Thousands of military commanders and staff officers are also drawn into "command activities," under party auspices, contributing volunteer service of a political type, e.g., delivering propaganda talks, investigating the quality of performance of a Governmental or party agency, or serving as a part-time auxiliary instructor for a political department. The steady routine of political indoctrination succeeds to a surprising extent, particularly as a disciplinary tool and as a morale-motivation device.

There are indications in the Soviet military press of occasional disagreements, even today, between the regular and the political officers, usually over whether training time should be devoted to professional military subjects or to political dialectics. This is more the exception than the rule, however, and nearly always occurs at the lower command levels. Tensions have also been reported between the political officers and officers who resent being forced to take part in the extracurricular political

activities. This reluctance, especially among younger technical officers, to participate in party work has generated ill-feeling among the political workers and also some of the other professional officers. The latter resent the fact that they themselves must submit to indoctrination and political work, while the technocrats, who enjoy greater career security and preferential treatment, are allowed to remain aloof from such timewasting activities.[22]

Such incidents should not overshadow the fact that, as a matter of institutional policy, the top party and military leaders are in basic agreement on the overall beneficial effects of the centralized politico-military control machinery.[23] Marshal Zakharov has stated that "party organizations struggle to improve the combat readiness of the troops, to strengthen military discipline, and to improve military and political training in the armed forces."[24] Similarly, Marshal Sokolovsky is on record with the view that "Political agencies and party organizations . . . should concentrate all their efforts in party-political work toward the successful fulfillment of our main task—a further improvement in the combat preparedness and combat capability of the armed forces of the Soviet Union."[25] Marshal R.Y. Malinovsky, in numerous speeches and writings during his tenure as Minister of Defense from 1957 to 1967, expounded the view that "the leadership of the party is the decisive source of strength and might of our Armed Forces."[26]

THE EFFECT OF PARTY PURGES

Early Personnel Reductions. There have been five periods in the history of the Soviet Armed Forces when, for one reason or another, major "purges" were aimed at the military establishment. At least that is the way these reductions in force are usually described by most Kremlinologists. A close look at the circumstances of each period suggests it is a misleading oversimplification to describe all of these cutbacks as "purges."

The first so-called "purge," which occurred in the early 1920's, was in reality a massive demobilization. Following the Civil War the Red army numbered over five million men. It was clearly a matter of economic necessity to reduce the size of the military establishment. Three million men were demobilized in 1921, 800,000 in 1922, and 140,000 more in 1924.

Naturally, the first to go were the least reliable individuals among the old imperial officers and NCO's. Many political commissars also lost their jobs during this period. This reduction occurred at a time when the party leaders were arguing amongst themselves over the form and future of the peacetime Red army.

The dispute over strategic doctrine was not resolved until the midtwenties, when the Soviets finally settled upon a mixed militia and regular force. This, in turn, provoked another turnover of personnel. The reduction in force in the late twenties was more on the basis of professional qualifications *and* political orthodoxy, although not necessarily party membership. Class origin was, however, taken into consideration, as the party made a deliberate effort to instill a proletarian image to the armed forces. In 1929 an age restriction for certain billets (a limit of 36 years for company commanders, 40 for regimental commanders, and 45 for generals) was instituted to rejuvenate the command structure with the young Red Commanders.

The Great Purges. The ruthless purge of top Red army leaders in the late 1930's forms a vital premise of the thesis of continuing conflict between the party and the military. This narrow interpretation of the events of that period is a good example of the sort of

historiography of which the Soviets themselves are frequently accused, i.e., explaining the events of yesterday in the light of the political realities of today.

The officers of the Red army were initially outside the scope of the widespread purges which Stalin initiated in the midthirties to tame the party apparatus. Although the political administration and the state security controls were still present, military officers were immune from arrest by civil authorities.

The secret police assault on the military began in late autumn of 1936, with the discreet "demobilization" of several Red army officers. As civilians, the ex-officers were now subject to arrest by the secret police. This was the payoff for bitter disagreements in Spain between army officers and secret police officers.[27] Criticism of secret police tactics in Spain by various army leaders was interpreted as disloyalty to the regime. Additionally, down at the working level it was a much easier matter for the secret police to construct a case against officers who had traveled abroad and associated with foreigners, including non-Communist participants in the Spanish Civil War.

The irony of this situation is that it was the top talent which suffered. Soviet officers who fought in the Civil War in Spain in 1936-38 under *orders* of the Soviet Government were usually welcomed back to the Soviet Union with warm congratulations and high decorations from the Commissar of Defense, Marshal Voroshilov, followed by an interrogation by the Soviet secret police.[28]

In addition, many commanders and commissars were seriously concerned about the appalling effect on the morale of their troops caused by Stalin's ruthless collectivization policy. Although there were some protests and complaints, there is no evidence to suggest the existence of any sort of organized opposition or conspiracy within the military.[29]

In May of 1937 Stalin was persuaded, on the basis of false documents originated by the NKVD in collusion with the Gestapo and relayed through Czechoslovakia to his personal secretariat, to strike down the top figures in the Red army.[30] Marshal Tukhachevsky, the Red army's most prominent leader, and six of his top commanders were arrested on charges of treasonable conduct and Trotskyite activity. After a secret court-martial, they were convicted of conspiracy with the German General Staff and promptly executed. Although the documentary evidence against the top marshals was false, it was very convincing. From the top marshals on down the chain of command, it was easy to build cases against many other officers on the basis of professional association.[31]

At a time when the Red army was rapidly increasing in enlisted manpower and striving to introduce new weapon systems, the blood purge of the officer corps was an incredibly senseless and shortsighted policy which resulted in the virtual elimination of the top echelons of the command structure. It was not uncommon for the commanding officer, commissar, chief of staff, and the service chiefs of an entire command to be purged. One-third of the Red army officer corps was executed, imprisoned, or dismissed from active service, including three of five Soviet Marshals, all 11 Deputy People's Commissars of Defense, 13 of 15 Generals of the Army, and 75 out of 80 members of the Military Soviet. Fifty-seven of 85 commanders, about half of all regimental commanders, and all but one fleet commander were purged, if not shot.[32] However, most of the officers below the rank of colonel were imprisoned rather than executed.[33] The purge reached the political officers as much as the military commanders. Gamarnik, the chief of the MPA, committed suicide as the secret police were on the verge of arresting him. As Khrushchev pointed out later, ". . . during this time [1937-41] the

cadre of leaders who had gained military experience in Spain and in the Far East was almost completely liquidated."[34]

But it is wrong to suggest, as some political analysts are wont, that the purges produced a generation of mediocre Soviet leaders. Many of the early promotions proved highly successful. A brilliant young division commander named Georgi K. Zhukov advanced within 3 years to the position of Chief of the Soviet General Staff. However, some of the "deep selectees" who were found to be incompetent were later purged.

In the process of molding a new officer corps, Stalin also restored the influence of the new political commissars over the military commanders. An important task for the new commissars was to ensure that the younger officers, including the new commanders, were carefully indoctrinated with the belief that the purge was only directed against specific political criminals who were clearly identified as "enemies of the people." As a result, the survivors of this period, including many who were sacked but not shot, attributed their very existence to the benevolence of the party, in general, and to Stalin, in particular. All of the deep selectees owed their early promotions to Stalin.

Only later, when the full horror of Stalin's crimes was revealed at the 20th Party Congress in 1956, did it become known that this was a blood purge directed against every element of Soviet society. All of the pillars of the ruling elite—including, for a time, the secret police themselves—were victimized by Stalin.

Thus, the remarkable thing about the purges is that they were never *perceived*, either at the time or later, by the emerging generation of political and military leaders as being a deliberate, illegal attack on the Red army by the party.[35] Khrushchev touched on this point years later when he said, "The extermination of the Old Guard of the army was for a long time considered a credit to the men responsible rather than a crime for which they should have been punished."[36] The memoirs of some of the survivors tend to corroborate this. The manner in which many officers were eliminated, e.g., through administrative orders and secret tribunals, contributed greatly to the widespread ignorance of the enormity of the purge. Many officers were apprehended by the secret police while in transit to new duty stations. Thus, the old and new commands were only vaguely aware of the officer's disappearance, let alone his arrest. The secret police, of course, arranged all of the transfer orders as well as whatever followup cover story was necessary to account for the officer's disappearance or reassignment while en route.

In fact, if anything, the purges forced the members of both the party apparatus and the military establishment closer together into a common, undying hatred of the secret police organization.

Significantly, none of the purged generals were put on display at the infamous public show-trials in Moscow. They were tried and executed in secret. This may have been due to recognition by the secret police that the rugged old campaign veterans could not be coerced into humiliating themselves in an orgy of self-vilification, to which the purged civilian politicans were forced to submit. Thus, the Soviet Armed Forces emerged from this period with what might be described, in capitalist public relations terms, as a "clean image," in contrast to the malevolent shadow cast by the secret police. Although this might seem somewhat like a Pyrrhic victory, even in a totalitarian state there are some distinct political advantages (as we shall see later) for an institution which enjoys strong popular support.

Postwar Demobilization. The next so-called purge occurred between 1945 and 1948. Some authors have described

this as a small-scale repetition of the blood purges of the late thirties. In reality no blood was shed, although several careers were terminated abruptly. The object was to ensure the hegemony of Stalin, by preventing the formation of cliques around popular military leaders. Marshal Zhukov, Marshal A.A. Novikov, and Fleet Adm. N.G. Kuznetsov, the top figures in the army, air force, and navy, respectively, were all demoted. (Stalin later recalled Zhukov and Kuznetsov to respectable positions.)

The 1945-48 period was also an era of massive demobilization, from 11,365,000 men in the armed forces in May of 1945 to 2,874,000 men in 1948.[37] For those who wished to make the service a career, it obviously helped to have good marks in both professional performance and political reliability. In this regard, however, the Soviet political leaders were not exactly pioneering some new innovation in the field of civil-military relations. The requirement of rigid party line conformity is something which all military men have to face, especially during periods of severe personnel reductions. Aside from this fact, the Soviet political leaders were faced with a serious postwar internal crisis, resulting from Stalin's wartime relaxation of civil controls. The political subordination process taking place in the Red army was just another aspect of the regime's overall program for reestablishing control over the whole of Soviet society.

Khrushchev's Reductions. The fifth "so-called" purge occurred during the period 1956-61, under Khrushchev. This was unquestionably a reduction in force, motivated by economic considerations but with strategic overtones. Manpower was reduced from 5,723,000 in 1955 to 3,623,000 in January of 1960. Plans called for a further reduction to 2,423,000 by the end of 1961. (This plan was altered, however, in the middle of 1961, and the military manpower levels were subsequently raised.) In financial terms, the Defense Ministry's share of the budget dropped from 19.9 percent in 1955 to 12.9 percent in 1960. The cutbacks involved the forced retirement of about 150,000 career officers.[38] The attrition was particularly high among those officers who lacked technical qualifications.

Again, this was during a period of major conflict between the top leaders regarding what strategic doctrine the Soviet Union should develop. As in so many previous disputes, the conflict was generally within institutional boundaries. The harsh impact of a changing technology and the modernization of the Soviet armed forces caused considerable division within the officer corps. Large numbers of tradition minded (i.e., ground-force oriented) officers were replaced by technically qualified officers as the Soviet Union moved into the strategic missile era.[39]

When Khrushchev proclaimed his new doctrine, the older generation of officers was divided into two categories—those whose ideas were out of date and those who were still capable of rendering useful service. Those whose names were not renowned in battle and who did not occupy the very highest positions in the armed forces were removed. The promotion of 454 generals in 1960 is clear evidence of the elevation of a new cadre of officers to major leadership positions in the military.[40] Many of those who were released were the same individuals who had been deep selected in the late thirties and enjoyed major commands during World War II but, by the late fifties-early sixties period, had fallen out of step with the new technology.

Where political considerations made it necessary to retain some of the senior marshals and generals, they were—with a few notable exceptions—virtually removed from positions of responsibility and decisive authority. New positions

were, in fact, created for them. An informal group known as the "general inspectors"—a kind of old marshals' corps—came into being.

By 1965, barely one-quarter of the marshals of the Soviet Union (i.e., the officers of the highest rank) and only about one-third of the marshals in the technical arms had taken part in actively promoting or writing about the revolution in military techniques and technology.[41]

The important point here is to draw a distinction between the feelings of the members of the older generation, who were understandably unhappy about being passed over and put out to pasture, and the overall attitude of the group which remained in the service in positions of responsibility. Through a political decision a new generation of military leaders evolved, owing their success to the party.

* * * * *

It is well to remember that the Soviet political system feeds itself on purges. It has always done so, and there is no reason to doubt that it will continue to do so in the future. By and large, however, the armed forces have suffered less from purges over the years than any other of the major pillars of the ruling elite. The period of the late 1930's is the only one which could be categorized as a genuine purge of the military. And Stalin personally, rather than the Communist Party, has been blamed for the events of that unhappy era. The other so-called purges—in the early twenties, the late twenties, the late forties, and the late fifties--were not political reprisals and, in the long run, usually benefited the Soviet armed forces.

It is highly probable, however, that in due course a new generation of military leaders will emerge to replace the "Class of 1960" at the top of the armed forces. It will not be a sudden and drastic turnover, though, because literally hundreds of the more senior officers have already died from natural causes in recent years. When the replacement process is completed, many Western Kremlinologists will probably hasten to recognize the effect as a drastic new purge, adding further fuel to the fires of continuing conflict between the CPSU and the Red army.

THE PARTY'S DENIAL OF A PROFESSIONAL IDENTITY FOR THE MILITARY

Background. The allegation that the Communist Party has consistently denied the Soviet military establishment any sort of professional identity is another major premise of the theory of continuing conflict.[42]

There is some basis in fact for this charge. In general, the historical tendency of the Soviet system itself has been to suppress the emergence of autonomous interest groups of any kind that might develop a life of their own and challenge the leadership monopoly of the party. Strong political pressure to completely emasculate the military establishment was applied, in particular, after the Civil War. A rank structure was not introduced until the midthirties. After World War II Stalin claimed all the credit for the achievements of the Soviet armed forces during the war.

Conversely, there is considerable evidence to suggest that the opposite conclusion can also be drawn, viz., that the civilian political leaders have carefully fostered the development of a unique professional identity for the military's officer corps.

The Militia Dispute. In order to fully comprehend the development of professionalism in the Soviet armed forces, it is necessary to have an understanding of the politico-military events of the post-Civil War period. From 1920 to 1925 there were many bitter disputes within the party over a variety of issues,

including the problem of devising a permanent form and function for the Soviet armed forces. This was due, in part, to the simple fact that the Bolsheviks had no clear concept of what the permanent military arm of a socialist state should be like. As Lenin said, "We proceeded from experiment to experiment; we endeavored to create a volunteer army, feeling our way, testing the gronnd and experimenting to find a solution to the problem.[43]

The debates on the organization of the armed forces were further complicated by the fact that the overall strategic role of the military in Soviet external policy was also being discussed. The Soviet state had emerged from its Civil War totally isolated and surrounded by a hostile world. The Bolsheviks were faced with the need to maintain sufficient military strength to cope with a serious foreign relations situation. In Lenin's words,

> We are living not merely in a state, but in a system of states, and it is inconceivable for the Soviet Republic to exist alongside of the imperialist states for any length of time. One or the other must triumph in the end. And before that end comes, there will have to be a series of frightful collisions between the Soviet Republic and the bourgeois states.[44]

Meanwhile, on the home front, a rising spirit of dissatisfaction among the peasants, which culminated in open rebellion in several areas, presented the Red army with problems of military pacification and punitive operations.

The ensuing conflict within the political hierarchy was between the proponents of a loosely organized and locally controlled citizen militia force and the advocates of a strong, professional military force. Trotsky, the leader of the Red army during the Civil War, became the leading advocate of the citizen militia forces. He envisaged a gradual two-stage development for the Red army. After the initial period, during which as a matter of wartime expediency the Red army was forced to operate in accordance with traditional military concepts, he preferred transforming the armed forces into a decentralized militia organization. Not only was the militia concept economically more feasible for the Soviets, but also more nearly in accord with traditional pacifist-socialist principles, and—hopefnlly—more easily controllable by local civilian party cells.[45]

With their professional security at stake, the members of the military hierarchy attacked the militia idea on the grounds of inefficiency. As the idea of a mixed military establishment—part militia and part cadre army[46]—emerged as a possible and workable system, the opposition to Trotsky gradually shifted its attack from the organization of the Red army to discussions of tactical doctrine. The notion became popular that a newly developed proletarian military techniqne (essentially guerrilla warfare procedures, using cavalry forces) accounted for the sneeess of the Red army dnring the Civil War. The Red Commauders, largely self-trained in the heat of battle, took credit for devising this new military doctrine which they cousidered unique iu the history of warfare. Aside from the political aspects of the situation, this was the first case of professional pride for the young Red Commanders, aud it revealed a strong streak of personal ambition as well as sincere faith in the future of the new Red army.

In late 1923 and early 1924, several investigating commissions, representing the Central Committee, examined the military/material status of the Red army and submitted reports which were highly critical, by implication, of Trotsky's policies. By mid-1924 Stalin had achieved an irretrievable grasp on the political apparatus of the military and, as a result, Trotsky had been effectively

replaced in the leadership of the Red army by Mikhail Frunze.[47]

Under Frunze a unified structure and a unified tactical doctrine were imposed on the Red army. The military organization as a whole was modernized and stabilized. Staff and administrative functions were clearly delineated, new life was pumped into the naval and aviation branches, and emphasis was placed on improving the overall technical competence of the armed forces. Party members were infused into the military machine, and regulations were revised to permit a younger age distribution on the major staffs. Frunze's basic slogan, "make way for the Red Commanders," heralded the political debut of a new generation of military leaders, headed by Stalin's old cohorts from the Tsaritsyn operations and the Polish campaign: Yegorov, Budenny, Voroshilov, et al. During this period of military reform, a new style of political soldier emerged—typically an ex-enlisted man or proletarian who possessed only a rudimentary military education, a superficial understanding of Marxist phrases, and a ruthless ability for making decisions in terms of narrow political chauvinism.

The most noteworthy aspect of Frunze's regime, however, was the new political and psychological spirit which he instilled in the armed forces. To Frunze the serious business of modern warfare required the complete subordination of all aspects of society, including in particular the officer corps of the military establishment, to the strong leadership of a single, elite, national policymaking organization, i.e., the Communist Party. This is the basic philosophy which the civilian political leaders have pushed ever since, and four generations of Soviet officers now accept it and believe in it as a way of life.

Building the Base. As Stalin gradually eased into control of the Soviet political system in the midtwenties, the Red army entered a new epoch. An early clue to one dimension of this era was revealed in the style and substance of a speech to the Central Committee on 19 January 1925, in which Stalin forcefully supported additional defense expenditures for the Soviet Armed Forces.

By 1928 Stalin was sufficiently in command of both the party and the government apparatus to institute the Soviet Union's first Five-Year Plan for economic development, which was a conscious attempt to create the industrial base needed to support a modern military establishment. A major objective of the plan was to raise the combat capabilities of the Red army to match those of its potential enemies in Europe and Asia.[48]

As a result of the rapid growth in heavy industry, the Red army soon began to increase both the quantity and quality of its armaments and military technology.[49] Unlike the Western democracies, who were lulled by the spirit of pacifism in the thirties into a penurious attitude toward spending for national security, the Soviet Union openly pushed for military preparedness. Not only was industry mobilized for military production, but the populace was psychologically conditioned for war. Young people were taught in numerous paramilitary organizations, voluntary sports associations, small arms courses, aero clubs, and evening nursing courses that their primary duty was to prepare for the defense of the Soviet homeland from foreign invaders.

Significant emphasis was also placed on providing the officer corps with training in new military technology and operational procedures. By 1938 over 50 percent of the corps commanders were graduates of command-staff level courses (some of 2-3 years duration). As a result of the refresher courses and training in the academies, this generation of officers received, albeit rather late, a fairly complete military education. A thorough political education was

also stressed so that by 1938, 95.9 percent of the corps commanders and 87 percent of the regimental commanders belonged to the party. Good Communists and hard workers, they were "... excellent executors of orders, stubborn, conscientious, and incapable of discouragement."[50] Eventually they were to defeat the German generals.

Although many of the officers of this generation took no part in the Civil War, they were all brought up on legends about its heroism. Their formative years were colored by works such as N. Ostrovsky's *How Steel Was Hardened.* As young officers they were beneath the scope of the purges in the late thirties.

Thus, in addition to substantial material improvements in the Red army during the 1930's, a broad base of politically loyal and technically proficient young officers was carefully groomed for higher command.

The Wartime Generation. In the 1940's the Soviet military establishment added a new generation of professional officers. This is the generation that *fought* the Great Patriotic War in the trenches at Stalingrad, in the tanks at Kursk, and in the great rolling offensive across the broad steppes of Eastern Europe. As young officers in the best years of their lives, they were inspired by the words and music of Russian nationalism.

Thus, the wartime generation of officers is professionally and psychologically quite distinct from the preceding and succeeding generations in the Soviet armed forces.[51] For many, their meritorious service in World War II resulted in early postwar promotions to battalion and regimental command. In these positions of responsibility they obtained the necessary professional qualifications and political "visibility" to move higher. The members of this generation, many of whom are now flag officers, are now serving on high-level staffs or in command of divisions or corps.

Obviously, the wartime generation of officers perceives itself as being the hard-core cadre of a professional military force. At the same time their ideological commitment to the party and the regime is quite impressive. This makes sense only if one understands the weird perspective of two careers lived jointly by the same man. Every Soviet official of any standing has a professional career and a career in the party; his performance in each constantly affects his promotion prospects in the other.

The Postwar Professionals. In the postwar years the Soviet armed forces have added two new generations of officers, with each group possessing different but perfectly valid reasons for making a career out of the military profession.

The middle management level of officers is composed largely of captains, majors, and colonels between the ages of 35 to 45. Except for some of the older ones, this generation did not participate in the Great Patriotic War. Their ages ranged from 5 to 15 at the outbreak of the war; all of them grew up in wartime in an atmosphere of intense and enthusiastic patriotism. Their fathers, uncles, and older brothers all served in the armed forces. Most of the members of this generation lost some known relative. In many cases both parents were lost during these years. Their first really vivid impressions were derived from the patriotic upsurge during the war, which produced in many a youthful desire to commit some feat of heroism such as the "gallant, fearless knights" at the front were performing.[52] During the war the older ones worked in munitions factories while the younger ones went to school. From 1943 on many orphans entered special homes or attended one of the newly created Suvorov cadet schools.

The concept of dedicated service to the regime became deeply implanted. Thus, many of the young men in this generation remained in the army after enlistment and attained commissioned or noncommissioned rank. In addition, they have been able to actively participate in the growth in size, sophistication, and striking power of the Soviet armed forces in the past two decades. It would be unreasonable to even suggest that this group harbors feelings of professional inferiority.

The youngest generation of officers in the Soviet armed forces is composed of those individuals who were the war and immediate postwar babies. For them the Stalin period and the war belong in the past. Many of them, as children, did not experience the patriotic upsurge of the older generations. Thus, in some respects the members of this generation are more independent minded than their elders, who matured under different social conditions. But their ideological commitment to the regime is based on a commonly held belief that they have received the best possible education and professional training. In particular, they have been privileged to play major roles in the modern technical revolution within the Soviet armed forces. In the age of thermonuclear weaponry and missile technology, they have the training and operational experience in nuclear physics, rocketry, electronics, and computer systems. And they also grasp the modern language of industrial management and mathematical manipulation. From the standpoint of military professionalism, they enjoy certain prerogatives denied others, and they have the satisfaction of knowing that the Soviet high command recognizes that "... to such officer-specialists belongs the future of our armed forces.[53]

* * * * *

The foregoing discussion of the evolution of four generations of military officers suggests that the civilian political leaders have deliberately fostered the development of a high degree of professionalism in the Soviet armed forces. The process has involved some growing pains. In general, however, in return for the finest equipment and training that rubles can buy, the regime has created a loyal and thoroughly professional military establishment.

By developing a highly professional force, with all subordinate levels submissive to the top echelons, and then winning over the top military leaders, the party has accomplished its objective of complete control of the organization. Adequate loyalty at the top is ensured by a lifetime of ideological indoctrination, plus the tangible rewards which come with rank and high pay. The aspiring young Soviet military officer looks forward not simply to being a great general or admiral, but to becoming a flag officer with a good party record and good party connections.

THE SPECTER OF "BONAPARTISM"

Background. The specter of "Bonapartism," a counterrevolutionary coup by a strong military figure, has haunted the Communist Party's leaders ever since they came to power in Russia.

There are valid Russian historical precedents for the Bolsheviks to fear a mutiny from within. Even under the Czars the matter of succession was often a problem. A change of rulers was often brought about by murder, intrigue, and revolt. On several occasions the regime's own Praetorian guard sided with the opposition.[54]

The First Succession Struggle. The first Soviet confrontation with the problem of succession came with Lenin's passing from power. Trotsky, the War Commissar and leader of the Red army, was widely feared as a potential Bonaparte, i.e., a creature of the Revolution who might become its subverter.

Despite his influence among the upper ranks of the Red army, Trotsky was unable to make good use of his support.

However, if Trotsky was unable—or unwilling—to utilize the Red Army as a power base, his opponents were not nearly so squeamish. In the postwar years the amorphous alliances which were created during combat gradually evolved into the shadowy form of a political bloc within the military. Although for several years the members of this group were neither fully coherent in their views nor completely consolidated in their relationships, they were one of several political stalking horses used by Stalin in his efforts to oust Trotsky from control of the armed forces. Stalin's military supporters included officers of notable prestige such as Frunze, Voroshilov,[55] and Budenny.[56]

The territorial reorganization concept pushed by Trotsky in the post-Civil War period alienated those military officers who realized that there would be no room for professional careers in the militia setup. However, not all of Trotsky's opponents were motivated hy self-serving interests. Many of them were alarmed and frustrated by an apparent trend toward doctrinaire military conservatism.

The newly developed proletarian military doctrine was opposed by the older ex-imperial officers, on professional grounds, and by Trotsky as being bad Marxism, i.e., a true Marxist approach should be based on the avoidance of blind support for a doctrinaire military science. As the controversy continued, Trotsky was gradually made to appear to be the champion of "reactionary" policies. The fact that the ex-Czarist officers now supported him was taken as proof of his deliberate stand against the "progressivism" of the Red commanders. The effective power of Trotsky was so far reduced by mid-1924 that he was not allowed to vote at the 13th Party Congress, and by 1925 he had been ousted from the War Commissariat.

Thus the military was deeply, albeit indirectly, involved in the fateful fracas for leadership at the top which ensued during Lenin's lingering illness from May 1922 until his subsequent death in January 1924. This bitter succession struggle was played out against a turbulent backdrop of widespread social unrest, narrow political intrigue, and stumbling statesmanship. Although the Red army was not prepared to participate as an active political force in this power struggle, neither could it remain isolated and immune from the situation.

The Zhukov Affair. The oscillations of Marshal G.K. Zhukov's career after World War II form another vital premise to the theory of continuing conflict between the party organization and the military establishment.

During the war Zhukov directed the first major Soviet success in the defense of Moscow, turned the German tide at the Battle of Stalingrad, lifted the siege of Leningrad, and led the Russian advance to Berlin. For sheer operational brilliance, his exploits were unsurpassed in the Soviet military high command.

With his outstanding war record, he became the country's most famous and popular soldier. There are indications, however, that Zhukov was neither well liked personally nor well respected professionally by his peers in the military. On the purely human level, this may have been a reaction to the opportunistic manner in which Zhukov clawed his way to the top during the prewar period or to the arrogant and harsh manner with which he customarily treated his subordinates.[57] Also, from a "service reputation" standpoint, Zhukov was never fully exonerated from complicity in the Soviet failure to provide the industrial wherewithal, strategic planning, and tactical training necessary to forestall the early operational advances of the Germans.[58]

After the war Stalin banished Zhukov to a series of obscure billets. It is uncertain whether this was due to political envy or professional jealousy. Most likely Stalin was motivated by a mixture of the two sentiments. Stalin obviously resented Zhukov's grassroots popularity. At the same time, Stalin was embarking on a deliberate effort to portray the bumbling efforts of the Soviets during the early wartime months as part of a preconceived "Stalinist military doctrine." This effort was bound to bring some sort of noisy rebuttal from a man of Zhukov's temperament and immense professional ability.[59]

After a tour as Commander of the Odessa Military District, Zhukov was transferred to the command of the Ural Military District. In the midst of his political exile, in 1950, he attended the provincial party conference at Sverdlovsk (Zhukov had been a party member since 1920) and delivered a short speech. The delegates applauded him for 5 minutes, against the orders of their party secretaries. This little index of Zhukov's political sex appeal annoyed Stalin profoundly, and the marshal was forbidden to attend any large meetings in the future.[60]

In 1951 Zhukov was recalled from obscurity for a mission to East Germany, and in 1952 he was elected a Candidate Member of the Central Committee. This may have been done to bolster the military as a counter to any political aspirations the secret police might have had.

Stalin's death in March of 1953 left a tremendous void at the apex of the Soviet governing hierarchy. In the leadership crisis which followed, Zhukov lined up the support of the armed forces behind the party organization, in common opposition to the secret police organization led by Beria. For this he was rewarded with full membership in the Central Committee. Later, as a Khrushchev supporter in the middle fifties, he emerged as the Minister of Defense and even became the first military man to be voted into the inner circle of the ruling elite, the Presidium.

Exactly when Zhukov moved beyond the pale of normal civil-military relations is uncertain. The actions taken by Zhukov in June of 1957 to support one political clique against another raised doubts in the minds of many political and military leaders.[61] Shortly thereafter he showed "bad form" in a public speech, presenting himself as spokesman for the armed forces and picturing the latter as a popular force prepared to deal with political cliques (which did not serve Zhukov's view of the national interest). With the support of many military leaders, Khrushchev quickly engineered the removal of Zhukov as a threat to civilian political authority. The old warhorse was put out to pasture and treated as a nonperson for several years.

In Khrushchev's behalf, it should be noted that he was simply taking the same action which President Harry Truman was forced to take with an insubordinate U.S. general 6 years earlier. As Khrushchev noted later, "He [Zhukov] didn't correctly understand his role as Minister of Defense, and we were compelled to take action against him in order to prevent him from going through with certain schemes which he had concocted."[62]

The widespread, high-level military support for Khrushchev's demotion of Zhukov indicates more than the usual element of Soviet orthodoxy. Although Zhukov was the senior military officer in both the armed forces and the party political hierarchy, he apparently owed no special allegiance to either organization. Moreover, his opponents covered both sides of the fence. Zhukov dug his own political grave by his arrogant behavior; when he was pushed into it by party officials, it was across the outstretched ankles of many of his fellow military officers. The "Stalingrad Group," consisting of influential

officers such as Marshals Malinovsky, Grechko, Chuikov, Zakharov, Moskalenko, Bagramian, Krylov, Biriuzov, Sudets, Eremenko, Golikov, and Rotmistrov, whom Krushchev had associated with to some extent during the siege of Stalingrad, all disliked Zhukov.[63]

The point here is that as the misdeeds of Stalin were not representative of the party's views, as a whole, neither is Zhukov's "Bonapartist" behavior characteristic of the military organization. Zhukov was his own man.

The Palace Revolution. After Khrushchev was dethroned in October of 1964, many Western Kremlinologists immediately fingered the top Soviet military leaders as prime suspects in the affair. The combination of Zhukov's flirtation with power politics and well-known military objections to Khrushchev's economic and strategic policies was dredged up to form a circumstantial, if somewhat shallow, case against the military establishment.

Although longstanding differences with Khrushchev undoubtedly helped put the military leaders in a frame of mind receptive to the suggestion of ousting Khrushchev, there is no real evidence to suggest that the military either initiated or participated in the palace revolution. Whatever role the military played—if any—evidently it was minor. The least that can be said, however, is that the top military leaders made no attempt to use the resources at their disposal to save Khrushchev from his fate.

By the fall of 1964 there was general opposition to Khrushchev's policies and leadership style from virtually every element within the Soviet power structure. He was brought down by a coalition of his political peers rather loosely grouped around a common desire to maintain the Soviet Union's traditional commitment to the predominance of heavy industry. One of the first acts of the new leadership was to make it clear that there would be no change in economic priorities, i.e., no shift in resource allocations from the defense sector. The new leadership would promote consumer welfare, to be sure, but not at the expense of the military's purse, as Khrushchev had advocated.

The most significant aspect of this entire situation is the notable restraint which the military high command displayed during a period of fragmented party leadership. This would have been a prime situation for a strong military figure with legitimate, longstanding party credentials to step in and seize power. A number of top military figures, such as Marshals Konev, Malinovsky, Grechko, Golikov, Vershinin, Zakharov, et al., were well qualified on both professional and political grounds to take over the top job.[64] None, apparently, felt disposed to do so.

The Sustained Succession Struggle. Since the day Khrushchev was dismissed, on 14 October 1964, it has been widely questioned in the West whether the collective leadership would endure or eventually be dissolved and replaced by a single strong man.

In part, this speculation was due to the apparent inability of the collective leadership team to cope with a continuing series of domestic and international problems, e.g., an ideological revolution in Czechoslovakia, border clashes with China, the failure of agricultural policies, space program slippages, a drop in the industrial growth rate, restiveness among the intellectuals, disaffection among youth, and accelerated disintegration of the world Communist movement, et cetera.

In addition, the complex structure of the Soviet system, not to mention several hundred years of Russian history, hardly indicates that collective rule is workable. Power tends to flow into the hands of a single, ruthless individual. A dictatorship requires a

dictator, and, in the interim period between dictators, the struggle for power continues behind the scenes.

The classic Communist succession struggle involves three phases: initial "collective leadership," for purely administrative stabilization; followed by a period of fierce backyard factional struggle; and, finally, complete consolidation and control by the new leader.

The collective leadership which replaced Khrushchev at first sought to return to the forms prescribed in party statutes. They held frequent Central Committee meetings in 1965 and managed to hold the 23d Party Congress in March of 1966. The Party Congress revamped the Politburo, Secretariat, and Central Committee in conformity with the new leadership. By 1967 Brezhnev was more-or-less the "first among equals" of the collective leadership, with Premier Alexi Kosygin and President Nikolai Podgorny remaining as representational figures in what seemed to be an informal triumvirate or troika.

The traumatic experience of the Czechoslovak crisis shattered the neat image of the new ruling oligarchy. As the crisis developed and climaxed with the invasion of 20 August 1968, signs began to appear of both a vacuum of power and a struggle for power at the top, with effective influence frequently appearing to pass into the hands of either the marshals of the Soviet Army or the shadowy agents of the KGB.

Among all the various leaders, factions, patronage groups, and rival machines involved in the power struggle, the malevolent presence of the secret police organization constitutes the biggest threat to all other contenders.

Conversely, the army is the only potentially "popular" organization in the competition. The Soviet people do not easily identify with the CPSU and secret police machines, which have enslaved and terrorized them for over a half a century. The armed forces, however, enjoy a reputation for loyal service to the people, in defense of the homeland against foreign invaders.

Thus, during the prolonged inner struggle phase until Brezhnev's eventual triumph as the single supreme figure in 1971, there was frequent speculation that the military high command represented the real ruling authority. For instance, in a speech in London on 25 September 1969, Charles E. Bohlen, former Ambassador to the Soviet Union, expressed the belief that the present Soviet political system would soon (within a decade) disappear. He foresaw either a military takeover or a seizure of power by disgruntled young Russians.[65]

Anatole Shub, veteran *Washington Post* correspondent to Moscow, observed in 1969,

> The Politburo leaders and the Party machine have yielded considerable power . . . to the army and the KGB, neither of which is under quite the firm control that Khrushchev seemed to exercise over both between 1958 and 1963. . . . The real authority of the top leaders, individually and collectively, is thus considerably circumscribed. . . . Most Moscow Kremlinologists suspect that Brezhnev has retained power as long as he has mainly through the support of the military-industrial complex . . . .[66]

The results of the 24th Party Congress, which clearly established Brezhnev as firmly in control of the Soviet Union in April of 1971, may be interpreted as a victory of sorts for the armed forces. Brezhnev has always been known as a heavy industry man and, as such, a favorite of the military hierarchy. Although the new number two man, Nikolai Podgorny, generally, favors consumer goods production at the expense of defense needs, his promotion to the second spot in the Kremlin lineup is probably more of a payoff for his long career as a party apparat-

chik and his strong Ukrainian support, rather than an indication of a major shift in economic priorities. In any case, at his advanced age (68), it is doubtful if he can be considered a serious contender for the role of heir apparent.

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The author's conviction is that the military never has attempted and will never attempt to take over the throne itself. Yet, the evidence would appear to confirm that the military has never been on the losing side during a succession struggle. The Soviet officer corps has a vested interest in preserving the existing political order, which even a temporary putsch would destroy. The military leaders are indebted to the system for the lofty positions they occupy and for the overall status of the armed forces in the Soviet society. Indeed, their upbringing and sense of tradition has conditioned them to reject any alternative system. While they are not reluctant to express divergent views on various party policies, they have never revealed any desire to become an independent political force which would rival the party itself.

The evidence suggests, however, that any civilian political leader with serious expectations for the top job in the Kremlin must establish a good working relationship with the top military figures. If nothing else, the military controls, behind the regular party workers and Government administrators, the third largest bloc of seats in the Central Committee (14 full/20 alternates in 1966).[67] Also, by conservative estimate, approximately 60 percent of the Soviet industry works directly to support the military.[68]

ROLE OF THE MILITARY IN POLICY FORMULATION

Policy Debates. A detailed analysis of Soviet politico-military policymaking procedures is beyond the scope of this study. However, inasmuch as policy conflicts are sometimes apparent between Soviet political and military leaders, the author will attempt to give a broad interpretation of the effect of these disagreements on the overall politico-military relationship.

During the past decade there has been frequent evidence in the Soviet military press of independent military views on the allocation of resources and foreign policy, as well as the more technical military questions of force size, composition, doctrine, and nuclear testing.

The focal point of all policy disputes between Soviet military and political leaders has always been the problem of resource allocation. In allocating resources, the regime must decide what compromises to make between three pressing sets of requirements: light industry and consumer needs; heavy industry and military-defense claims; and overall economic growth. Khrushchev's attempts to drastically reduce armaments and manpower were vigorously and successfully opposed by the military leaders. It should be noted that many civilian political leaders also opposed Khrushchev on this issue.

In the early years of the Brezhnev-Kosygin period, the civil-military competition for rubles continued. The new military budget for 1965, announced in late 1964, called for a reduction in defense spending of 500 million rubles, suggesting a continuation of Khrushchev's emphasis on strategic missile forces at the expense of conventional forces.[69]

A series of articles in the military press took issue with the cutbacks and with the one-sided emphasis on deterrence.[70] Civilian leaders continued the debate on resource priorities at the top political echelons in 1965. By late 1965 the defense-oriented people appeared to have won their case. The 1966 military budget was increased 5 percent to 13.4

billion rubles. The defense budget was further increased to 14.5 billion for 1967, and 16.7 billion for 1968, and 17.7 billion for 1969.[71]

The effect of this spending was to transform the U.S.S.R. from an essentially continental military power into a truly global superpower, with a balanced lineup of forces composed of strategic attack and deterrence systems, a formidable blue-water fleet, and conventional ground troops supported by modernized amphibious and airlift capabilities. The massive military buildup enables the U.S.S.R.'s civilian political leaders to maneuver in the foreign policy arena in a climate of recognized Soviet power.

Policy Formulation. In theory, the military's position on the national policymaking level ranks far below that of the civilian political leaders. A clear statement of the civilian leaders' authority is contained in Marshal Sokolovsky's authoritative *Military Strategy:* "Concentrations of the leadership of the country and its Armed Forces in the hands of the highest political agency of government control, as during the years of the last war, is a decisive condition for the victorious waging of a war. . . ."[72]

In the Khrushchev era the military was represented on the higher military council, which functioned directly under the Presidium of the Central Committee.[73] In the early Brezhnev-Kosygin period, this institution appears to have been disbanded, possibly because the collective leaders were reluctant to allow a single person to wield the power which chairmanship of such a body would bestow. Curiously, the reference to a ". . . possible organization of a higher agency of leadership of the country and the Armed Forces . . . ," contained in the post-Khrushchev revision of *Military Strategy,* omitted the words ". . . and will be headed by the First Secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU and the head of the government, to whom the functions of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief of all the Armed Forces may also be entrusted."[74]

A series of articles in the military professional press in 1965-67 added to the ambiguity over military access to the apex of politico-military policymaking. Marshal M.V. Zakharov, in an article in *Red Star* in February of 1965, stressed the importance of professional military expertise in the formulation of defense policy. As Chief of the Soviet General Staff, he also cautioned against the errors of subjectivism, superficial judgments, et cetera.[75]

In an article in the January 1966 issue of *Military Thought,* Col. Gen. N. Lomov called for the creation of a "single military political organ which would unite the political and strategic leadership in wartime as well as in times of peace." Lomov argued that the complexity of modern warfare and the new weapons developed as a result of the technological revolution had raised the premium on professional military expertise in any command arrangement over the armed forces. Lomov pointed out that "recommendations" of the higher military command as a "highly qualified adviser" on military problems "cannot be ignored by the deciding political levels." Marshal Sokolovsky also spoke out for more professional military influence upon the strategic planning process in April of 1966.

Other military leaders upheld the political leadership. In an article in *Red Star,* Maj. Gen. V. Zemskov stated that solution of the complex tasks of modern war "falls completely within the competence of the political leadership."[76] Although Zemskov rebutted the contention that military professionals should have greater access to the top level of strategic planning, he also pointed out that there was need in the Soviet Union for peacetime creation of a single "supreme military-political

organ," through which the political leadership would exercise its role.[77] This was an oblique admission that the Soviet Union lacked adequate institutional arrangements for top-level coordination between the political and military leadership.

Further evidence of the military's concern for a fair share of the decision-making process can be seen in the flowering tributes in *Military Strategy* to the expertise of the "many talented officers and generals" and in a blunt reference to the fact that "... there are no examples where an army not having a definite organization and led by an inexperienced military leader successfully waged war with an army headed by an experienced military leader."[78] The flurry of memoirs which senior Soviet military officers rushed into print with, in the post-Khrushchev era, reflected the same critical view of the political leadership of the armed forces during World War II.[79]

The marshals continued to assert themselves. In March of 1967 they succeeded in preventing the appointment of a civilian to the job of Defense Minister. When the incumbent, Marshal Malinovsky, died, party spokesmen spread the word to foreign newsmen that his replacement would be Dmitri Ustinov, a party civilian with a long career in the management of defense industry. After a week of factional struggle, Marshal Andrei A. Grechko emerged as the new Defense Minister.[80]

Later in 1967 the Soviet military leaders were accused of precipitating the Middle East crisis. Subsequently, the Soviet military moved advisers, instructors, warships, and hardware into the area on an unprecedented scale.

The Czech Crisis and Its Aftermath. The Czechoslovakian crisis in 1968-69 represented a continuing display of military assertiveness in the field of major foreign policy for the Kremlin. After initial vacillation by the top civilian political leaders, the marshals exerted sufficient pressure to force a well-executed military solution to the Czechoslovak problem.[81] Later, when the civilian leaders bungled the political aspects of the invasion, the military professionals were forced to assume an even more active politico-military role during the subsequent occupation period. The zenith point for the Soviet military leaders came in April 1969, when Marshal Grechko personally flew to Prague to force the top Czech party leaders from office and install a new administration favorable to the Kremlin.[82] Sending the Minister of Defense to dictate to a foreign Communist Party was not merely a failure to observe diplomatic form, for it also raised the serious question of whether the party was using the army to carry out its orders or vice versa.

Party officials, disturbed by the rising influence of the military, rebounded with a symbolic reminder of the primacy of civilian political leadership. The traditional May Day military parade through Red Square was abruptly canceled, and, for the first time in the Soviet era, the Minister of Defense was denied the honor of making the major speech of the day. However, at the purely civilian demonstration which was arranged, a conspicuous cluster of bemedaled marshals and generals shared the reviewing stand with the top civilian political figures.

In recent years the military press has continued to publish articles which reflect hard-line criticism of the political leadership's judgment on matters such as negotiating with the United States and slowing down the arms race.[83] The official position of the party is that struggles between socialist and capitalist countries "are and must be carried out by peaceful means—economic, political, ideological, but not military."[84] The general thrust of the military's argument is that as long as any form of class struggle continues, "the concept of war

as armed conflict in the name of definite political aims remains in force even in the present era."[85] Ergo, the need remains for continued reliance on a high level of national security based on a "steady strengthening of the military might of the Soviet Union and of the entire Socialist camp by development of production forces and continuous growth of its material-technical foundation."[86]

* * * * *

It is, of course, impossible to know precisely and to what extent factional pressures and professional grievances influence the overall decisionmaking process in the Soviet Union. After all, it is not easy to establish and weigh pressure group influence in our own society, where access to relevant data is more open than in the U.S.S.R. However, some general observations can be ventured.

First, the influence of the military high command on general policy has grown immensely in the post-Stalin era, largely because of the critical importance of the Soviet armed forces in foreign affairs considerations and domestic economic issues. The fact that most major issues are usually resolved to the satisfaction of the marshals indicates that some form of institutional arrangement exists for a clear-channel transmission of military inputs to the decisionmaking process.

Second, the evidence hardly supports the proposition that the Soviet marshals have successfully usurped the ultimate authority and policymaking prerogatives of the party leaders or that they even aspire to do so. No military leader since Zhukov has been admitted to the Politburo, which is the elite ruling body of the regime.

Third, the question of who—i.e., party or military leaders—exerts the most influence on major policy decisions is largely immaterial. The significant factor is that the really vital issues are resolved promptly and by the responsible politico-military professionals at the top. The Soviets can respond to strategic issues very rapidly.[87] In contrast to the United States tortured and drawn-out decisionmaking process, e.g., irresponsible public debate by unqualified and poorly informed amateurs over a missile defense system, SST development, management of the Indochina war, NATO force posture, et cetera.

Fourth, the fact that politico-military policy disagreements do crop up in the Soviet political system periodically indicates the existence of a healthy relationship among the top leaders. The fact that the military officers do voice their candid opinions, in public speeches and on the pages of professional journals, indicates lack of fear of reprisal. Even the civilian political leadership itself does not always agree on some of the matters at issue. Disputes over policy and conflict on the question of who should make policy decisions pervade the Soviet political system.[88]

BIOGRAPHIC SUMMARY

Lt. Comdr. Gerald C. Caron, U.S. Navy, did his undergraduate work in history at Regis College in Denver, did graduate work in Russian history at Western Washington State University, and holds a master's degree in international affairs from The George Washington University. Following his commissioning from Officers Candidate School, he underwent training as a naval flight officer and subsequently served as a bombardier/navigator in a number of attack, and air test and evaluation squadrons and as targeting officer for Commander Task Force 77 in Southeast Asia. Lieutenant Commander Caron is a 1971 graduate of the College of Naval Command and Staff and is currently serving on the faculty of the Naval War College in the Center for War Gaming.

Moreover, the civilian leaders are obviously intelligent enough to realize that the military leaders are only doing their duty in lobbying for increased national security. (In this regard, it appears that the Soviet military leaders were able to state their case more freely during the crucial decade of the 1960's than U.S. military men were.)[89]

Fifth, with the apparent approval of the civilian leaders, the service chiefs appear to enjoy unrestricted "decision-making power within their own sphere of professional interest," when the international situation calls for specific operational military action.[90] Khrushchev was the last civilian leader with any legitimate credentials as a pseudo-commander, based on actual wartime operational experiences.

CONCLUSIONS

Eternal peace lasts only until the next war.

—Russian Proverb[91]

On the Question of Lasting Disagreements Between the CPSU and the Soviet Military Establishment. Are there, in fact, genuine and lasting institutional disagreements between the CPSU and the Soviet military establishment? The answer to this question must be prefaced with the reminder that the political cohesiveness of a particular governmental system in any major country is downright difficult—if not impossible—to measure with electronic precision. Factional disputes and group liaisons, as well as certain basic trends and prevailing problems, can all be identified. Yet, in politics the whole is not always equal to the sum of the parts. Nonetheless, a negative answer to the preceding question is supportable when the following points are considered.

First, the Communist Party's political control over the armed forces in the Soviet Union has fluctuated greatly in degree and effectiveness over the years. But the civilian political control has never been so oppressive as to transform the military establishment into an angry and carnivorous beast estranged from the mainstream of the Soviet political system. On the contrary, the military has always led a moderately active, although inconspicuous, political life. The Soviet civilian leadership has always encouraged a sense of political participation and development among the professional officer corps. That this was done for reasons of self-preservation in no way detracts from the situation. Many of the top military leaders even sit on the party's Central Committee. However, the Soviet political system is in no danger of becoming a stratocracy.

Second, it is important to realize that the effect of the party's centralized politico-military control system is perceived differently at various strata within the military. At the operational levels, for instance, the party's efforts have been—and, no doubt, will remain—a source of some friction and frustration to many professional officers. Similarly, but for different reasons, officers in the command hierarchy continue to express various complaints, but these are in no way extraordinary in scope or in intensity of feeling. Overall, the routine inconveniences caused by party interferences are shared by all elements of the society, and most Soviet citizens learn to live with them. The situation is somewhat analogous to a persistent, but tolerable, head cold; certainly it is nowhere near as debilitating as, say, a terminal case of cancer. One must be careful to not confuse a myriad number of minor complaints with an accurate representation of the overall attitude of the majority.

Third, with regard to the major Soviet politico-military disputes, e.g., over matters such as national security and the domestic economic situation, it is obvious that institutional labels are meaningless. Many of the major Soviet

politico-military disputes, (e.g., strategic doctrines, employment of forces, et cetera) have been of an intra-institutional nature, rather than across party-military lines. While the professional soldiers consistently argue for a greater allocation of resources for national security, at the top they are all party members. All of the leading civilian and military leaders are in basic agreement that no economic program will be undertaken which might impair Soviet security. In nearly every case the so-called major historical "conflicts" have been resolved to the satisfaction and long-term advantage of the military establishment. Moreover, the Soviet military leadership has always welcomed the party's efforts toward intensive industrialization, systematic control of the sources of food and raw materials, and imposition of discipline on the masses.

Finally, there is the matter of ideological orientation. The military is even "more ideologically oriented than is the Party."[92] The Soviet politico-military leadership really does believe that peace is only the interval between conflicts. In addition to the basic Marxist-Leninist viewpoint on this subject, there is the factor of a scarred psychological heritage, resulting from centuries of foreign invasions on Russian soil. The military's ties to the Soviet state are rooted as much in national pride as in party ideology, and the party has skillfully managed to capitalize on this aspect by identifying itself with the objectives imposed by Great Russian geopolitical determinism. If nothing else, the historical direction of Mother Russia is clear to both civilian and military leaders.

Effect of Soviet Civil-Military Relations. The overall effect of the political-military institutional arrangement on the Soviet political system is one of stabilization. The ruling elite enjoys the unqualified support of the overwhelming majority of the Soviet military establishment, which would willingly assist in suppressing domestic disorders or a modern-day revolt from within the ranks—such as the Streltsi, Dekahrist, and Kronstadt uprisings. The Soviet military establishment has, in effect, replaced the secret police apparatus as the principal pillar of the regime.

The manifold dimensions of this fact are of direct concern to the West, i.e., the West cannot expect future Soviet internal developments to lessen the threat to U.S. security. For the foreseeable future, the Soviet Union will continue to become a stronger and more formidable opponent.

The evolution of Soviet politico-military relations into an efficient working model greatly improves the U.S.S.R.'s capacity to press the contest with the West. In return for their support of the system, the top Soviet military leaders are in a position to exert an aggressive influence on the overall thrust of Soviet foreign policy. Yet, the Soviet leaders' emphasis on the ultimate political determination of military policy is fully accepted by the military. This is in line with their Marxist view of the essentially political nature of war and in consonance with Lenin's doctrine of tight control by an elite clique.

The extreme centralization of Soviet political, economic, and military leadership provides the U.S.S.R. with a notable strategic advantage over the West. A small group of leaders possesses the power to make profound policy decisions; hence, the system is geared to generate vital decisions much faster than Western governments are able to. The speedy buildup of the Soviet's strategic missilery, their "new" navy, and the blitzkrieg of Czechoslovakia are painful examples of this capability.

While the enormous bureaucracy below is used to govern and control, the real decisionmaking power remains in

the hands of a very few leaders at the top. The Soviet military leaders belong to that group. They are, in effect, part of the "ruling elite."

FOOTNOTES

1. Speech at the Eighth Party Congress, 18 March 1919.

2. Louis Nemzer, "Conflicting Patterns of Civil-Military Relations in the USSR," RAC-TP-142 (McLean, Va.: Research Analysis Corp., May 1964), p. 7.

3. Roman Kolkowicz, "The Soviet Army and the Communist Party: Institutions in Conflict," R-446-PR (Santa Monica, Calif.: Rand, August 1966), p. 15-16. Also see Abdurakhman Avtorkhanov, *The Communist Party Apparatus* (Chicago: Regnery, 1966), p. 306.

4. Milton C. Lodge, *Soviet Elite Attitudes since Stalin* (Columbus, Ohio: Merrill, 1969), p. 29, 99-119.

5. Figures released on the 50th anniversary of the regime in 1967 showed 85 percent of the entire military personnel were members of the party or of the Kosomol. Among the officer corps alone, the figure was even higher at 93 percent. John N. Hazard, *The Soviet System of Government,* 4th ed. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1968), p. 161.

6. The precise number of ex-Czarist officers and NCO's recruited into the Red army is uncertain. "Almost 40,000" is the figure set by George Von Rauch in *A History of Soviet Russia* (New York: Praeger, 1967), p. 100. The figure is listed as "no fewer than 48,409 ex-officers" and "214,717 ex-NCO's by John Erickson in *The Soviet High Command* (London: Macmillan, 1962), p. 33.

7. During the initial phase of the war, the commissars were representatives of Lenin's infant Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic (RSFSR). Although for the most part Communists, their political complexion covered all shades of the socialist left. Of 500 commissars sent out from 1 July to 10 October 1918, there were 300 Communists, 93 Communist "sympathizers," 35 leftist S.R.'s, three "Internationalists," one Anarchist, one S.R.-Maximalist, and 68 of no party affiliation whatsoever. Erickson, p. 45-46.

8. Stalin's position as a civilian involved in the Civil War was not clearly defined. He had no senior military appointment but turned himself into what Trotsky described as a "manager of all the military forces at the front." Erickson, p. 68.

9. *Ibid.*, p. 39-40, 67-68; Kenneth R. Whiting, *The Development of the Soviet Armed Forces, 1917-1966* (Maxwell Air Force Base, Ala.: Air University, 1966), p. 17; Von Rauch, p. 89; Ian Grey, *The First Fifty Years: Soviet Russia, 1917-1967* (New York: Coward-McCann, 1967), p. 143.

10. Party membership among the graduates of these courses was as follows: 1918, 70 percent; 1919, 54 percent; 1920, 62 percent; 1921, 65 percent. Merle Fainsod, *How Russia Is Ruled,* rev. ed. (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1965), p. 470.

11. However, many of these aggressive young officers—men like V.K. Blyukher, S.M. Budenny, S.K. Timoshenko, G.K. Zhukov, N.I. Krylov, R.I. Malinovsky, K.A. Vershinin, M.V. Zakharov, et al—achieved remarkable successes in the field and were not only destined to enjoy later high command in the Red army hierarchy, but to become involved in subsequent politico-military disputes.

12. The Red army's major offensive on Polish soil during this war was a chastening experience. Tukhachevsky led a vast sweep through northern Poland toward Warsaw in anticipation of support on his southern flanks by Stalin's 1st Cavalry Army. The entire process of planning and logistics was poorly coordinated to begin with, and the Poles quickly routed the Russian force after the flanking support from the south did not materialize.

13. Vladimir I. Lenin, *Collected Works* (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1965), v. XXIX, p. 448.

14. Nemzer, p. 14.

15. A. Beloborodov, *Krasnaya Zvezda,* 6 May 1961.

16. M.V. Zakharov, *Krasnaya Zvezda,* 12 October 1962.

17. V.D. Sokolovsky, ed., *Military Strategy,* 3d ed. (Moscow: Military Publishing House, 1968), p. 387.

18. From the "New Program of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union," in Arthur P. Mendel, et al., *Essential Works of Marxism* (New York: Bantam Books, 1961), p. 459; and Sokolovsky, p. 385-386.

19. Sokolovsky, p. 386, 394.

20. Mendel, p. 460.

21. *Ibid.*

22. Roman Kolkowicz, "The Impact of Modern Technology on the Soviet Officer Corps," P-3380 (Santa Monica, Calif.: Rand) (Paper presented at the 6th World Congress of Sociology, 6 September 1966, Evian, France); Roman Kolkowicz, "Political Controls in the Red Army: Professional Autonomy Versus Political Integration," P-3402 (Santa Monica, Calif.: Rand, July 1967), pass.; and Roman Kolkowicz, "The Impact of Technology on the Soviet Military: a Challenge to Traditional Military Professionalism," RM-4198-PR (Santa Monica, Calif.: Rand, August 1964), pass.

23. R.Y. Malinovsky, "Address to the XXIII Congress CPSU," William R. Kintner and Harriet F. Scott, et al., eds., *The Nuclear Revolution in Soviet Military Affairs* (Norman, Okla.: University of Oklahoma Press), p. 278-289; and A.A. Yepishev, "Address to the XXIII Congress of the CPSU," *Ibid.*, p. 289-301.

24. M.V. Zakharov, *Krasnaya Zvezda,* 15 October 1961.

25. Sokolovsky, p. 394.

26. Malinovsky, quoted in Kintner and Scott, p. 288.

27. The sanguinary struggle between the NKVD and the Red army erupted in Spain when the secret police knifed through to control over all Soviet personnel, the International Brigade, and the Republican government itself. The army officers objected to the NKVD's insistence on pro-Stalinist orthodoxy, at the expense of victory. Whiting, p. 34. Also see Erickson, p. 452, 455.

28. Seweryn Bialer, et al., ed., *Stalin and His Generals* (New York: Pegasus, 1969), p. 567, pass.; Whiting, p. 34.

29. George Kalkov, *The Trial of Bukharin* (New York: Stein and Day, 1969), p. 161, pass.

30. Leonard Shapiro, "The Great Purge," B.H. Liddell Hart, et al., ed., *The Red Army* (New York: Harcourt, Brace, 1956), p. 70; and Boris Nicolaevsky, "Crimes of the Stalin Era," *The New Leader* (New York: 1962), p. 39; Walter Goerlitz, *History of the German General Staff* (New York: Praeger, 1957), p. 307-308.

31. As early as 1922 the Soviets and the then secret German General Staff were engaged in a surreptitious exchange program. Soviet officers such as Tukhachevsky went to Berlin to study the command and staff procedures of the elite professionals in the clandestine Truppenamt organization. The Germans, in turn, were able to train in Russia with real military hardware. Nearly all of the high ranking officers that Stalin purged in the late thirties had passed through the Reichswehr's instructional course. Goerlitz, p. 232-233, pass.

32. Bialer, p. 59; and Whiting, p. 26.

33. Erickson, p. 506.

34. Khrushchev, "Crimes of the Stalin Era," p. 39.

35. Bialer, p. 63-114. As Admiral Kuznetsov described it later, although many of the officers were "tormented by doubts . . . [most] . . . had no idea of the true scale of the violations of legality." *Ibid.*, p. 92; also see Erickson, p. 462, 465-466.

36. Edward Crankshaw and Strobe Talbott, eds., *Khrushchev Remembers* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1970), p. 89.

37. Whiting, p. 65-66.

38. Nemzer, p. 30-33.

39. Lieutenant General Kalashnik, deputy head of the MPA, stated that "since 1945 the number of engineer technicians in the armed forces has grown three times," *Kommunist Vooruzhennykh Sil,* no. 22, November 1962, p. 15. While the absolute increase of technicians was indeed threefold, the relative increase was between 10 and 15 times, because in 1962, when Kalashnik was writing, the Red army was only about one-quarter the size it had been in 1945. Kolkowicz, "The Impact of Modern Technology on the Soviet Officer Corps," p. 23.

40. Nicolai Galay, "The New Generation in the Soviet Armed Forces," *Studies on the Soviet Union,* v. V, no. 2, p. 29-46.

41. *Ibid.*, p. 38-39.

42. Thomas W. Wolfe, "Soviet Strategy at the Crossroads," RM-4085-PR (Santa Monica, Calif.: Rand, April 1964), p. 100; Kolkowicz, "The Soviet Army and the Communist Party: Institutions in Conflict," p. 19, 23-41; Lodge, p. 107.

43. Lenin, p. 153.

44. *Ibid.*

45. Trotsky's plan was not simply an unrealistic melange of utopian thought. The intent was to use the socialist worker-peasant militia program to support the needs of both industry and defense. The militiawas to be organized to correspond to major industrial and agrarian centers so that local trade union officials might also become militia commanders. Thus the effect would be a virtual physical dictatorship of the proletariat with worker-soldier cadres spreading the party control over the whole country.

46. The regular army was reorganized into a peacetime force of 562,000 men. Overall, the army was composed of 29 regular and 42 territorial infantry divisions.

47. Mikhail Frunze, although a party intellectual, compiled an impressive record as a self-taught military leader between 1917 and 1921. He commanded the Eastern Front that smashed Adm. A.V. Kolchak's forces and later commanded the armies which destroyed Baron Wrangel's troops in the autumn of 1920. He emerged from the war with the reputation of being a first-rate tactician and strategist.

48. Sokolovsky, p. 383; Edward M. Earle, ed., *Makers of Modern Strategy* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1944), p. 350-353; Nicolas Spulher, *Soviet Strategy for Economic Growth* (Bloomington, Ind.: Indiana University Press, 1964), p. 74.

49. For example, aircraft procurement went from 860 planes a year in 1931 to 3,578 in 1937; tank production increased from 740 a year in 1931 to 3,139 in 1937; and artillery pieces increased from 2,000 guns in 1931 to over 5,000 in 1937. Whiting, p. 23.

50. Michel Garder, *A History of the Soviet Army* (New York: Praeger, 1966), p. 100.

51. Since the generation of wartime junior officers is now on the verge of becoming the new high command cadre, it is interesting to speculate on the general psychological makeup of the group. The most decisive elements in their makeup may be found in the heavy defeats at the beginning of the war, when entire regiments were virtually annihilated (see Peter Deriabin and Peter Gibney, *The Secret World* (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1959), p. 51). Their most characteristic traits may be seen in an endless stream of tendentious war fiction such as K. Simonov's *Days and Nights, The Wing and the Dead,* and *They Were Not Born Soldiers* and in V. Nekrasov's *In the Trenches of Stalingrad* and *The Second Day.*

52. Galay, p. 31-32.

53. Marshal Biriuzov, former Chief of the General Staff, quoted in Kolkowicz, "The Impact of Modern Technology on the Soviet Officer Corps," p. 7.

54. Notably the Streltsi, the elite royal guard, who participated in several mutinies in the 17th century; the officers and imperial guardsmen who participated in the Dekabrist uprising in 1825; and also the troops who joined in with the rebels during the 1905 revolution.

55. Kliment Yefremovich Voroshilov was fundamentally a full-time political hack, however, with scarcely any qualifications as a soldier, except for his wartime association with Stalin.

56. Trotsky's reply to Budenny's request for a cavalry command in 1918 provides a clue to the depth of alienation between the two men. Budenny, who had been a professional cavalryman as an NCO in the Imperial Army, was told by Trotsky: "You don't understand the nature of cavalry. That is a very aristocratic family of troops, commanded by princes, barons, and counts . . . " Erickson, p. 70.

57. Bialer, p. 89, 138-141, 417-420, 434-430, pass; Crankshaw and Talbott, p. 170; Garder, p. 147.

58. James E. McSherry, *Stalin, Hitler and Europe: the Imbalance of Power, 1939-1941* (Cleveland: World, 1970), v. II, p. 249-251; Matthew P. Gallagher, *The Soviet History of World War II* (New York: Praeger, 1963), p. 144, 158-159; Bialer, p. 151, 184-218, and 369-372.

59. For Marshal Zhukov's own authoritative description of the epic defense of Moscow and the subsequent counteroffensive, see Bialer, p. 277-293 and 318-336.

60. Deriabin and Gibney, p. 219.

61. An attempted coup against Khrushchev by the "Anti-Party Group" was thwarted when Zhukov arranged for a spectacular airlift to Moscow for Khrushchev supporters to participate in a special session of the Central Committee.

62. Crankshaw and Talbott, p. 162.

63. Roman Kolkowicz, *Conflicts in Soviet Party-Military Relations: 1962-63* (Santa Monica, Calif.: Rand, August 1963), p. 4, 37-45. Also see Garder, p. 146. Another bitter opponent of Zhukov's was Marshal Ivan Konev, although the latter was not, technically, a member of the "Stalingrad Group." Their professional rivalry dated back to 1939 when Zhukov relieved Konev, for cause, of his command in the Far East and continued unabated throughout WW II and the postwar period.

64. All of these officers fought for the Red army during the Civil War and joined the party before any of the top civilian contenders such as Brezhnev and Kosygin did.

65. Dickinson, p. 916.

66. Anatole Shub, *The New Russian Tragedy* (New York: Norton, 1969), p. 115.

67. Yaroslav Bilinsky, *Changes in the Central Committee: Communist Party of the Soviet Union, 1961-1966* (Denver: University of Denver Press, 1967), p. 49.

60. Shub, p. 81. The estimate of 60 percent is imprecise because of the "two-track" Soviet price structure; thus a ruble is worth only about 25 cents in consumer goods, but buys $2.50 worth of military hardware.

69. Alfred L. Monks, "Evolution of Soviet Military Thinking," *Military Review,* March 1971, p. 82.

70. Thomas W. Wolfe, "Policymaking in the Soviet Union: a Statement with Supplementary Comments, P-4131 (Washington: Rand, 23 June 1969), p. 14.

71. Monks, p. 82; Wolfe, "Policymaking in the Soviet Union."

72. Sokolovsky, p. 376.

73. Wolfe, "Policymaking in the Soviet Union," p. 17 (n.b.: The Higher Military Council was also sometimes described as the Supreme, or Main, Military Council.)

74. Sokolovsky, p. 476, 487.

75. Thomas W. Wolfe, "Problems of Soviet Defense Policy under the New Regime," P-3098 (Santa Monica, Calif.: Rand, March 1965), p. 9-11.

76. V. Zemskov, "For the Theoretical Seminar: an Important Factor for Victory in War," *Krasnaya Zvezda,* 5 January 1967, quoted in Wolfe, "Policymaking in the Soviet Union," p. 17.

77. *Ibid.*

78. Sokolovsky, p. 378-382.

79. Bialer, p. 339-461; and Dickinson, p. 903.

80. Shub, p. 109.

81. *Ibid.,* p. 97-102.

82. *Ibid.,* p. 107-108; and Wolfe, p. 18-19.

83. Wolfe, "Policymaking in the Soviet Union," p. 20-21; and Thomas W. Wolfe, "Soviet Policy in the Setting of a Changing Power Balance," P-4055 (Santa Monica, Calif.: Rand, March 1969), p. 11.

84. Sokolovsky, p. 180.

85. *Ibid.,* p. 181.

86. *Ibid.,* p. 189.

87. U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Government Operations, *National Policy Machinery in the Soviet Union* (Washington: U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1960), p. 57, 65-66; and Arleigh Burke, et al., *The Soviet Military Technological Challenge* (Washington: The Center for Strategic Studies, 1967), pass.; and Thomas W. Wolfe, "Soviet Power and European Security," P-3429 (Santa Monica, Calif.: Rand, August 1966), p. 25-27.

88. Lodge, p. 114, pass.

89. For readers who might wish to pursue this subject, from the aspects of strategy, tactics, and logistics, I highly recommend the following materials: Jaci Erickson, "A Seat for the Soldier at the National Council Table," *Armed Forces Journal,* 1 November 1969, p. 2; Thomas A. Lane, "The Kissinger Variant," *Armed Forces Journal,* 21 December 1970, p. 8-9; Henry E. Eccles, "The TFX F-111 Aircraft: a Perspective in Military Command and Defense Management," *Naval War College Review,* April 1971, p. 66-87; Paul R. Schratz, "The Ivy-Clad Man on Horseback," *United States Naval Institute Proceedings,* March 1965, p. 42-49; and Samuel P. Ingram, "Civilian Command or Civilian Control," *United States Naval Institute Proceedings,* May 1968, p. 26-31.

90. U.S. Congress, Joint Economic Committee, *New Directions in the Soviet Economy* (Washington: U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1966), p. 61.

91. Robert D. Heinl, Jr., *Dictionary of Military and Naval Quotations* (Annapolis, Md.: United States Naval Institute, 1966), p. 235.

92. Lodge, p. 90.

That the soldier is but the servant of the statesman, as war is but an instrument of diplomacy, no educated soldier will deny. Politics must always exercise an extreme influence on strategy; but it cannot be gainsaid that interference with the commanders in the field is fraught with the gravest danger.

G.F.R. Henderson: Stonewall Jackson, 1898