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
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PROFESSIONAL READING

Newell, Gordon and Smith, Allan F. *The U.S.S. Missouri: a Biography of the Last Battleship*. Seattle: Superior, 1969. 190p.

The battleship U.S.S. *Missouri* was launched late in World War II, but that did not prevent her from acquiring considerable wartime experience and a sizable group of enthusiastic admirers. In *The U.S.S. Missouri: a Biography of the Last Battleship* Gordon Newell and Vice Adm. Allan F. Smith recount the operations and career of this vessel, including its grounding in 1950. Their account is accompanied by many historic photographs, which are one of the book's major assets.

The account itself is a very light treatment of the subject, excepting that which is given to the errors leading to the grounding of the *Missouri* on Thimble Shoal. It focuses primarily on the accomplishments of the ship as an individual unit rather than an analysis of its strategic role. Technical details are scarce, and the book is clearly intended for the battleship enthusiast. The bibliography is quite limited, for the authors apparently rely heavily on personal recollection. The book is recommended for the *Missouri* veteran, but not for a serious student of naval history.

D.G. WHITE
Ensign, U.S. Naval Reserve

Northedge, Frederick S., ed. *The Foreign Policies of the Powers*. New York: Praeger, 1968. 299p.

In this first book of a new series, *Studies in International Politics*, the

editor has brought together seven excellent essays on the foreign policies of the same number of major states—the United States, the Soviet Union, the People's Republic of China, Britain, France, Federal Germany, and India. The scholarly presentations are obviously the result of a great deal of research, analysis, and experience with the foreign policies of the several countries by their contributors—all teachers at the London School of Economics and Political Science. While some historical accounts and details are present in the essays, they reveal more of the reasons for the styles of reaction by each of the countries than they do of the purely historical aspect. As Northedge, the editor, points out, the emphasis was intended to be analytical rather than historical or descriptive. The first selection, "The Nature of Foreign Policy," by Northedge himself, is an excellent and illuminating one which puts the subject in fine perspective for the reader. The treatises on the United States (written by a non-American) and on Britain were especially perceptive and frank. The essays are valuable background reading for those studying the nations involved in order to arrive at policy/strategy evaluations.

A.H. CORNELL
Captain, U.S. Navy

O'Ballance, Edgar. *Korea: 1950-1953*. Hamden, Conn.: Archon Books, 1969. 171p.

Probably the best review of this book

is the Preface written by the author. His opening sentences read:

In this book I have attempted a review, in broad outline, of the war fought in Korea from June 1950 until July 1953. By now, the clouds of propaganda and emotional thinking that obscured it, not only while it was being fought but for a few years afterwards, have largely dispersed. Most if not all of the myths which surrounded it have been exposed for what they are.

The incidents which led up to the war, the war itself, and the events which brought about the truce are covered in a comprehensive, but concise, manner. It is the best and most honest evaluation of the Korean war which this reviewer has read to date. Further, there is an excellent discussion of the psychological battle which took place between the two opponents, a battle from which the free world has unfortunately learned very little, if present-day actions are any indication. The author also presents an exceptionally good treatment of the much talked about problem of the possibility of the Korean war's having almost caused world war III. O'Ballance concludes that the Communists agreed to a truce only when they feared that the United Nations forces were about to expand the war.

The sole criticism offered regarding the book, other than the inclusion of some very minor errors, is that the method in which specific dates and the sequence of events are presented is sometimes quite difficult to follow. This does not detract materially from the fact that this is an unusually good and readable book, which is recommended for all military personnel, whether they are students of history or not.

W.S. HATHAWAY
Colonel, U.S. Army

Von der Porten, Edward P. *The German Navy in World War II*. New York: Crowell, 1969, 274p.

In *The German Navy in World War II*, Edward P. Von der Porten presents a broad, accurate view of German naval strategy employed during World War II. The author states that the period from the scuttling of the Imperial High Seas Fleet in Scapa Flow on 21 June 1919 until construction started on the battle cruiser *Deutschland* in 1928, was one devoted to reorganizing the Navy and inquiring into the strategy for the future. Operational problems which did not require extensive funds, such as minesweeping, coding, codebreaking, and long-range communications, were solved for the future German Navy. At the same time, a searching evaluation was made of German naval strategy. Vice Admiral Wolfgang Wegener tore apart the strategy employed in World War I, stating that the concentration on the idea of battle which dominated late Imperial Navy thinking was a faulty reading of the international naval "bible," Mahan's *The Influence of Sea Power on History*. Mahan stressed the battle to contest sealanes, but Grand Admiral von Tirpitz had stressed battle in his strategic world, the North Sea. The die was cast for a high seas strategy for the Navy in 1928 when the decision was made to construct a seagoing battle cruiser instead of a coastal monitor built to support the army. The book points up the problems, failures, and successes which were experienced in the commerce raiding campaign of the auxiliary cruisers and capital ships; in Admiral Karl Doenitz's organization and execution of the U-boat campaign against the Allies; in the worldwide operations of a navy with limited access to the high seas; in operations with limited external support facilities; and in fighting an acknowledged more powerful British Navy. There are many lessons for the student of naval strategy to learn from the German experience of World War II.