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## MARXIST NATION BUILDING IN THE DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM

*With the surrender of the Japanese in 1945, Ho Chi Minh and his compatriots faced the problem of building an industrialized Marxist nation from an extremely localistic peasant society. By the beginning of 1965 they had succeeded in creating political and economic institutions which closely corresponded to the theoretical Stalinist model posited by a number of scholars. The methods by which this was accomplished provide an interesting and different case study in nation building in Southeast Asia. Similarly, the asymmetrical development, in terms of nation building, of the DRV military structure presents a unique situation that will have to be dealt with by North Vietnamese leadership and the U.S. planner.*

A research paper prepared

by

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The process of modernization that has taken place in the Democratic Republic of Vietnam is unique in Southeast Asia. The DRV is the only nation in Southeast Asia that has effectively employed a system of political mobilization to accomplish revolution against its colonial masters and to pursue its goals under a Marxian doctrine of modernization through rapid industrialization. Until 1965 nation building in the DRV seemed to fit generally within the pattern of political, social, and economic development predicted by the theoretical Stalinist model posited by a number of scholars. When the war in Vietnam was taken north of the 17th parallel in earnest after 1965, the nation building process was arrested. This paper examines the actions taken by the political elite of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam that permitted the initiation and completion of a successful revolution and the subsequent creation of a "socialist" nation in light of the analyti-

cal tools provided by A.F.K. Organski's formulations, augmented by Lucian R. Pye's concepts relating to the political crises faced by emerging nations.<sup>1</sup>

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The first task that faced Ho Chi Minh in 1945 when he assumed power in the vacuum created by the surrender of the Japanese and the weakness of the French was the completion of national primitive unification.<sup>2</sup> This process had begun many centuries before the present one, probably as a result of Indianization on the southern Mongol peoples who had drifted south into Tonkin and subsequently Annam. Later a much more important and lasting Sinicized layer of cultural influence reinforced these trends.<sup>3</sup> A common language, along with a dynastic state system, developed together with other manifestations of nationhood.<sup>4</sup> The groundwork had been laid for the Viet

nation. The gap, however, between ruler and ruled was vast. It was later underlined by the colonial experience where differences in power and wealth accentuated by differences in race, language, and culture resulted in prejudice and discrimination on the part of the French and greater resentment and hatred on the part of the native Vietnamese. This was manifested in tremendous violence when the relationship ended. While the French were still in power, loyalty and unity of the people coalesced around the village elite rather than the French trained traditional elite. After the French lost power, the traditional rulers represented by Bao Dai and his court were hated to a greater degree than were the French. This phenomenon can be attributed to several factors. The predominance of French education, either in Vietnam or in France, was noticeable.<sup>5</sup> Separation from rural life was a consequence of the most frequent career patterns. Robert Shaplen has emphasized the psychological isolation of the elite from the peasantry.<sup>6</sup>

Its emergence from a Confucian tradition gave the Vietnamese elite some common as well as distinct characteristics. Vietnam is alone in Southeast Asia in having been ruled by a mandarin bureaucracy before the coming of the West. The pattern of government, borrowed from China, seems to have been adequate for the needs of traditional society. Independence and a modicum of internal order were maintained for centuries until the intrusion of the modern West. Nor were Confucian ideas and institutions immediately set aside upon the arrival of the French. Mandarin examinations were not abolished until 1922, and the traditional bureaucracy was only gradually displaced by the French administrative system.<sup>7</sup>

Indications are strong that in Ching China there was a high degree of self-perpetuation within the mandarin class. About 80 percent of those who obtained mandarin degrees in the last

Chinese dynasty were the offspring of degree holders, despite the ideal of open access to the examinations.<sup>8</sup> Though no comparable research has been done for Vietnam, preference elsewhere in elite recruitment for sons of mandarins has been noted by some scholars.<sup>9</sup> It would be natural to assume that status and educational opportunity correlated highly through the French period also.

Educational facilities under colonialism were not extensive. Wurfel has pointed out that "In the early 1930's less than 1,000 attended universities. Nearly two-thirds of this number were in the single Indochinese university at Hanoi, and most of the rest were in France." As late as 1939, he continues, "... only about 6,000 Vietnamese were in secondary schools of all types, i.e., beyond the 10th grade." In the population as a whole, "... literacy was variously estimated at between five and twenty percent, thus differentiating a well educated elite even more sharply from the ordinary citizens."<sup>10</sup> One scholar has pointed out that in the 1930's some young men of "modest means" gained excess to the intellectual elite through higher education, but emphasized that it was the exception rather than the rule.<sup>11</sup> Nearly 20 years later, Robert Scigliano reiterated: "Secondary and higher education has been the preserve of the well off" [traditionally].<sup>12</sup> I suspect that, as Moore has demonstrated, as in the case of China the traditional Vietnamese elite never penetrated peasant society.<sup>13</sup> The saying, "The Emperor's law ends at the Bamboo hedge," reveals much.

Penetration of society in the older traditional nations of the West such as France, England, and Italy was accomplished by a bureaucracy followed by a political party.<sup>14</sup> It is true that there were many political parties in Vietnam during French rule, but they were constituted mainly by marginal men, French educated and urbanized in a

more or less Western sense. They were nationalists in orientation, but, historically, the nationalists in Vietnam had never developed a unified movement. Not only was there a multiplicity of parties and movements, but these groups were further divided internally by warring factions. Sacks points out that,

... Unlike the communists, who built their organizations in the jails and in exile, the nationalists blamed each other for defeat and engaged in bitter emigre squabbles. The nationalist leaders were manipulated by the French, by the Japanese, by the communists, and latterly by the Americans, with the result that a legacy of division and weakness has been perpetuated [in the South below the 17th parallel].<sup>15</sup>

Ho Chi Minh was not present in 1927 to participate in the CCP interparty dispute caused by Mao's Hunan Report. It seems certain that he soon learned the details. It would be according him too much credit to think that he disagreed openly with the "Moscow-Li Li-san line" and had joined Mao in urging the formation of a peasant-based party.<sup>16</sup> Nevertheless, one can interpret the evidence available and come to the conclusion that by 1941, when Ho returned to Vietnam after a prolonged and enforced absence of many years, he had enlarged his scope and focus of recruitment to include the peasant as the potential source of political power in Vietnam. It was at this time that he began to flesh out his organization with the help of anyone who would give it. The Chinese nationalists, the British, and Americans were his benefactors and sponsors alternatively and conjunctively during the war years.<sup>17</sup> From that point on, anti-Japanese nationalism formed the organizational cement necessary for the creation of his party. First anti-Japanese,

then anti-French, later anti-American nationalism lured the non-Communist elements of Vietnamese society into Ho's fold. The period 1941-1945 marked the beginning of the final liberation movement, and in this sense one can discern when upper peasant loyalties began to gather around new national leaders in a shift from the traditional elite. One can exaggerate the nationalistic motivation in explaining Ho's appeal to the Vietnamese. Agrarian unrest and other dissatisfactions existed in the Vietnamese villages and hamlets which were exploitable.<sup>18</sup> The important thing to recognize is that Ho Chi Minh had succeeded in building an effective organizational structure, a political party that was, by 1944, a constellation of all causes in the name of a united front.<sup>19</sup> It was this political party that eventually permitted Ho Chi Minh and the Communist Party to destroy the northern Vietnamese peasant world with its static institutions and nonsecular, particularistic ethos. If any one thing can be said about Ho Chi Minh, it is that he was first and foremost a pragmatic organizational genius.<sup>20</sup> Ho Chi Minh always preferred indirection to destroy opposition and build political support. He generally found a way to isolate the leadership of rival political parties from their support. The Communist Party subverted and absorbed organizations from the inside. Afterwards the opposition leaders who were not coopted were quietly put on the shelf or under it, as the case may have been.

It was in this fashion that Ho Chi Minh met the *penetration crisis*, or at least the first half of it. By 1958 the process was nearly complete in the areas comprising the DRV. In one sense the French did Ho Chi Minh a favor by prolonging the resistance for 8 years (1946-1954). It would seem that the longer a colonial people struggle against their masters, the stronger their national identity. Martyrs, symbols, traditions,

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political organization, and military units were created in the forge of revolution. A large "hero industry," as General Griffith has called it in the context of China,<sup>21</sup> was created; a very useful industry to have for any political elite, indeed.

An interesting side effect to the reversal of Western experience alluded to above occurred with the creation of this first Vietnamese mass political party.<sup>22</sup> In advanced Western nations, expansion of the franchise and growth of political parties followed modernization, while the reverse order occurred in Ho's Vietnam. I refer specifically to the elections conducted by Ho's provisional government in the autumn of 1945.<sup>23</sup> The franchise did not expand in response to the increase of political consciousness as in the West. The universal suffrage that marked the end of the long political development in Western nations really marked the beginning of such development in the DRV. The meaning and effect of such political institutions in the political environment of the DRV, and in many other new nations as well, are not the same as in the old. That is to say that the primary effect of the franchise and the political party in the DRV was not representation but *unification* of the country. Ho Chi Minh looked at the franchise as an important step in creating a national political identity. The act of voting on national issues represented an experience shared with fellow Vietnamese. It helped focus attention upon the national government and its policies and action, for under the Communist system everybody votes.<sup>24</sup> This is all the more impressive when one considers the communication problems in northern Vietnam at the time caused by the chaos left in the wake of Japanese defeat. The functions of representation and manipulation manifested in Western voting took second place, if they took any place at all, to unification in the DRV. Parenthetically, writers such as Wein-

stein seem to be misled about the function of voting in the DRV by equating it to Western practices.<sup>25</sup>

The second half of the solution to the penetration crisis was the development of a bureaucracy which completed the unification process in the DRV. This was done in an uniquely Asian way. The "can-bo" or political cadres that infiltrated peasant society formed a shadow government bureaucracy during the French occupation and suppression period after 1945. Fall has called this system one of "hierarchies parallel."<sup>26</sup> When areas were uncovered by the Viet Minh forces, these cadres surfaced and replaced the system of mandarins and notables and became the "de facto" government. Bernard Fall's description and analysis of Viet Minh administration during that struggle could well serve as a textbook on government and administration in areas of the south today.<sup>27</sup> Of course, during the Indochinese War, the sort of administration required was relatively simple and undemanding in terms of administrative quality. The bureaucracy established by the Viet Minh was, of necessity, streamlined to the immediate task of supplying the needs of the local Viet Minh guerrilla and later the PLA. The creation of an effective bureaucracy after 1954 really posed long-term problems which are not yet solved in the DRV.<sup>28</sup> As most leaders of newly emergent nations have discovered, to their dismay, a good revolutionary doesn't automatically make a good administrator. In the DRV, as in most ex-colonial nations, the legacy of trained bureaucrats was meager indeed. During the French period, a national bureaucracy was imported from the outside. It existed only in the depth and scope required for it to remain an efficient extractor of profit from Indochina. Outside of maintaining order, collecting taxes, and supervising the traditional Vietnamese institutions and organizations, the colonial government did little to modernize native

life.<sup>29</sup> The French, despite claims to the contrary, did next to nothing to prepare native Vietnamese to be administrators. When they did attempt to train Vietnamese toward the end of the colonial period, it was functionary administration and included little responsibility in real government. These people were the product of what has been called the "fonctionnaire spirit." This phenomenon, hardly unique in an underdeveloped country, has been described in the following uncomplimentary manner by one Vietnamese scholar, Nguyen Thai: "The fonctionnaires . . . manifested a certain reluctance to lead and act, they tended to avoid decisions and to advance procedure to cover their unwillingness to assume responsibility. They were more concerned with their civil service status and its petty privileges than any national program of administrative activity."<sup>30</sup> Whereas the war of 1946-1954 really helped Ho Chi Minh strengthen his party apparatus, it had a devastating effect on the preparation of civil servants other than in the military profession.<sup>31</sup>

In comparison with other new nations who parted company with their former colonial masters in relative friendship, where it was possible for Europeans to stay on and help during the early years, the DRV fared badly. After 1954 there existed only the barest administrative structure, and in some areas that structure was ripped up by its roots. Native Vietnamese bureaucracy was developed only with difficulty. The formal structure was hastily thrown together after the final French departure from areas above the 17th parallel and was found to be defective, not only in numbers, but in quality of its personnel. Inducements were offered to get former French colonial administrators to stay, but these efforts were generally unproductive.<sup>32</sup>

Of course, in Ho Chi Minh's view, the unification problem was not solved.

Unification was what he believed the war with the French was all about. He fully expected that the Geneva agreements of 1954 would permit relatively peaceful unification of all Vietnam through the promised elections of 1956. For a number of what he considered very good reasons, Ho Chi Minh expected the major powers, Russia and China, who were signatories to the agreements, to ensure the elections would be held.<sup>33</sup> It was the French who effectively prevented the elections from being held by pulling their forces out of the territory of the State of Vietnam prior to the time the two contending governments were to hold consultations over election procedures. The French, were, after all, the only power with military forces in place that could have ensured that the elections would be held, short of direct intervention of one or both of the "superpowers."<sup>34</sup> The French never were held directly responsible by the Ho Chi Minh in public statements. He maintained that the United States was ultimately responsible for Diem's refusal to accept the obligations incurred by the French Government at Geneva. This posture gave continuity to his position that the Americans simply replaced the French imperialists.<sup>35</sup> Seen from one level of analysis, the Viet Cong are in reality a bureaucratic and political apparatus necessary to complete the unification process that began in 1941 with the creation of the Viet Minh League.

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While the unification process continued apace below the 17th parallel after 1956 through the NLF/Viet Cong medium, the problems of consolidating and gains in the territory held by the DRV in the north were attacked. These problems had to do with finding means to integrate Vietnamese society so that it could be effectively harnessed to the politics of industrialization, in the Mao-

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ist style.<sup>36</sup> The integrative problems posed were twofold: allocation of social and economic benefits and burdens on an equal basis and the development of recruitment patterns for elite personnel along with the allocation of shares of the infrastructure to various regional and ethnic groupings in the DRV.<sup>37</sup>

The solution to the first problem resulted in a complete eradication of the traditional elite and the landed aristocracy in North Vietnam over a period of roughly 6 years, from 1954 to 1960-61. The process was marked by social and political violence such as the Nghe An peasant's revolt in 1956, two "land reform campaigns," a "thought reform campaign," a "rectification of errors campaign," and a miniature "100 flowers" interlude.<sup>38</sup> All this was accompanied by public trials of large and small landlords, purges of urban intellectuals, land redistribution programs, without, incidentally, permanent titles to the land (perhaps in view of eventual collectivization?). Criticism/self-criticism played an important part in the restructuring process, much as it had in Mao's programs and probably for the same reasons relating to communications problems in a similar peasant society.<sup>39</sup> The severity of the various programs and campaigns was remarkable to the degree that Ho Chi Minh had to interrupt them in 1956 temporarily and publicly shed tears where citizens could see his remorse. The North Vietnamese farmer found the land reform campaign especially repressive, and this resentment resulted in the public disgrace of its innovator, Truong Chinh. It is now well known that his demotion in the government and party was only a sham, a sop to dissident elements of the populace who suffered from overzealous "can-bo" and land reform cadres. Nevertheless, new campaigns were started in 1958 to persuade the peasant that private ownership was unproductive. By 1964 over 30,000 cooperatives existed in the countryside as a result of these

programs.<sup>40</sup>

It should be recalled that the Viet Minh League, at the time of its inception in 1941, was composed of many diverse elements. It was a front organization, if you will, and controlled by the Communist Party, known as the Lao Dong Party in later days.<sup>41</sup> This situation continued until roughly the fall of 1955 when a series of reorganizations took place in the governmental structure that complemented earlier political changes wherein the older Lien Viet Front was to be replaced by one called the Mat-tran To-quoc or "Fatherland front." This series of movements led to a consolidation of Ho's position and eventually to a real purge of former members of the Viet Minh. This purge was the "Nhan Van-Giai-Pham purge" that saw the destruction of politically unreliable North Vietnamese literary figures and intellectuals.<sup>42</sup> The historical record shows the Vietnamese Communist movement to have been one of the most extreme, one of the most fanatical, one of the most ruthless and dogmatic in the international movement. Bourgeois elements in the cities were eliminated from any influence in the control of the government machinery, and the small urban proletariat was integrated completely through the machinery of the "Viet-Nam Tong Lien Doan Lao Dong" (VLD) or "General Confederation of Labor" founded in 1945.<sup>43</sup> This was not a labor union in the Western sense. It was and is merely an effective tool of government designed to execute policies in matters of production and labor control. A tremendous proliferation of organizations designed to enmesh the Vietnamese citizen in the political and social fabric of the new nation took place after 1954. Widespread popular participation in the political life, the economy, and the society, as contrasted with popular control in a democratic sense, was fostered by changes in the Constitution and elected assemblies. Additionally, certain

autonomous regions were created in the northwest area of Vietnam to include ethnic minorities in the process and structure of the DRV political society.<sup>44</sup>

The net effect of all of this economic, social, and political restructuring was to place the individual at the mercy of the national economy and deprive him of any control over that economy or over the government. At the same time it involved him heavily in the new style of political life in the DRV. This was done, not only through the peasant's economic dependence, but also by compelling him to perform a large amount of passive political work. The Vietnamese peasant was deluged with information and propaganda, forced to attend endless rounds of rallies and speeches, and urged to the polls to vote in elections in which there was no choice.<sup>45</sup>

In a broad sense, the Vietnamese common man traditionally expected little or nothing from his national government but to be left alone. By contrast, he demanded a great deal from local government, whose identity with the village community was complete and which therefore exerted very great authority. This was in sharp contrast to the relatively small number of people who lived in the "city" (the nonagricultural and nonrural people), who were, for all practical purposes, part of the government or depended upon it—whose business was government. In any case, the latter group was so small that, as one scholar puts it, "government could be operated largely for its own benefit without any great price being paid by the rest of society, except during the periods of war."<sup>46</sup> The DRV destroyed this conception of government. Consequently, Ho Chi Minh and the Communist Party were faced with finding new relationships to permit identification and commitment. The correlative result was an increase in expectations and demands on govern-

ment. In some cases these demands were met; in others they were not, and violence and repression resulted.

All of this did essentially one service for Ho Chi Minh and the Lao Dong Party. It set the stage for industrialization. These new styles of political life created new structures that protected capital from the Vietnamese people. He had created a vastly more efficient system to squeeze the peasant for his surplus than the French or the traditional leaders had ever conceived of in their day. The new concept of government permitted capital formation by holding expenditures for agriculture to minimal levels and allowing all surplus in the form of an elaboration of taxes to be plowed back into the centrally directed economy as industrial investment.<sup>47</sup> This does not mean that for Ho Chi Minh all was success and there were no failures. Quite to the contrary, northern Vietnam traditionally has been a relatively rice-poor area, and the war against the French did additional harm to production. The year 1955 was particularly bad, and large amounts of grain had to be imported from other countries.<sup>48</sup> A considerable amount of social capital and human labor was spent to develop new rice-growing areas as well as to improve irrigation facilities in older agricultural areas. Under the circumstances, these improved and new water works can be considered capital investment.<sup>49</sup> Nevertheless, the period 1956 to 1964 showed respectable industrial growth rates although "takeoff," if defined as a largely self-generated, relatively sudden transition to sustained economic growth, was not yet in sight.<sup>50</sup> Coal and a number of basic ores occur in northern Vietnam. These resources were in the process of being exploited with Chinese and Russian financial help and technical assistance in 1964 when the bombing commenced.<sup>51</sup>

It is interesting to note that Ho's economic and political policies followed Mao's by roughly 4 to 5 years until



1965. Obviously, any further substantial economic development will have to be postponed until after the conclusion of the present war.

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One problem that Ho Chi Minh has not had to face that Mao Tse-tung has is that of a massive rural-urban migration in overwhelming numbers. Thus far, a "lumpenproletariat" has not developed. North Vietnam, like the rest of the Indochinese peninsula, except Annam, is underpopulated with the majority of the people clustered in the coastal plains and deltas. Agricultural and industrial labor shortages have occurred from time to time.<sup>52</sup> Skilled labor is at a premium, and these facts account, to some degree, for the massive influx of Chinese labor as well as Russian and Chinese technicians since 1955. The present war has influenced this influx only in degree and types of assistance, for the skilled and semiskilled labor would have been required in any event, war or not.

Much has been made of the educational achievements in the DRV by its protagonists. Ho Chi Minh claimed tremendous increases in literacy levels since the French period.<sup>53</sup> Beginning with the initiation of the "War against Ignorance," announced almost immediately after the declaration of independence of the DRV in 1945, there has been a tremendous drive to educate the North Vietnamese people.<sup>54</sup> To the casual observer the educational goals announced by Ho Chi Minh are of themselves impressive. The great effort and energy expended in this effort represent a solution to several problems faced by the DRV political elite which are discussed below.

The Stalinist model relies upon widespread education as a long-range measure to create a modern labor force. Well aware that rapid industrialization is impossible without a literate population and a broad stream of highly trained

professionals, the DRV Government placed great emphasis on education. The DRV mounted a major drive against illiteracy and, in the process, managed to reform and expand its educational system.<sup>55</sup> In addition to its long-term goal, the education program served to create an important source of support for the government and party. It has created a new sort of identity, a feeling of oneness among the Vietnamese people. Education provided a major ladder for upward mobility, particularly in the early stages of the Viet Minh struggle when schooling was offered to a large number of peasants and workers from uneducated families. Various studies have demonstrated that this upward mobility, or at least the promise of it, served to recruit many young men into the Viet Minh ranks and more recently into the Viet Cong-NLF fold.<sup>56</sup> As in other nations, it is no less true in North Vietnam that those who do rise become strong supporters of the system that has improved their lot. Fall has suggested that the school system of the DRV, along with the armed forces, were, "... perhaps the most solid elements of the political structure of the country."<sup>57</sup>

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Still another crisis the DRV and Ho Chi Minh faced was that of establishing legitimacy to rule.<sup>58</sup> The traditional symbol of legitimacy, the Emperor's seal, was passed to Ho Chi Minh in August 1945, but that was only a symbol. It is also true that Bao Dai abdicated in favor of Ho and his government in 1945, but this is one crisis that can reoccur in developing nations again and again. It seems to me that there are at least three indices that can be used to test progress of the government in ascertaining how it has met this crisis. They are:

- Loyalty of the population
- Conformity to the ruling elite
- Treatment of opposition<sup>59</sup>

There obviously may be more. As an example, surface effects in terms of frequency and types of conflict (legal and illegal strikes, demonstrations, riots, and revolts, et cetera) can be quantified and scaled to give one an index to measure legitimacy.<sup>60</sup> One must be careful here to make a distinction between political violence and other types of violence, although this is not always easy to do. The example presented during the Democratic Convention in Chicago in 1968 bears witness to this problem.

I will not dwell on the question of loyalty of the North Vietnamese population for the fact that the Viet Minh were able to sustain and ultimately win a guerrilla war, the "war of resistance," speaks for itself. It is true that certain elements of the population "voted with their feet" and moved south in 1954. I believe their reasons fall into a separate category and will treat with them subsequently.

The one group of people who have not really been assimilated totally into the DRV polity are the so-called montagnards, the ethnic minorities living in the northwest section of North Vietnam.<sup>61</sup> As late as 1962 the Hanoi newspaper *Nan Dan* complained that political work among the various tribes was proceeding much too slowly; that the Lao Dong party had been essentially unsuccessful in creating party cadres.<sup>62</sup> The real problem lies in coming to grips with the type of society and negative political influence exerted thereby among people involved in *swidden* agriculture.<sup>63</sup> This is certainly an area where much research needs to be done, not only in North Vietnam, but in the south as well. The DRV has done the next best thing. It has left them essentially alone by creating political subdivisions euphemistically called "autonomous areas." As previously mentioned, the DRV has had less trouble with the various tribal minorities than have the successive governments in the south.

As for the balance of the North Vietnamese population, nationalism and the promise of better things to come through Marxism-Leninism, with industrialization as the goal, serves Ho Chi Minh and the Communist Party in this process of obtaining loyalty to their rule.<sup>64</sup> "Uncle Ho's" reputation as the "father of his country," the wartime leader role, so to speak, is also manipulated as a symbol of legitimacy.

Conformity to the ruling elite serves as another index. In this case the party apparatus, which pervades to the lowliest, meanest village, has two functions: first, it is a communication system, primarily "oral" by definition.<sup>65</sup> It passes the word down, directs action, mobilizes the population in consonance with the current party line. The party serves to ensure loyalty by placing constraints on behavior. Put another way, the party apparatus is a method developed to impose the elite's preferences on the masses. Indoctrination is one of the most effective means of ensuring loyalty and, if the DRV is a valid example, when it is carried out thoroughly there are likely to be few fundamental differences articulated in the goals and preferences of the elite and the masses.

The second function the party apparatus performs is control of mass inputs until the totalitarian elite has achieved the society posited as its goal. That is to say, there is "feedback" in the DRV, but it seems to me that its quality is limited to information which allows the elite to redefine its goals so that they are never achieved (mass line)—thus ensuring its continued justification and legitimacy. Trotsky's permanent revolution, led by the Lao Dong Party, then exists.

The third index has to do with the treatment of opposition. Because the existing system in the DRV is a political mobilization system of the totalitarian type, it cannot tolerate individual or organized opposition. The Maoist model

demands consensus in order to achieve change. In the DRV the party apparatus has served as the combat organization to eliminate dissent. It is true that potential opposition in the form of various nationalistic groupings were permitted to exist during the period from 1945 to 1954.<sup>66</sup> The reasons for this seem obvious. Ho Chi Minh could not eliminate them while he was fighting the French. He needed all the support he could get. After 1954, however, he had the means and proceeded accordingly.

One method used to destroy political opposition was forced labor. Not very much has been written on this subject.<sup>67</sup> Forced labor served the function of ruthlessly destroying opposition by removing politically dangerous elements from circulation and by striking terror in the hearts of those who remained. The Lao Dong also apparently hoped to achieve some genuine political conversions through the political-education programs at the labor camps. In this connection a common misconception has arisen over the reasons for the exodus of the large number of North Vietnamese to the south in 1954. The religious reasons for the refugee exodus from the north have been played up to a considerable extent by the Western press and adequately investigated by scholars. Ellen J. Hammer is more balanced when she states, "... it would seem that revolution against forced labor and the tight economic and political controls and heavy levies imposed upon them by the communists, weighed heavily among the refugees, regardless of their religion." While elaborating the situation concerning forced labor, she said: "This policy [of forced labor] was reflected quickly in the flood of refugees that began streaming out of North Vietnam, taking advantage of the Geneva Agreements, to demand sanctuary in the south."<sup>68</sup>

One scholar points out that there is good evidence that forced labor is extremely inefficient.<sup>69</sup> Nevertheless, this

inefficiency has not been economically important to the DRV since the investment in forced labor is very low and capital in the DRV is in scarce supply and simply not available for this kind of enterprise. In more recent years the North Vietnamese Army and approximately 80,000 Chinese service troops have been used to perform work where labor-intensive national projects were undertaken.<sup>70</sup> The political elite of the DRV has, in the main, been successful in maintaining its position as the legitimate Government of North Vietnam although the impact of the war is, as yet, not clear.

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The next two crises are ones that the Western democracies faced *after* the process of industrialization had been completed. Oddly enough, the DRV has attempted to meet these two crises at the very start of industrialization. They are the crises of *participation* and *distribution*.<sup>71</sup>

The two most important indices of development relating to mass participation are the granting of *universal suffrage* and provision under law for the exercise of *civil rights* regardless of race, creed, and origin.<sup>72</sup> Universal suffrage was granted in 1945 under the first Constitution. I have already pointed out the real meaning of the vote in the DRV,<sup>73</sup> and, consequently, it is not necessary to develop this subject much further except to add two comparative points. It was not until after the beginning of the 19th century, under President Jackson, that the polity in the United States was expanded to include those who were not landowners or propertied men. Much later, in the early 1900's after industrialization had been completed, women were finally given the vote. In Japan it was not until industrialization was underway, during the Meiji Restoration, that the 1898

Constitution provided for limited suffrage. When the Diet met for the first time in 1890, only a half million people out of a population of nearly 40 million had the vote. A law of 1900 brought in the secret ballot. And the law of 1925 brought in universal male suffrage for the first time. Laws of 1945, passed under the occupation, gave all over the age of 20 the right to vote, females as well as males.<sup>74</sup> One can see from these comparisons the tremendous appeal the Stalinist model has for people who have never been allowed to participate in their nation's government. True enough, voting in the DRV only represents going through the motions, but the psychological and propaganda values are inestimable to the DRV political elite.

Civil rights are spelled out in the 1960 Constitution in a manner that reminds one of the American Bill of Rights. The first manifestation of intent in this regard was the socioeconomic leveling that took place in the various land reform/redistribution campaigns which started in 1953.<sup>75</sup> "Landlords," "feudalists," "compradors" were all targets. The ideal was the development of a "classless society" and, at least among the mass of the North Vietnamese population, the ideal was approximated, although the price in human terms was high. Beyond this leveling process there has been little recognition of human rights as we understand them; just the right of geographic mobility is restricted and controlled by the local party apparatus. Religious freedom is restricted as well. As in Western experience, or "bourgeois industrialization," the use of female labor (but not child labor) in difficult tasks is widespread.<sup>76</sup> The North Vietnamese boast that there is no discrimination in jobs on the basis of sex,<sup>77</sup> but it seems to me that one of the reasons many women are in the labor market is less the relaxation of discrimination than the more important fact that one breadwinner is not enough to support a family. Additionally,

women swell the available rural and urban labor force. Consequently, the civil rights written into the Constitution remain to be granted to the average North Vietnamese in fact of practice. True civil rights mean the toleration of opposition, and that cannot be accepted at this stage of development of the DRV.

The last crisis is the one that really seems premature in terms of Western experience. This is the distribution crisis<sup>78</sup> whereby the standards of living are raised through welfare politics. This crisis cannot be met at this stage of development in the DRV except in a very superficial way. The function of politics in the initial stages of industrialization under the Maoist model is the facilitation of rapid accumulation of capital at almost any cost in human welfare.<sup>79</sup> The one area where claims are valid is in the field of public health and safety. The DRV has made vigorous efforts to improve the health of its people since coming to power. Mortality from many diseases has dropped sharply, and the life expectancy has apparently risen.<sup>80</sup> A number of drives have been conducted to indoctrinate factory workers in safety practices, and the DRV claims great progress here. Beyond a lowered mortality rate, little has been done to improve the peasants' lot. The reason for this countercurrent to the depression of living standards—that is, holding consumption at a subsistence level is simply to increase the efficiency of the labor force.<sup>81</sup>

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There is one area of development that has not been dysfunctionally affected by the present war. This pertains to the strengthening and modernizing of the North Vietnamese Army (VPA). What the meaning and effect on future development of a more modern military establishment will be, in comparison with the other political and social

sectors of the DRV polity, is not clear. One can only speculate about future trends. It would seem, however, that the VPA's political influence has been strengthened and, for the present, the army has become a dominant voice in the councils of the Lao Dong Party as a result of the increased commitment of North Vietnamese forces in the south against a stronger and more technologically advanced enemy. In this context, there is evidence to detect a burgeoning "Red versus Expert" conflict among the party elite.<sup>82</sup> Presently, it would seem that the "experts" are in the forefront of the debate by virtue of the fact that General Giap was required for a time in 1968 to take personal command of VPA forces arrayed along the DMZ and in South Vietnam.<sup>83</sup> Giap's stand for use of large-scale forces and offensives, simultaneously with guerrilla warfare, appears to be in opposition to the Lin Piao rationale, i.e., consolidation of united front forces in a revolutionary, guerrilla warfare strategy.<sup>84</sup>

It is also instructive to note that the VPA has undergone a striking material modernization in comparison to its relatively primitive state in 1954 at the conclusion of the war against the French.<sup>85</sup> Because of the introduction of complicated weapons systems, such as armor, guided missiles, and advanced jet aircraft, one can infer a diversification or increase in skills required, so to speak, in the North Vietnamese military establishment. In relation to the civilian sector, this is asymmetrical development in terms of nation building. There has been no corollary development of an indigenous Vietnamese industrial base to support a modern military establishment. The design and equipment is Soviet and, to a small degree, Chinese manufactured. Nevertheless, technologically trained North Vietnamese do exist in the army and constitute a new, potential elite that will have to be integrated into the social and political

fabric of the DRV after the war. Their outlook will likely tend to be more pragmatic than the ideologists and intellectuals, excepting the late Ho Chi Minh, who have so far constituted the Lao Dong Party and DRV Government elite. According to one theorist this is the natural course of events based on the historical record of the Russian and Chinese Communist regimes.<sup>86</sup>

It seems probable that the next generation of North Vietnamese leaders will be more of the bureaucrat-administrator type, but it is difficult to predict what this will mean in terms of DRV policy; perhaps greater ideological flexibility and, depending upon the nature of the solution to the present war, a rapprochement with its Southeast Asian neighbors. There is some evidence that the pragmatic bureaucrats are now beginning to dictate policy in the DRV.<sup>87</sup> Ho Chi Minh's death should accelerate their ascendancy to power.

The point is, assuming that the United States continues to view the war as limited in scope and the VPA is not destroyed, a sizable modern military force will exist in North Vietnam after

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## BIOGRAPHIC SUMMARY



Lt. Col. Louis H. Buehl, U.S. Marine Corps, did his undergraduate work at Miami University, holds a master's degree in Far Eastern Studies from the University of Michigan, and subsequently did

additional postgraduate work in this area at Brown University. He has had numerous assignments as a line infantry officer, as a logistics officer, and served as staff secretary to the 1st Marine Air Wing (Japan) and later to 3d Marine Amphibious Force (Vietnam). Lieutenant Colonel Buehl is a graduate of the Naval War College, School of Naval Command and Staff (Class of 1969), and is currently assigned to the 5th Marine Division in Camp Pendleton, Calif.

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the cessation of hostilities. There will exist no defense industry capable of supporting and maintaining the VPA's modernity, and it seems safe to speculate that the military elite will insist on maintaining and improving its technology in light of perceived external and, to a lesser extent, internal threats.<sup>8,8</sup> For the foreseeable future, this can only be done through the acceptance of foreign (Russian or Chinese or both) assistance and aid.<sup>8,9</sup> The Vietnamese have thus far attempted to avoid overcommitment to either the U.S.S.R. or, most especially, the Chinese in light of past experience with Chinese imperialism.<sup>9,0</sup> Unless there is a very dramatic rapprochement between China and Russia, the North Vietnamese will remain in much the same position they now find themselves, between Scylla and Charybdis. If this logic proves correct, it is possible that the burgeoning "Red versus Expert" debate among the party elite will have serious ramifications for reconstruction and continued development along the lines of the Stalinist model. The anticipated debate will most likely center on alloc-

ation of resources, both domestic and foreign, to the tasks of nation building or rebuilding, as the case may be. The pressure from the military elite for a large share of these resources is likely to be great. If this proves to be the case, U.S. military and civilian policy planners will have to deal with the implications of the existence of an aggressive, militaristic, and undoubtedly disagreeable nation north of the 17th parallel. The sort of questions posed by this reality have a great deal to do with our military posture in that region of the world after the fighting ceases in accordance with any agreement reached in Paris. Key among these unanswered questions is what level of U.S. presence represents a credible guarantee of meeting our treaty obligations while maintaining low visibility in light of North Vietnam's chauvinistic irredentism in relation to South Vietnam and the DRV's xenophobia toward non-Marxist Westerners in general. Any decision reached in Washington and Saigon on these matters may well provoke additional crises in Hanoi for their political elite.

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## FOOTNOTES

1. A.F.K. Organski, *The Stages of Political Development* (New York: Knopf, 1965), *passim*; Lucian H. Pye, *Aspects of Political Development* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1966), p. 62-67.

2. Organski, p. 20-54.

3. Chester A. Bain, *Vietnam: the Roots of Conflict* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice Hall, 1967), p. 34-79; Charles A. Fisher, *South-East Asia*, 2d ed. (London: Methuen, 1966), p. 84-90.

4. One interesting method for consolidation of frontier areas used during the (later) Le Dynasty (1428-1504) was the establishment of military colonies in conquered areas of Champa to provide a self-supporting army of occupation. Bain, p. 66.

5. David Wurfel, "The Saigon Political Elite," *Asian Survey*, August 1967, p. 527.

6. Robert Shaplen, *The Lost Revolution* (New York: Harper, 1965), p. 253 ff.

7. Wurfel, p. 528.

8. Robert Marsh, *The Mandarins* (New York: Free Press, 1961), p. 82 ff.

9. Roy Jumper and Nguyen Thi Hue, "Notes on the Political and Administrative History of Vietnam," Michigan State University, Lansing, Mich.: 1962, n.p.

10. Wurfel, p. 528.

11. Charles Robequain, *The Economic Development of French Indo-China* (London: Oxford University Press, 1944), p. 37.

12. Robert Scigliano, *South Vietnam: Nation under Stress* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1963), p. 50.

13. Barrington Moore, Jr., *Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy* (Boston: Beacon Press, 1966), p. 162-178.

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14. *Ibid.*, p. 3-108. See also Organski, p. 56-58. Pye, p. 64-65, points out in this context, "The penetration problem is that of building up the effectiveness of the formal institutions by government and of establishing confidence and rapport between rulers and subjects."

15. Milton Sacks, "Restructuring Government in South Vietnam," *Asian Survey*, August 1967, p. 517.

16. Mao Tse-tung, *Report on Investigation of the Peasant Movement in Hunan* (Peking: Foreign Languages Press, 1953) provided the basis for this conflict.

17. That this statement is a fact is incontestable, for nearly every author writing of this period agrees. The only disagreement is over the details of how much and the degree of support by type and nature. No unclassified information has been released concerning OSS policy and activities in Indochina as yet. Shaplen, p. 31-35 presents, for example, details concerning this period but in an unscholarly and journalistic form without citations.

18. Bain, p. 91-96. See also Erich Jacoby, *Agrarian Unrest in Southeast Asia*, 2d ed. (New York: Asia Publishing House, 1961), p. 148-188.

19. Bernard B. Fall, *The Viet-Minh Regime* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University, Dept. of Far Eastern Studies, 1954), p. 2-3.

20. Douglas Pike, *Viet Cong* (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1966), p. 42-43. Pike's analysis of Ho's success is precisely this: [Ho Chi Minh's] "... primary genius was clearly in the field of organization."

21. Samuel B. Griffith, *The Chinese People's Liberation Army* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1967), p. 213.

22. Lipset points out the importance of mass parties in total ideologies thusly:

... attempt to create what the German-American political scientist Sigmund Neumann has called an 'integrated' environment, in which the lives of the members are enmeshed within ideologically linked activities. These actions are based on the party's assumption that it is important to isolate its followers from the 'flashhoods' expressed by unbelievers. Neumann has suggested the need for a basic analytic distinction between parties of representation, which strengthen democracy, and parties of integration, which weaken it.

Seymour M. Lipset, "Political Man," in Frank Munger, ed., *Studies in Comparative Politics* (New York: Crowell, 1967), p. 230.

23. See Fall, *The Viet-Minh Regime*, p. 8-10.

24. Lipset, p. 230-231, points out that while parties of representation view their function as primarily one of securing votes around election time, parties of integration

... are concerned with making the world conform to their basic philosophy. They do not see themselves as contestants in a give-and-take game of pressure politics, but as partisans in a mighty struggle between divine or historic truth on one side and fundamental error on the other. Given this conception of the world, it becomes necessary to prevent their followers from being exposed to the cross-pressures flowing from contact with outsiders which will reduce their faith.

25. Franklin B. Weinstein, *Vietnam's Unheld Elections* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University, Dept. of Asian Studies, Southeast Asia Program, 1966), *passim*. He takes, it seems to me, an overly legalistic position when he castigates Diem for not accepting the French obligation to hold elections in 1956 in accordance with the Geneva agreements of 1954.

26. Bernard B. Fall, *The Two Vietnams: a Political and Military Analysis* (New York: Praeger, 1963), p. 113.

27. See Fall, *The Viet-Minh Regime*, p. 21-31.

28. For a description of the dysfunctional effect of French administrative practices on the development of Vietnamese administrators, see Charles A. Joiner, "Administrative Role in Counterinsurgency," *Asian Survey*, August 1967, p. 554-555.

29. Bain, p. 91-95.

30. Nguyen Thai, *Is South Vietnam Viable?* (Manila: Carmelo and Bauermann, 1962), p. 46.

31. This is a generalization that has been made by a number of scholars concerning developing nations that have had to fight with their colonial masters for independence. See, for example, Morris Janowitz, *The Military in the Political Development of New Nations* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1964), p. 28; Bain, p. 145, in relation to Vietnam.

32. Fall, *The Two Vietnams*, p. 139. See also B.S.N. Murti, *Vietnam Divided* (Bombay, India: Asia Publishing House, 1964), p. 111.

33. Weinstein, p. 10, 21. He goes into great detail in examining the reasons for this belief, but essentially it was because the Russians said they would be held.

34. Fall, *The Two Vietnams*, p. 316-330. See also Denis A. Warner, *The Last Confucian* (Harmondsworth, Eng.: Penguin Books, 1964), p. 143. Both these authors present evidence that the United States supported and encouraged Diem's decision not to hold the elections. Nevertheless, the French were the ones that abrogated their responsibility to see that elections were held.

35. Ho Chi Minh, *Selected Works* (Hanoi: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1962), v. IV, p. 157-161, and *passim*.

36. Organski, p. 56-120. Pye, p. 65, for the concept of the "integration crisis."

37. See Karl W. Deutsch, "Social Mobilization and Political Development," *American Political Science Review*, September 1961, p. 493-514, for a similar concept of integration.

38. Fall, *The Two Vietnams*, p. 169-200. Fall points out that this all took place in an area where approximately 98 percent of the peasants already owned their land.

39. For a short description of these problems, in the view of one scholar, see Richard H. Solomon, "Communication Patterns and the Chinese Revolution," *The China Quarterly*, October-December 1967, p. 88-110. For greater detail and competent analyses of these problems, see Frans Schurmann, ed., *Ideology and Organization in Communist China* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1966), *passim*.

40. John C. Donnell, "North Vietnam: a Qualified Pro-Chinese Position," Robert A. Sealapina, ed., *The Communist Revolution in Asia* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1965), p. 148-149.

41. Fall, *The Viet-Minh Regime*, p. 39-40, 72.

42. Hoang-van-Chi, *From Colonialism to Communism: a Case History of North Vietnam* (New York: Praeger, 1964), p. 221-239.

43. Fall, *The Viet-Minh Regime*, p. 139-145.

44. For a description of the DRV efforts in these areas among the ethnic minorities, see Fall, *The Two Vietnams*, p. 148-152. Cf. in relation to the RVN efforts, among the same peoples in the south, see Pike, p. 14, 205, and *passim*. Fall's thesis is that the DRV has done very well while the RVN, in Pike's opinion, has done badly in attempts to involve these people in politics and the nation.

45. Hoang-van-Chi, p. 61 describes this interval.

46. John T. Bennett, "Political Implications of Economic Change," *Asia Survey*, August 1967, p. 589.

47. The evidence presented in Fall, *The Two Vietnams*, p. 169-200, permits no other interpretation. The system of taxes, borrowed from Mao Tse-tung's China, is designed, it seems to me, for only one purpose—to permit capital formation.

48. Fall, *The Two Vietnams*, p. 138-139, 153.

49. Clifford Geertz, *Agricultural Involution* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1966), p. 32 makes this distinction.

50. Fall, *The Two Vietnams*, p. 170-175. Fall makes the point that the amount of natural resources to be found in the DRV are so minimal that full-scale industrialization will never be possible without massive outside aid. Light industry seems to be the best solution.

51. *Ibid.*, p. 175-178.

52. *Ibid.*, p. 153, 169.

53. Ho Chi Minh, p. 440.

54. Fall, *The Two Vietnams*, p. 183-187.

55. Fall, *The Viet Minh Regime*, p. 148-149.

56. Pike, p. 376.

57. Fall, *The Viet Minh Regime*, p. 149.

58. Pye, p. 63-64.

59. These concepts were presented in a lecture given by A.F.K. Organski at the University of Michigan in December 1967. They are also contained and elaborated to a degree in Herbert Feith, "Indonesia's Political Symbols and Their Welders," Jason L. Finkle and Richard W. Gable, eds., *Political Development and Social Change* (New York: Wiley, 1966), p. 365-378. See also Pye, p. 63-64 for a discussion of this political crisis.

60. Vernon Van Dyke, *Political Science: a Philosophical Analysis* (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1960), p. 181.

61. Fall, *The Two Vietnams*, p. 151, states that there are over 2½ million ethnic minority members living in the DRV.

62. Donnell, p. 143, as cited.

63. For a description of the political and economic structures evolving from "swidden agriculture" see Geertz, p. 22-28.



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64. This point is made clear by the writings of members of the Lao Dong Party elite. See, for example, Le Duan, *On the Socialist Revolution in Vietnam* (Hanoi: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1965), v. IV, p. 21 and *passim*.

65. This concept has been introduced in Daniel Lerner, *The Passing of Traditional Society* (New York: Free Press, 1964), p. 54-65. He has designed a profile of communication systems that relate to political development. The profile is reproduced in part as follows:

SECTOR	MEDIA SYSTEM	ORAL SYSTEM
socioeconomic	urban	rural
cultural	literate	illiterate
political	electorate	designative

66. There were at least four organized nationalist groups in Hanoi that were in competition with Ho Chi Minh's party in 1945. See Hoang-van-Chi, p. 61. Also Fall, *The Viet Minh Regime*, p. 3-4, 39-80, for discussion of the united-front technique of overcoming opposition in 1945-46.

67. One Indian author who was a member of the ICC has written that the DRV found it necessary to resort to forced labor in 1953-1954 in order to obtain the manpower to build the roads and railroads in its territory linking the DRV to China. See Murti, p. 85.

68. Ellen J. Hammer, *The Struggle for Indochina Continues* (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1955), p. 85.

69. Organski, p. 112. Another aspect of this economic concern over forced labor is forced resettlement. Bain, p. 157, states that in 1963 over 100,000 people were forcibly resettled in the highlands in order to relieve food shortages and population pressures and to develop new export crops such as rubber. He states that this process has not improved food production or compensated for growing agricultural deficits.

70. "The Tet Offensive: How They Did It," *Newsweek*, 11 March 1968, p. 64, states that China promised 300,000 additional men would be furnished in order to free VPA troops to fight the United States. See also Bain, p. 159.

71. Pye, p. 65-67.

72. Cora A. Du Bois in her book *Social Forces in Southeast Asia* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1959), p. 48, has advanced an interesting proposition in this context. She states: "One is tempted to assume that literacy is positively correlated with the degree of political autonomy made available to an area."

73. *Ibid.*, p. 13.

74. Ardath W. Burks, *The Government of Japan*, 2d ed. (New York: Crowell, 1964), p. 94.

75. For an essentially Vietnamese description of these events by one who was there during the various campaigns, see Hoang-van-Chi, p. 163-245.

76. Fall, *The Viet Minh Regime*, p. 143; for use of women in the VPA, p. 94.

77. Article 24, Chapter III, "Fundamental Rights and Duties of Citizens," "Constitution of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam," Jan F. Triska, ed., *Constitution of the Communist Party-States* (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University, Hoover Institution on War, Revolution, and Peace, 1968), p. 203.

78. Pye, p. 66, describes this as "the final crisis" whereby the government must determine "Who is to benefit from government, and what should government be doing to bring greater benefits to different segments of the society."

79. Organski, p. 102-104; Fall, *The Two Vietnams*, p. 174, states that this is true in practice in the DRV.

80. Bain, p. 158; Donnell, p. 147, puts the population increase at about 3 percent per annum. He also states that birth control has been instituted.

81. Fall, *The Two Vietnams*, p. 162-168. Fall concludes, "Hanoi seems resigned to making eating and wellbeing a privilege limited to the strong and able-bodied, who are capable of fulfilling their production quotas."

82. Joiner, p. 8 ff.

83. Bernard Weinraub, "Vietcong Indicate Giap Heads Offensive in South," *The New York Times*, 27 February 1968, p. 3:6. This source also suggests a split in the party over the Vietnam war that resulted in Giap's assumption of tactical control.

84. Bain, p. 159, feels that the Chinese are responsible for the "hard line" and implies that the Lin Piao rationale was not meant to apply to the Vietnamese situation.

85. According to Dr. John S. Foster, Director of Research, U.S. Dept. of Defense, as quoted in "Enemy Hardware Threat Growing," *Navy Times*, 6 March 1968, p. 30.

86. Organski, p. 99-102.

87. "The Tet Offensive: How They Did It," p. 64-65. This source states that "... a secret delegation of Communist military experts from North Korea, China, and Cuba visited the war theater and reported back that the Viet Cong and VPA forces could not hold out many more months longer against the U.S. and its allies." As a result, a group of Politburo members of the Lao Dong Party, led by Troung Chinh, "... demanded a change of strategy." The article states that in March or April of 1967 the Central Committee of the party passed "Resolution 13" calling for a new strategy to achieve victory in the "... shortest possible time."

88. John Hughes, "Red Wedge: Cong Successes in South Vietnam Sharpens Peking-Moscow Rivalry," *The Christian Science Monitor*, 5 February 1968, p. 2. This observer presents evidence that the VPA has come to look to the Russian Army for its model in terms of equipment and supplies.

89. It seems unlikely that Western nations would offer to contribute to the maintenance of the VPA and more unlikely that such an offer would be accepted.

90. That this has been the case is made clear by many scholars. See, for example, Bain, p. 160; Donnell, p. 150-165. In an editorial in *Hoe Tap*, DRV leaders indicated irritation at being pushed by both sides. "Let Us Step Up the Theory-Formulating Task of the Party," *Hoe Tap*, Hanoi, September 1966, FBIS.



The use of force alone is but *temporary*. It may subdue for a moment; but it does not remove the necessity of subduing again; and a nation is not governed, which is perpetually to be conquered.

*Edmund Burke: Second speech on conciliation  
with America, 22 March 1775*