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Maximum Feasible Misunderstanding

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System and an equally valuable discussion of the nation's manpower needs as related to seeking an equitable basis for deferment policy. The author's conclusion is that although selective service in some form is necessary, the present system is outmoded and should be abolished. It is unable fairly to cope with a situation in which only a relatively small portion of the nation's available manpower pool is required at any given time. The result, he contends, is that the burden of military service tends to be borne disproportionately by low-income families in no position to engage in deferrable activities.

Mr. Marmion discusses the major alternatives to the present Selective Service System and concludes that a random selection or "lottery" system is an absolute necessity, especially during periods requiring less than total manpower mobilization. A voluntary army is dismissed as a useful concept, after discussion leading to the implication that it is not economically feasible and to the inference that it would be morally repugnant in a democratic society. The author feels that necessary manpower to maintain national security should be raised in such a way that everyone is called upon to share the burden and that an all-volunteer system would create a socially and economically isolated elite. Universal military training is also considered impractical because of the cost and because the number of men reaching the eligible age at any given time exceeds military requirements. National service is considered a possible means of selectivity, utilizing all available manpower in an acceptable manner; however, to date, the high cost, vagueness of proposals for its inception, and the colossal problems of coordination among various Government agencies render any immediate achievement unlikely.

Mr. Marmion makes it apparent that he is no fan of Lt. Gen. Lewis B. Hershey, the Selective Service Director,

upon whom he places much blame for failures to reform the system; this approach tends to place his objectivity in some doubt. The book is well documented, however, and in three appendices contains the 1967 report of the Civilian Advisory Panel on Military Manpower Procurement to the House of Representatives (Clark Report), a summary of the Report of the National Advisory Commission on Selective Service (Marshall Report), and Public Law 90-40 with Executive Order 11360 of 1967 amending the selective service regulations, making it a valuable reference work in an area which should be of professional interest to the military officer.

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Moynihan, Daniel P. *Maximum Feasible Misunderstanding*. New York: Free Press, 1969. 218p.

According to Dr. Moynihan, social programs such as the war on poverty and community action, which were based on maximum feasible participation by those people who should benefit from the programs, failed because of a phenomenon called "maximum feasible misunderstanding." In this well-written book the author explains the failure of the Great Society. Dr. Moynihan delves into the enormity and complexity of the problems associated with improving the lot of the underprivileged element of contemporary American society. Isolation of the real problems of the underprivileged, though difficult, is an ongoing project that has made significant progress. The search for solutions to these problems, according to the author, has not progressed nearly so far. While the Government has the financial wherewithal, it possesses insufficient knowledge to use its money effectively in solving the problems. The close relationship between political power and money guarantees, at least for the present, political control of antipoverty

programs and prohibits direct control of funds by professional social scientists. These social scientists do not have the answers either, but they might, according to Dr. Moynihan, discover them more rapidly if given the funds to experiment. The logical compromise is political control with professional advice. However, when professional advice conflicts with current political practice, current practice prevails, and the existing social unrest continues. The author gives no solutions, but he does present a clear picture of the problems. This book is recommended for those who are interested in furthering their understanding of present-day social problems in this country.

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Trumbull, Robert, *This Is Communist China*. New York: McKay, 1968. 274p.

In this book the author has recast the observations of a team of nine Japanese journalists and academic specialists who completed an extensive 3-month tour of Communist China in late 1966 and early 1967. These observations were originally written for the average readers of a Japanese daily newspaper. The reporters saw the cultural revolution as stemming from a fierce political struggle within the Chinese Communist Party, particularly between Mao Tse-tung and Liu Shao-chi, representing the hard line and the more moderate view, respectively. Throughout the book, in the recorded conversations with various Chinese, the love for and worship of Mao are reflected. The people believe that he is responsible for leading them out of the "bad old times," and their sayings pro-

vide fuel for the fire of propaganda upon which Mao lays so much emphasis. Also important in the support of propaganda and revolution are the famous wall posters which played such an important role in the dissemination of news to the Chinese people regarding the progress of the cultural revolution. Quite apparent to the observers was the attempt by the Chinese Communists to rewrite ancient history and to remold the people, especially the youth. The Red Guards' average age was 17, and they stressed the importance of the group rather than the individual—and effort to produce "the socialistic man." The Japanese were impressed with the material progress of China and the improvement of sanitary conditions, transportation, and industry. However, they noted that the Chinese standard of living was considerably lower than that in Japan and other industrialized countries.

The extreme hatred of the Chinese for the United States is stated over and over, and much of the propaganda activity is directed against the "cowardly United States." It is concluded that Mao has no intention of reaching a compromise with the United States concerning a Vietman settlement. Although the army is Mao's greatest source of strength today, the military strength of Communist China is evaluated as an unknown factor.

In spite of extensive Chinese rhetoric, this book is most interesting reading. It does give one a certain feeling for the existing conditions in China, at least as seen through Japanese eyes.

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