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American Foreign Policy

J. N. Laccetti
U.S. Air Force

Henry A. Kissinger

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student desire to identify with a social issue, such as civil rights, is a secondary component and results from feelings of guilt combined with altruistic emotions. These conflicts have repeatedly resulted in the most idealistic student movement converting itself into a blind, irrational power hostile to liberal democratic values and have led to eventual self-destruction. It is Professor Feuer's hope that, through exposure, the self-destructiveness and guilts of generational revolt can be reduced in order to gain the benefits of the students' idealism. Fortunately, considering its length, *The Conflict of Generations* is really two books in one. For the scholar there is detailed analysis of numerous student movements and up to nine pages of footnotes and source material at the end of each chapter. For the reader whose interest is confined to concern over the social unrest in the United States, the chapters of the book relating to foreign student movements can be skipped with little loss of understanding.

The Conflict of Generations is interesting, easy to read, and affords the over-30 generation a much needed insight into the motivations that drive the more radical elements of the young.

E.H. STEENTOFTE
Commander, U.S. Navy

Kissinger, Henry A. *American Foreign Policy*. New York: Norton, 1969. 143p.

The three essays which comprise this compact volume were written by Dr. Kissinger before he assumed his present position as President Nixon's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs. For all its compactness this book has a great deal to offer to anyone desiring a better perspective and understanding, not only of American Foreign policy, but of the structure and nature of the international system as well. The first essay, "Domestic Structure and Foreign Policy," looks at the widely differing

social and political systems in the world and outlines the problems that they pose for international relations. For the purposes of this essay, the author concentrates on the administrative systems and the backgrounds of national leadership groups in order to analyze how these affect the conduct of international affairs. One of the many incisive points made in this essay is that those who have succeeded in reaching the top in the Communist leadership have had to be "single-minded, unemotional, dedicated, and, above all, motivated by an enormous desire for power." This, says Kissinger, dictates against Soviet leaders' accepting declaration of good will at "face value." In his second essay, "Central Issues of American Foreign Policy," Kissinger stresses the "structural and conceptual problems rather than specific policy issues." The key root word is "concept," a word quite appropriate to the overall thesis that the author weaves in each of these essays. In this particular article the concern is that the United States must formulate clear conceptions of the kind of world order and structure she is looking for, and, at all times, the right questions must be asked about the whole essence of American foreign policy. The Nixon administration's intensive review of U.S. foreign policy is probably linked, at least in part, with Kissinger's ideas as here expressed. The last selection, "The Vietnam Negotiations," is the well-known article which first appeared in this year's January issue of *Foreign Affairs*. This essay—as well as the others for that matter—deserves careful reading, even if one has already read it or feels that he knows enough about it because of the amount of comment the article elicited.

As is customary with most of Kissinger's writing, these articles are not only perceptive and illuminating, but very well written indeed. This does not mean that one quick reading will give full value. A second or even third perusal will prove even more rewarding.

This is an excellent volume, especially suited to the curricula of the War College's first few months.

J.N. LACCETTI
Lieutenant Colonel, U.S. Air Force

Le Masson, Henri. *The French Navy*. New York: Doubleday, 1969. 2 v.

The French Navy was handicapped in many ways during the Second World War. Within a year all of the Atlantic and Channel ports were occupied by German forces, while French African possessions were threatened by De Gaulle's Free French movement. The action at Oran and the seizure by the British of all French vessels in ports under their control deprived the French Fleet of much of its fighting power, and the scuttling of the vessels in Toulon in 1942 further reduced its resources.

Henri le Masson has collected in two volumes a valuable historical reference work for the French Navy during World War II and during the interwar period. The average reader will be interested mainly in volume I, which describes the warships of the French Navy. Volume II deals with sloops, minesweepers, and other small auxiliary vessels.

In addition to the reference sections, the author begins his first volume with a brief commentary which sheds valuable light on French naval planning during the interwar years. In it he expresses criticism of the Popular Front government of Leon Blum and the social laws which that government enacted, claiming that they slowed down the rearmament efforts of the Third Republic.

In dealing with the 1940 defeat, the author defends the loyalty which the major units of the navy gave to the Vichy regime. He is critical of the British operation at Oran, pointing out that orders had already been given Admiral Darlan not to surrender the fleet—orders which were obeyed at Toulon 2 years later. As he was himself a naval liaison officer in London at the

time, his opinion on this matter is relevant.

While the primary benefit of this effort is its research effort, compiled from official sources, the author does neglect to discuss certain important facts about the French Navy. During these years, ship designs were very general in nature, and the details were usually supplied by engineers in the naval yards. This improvisation resulted in great variations in layout and performance.

A second factor the author fails to consider is the wisdom of allocating large resources to the French Navy at a time when the obvious enemy would be invading by land. Masson notes that the navy absorbed 21 percent of the French military budget until 1938, but he does not address himself to the question of whether such an expenditure was justified in the light of France's strategic situation. The French were naturally unwilling to rely on the British for the protection of their colonies, but could they, in fact, maintain simultaneously an army strong enough to contain Germany and a navy strong enough to play an independent role? The author apparently thinks this was possible, but the verdict of history leaves the question open to doubt.

D.G. WHITE
Ensign, U.S. Naval Reserve

Marmion, Harry A. *Selective Service: Conflict and Compromise*. New York: Wiley, 1968. v.p.

This book is a short, but informative, effort to analyze the Selective Service System. The author's intent is to demonstrate the shortcomings of the present "draft" and to point up the need for reforms in the law beyond those incorporated in the 30 June 1967 Act (Public Law 90-40) which amended the existing Universal Military Training and Service Act. The volume contains a valuable brief history of the Selective Service