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The Nixon Doctrine is a logical development in contemporary world affairs that reflects the economic recovery of our allies, fissures in the facade of the Communist monolith, and recognition of increased Soviet strategic power. The doctrine's principles of partnership, strength, and willingness to negotiate acknowledge limiting the U.S. role in the world but "not" withdrawal. When viewed as a whole, the elements of the Nixon Doctrine seem to clearly establish the necessity of a sea-based, blue-water strategy—a lower profile abroad yet with the intention to fulfill commitments by greater reliance upon a mobile sea-based strategy.

THE NIXON DOCTRINE AND THE NAVY

An article

by

Commander James A. Barber, Jr., U.S. Navy

Most people understand that the Nixon Doctrine involves a lowering of the U.S. profile throughout the world and further, places some limitations on our willingness to intervene overseas. The author is not nearly so confident that there is widespread understanding of some of its other implications and believes that it would be a mistake to view the Nixon Doctrine as an arbitrary decision by a single administration. On the contrary, the Nixon Doctrine seems to have been dictated by the course of world events.

At the end of World War II the United States was the only major power not devastated by the war. Europe and most of Asia were exhausted, but the United States was stronger in 1945 than we had been in 1940, and we enjoyed the significant military advantage of a monopoly of the atomic bomb. This

meant that if anything of significance was to be done in the world, whether of a military, economic, or political nature, we were the ones who had to do it. Walter Lippmann has argued that the resultant extension of U.S. influence was inherently temporary and artificial and could last only so long as the rest of the world remained prostrate.

But now the world is fundamentally different from what it was like in the first few years after World War II. Three important things have happened: (1) our allies have recovered economically and have grown in strength; (2) fissures have appeared in the Communist facade, so that although still hostile, communism no longer appears so monolithic; and (3) our nuclear monopoly has been replaced by a situation of mutual thermonuclear deterrence. No matter what administration was in Washington, these

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dramatic changes in the world would probably have led to a U.S. foreign policy which looked a great deal like the Nixon Doctrine. This is important since it permits us to plan on a longer term basis than if we had to assume that the Nixon Doctrine was a transient policy subject to change with the vagaries of politics.

What the Nixon Doctrine adds up to is an expectation that our friends and allies will carry a responsibility for their own security commensurate with their increased strength. We are not withdrawing from our commitments, and we recognize clearly that our nuclear strength has to provide a continuing protective shield. But we also recognize that the proportion of the load for military security that we have been carrying is fundamentally that which was established when our allies were weak, and now that many of them are strong, it is time for redistribution. Almost certainly our difficulties with the Vietnam war have hastened our reaction, but the Vietnam situation is not fundamental to the reorientation of our policy. It may be the occasion for the change, but it is not really the cause.

President Nixon, in a speech on 3 November 1969, set forth three key elements of what he described as "our cooperative approach to the defense of our common interests."

These were:

First, the United States will keep all of its treaty commitments.

Second, we shall provide a shield if a nuclear power threatens the freedom of a nation allied with us or of a nation whose survival we consider vital to our security.

Third, in cases involving other types of aggression, we shall fur-

nish military and economic assistance when requested in accordance with our treaty commitments. But we shall look to the nation directly threatened to assume the primary responsibility of providing the manpower for its defense.¹

As the President noted later, this policy requires that we render assistance in helping our allies to develop their own strength, and it also requires a careful balancing. If, particularly in the case of smaller allies

... we do too little to help them—and erode their belief in our commitments—they may lose the necessary will to conduct their own self-defense or become disheartened about prospects of development. Yet, if we do too much, and American forces do what local forces can and should be doing, we promote dependence rather than independence.²

Three Basic Principles. The President also has stated that the three basic principles underlying our foreign policy are partnership, strength, and a willingness to negotiate. There is nothing very earthshaking in these principles, but the way in which they are interpreted and emphasized adds up to a fairly comprehensive redirection of our foreign policy.

The heart of the Nixon Doctrine lies in the interpretation of the first principle, that of partnership. The central thesis of the doctrine, as expressed by the President, is:

... that the United States will participate in the defense and development of allies and friends, but that America cannot—and will not—conceive *all* the plans, design *all* the programs, execute *all* the decisions and undertake *all* the

defense of the free nations of the world. We will help where it makes a real difference and is considered in our interest.³

The Nixon Doctrine, in other words, does amount to a limiting of our role in the world, but not a withdrawal from that role. The President has argued that, given the changed nature of the international world and the pressing demands of neglected domestic needs, this is the only way in which the United States can carry out its responsibilities.⁴

It is important to note the stress the President has laid upon the role of U.S. *interests*, as opposed to just commitments. Although he has stressed that the United States will meet its commitments, he has also pointed out that:

It is misleading . . . to pose the fundamental question so largely in terms of commitments. Our objective, in the first instance is to support our *interests* over the long run with a sound foreign policy. The more that policy is based on a realistic assessment of our and others' interests, the more effective our role in the world can be. We are not involved in the world because we have commitments; we have commitments because we are involved. Our interests must shape our commitments, rather than the other way around.⁵

As this writer understands it, this means that we will honor our present commitments, be cautious in undertaking any additional commitments, but may well render support even in the absence of a formal commitment if we feel our interests are at stake. But the key to the Nixon Doctrine is that primary responsibility is seen to rest with the nation threatened and that the role of the United States is a supporting and not a primary role. This concept has some pretty clear implications for other

policies, including naval policy, subjects which will be addressed a little later.

The second of the three basic principles enunciated by President Nixon is that of strength. It is interesting that this principle is set forth at the same time that we are cutting back sharply on military budgets. The logic involved seems to be that as we reduce the degree of our overseas involvement, we can also trim the size of our military establishment, but that there is an irreducible minimum of essential military strength. The problem in this unpredictable world is knowing just what that irreducible minimum is. The concept formulated by the administration to describe the level of military strength which is necessary is that of "sufficiency." But this does not really provide a very precise or detailed answer to the problem of the kinds and strengths of military forces which we need.

In the case of strategic sufficiency, the concept seems to mean that we have foregone any attempt to achieve clear thermonuclear superiority over the Soviet Union but do intend to maintain strategic forces sufficient to "deter all threats of general war no matter what the cost."⁶

In the case of general-purpose forces, the administration has settled upon what has been termed the "one and one-half war" strategy. This means that we will, at least in theory, "maintain in peacetime general-purpose forces adequate for simultaneously meeting a major Communist attack in either Europe or Asia, assisting allies against non-Chinese threats in Asia, and contending with a contingency elsewhere."⁷

Although not really spelled out clearly in the doctrine, the "major Communist attack" for which our forces are to be prepared is considerably smaller than the maximum attack they are capable of mounting. The reasoning is that the nuclear deterrent places some sort of upper limit on the size of any

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conventional conflict and that we need conventional forces only of a size adequate to meet those conflicts that can develop within this limitation. The implicit expectation is that conventional war larger than can be met with our existing conventional forces will escalate to nuclear war. Thus our strategic nuclear deterrence forces have the burden of insuring that conventional conflicts remain within nonnuclear limits.

The third of the basic principles is that of willingness to negotiate. This does not imply that the differences between the Communists and ourselves can be talked away. As the President has stated:

We are aware of the difficulty in moderating tensions that arise from the clash of national interests. These differences will not be dissipated by changes of atmosphere or dissolved in cordial personal relations between statesmen. They involve strong convictions and contrary philosophies, necessities of national security, and the deep-seated differences of perspectives formed by geography and history.⁸

Yet there are areas in which we have common interests. One of these is arms control. In an arms race there is no inherent advantage in an increase in strength if that increase is matched by the other side. For example, the United States and the Soviet Union each have something more than a thousand operational ICBM's. If the strategic arms race continued, we could find ourselves a decade from now in a position in which each of us had multiplied our capability, but were still roughly equal. Both sides would have spent an enormous amount of money in the pursuit of military security—but, if anything, we would both be somewhat less secure than we are now. Thus we have a mutual interest with the Soviet Union in placing some

sort of effective damper on the strategic arms race—which is, of course, what the SALT talks are all about. We cannot expect to resolve the fundamental differences between the Communist and non-Communist worlds by negotiation, but we do have a clear common interest in avoiding any large-scale war and insuring that smaller scale conflicts are limited. Thus there is at least some prospect of improving the security of ourselves and our allies through direct negotiation.

The world has changed in important ways since the time the outlines of our post-World War II national strategy were formed: increased relative strength on the part of our friends and allies, some loss of cohesion in the world Communist movement, a vast increase in Soviet nuclear capability, recognition of increased domestic needs, as well as discomfort over the costs of the war in Vietnam, which have been social and political as well as economic and military. What is being argued here is that the Nixon Doctrine has, in large measure, resulted from a recognition of these changes and is not just a product of the philosophy of a particular political administration. We may therefore expect the trends incorporated in the doctrine to have more permanence than they might otherwise have.

The policies embodied in the Nixon Doctrine have some rather specific implications for military policy, for the Navy, and for naval strategy. When viewed as a whole, the elements of the Nixon Doctrine seem to me to add up very clearly to the necessity of a sea-based, blue-water strategy. A lowered profile abroad, fewer foreign bases, a reduction or even withdrawal of many of our land-based forces overseas, and the exercise of a much greater degree of restraint in getting directly involved in overseas conflicts all signify a much lower key U.S. military presence abroad. Yet, at the same time, we have emphasized our intention to fulfill all of

our commitments, to act vigorously where our interests are directly involved, and to provide continuing support to our friends, although asking them to assume more of the direct burden of their own defense. The only way of accomplishing these somewhat conflicting aims is to place greater reliance upon a mobile sea-based strategy.

Naval forces have certain unique virtues in the support of a strategy which seeks to combine a low profile with the ability to take effective action when required. First of all, naval forces operate in an international medium: the high seas. More than 100 of the nations of the world border directly on the high seas. This gives us direct access to most of the world's trouble spots. Naval forces, unlike land-based forces, do not need to request overflight authorization or the diplomatic clearances necessary to move or land troops before positioning themselves in the neighborhood of potential trouble spots. The sea provides both freedom and flexibility in the deployment of military force in advantageous ways in advance of actual trouble.

Second, naval forces are not dependent upon local bases to nearly the same extent as are other kinds of military forces. Ships are integral units which carry much of their own support with them, and through mobile logistic support they can be maintained on forward stations for long periods of time. This means that naval forces need not involve the political difficulties inherent in troops or bases on foreign soil. Perhaps even more important from the standpoint of the Nixon Doctrine, naval forces do not involve the same pressures toward involvement that exist when U.S. forces are physically present in an area of crisis.

U.S. bases and troops in foreign countries can serve as prime targets for anti-U.S. propaganda and, in the event of a local insurgency, can be the object of insurgent attack. Such attacks are

never taken lightly, particularly if American lives are lost, and our natural and proper reaction is to defend U.S. lives and property. This can easily escalate into full U.S. involvement, more as a matter of instinctive reaction than of carefully considered national interest. On the other hand, if U.S. forces in the area are sea based, the likelihood of such an inadvertent involvement is greatly reduced. We still retain the capability of providing military or logistic support or of protecting or evacuating U.S. citizens, but we are not in danger of becoming involved in a local controversy against both our will and our best national interest.

Virtually all types of sea-based forces have a role in this kind of strategy, but two are of particular importance: the carrier task force and the amphibious forces with their embarked contingents of U.S. Marines. The mobile striking power of the attack carrier task force gives us an ability to mass tactical air forces practically anywhere in the world with a speed and flexibility which can be matched no other way—particularly if we are no longer able to depend upon U.S. prepared and maintained overseas airbases throughout the world. It is worth mentioning that our recent forced withdrawal from Wheelus Air Force Base in Libya has demonstrated again just how vulnerable our overseas advanced bases can be to political pressure.

In many situations which call for military action, as, for example, in the protection of American lives and property or in the support of a friendly government against an attempted coup d'état, the ability to move rapidly counts for a great deal more than does the ability to provide much larger forces later on. The Marines, with their unsurpassed ability to project power ashore from their sea bases, provide the capability of acting rapidly to control situations before they get out of hand. As an Army friend is fond of reminding me

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whenever I dwell upon the fact that 70 percent of the earth's surface is covered with water, "the other 30 percent is where the people live." The Marines provide the Navy with the capability of going where the people live, when the situation dictates, without the liabilities of being there when it does not.

There are, of course, times when we want to make it absolutely clear in advance that we *are* going to be involved. An example of this is our deliberate policy of maintaining a substantial troop presence in Europe as a clear signal to the Soviet Union and to our allies that we are firmly committed to NATO defense and would be almost automatically involved in any large-scale hostilities in Europe. Yet, if we are to carry out the full implications of the Nixon Doctrine, there are many cases where we do not want this sort of automatic involvement—but do want to have the capability of rendering prompt and effective support in situations in which we consider it in our interest to do so. Only sea-based forces provide this flexibility.

Finally, the emphasis in the Nixon Doctrine upon partnership also has implications for a sea-based strategy. Most importantly, if we are to be able to render effective support to our allies, we must have the clear capacity to keep open the sea lines of communication over which that support must come. Unless we are able to do this, we will be incapable of providing meaningful military support.

The author is concerned that there has been insufficient attention outside the Navy to the critical importance of being able to keep the sealanes open and the immense difficulty of doing so in the face of the Russian submarine threat. Two elements of our strategy under the Nixon Doctrine are particularly vulnerable on this score. One is the idea of the "one and one-half war" strategy, which is based upon a policy of maintaining, in peacetime, forces

adequate for meeting a major attack in either Europe or Asia, but not both. Implicit in this strategy is the necessity of being able to reorient forces from one side of the world to the other in a short space of time. Only a small portion of the job can be done by air. The United States has learned over and over that more than 95 percent of the supplies of war have to be moved by sea.

If, as the strategy assumes, the contingency to be met is a "major Communist attack," it seems foolhardy to expect to be able to accomplish such a major reorientation unopposed. I think we are sometimes prone to forget just how close we came to losing the Battle of the Atlantic in both World Wars. In both cases final success came only after a period of U-boat dominance. Only after large increases in the quantity and quality of antisubmarine warfare (ASW) forces, after the strategy of escorted convoys had been adopted, and, in the case of World War II, after the technical breakthroughs of radar, radio direction finding, improved sonar, and adoption of hunter-killer tactics were sea lines of communication in the Atlantic adequately protected.

To these lessons of history must be added recent breakthroughs in submarine technology and the existence of a Soviet submarine force substantially larger than that possessed by the Germans in both World Wars. Even the most optimistic proponent of ASW would not claim that advances in that art have done any more than hold even with the improvements in submarine technology. The moral is that it is unrealistic military planning to expect to be able to do any better against full-scale submarine attacks against lines of communication than we were able to do in the two World Wars. We may not be able to do as well. To expect to be able to conduct a major transfer of troops, equipment, and supplies in a timely way against the opposition of the

strongest submarine force the world has ever seen is to disregard the clear lessons of history.

A second and closely related problem has to do with our policy of maintaining a capability to conduct a "90-day defense" in Europe. For such a policy to be realistic we must be able to provide significant reinforcements to the European theater before the end of that time. Again, a significant part of the early part of that job can be done by air—but this must be followed up within a fairly short period of time by massive sealift. This writer is not at all sanguine about our ability to do this with the forces we presently have or will have in the foreseeable future. This is not to say that we would inevitably lose a new Battle of the Atlantic. However, it could be at least as long, bloody, costly, and discouraging as its predecessors and that to expect it to be anything else is to be unjustifiably optimistic.

At least a portion of the solution to the problem of defending the seaways lies in the partnership portion of the Nixon Doctrine. The concept of partnership involves a pooling of military resources where appropriate, and naval forces are particularly effective in this kind of partnership. Again, this is because they are integral and self-contained units, and their organization is such that the problems of communication and coordination are much less difficult than in almost any other kind of multinational force. This would appear to be borne out by the success of the NATO Standing Naval Force Atlantic. A wider application of the concept may help in solving the problems of protecting our sea lines of communication.

The point to be emphasized is that the problem of maintaining sea lines of communication is basic to any other than the most limited kinds of overseas involvement. The United States, although dependent upon imports of some critical materials, is much less

vulnerable to cutting of supply lines than are some of our close allies—as, for example, Europe's dependence upon petroleum imports. If we are to support our allies, we must be able to protect them against any major stoppage of imports. This is a broad-gauged problem of sea control, having aspect of ASW, surface and air defense.

It should be a fundamental part of our maritime strategy to possess, in concert with our more important allies, the capability to counter any attempt by the Soviet Union to interrupt important sea communications, the greatest threat to which is submarine warfare. We should be able to counter this threat *directly*, without being faced with the choice between giving in or escalating to nuclear war.

The Navy's Role in Nuclear Deterrence. Perhaps the most fundamental task we can ask of our national military strategy is that it be effective in deterring strategic nuclear war. This was touched on earlier on the concept of "sufficiency" as a strategic goal of the administration. President Nixon has defined the overriding purpose of our nuclear strategic posture as being political and defensive. He has stated that the purpose is:

... to deny other countries the ability to impose their will on the United States and its allies under the weight of strategic military superiority. We must insure that all potential aggressors see unacceptable risks in contemplating a nuclear attack, or nuclear blackmail, or acts which could escalate to strategic nuclear war, such as a Soviet conventional attack on Europe.⁹

At the same time we have acknowledged that the Soviet Union now possesses powerful and sophisticated strategic forces which approach and in some

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categories exceed ours in both numbers and capability.¹⁰ We have also, by not embarking on a large-scale program of missile procurement of our own, implicitly recognized the futility of attempting to restore the margin of strategic superiority which we possessed a decade ago. At the same time we are a bit worried that the Soviet Union may be aiming at achieving such superiority for herself. These facts have rather clear implications for the place of naval forces in our deterrent strategy.

During the coming decade it is difficult to imagine any viable alternative to maintaining a U.S. nuclear strike capability with sufficient survivability to insure the destruction of any opponent, even after a surprise first strike.

To use the strategic jargon, we must have an assured second-strike capability—that is, nuclear strike systems that can survive any kind of a surprise attack and still be able to strike back at the aggressor with devastating effect. An important part of the strategy is that any potential aggressor must be clearly aware that we have this capacity and thoroughly convinced that we will use it.

On the other hand, a capability on our part of disarming the Soviet Union by attacking first is neither feasible nor desirable. It is not feasible because no matter how massive an attack by us, the Soviet Union would almost certainly have sufficient deliverable weapons remaining to destroy us as a viable society. It is not desirable because the possession of a first-strike capability by the United States would have the inevitable effect of making the Soviet Union trigger-happy in a crisis, for fear of being disarmed by a surprise attack.

To maintain the assured U.S. capability to strike back even after a surprise attack, which is an absolute strategic necessity, we find that there are good arguments for placing additional emphasis upon the sea basing of strategic weapons systems.

First, the sea basing of strategic systems directs any attack against these systems seaward, rather than against the U.S. landmass itself. Any attack against land-based sites would cause widespread collateral (civilian kill) damage, whether such damage was intended or not. Attacks directed against sea-based missiles would not involve this kind of damage to nonmilitary targets.

Second, sea-based systems are, in most cases, more survivable than equivalent land-based systems. This is a particularly important point with respect to second-strike capability. A deterrent system which cannot survive a surprise attack is worse than useless because it invites such an attack. Sea-based systems, particularly submarine-based systems, have a high survival value. We are made particularly aware of this when we face the problem of trying to counter equivalent Soviet systems.

Third, basing deterrent missiles at sea complicates the defensive problem of any potential opponent. Because of their mobility, he cannot do much in the way of pretargeting against them. Seaborne missiles are also much more difficult to counter by interception after launch. As viewed from the Soviet Union, ICBM's based in the continental United States have to come through a relatively narrow corridor, significantly limiting the problem of missile defense. Sea-based missiles, on the other hand, present almost a 360 degree potential threat around the Soviet Union and greatly complicate the necessary defenses. Further, the unpredictable range of sea-based systems reduces the detection and vulnerability time of the offensive missile, making defense even more difficult. For these reasons it would seem prudent that with "sufficiency" as our strategic criterion, we should move toward placing a large portion of our strategic nuclear deterrence forces at sea. We should, however, stop short of total dependence upon sea basing to avoid becoming vulnerable to techno-

logical breakthrough and to avoid giving potential enemies a single defense problem to solve. It is to our advantage to force them to consider defense against a variety of systems.

The Cold War and the Use of Military Force. Another area in which we have to do some rethinking has to do with the whole role of military forces in the kind of world in which we have to live. The American people have always had a strong tendency to think of war as an aberration. We have thought of peace as the normal state of affairs, and when involved in a war we have always been anxious to win it as quickly as possible to permit a return to "normalcy." Because of our tendency to view the world in these black and white terms, we have sometimes overlooked the spectrum of conflict which can, and usually does, lie between the extremes of peace and war. As an example, every command in the Navy has file cabinets full of "contingency plans" which provide instructions on what to do in a variety of circumstances. Almost all of these circumstances envision actual fighting. So far as I am able to tell, we do not put nearly as much intellectual effort and energy into how to handle situations which fall short of actual military violence. Yet I would maintain that these are the ones that are the most important in our present world. In the quarter century which has elapsed since the end of World War II, the Communists have managed some notable expansion of power and influence. However, during this same period only a handful of Soviet soldiers have been casualties in any kind of violent military action. During the same period the U.S. Armed Forces have sustained more than 300,000 casualties. This by itself should suggest that perhaps we are doing something wrong.

One of the greatest military strategists who ever lived was Sun Tzu, a Chinese gentleman of the 4th century

B.C. who is still read carefully by serious students of strategy today. He taught that the "supreme art of war is to subdue the enemy without fighting."¹¹ Sun Tzu believed that intellect and moral strength were decisive in war, and if they were properly applied it was possible to wage war with a certainty of success. War was never to be undertaken thoughtlessly or recklessly, but was to be carefully preceded by measures designed to make it easy to win. The aim was to isolate and demoralize the enemy and to break his will to resist. Thus it was possible to conquer his army without a battle and to take his cities and overthrow his state. Only when the enemy could not be overcome by these means was it necessary to have recourse to armed force.¹²

How carefully Soviet naval strategists have read Sun Tzu is a matter of conjecture, but it is well known that Mao has read him carefully. It is clear, however, that the strategy being pursued by the Soviets is based upon a philosophy very similar to that of Sun Tzu. In the Middle East, for example, the use by the Soviets of naval presence, military and naval aid and advisers, diplomatic support, trade agreements, and economic assistance add up to a coordinated and apparently successful means of substantially increasing Soviet influence in one of the strategically important areas of the world. All of this has been accomplished with only the most limited risk of Soviet Armed Forces actually becoming involved in large-scale fighting. It must be understood, however, that this kind of non-violent employment of military force must be based upon both genuine military capability and a belief on the part of the opponent that it can and will be used if circumstances dictate. It is this kind of game we have to learn to play more effectively than we have done in the past, and if the Nixon Doctrine is to be successful, it is imperative that we do so.

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Implementing the Nixon Doctrine.

There are those who have accused the Nixon Doctrine of being simply a theoretical excuse for cutting back military budgets, rather than a basic rethinking of the requirements of U.S. foreign policy. In a sense the doctrine is vulnerable to that charge, because the negative implications seem to have been carried out with more speed and enthusiasm than have the positive implications. This should not be surprising since, in the nature of things, the negative tasks are usually easier to accomplish. Yet, if the Nixon Doctrine is to be an effective national strategy and not just a theoretical peg on which to hang sharp budget cuts, there are a number of positive requirements.

The concept of partnership, for example, demands that we carefully re-examine our foreign aid and military assistance programs. The questions involved are much too complex to try to deal with in a paper such as this, but it does seem clear that if our allies are to provide more of their own defense, it is necessary to insure that they have the means to do so. This means both reducing their vulnerability through gains in economic and political strength and making sure that they have both the equipment and training to be effective in their own defense. At the same time we need to recognize that the interests of the United States will not always be identical with those of even our closest allies. In unity there may be strength, but alliance politics inevitably put greater strains on our diplomacy than would a "go it alone" policy. Partnership and collective defense is a right and proper policy, but we would be unwise to ignore the very real difficulties that can be involved.

Another implication of the emphasis upon partnership which requires action is the need to improve the coordination between ourselves and our allies and to develop programs which permit them to provide some of the leadership we have

often been in the habit of assuming to ourselves. For example, it would seem that there would be some significant advantages if there were to be established a NATO naval squadron in the Mediterranean. The Standing Naval Force Atlantic which has already been mentioned, has already proved the efficiency of the concept. We lose nothing in such an arrangement, for, as in the case of STANAVFORLANT, national forces are subject to immediate recall at any time. Yet what we would gain seems to me to be important. First, a visible symbol of NATO unity and purpose. Second, continuous training and practical experience in operating together, rather than just an occasional exercise. And finally, the moral weight of the whole Atlantic community behind force actions, whether they be simply making port visits or standing by for possible contingency action. Certainly, problems would be involved, but they are soluble, and the benefits to be gained are well worth the effort that would be involved.

BIOGRAPHIC SUMMARY



Comdr. James A. Barber, Jr., U.S. Navy, did his undergraduate work in economics at the University of Southern California. He holds an M.A. in economics from Vanderbilt University and an M.A. in international relations and a Ph.D. in political science from Stanford University. His primary operational experience has been in destroyers, most recently as Executive Officer of the U.S.S. *Henry W. Tucker* (DD 875) and as Commanding Officer of the U.S.S. *Hissem* (DER 400). He recently served as Plans Officer on the staff of the Naval War College and in July will assume command of the U.S.S. *Schofield* (DEG 3). Commander Barber recently received the Alfred Thayer Mahan Award for literary achievement from the Navy League.

In a less optimistic vein, there is room for concern that we are not doing enough to face up to the blue-water implications of the Nixon Doctrine. A blue-water strategy is not something that happens automatically. You have to have the forces and the training and the doctrine to make it work, particularly in the light of the impressive growth in capability of the Soviet Navy. The author is afraid that we are likely, in the future, to encounter situations in which we are in a position of distinct

naval inferiority. At the time of the Cuban missile crisis of 1962, the United States had unmistakable local naval superiority. In some future crisis this may not be so. In the last several years we have decommissioned about 400 ships of the U.S. Navy. During the same period of time we have commissioned 132 new ships. Unless this trend is reversed, the Navy may not be strong enough to carry out the full implications of the Nixon Doctrine for a sea-based strategy.

FOOTNOTES

1. "The Pursuit of Peace in Viet-Nam," *The Department of State Bulletin*, 24 November 1969, p. 440.
2. "U.S. Foreign Policy for the 1970's: a New Strategy for Peace." A Report to the Congress by Richard Nixon, President of the United States. *The Department of State Bulletin*, 9 March 1970, p. 294.
3. *Ibid.*, p. 276.
4. *Ibid.*
5. *Ibid.*
6. *Ibid.*, p. 321.
7. *Ibid.*, p. 322.
8. *Ibid.*, p. 273.
9. *Ibid.*, p. 319.
10. *Ibid.*, p. 318.
11. Sun Tzu, *The Art of War* (Harrisburg, Pa.: The Military Services Publishing Co., 1944), p. vii.
12. *Ibid.*, p. 49.

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The notion of strategy implies an organized authority capable of sustained action along lines of policy.

*Paul H. Nitze, Address to the Army War College,
27 August 1958*