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Insurgency is either endemic or epidemic in the world today and will continue into the foreseeable future—certainly until some new form of stability is reached or man no longer inhabits the planet. Vital to insurgent movements is leadership and organization. An insurgency is no place for part-time amateurs or halfhearted philosophers. The leader must have only one goal in mind—power! If diverted from this objective, he will be liquidated, evicted, or his movement is doomed to failure.

INSURGENCY: Origins and the Nature of the Beast

A lecture delivered at the
School of Naval Command and Staff
at the Naval War College
by
Professor Lyman B. Kirkpatrick

There was a time in Washington during the Kennedy administration when insurgency or counterinsurgency became a more popular form of study and interest than perhaps even some of the more familiar indoor sports. However, as I am sure Colonel Long made clear in his earlier discussion, nothing is really new. There has been insurgency throughout the history of man ever since the cavemen started to band together and beat each other over the head with clubs. Once any established form of authority was created, then insurgency, from a point of view of violence, was usually the opposition to that authority. Although I have dealt with it over so many years,* I still felt it useful to go back and make sure I was really familiar with what the term meant. The dictionary defines insur-

gency as, “rebellion without a revolutionary government”—the key there, of course, is “government”—“insurrection against an existing government by a group not recognized as having the status of belligerents.” “Insurgent: a person who rises in forceful opposition to lawful authority, especially one who engages in armed resistance to a government or to the execution of its laws; rebel.” An insurgency, if you go back to the derivation of the word, is to “rise up again.”

*The author was the seventh officer of the Office of Strategic Service (OSS) to be ordered to London in 1942. He was the OSS Liaison Officer to the French Intelligence Service, the Norwegian Intelligence Service, and several others during World War II.

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Now, of course, under these rather narrow definitions the French resistance against the German occupation during World War II would be excluded because the French resistance, at least in its later stages, was representative of the exiled government. Another example of World War II are the Yugoslavs. I certainly would classify their actions in the area of insurgency, acknowledging that General Mihajlovich was Defense Minister of the Government in exile in London and Cairo, and Marshal Tito eventually developed his own government in embattled Yugoslavia in 1943. Therefore, I am inclined to reject the narrower type of definition and simply classify insurgency as armed action against established authority.

Recently the *American Political Science Review* requested my opinion on an article on insurgency, in which case the author remained anonymous. The author was easily identifiable as a member of the Polish Home Army in World War II, an army that had a most unhappy fate. The Russians urged it to rise up on 30 June 1944; it did, and for 68 days it fought the Germans with a loss of 250,000 men, precisely what the Russians wanted. Nevertheless, this gentleman's experience shines through, and he did write a rather commendable article entitled "Internal Organizational Problems, Violent Political Movements Leading to Foreign Involvements." In this article the author states that there have been 400 episodes of insurgency in the past 12 years, episodes crossing national boundaries, involving 50 or more participants. I am willing to accept that, and I am inclined to think that may be a rather conservative figure. He makes the point that there are at the moment 93 extralegal movements in some 70 different countries.

I gather from some of the commentary that I heard from students at the college that there exists a degree of pessimism about the future of the world. I think I would say this to you:

insurgency per se is either endemic or epidemic in the world today and, in my opinion, will continue to be so for the foreseeable future—certainly for the rest of this century and perhaps on indefinitely until either a form of stability is reached or we decide to remove homo sapiens from this particular planet. Either, I think, is a distinct possibility. The point I would like to make is that you cannot eliminate or cannot have any hope to eliminate forms of insurgency from Africa which went from a continent of colonies to one of independent nations in the decade of the 1960's. I speak particularly of the three Portuguese colonies of Angola, Mozambique, and Portuguese Guinea. All three have very sizable insurgent movements which are occupying a great portion of the national resources of a very poor country like Portugal. But even the new nations have had, and will have, incidents of insurgency. In any event, let me simply suggest to you that in areas like Africa, perhaps even in a more advanced continent such as Latin America, certainly in many parts of Asia, and perhaps even in the more distinguished and developed countries—and I am not quite sure either of those adjectives are correct—we will see forms of insurgency. I do not believe that anybody can say that we do not have insurgency in the United States at the present time in the form of the Black Panthers or the Weathermen or, to put it on the other extreme of the political spectrum, potentially the Minutemen. They are not active, but the potential is there. Well, with this as a form of preamble, let me go on to describe the nature of insurgency.

First, an insurgency must have an objective or goal to have any potency whatsoever. It must have some political base or goal in order to exist, or it will not attract any group of followers or any loyalty on the part of the more sizable mass of the population. It must have a secure geographical base or bases

from which to operate. It must have leadership, a recognized and respected leader, otherwise it is going to devolve into sporadic and individual acts of terrorism which sooner or later will sputter out and fade because of the absence of coherence. It must have personnel. It must have a hard-core cadre of full-time revolutionaries. Now if you read Lenin you will find that this is the one thing he hammered on most persistently—a full-time cadre of hard-core personnel dedicated to the revolution. It must have supplies, either access to supplies, which is not difficult in a free society like ours, or some way of getting arms, ammunition, explosives, medical supplies, communications, and food. It must have finance. Insurgent movements cannot exist without money. French authorities make the statement that the French resistance cost 5 billion francs, and I think this is, if anything, conservative. Finally, it must have the capacity for secrecy to survive. This is something that is not easily acquired; it is something which people usually are not born with; it is almost invariably acquired by experience, most frequently by experience, in which only the survivors have the clandestine technique. Now let us go on to expand on these particular natures of insurgency.

The base. I put this first because I think it is absolutely essential. There must be a base for command, communications, and finance—the three key criteria. Operating bases are required for supplies. One cannot mount an insurgency unless you have arms, ammunition, explosives, and medical supplies, and these must be cached at a base or bases.

The base provides a place where the leader can be seen. The leader obviously does not live at the base; at least he does not live there for very long if he is wise. He will visit the base or bases and will see the troops in the field—the men who

who are taking the action. The base is important because it acts as a symbol for the insurgency. It may have to be moved frequently; it may be destroyed by opposition; but there must be a base.

This base will provide communications. In the modern day of electronics it is all very easy to say that the insurgents will have high-speed transmitters and receivers, and with just one quick squeak on the air transmit a hundred-word message. This, of course, is a possibility, but usually not a probability. Modern-day insurgency—perhaps with the exception of some highly sophisticated insurgent movements—will communicate by the human courier, generally by word of mouth rather than by encrypted or encoded messages, and for several reasons. The human courier usually is more reliable; secondly, he is more accurate; thirdly, he is more likely to get the message through, under existing conditions, than by more sophisticated methods.

Finance I have already touched on, but I would like to expand on it to simply put before you the proposition that the activities of the Black Panthers or the Weathermen in the United States could not exist unless there was considerable finance somewhere. The coordination of the Weathermen effort, which I have watched by viewing one campus, is one that requires a great deal of travel—they get around a great deal. They obviously have funds for publication. The number of explosions that we have witnessed indicates finance of some degree—someone is buying the dynamite.

Finance is important because it pays for bribery, which is a very effective way of getting prisoners out of jail or of having authorities look aside. It helps to take care of the widows and the families of those that are lost, and it secures medical treatment from those in the profession that are willing to treat wounds without reporting to the police authorities. So money is very important.

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I am rather interested—perhaps this is a parochial interest—but I am interested that so many of the authorities on insurgency neglect to mention or merely give a passing sentence to intelligence. I would suggest to you that intelligence is essential to the survival of an insurgent movement. Amateur efforts at gathering information are no substitute for the professional approach. Hard intelligence is required for planning operations. If one does not know where the guards and the areas of control exist, how could one expect to get into secure areas to commit sabotage or political assassination or whatever other the objective might be. Also, intelligence is absolutely essential to protect your own operation. If you examine the takeovers of the Eastern European governments, you will see the first targets of the Communists were the Ministry of Interior and the Armed Forces to gain control of both information and intelligence as well as power.

Let us next examine the nature of leadership in an insurgent movement. Whether the insurgent movements call themselves democratic in the Western sense or Communist in the socialist sense, insurgency is no place for the election of leaders. A leader acquires the leadership role by positively assuming it. He may be elected originally, but sooner or later that democratic process is quickly forgotten, if he is to survive, because leadership of insurgency must be completely and absolutely ruthless. Examine the life of Lenin. He had a great deal of consideration and sympathy for the people that worked with him which, I think, is an essential characteristic of a good leader. He looked after their families and was interested in their health, their well-being, et cetera, but if they transgressed or violated any of the orders, he was the first one to liquidate them without the slightest remorse. Now the leader has to be respected; sooner or later he will be shot if he is not probably from behind.

He has to have a certain degree of popularity. He has to be chosen by the most powerful elements, or sooner or later he will be eliminated by those elements that are powerful and not completely in accord with his leadership. He occasionally will be selected by an outside power.

If I may refer back to the article on the Polish Home Army—the author made no reference whatsoever to the leaders being sent in to the Polish Home Army from both London and Moscow. Nevertheless they were parachuted in, and the fight for leadership was bloody. Denouncements were made by one side or the other; the result was that the Gestapo was able to act as a very good executioner of Polish leadership.

The leader must have only one goal in mind if insurgency is to succeed and that is to acquire power. Nothing whatsoever can stand in the way of acquisition of power. If the leader lets anything stand in the way or is diverted from that objective, then the odds are that either he will fail, be liquidated or evicted, or the insurgency will fail. It is no place for modesty or humility on the part of the leader. If he is a man who knows anything about insurgency or guerrilla warfare, he will put his personal safety first and foremost because he will regard himself as indispensable to the success of the insurgency, and he will allow his true identity to be known to the fewest possible individuals. I suppose, from a theoretical point of view, the best leader is the one whose true identity is known by no one. For once his identity becomes known, even to a small cadre of individuals, the odds increase proportionately of it ultimately being known to the established authorities and an intensive manhunt would result. The best way to fight insurgency is to destroy its leadership. Once its leadership is destroyed, it is a headless octopus that thrashes around and ultimately dies.

The leader must have clandestine and

military ability. Clandestine perhaps first, but military ability certainly is essential. Many of the leaders of the French resistance, incidentally, had no military background. Of course, some were French Army. Quite a few, indeed, were French laborers, trade union members who fled to the countryside to avoid forced labor in Germany. But they acquired military capacity, and they perhaps had some technical skills which were most useful.

The leader must produce results or lose following. An insurgent movement that accomplishes nothing, sooner or later dwindles and dies away. But every now and then, perhaps more frequently, there has to be some form of a violent action with established results—the killing of one of the leaders of the established force, the cutting of communications, the destruction of a supply base, the ambush of a military convoy, any of these types of action in order to continue control and to build up the following. The leader cannot be absent from these actions. He must establish his own record of personal courage in order to get the following of the rank and file.

Opposition must be ruthlessly eliminated within the insurgency. There must be a well-developed—particularly as it gets larger—internal counterespionage and counterintelligence system because, again, if the established authorities are going to eliminate the insurgency, they must penetrate it. The authorities must get their own sources inside if they are to have any success in coping with the insurgency. The insurgents must recognize this, and any suspected penetration, opposition, or disloyal element must be eliminated absolutely ruthlessly.

I remember visiting the Philippines in 1964 and having several lengthy sessions with the then Minister of Defense of the Philippines, who I had come to know during an earlier visit of his to Washington. We discussed his role as a guerrilla

leader in the Philippines during the Second World War, and I asked him the question, "Did you eliminate any from your group who perhaps were innocent?"

He said, "Oh yes, yes, we accepted that, that they would fall along with the guilty, but it was better to eliminate everybody we suspected rather than take a chance and having the unit destroyed."

What I have pictured is a modest capsule of insurgency leadership, and one could specify numerous contemporary examples—Fidel Castro with his charismatic appeal, his obvious personal bravery, and the ruthlessness that he has surrounding him. I would gather that his brother Raul and Che Guevara were perhaps even more ruthless than Fidel himself, but this was one of the characteristics of his survival.

An insurgent movement is no place for part-time amateurs or half-hearted philosophers. Its place is for the full-time hard cadre. It will use the part-time insurgent. This is very obvious in Vietnam and in many other places where there are those who will be called out to fight with the hard core. But I am addressing myself primarily in this discussion to the hard-core cadre of technicians-in-violence because that is what your insurgents are. They must be full time, dedicated, disciplined, brave, self-sacrificing. Their every movement must be dedicated to conspiracy. (I put a parentheses in here and simply say that I am talking about your hard-core Communist functionaries—the underground illegal apparatus—as distinguished from the civil bureaucrats which they have in the overt or legal parties.) The insurgent must eat, sleep, breathe, and make love clandestinely. Incidentally, I add the latter not for any salacious reason or to put a romantic aspect to it, but the number of insurgent movements that have been betrayed—betrayed in bed—is quite fantastic. And so the wise insurgent movement builds in its sex. And

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incidentally, women are excellent in insurgency. This was demonstrated not just by Vilma Espin, now Raul Castro's wife, but by some of the magnificent women of the French resistance and other resistances.

Within an insurgent group you must have a great number of technicians-in-violence if you are going to mount an insurgency of any degree of size or strength that has a capacity to overthrow the existing authority. The explosion in New York in which three of the Weathermen were killed is quite demonstrative of the fact that the handling of explosives is not really for amateurs, although amateurs do it all too frequently. The demolition experts are essential not only for creating the demolitions out of perhaps scarce material, but for knowledge of how to engage in truly good sabotage. The need for ordnance experts is fairly obvious. You have got to have your skilled killers and, incidentally, silent killing is not altogether a dead technique and is occasionally essential in an insurgency.

Medical services are also necessary—read Che Guevara's diary about the experiences in Bolivia when sickness and wounded personnel perhaps helped drag down that abortive insurgent expedition.

Food is essential; insurgents have to eat, and nothing can destroy morale faster than hungry people. An urban-based guerrilla or insurgent activity, food is usually quite easy to obtain through the local distribution system. In rural areas you are almost totally dependent on the natives unless you want to pillage, and, of course, this can have counterproductive activities. I recall in March 1961 sitting in the headquarters of the Central Intelligence Agency with several Cuban experts discussing the then being mounted Bay of Pigs operation. I was not privy to all the details of the Bay of Pigs operation—incidentally, the present Director of Central Intelligence was not either and we were

having described to us some of the efforts to build up the resistance inside Cuba. The statement was made that a guerrilla unit which had been put into the Escambray Mountain area, the original site for the landing, was having difficulty getting food. The reaction was simply one of cold alarm because if the guerrilla unit is having difficulty feeding itself, then it means either the natives are hostile or they are so afraid of the security forces they dare not feed any guerrillas.

I believe that I have amply discussed the essential services required of an insurgency; now I would like to focus on the resistance of the established forces. I made the point that this conditions the nature of your insurgency. If the established forces choose to ignore an insurgency, the leader of the insurgents has only one alternative—he must intensify activity because being ignored results in loss of prestige and loss of the rank and file. No one pays any attention to their organization, the established authority takes on an image of confidence, and the insurgent movement never becomes viable.

The second aspect, of course, is measure-for-measure retaliation on the part of the established authority. This type of counteraction generally results in increased empathy for the insurgents. More rank and file affiliate themselves with the movement because the retaliation generally develops sympathy, perhaps even understanding, depending on how well the insurgents can use their objectives to convince the people that they are doing something for them.

A third technique on the part of the established authority is amputation. Try to find the insurgents, try to isolate them, then try to destroy them. The British used this in Malaya in the 12-year insurgent war there from 1948 to 1960. They isolated the insurgents by moving the population out of the insurgent areas and they gradually rolled up the terrorists. The established authori-

ties can also use terror, not just going after the insurgents, but creating terror in the ranks of the population. This certainly has an effect and generally tends to increase the strength of the insurgency. Then, of course, there is the extreme of planned genocide. Simply destroying all in order to stamp out the insurgency. This, naturally, would have the tendency of developing a rather universal base for the insurgency.

Now let me, in concluding about the nature of insurgency, just mention a word about secrecy. As I said, it is not easy to acquire. Some ethnic groups are rather more garrulous than others. I would simply have to report to you that prior to the Bay of Pigs landing, if one traveled around the Spanish speaking section of Miami, you could acquire a great deal of information about what was going on: which Cubans recently left Miami to go to Guatemala; who was flying the B-26's; where the landings were to be made. There was a great deal of talk among the Cuban exiles, but I am not singling them out necessarily for being too garrulous; most people are. However, in an insurgent movement any loose talk, lack of secrecy, or lack of clandestinity is almost fatal. The identity of the leaders and of all the hard-cadre personnel is something that must be kept secret in order to protect the insurgents. It is absolutely essential that the secrecy of the location of meeting places, safehouses, supplies, resupply routes, and courier routes be maintained. And incidentally, there should be full recognition here that any personnel captured are going to tell what they know. There are very few people that are built with the iron will, determination, and the high-pain plateau that is required for resisting interrogation when the interrogator is determined to gain the desired information. The operation techniques to be used and the personnel to be employed must be carefully protected. These are the things that the established forces are

going to try to find out. Then, of course, I leave the last but absolutely the most essential, the intentions of the group. If anybody besides the leader knows this, he is perhaps not a very wise leader. He should announce only at the very last minute the time and place of a raid, assassination, et cetera.

Now let us turn, in the last several minutes, to origins of insurgency: what creates an insurgent movement? The common cliché one reads in most of the literature—most particularly what I call the romanticized stories of insurgency that appear in the popular literature, the popular press, and so on—is that insurgency results from poverty, injustice, inequality, et cetera. I would not want to say to you that it does not result from that, but I would want to say to you that that is only one of the many reasons for insurgency. I would further suggest that more frequently insurgency comes from those outside of power wishing to obtain power, using the technique of the violent insurgency rather than established parliamentary or legitimate political methods. If the leader of an insurgent group is not aware that the acquisition of power is absolutely vital in order to succeed, that he has to overthrow the established power, then I would again suggest it would simply not take place.

There can be insurgent movements that will result from the right combination of people and circumstances, and perhaps the Hungarian revolt of 1956 was the combination of this. I am not at all sure the Hungarian people were either organized for a revolt or that there was an insurgent movement, either inside or outside of their Communist Party. I think it was more of a spontaneous mob reaction that resulted in an insurgency movement which had a short-lived but perhaps glorious existence. Now let us examine just briefly the origins of some of the modern insurgencies that we have facing us.

Let us take our own Black Panther

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movement in the United States, and incidentally may I commend to your attention an article in the 1 November 1970 *New York Times* Magazine section entitled "Our Other Man in Algiers" by Sanche de Gramont. It is an article about Eldridge Cleaver and the Black Panther exile headquarters in Algiers called the International Division of the Black Panthers. The Black Panthers are obviously an offspring of the civil rights movement, blacks who feel that they will never be able to obtain justice unless they destroy the existing structure of the United States. Incidentally, let me say that the Black Panthers claim not to be racists in their approach; in fact, Cleaver made the statement in an interview with de Gramont that they are now aligned with the peace and freedom party because they recognize that their previous approach was racial and not necessarily going to be successful. The multiracial Weathermen, of course, are the epitome of the young revolutionary; again, destroy the system because they believe they can never peacefully achieve any equality of their objectives in the society which they consider to be evil. The Quebec separatists, of whom we hear a great deal now, is an insurgency movement of some consequence. The objective, of course, is to take Quebec out of Canada and to create a separate nation.

I could go on with a very long list of insurgent movements. The figure that I quoted at the start of there being 93 insurgent movements in 70 countries is perhaps even modest. They seem to be increasing at a very rapid rate, and increasing with aid and assistance.

I would like to conclude by directing your attention to what I think is a very important aspect for your consideration in your year in the Command and Staff School of the War College. What is the role of the Soviet Union in modern insurgency? How many of the insurgencies are Marxist in nature? And exactly what is the impact and what

does this mean? I would say there is a strong Marxist element in most insurgent movements, but this does not necessarily imply that they are either Russian run or Russian controlled. I am

BIOGRAPHIC SUMMARY



Lyman B. Kirkpatrick, Jr., was born in Rochester, N.Y., educated in public schools there and at Deerfield Academy, Deerfield, Mass., and graduated from the Woodrow Wilson School of Public and

International Affairs of Princeton University in 1938.

After graduation he worked for the U.S. News Publishing Corporation in Washington, D.C., as an editor and personnel director. In 1942 he joined the Office of Strategic Services and served in Europe with that organization and as a military intelligence officer on the staff of Gen. Omar Bradley's 12th U.S. Army Group where he was the G-2 briefing officer. He left the military service with the rank of major, and for his service received the Legion of Merit, Bronze Star, French and Belgian Croix de Guerre, and the European Theater Ribbon with five battle stars.

After the war he returned to the U.S. News as an editor of *World Report Magazine*. In 1947 he went to work for the Central Intelligence Agency where he served in a variety of positions, including Division Chief, Assistant to the Director, Assistant Director, Inspector General, and from 1962 to 1965 was Executive Director-Comptroller. In September 1965 he resigned from CIA to accept an appointment on the faculty of Brown University in Providence, R.I., as Professor of Political Science and University Professor.

In 1960 he received the National Civil Service League annual award as one of the 10 outstanding career employees of the Federal Government. In 1964 he received the President's Award for Distinguished Service, the highest award that can be given a civilian in the Federal Service.

He is the author of *The Real CIA*, published by Macmillan in January 1968, and *Captains without Eyes*, published by Macmillan in 1969, of numerous articles, and has contributed to the *Encyclopaedia Britannica Yearbook*.

quite convinced—and I spend a great deal of my time simply studying Marxism—that there are hundreds of millions of Marxists in the world today, but very few Marxists agree as to what the ultimate objective should be of Marxism or Marxism-Leninism. The role of the Soviet Union, I think, is the obvious role that Russia has played for years, that is the role that they will assist the insurgents but they will be equally rapid in casting them adrift. The Spanish Civil War is a brilliant example of the Russians sending in assistance and when Spanish Loyalists started to become a liability to Russian foreign policy, they were cut off. So I think you can simply analyze the fact that the Russians will support insurgents if they think there is a possibility of encouraging the creation of a Marxist-Leninist entity that could acquire power.

Now the origins of insurgency are not necessarily eradicable. We are going to have poverty, we are going to have inequality, we are going to have in-

justice for the foreseeable future. Human nature simply does not change rapidly. These things are going to continue to exist, but their existence does not necessarily mean that an insurgent movement will be created or will develop in that particular area. The implication is, in fact the conclusion I would reach is that, yes, we are going to have many of these insurgencies for the foreseeable future. As far as what one does about insurgency, first and foremost, understand it. What is the insurgency? Why does it exist? What is its potential? Where is it going? Secondly, maintain a very careful watch about it. If you do not have good intelligence on it, for heaven's sake, get good intelligence on it. And then finally, of course, from an American point of view, a very careful and high-level analysis of what its implications are as far as American foreign policy is concerned. If the implications are serious and consequential and it is a *vital* national interest, then take action.



In a national insurrection the center of gravity to be destroyed lies in the person of the chief leader and in public opinion; against these points the blow must be directed.

Clausewitz: On War, 1832