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Charles W. Cullen
U.S. Navy

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THE MILITARY PLANNING PROCESS: HUMAN IMPERFECTIONS IN ITS APPLICATION

Decisionmaking systems have the tendency to take on the character of their leader, and the military planning process is no exception. In the author's research and experience, he has found four personality disorders in planners that he characterizes as the "Smoker," the "In and Outer," the "Worrier," and the "Cowboy." An understanding of these syndromes can be important to both the commander and to the development of sound plans.

An article prepared

by

Lieutenant Commander Charles W. Cullen, U.S. Navy

All men are liable to error; and most men are, by passion or interest, under temptation to it.

John Locke

Homo sapiens and the military commander—semirecognized subspecies—have throughout history felt the need for tools and devices to assist them in solving problems. Man has sought assistance that would enable him to define and project his scheme of things into a future state of affairs. The need is eternal because man, as a reasoning animal, has a host of bad habits which tend, with depressing regularity, to create significant differences between the real world and his imagined world. It would take more than these pages to properly sympathize with this regrettable state of affairs; but rather, let us merely recognize the frailty of man's reasoning powers as the starting point

and rationale for this discussion of the military planning process.

One important point warrants emphasis at the outset—that is, even the prudent use of the military planning process will *not* assure one of success. Perhaps this suggests that, like imperfect man, the tools he uses are also imperfect. In any case, no argument has ever been made that one cannot fail, using the planning process. The commander in possession of a beautiful plan rigorously drafted in strict accordance with the planning process is simply not assured victory.

What we can state is that the military planning process has proven extremely helpful to commanders over the years. It has minimized his mistakes by providing a systematic method of structuring an analysis within the limits of available and reliable information. This is saying a great deal if you ponder the environment in which the commander

must plan and operate. This, then, is the planning process' only claim to fame and the only reason that it has been nurtured and taught at the Naval War College.*

The military planning process can be described as a logic system. It is a theoretical construct that can be translated into the abstract forms and symbols that would rekindle the hearts of Aristotle, Aquinas, Von Neuman, and Morgenstern. I would not recommend the exercise as the process is demanding enough as it is. It would demonstrate, however, that the estimate of the situation lends itself to formal and symbolic logic because it is a model for handling ideas. The planning process functions independently of the arguments to which it is applied. In other words, the form is incidental to the substance of the analysis.

While the system does provide order, this is certainly no reason to suppose that it will be used in an orderly manner. Decisionmaking systems have the tendency to take on the character of the leader, and the military planning process is no exception.

From my vantage point as a reviewer of both actual operational and student estimates and the respective directives, the greatest single problem in the use of the planning process is the failure of the commander to conduct an analysis. This sounds pretty basic, but it happens. The failure to conduct an analysis is responsible for more unsatisfactory directives than any other single cause. If you take the term "analysis" and look it up in your Funk and Wagnalls, you will discover that in order to conduct an analysis you must break down a conceptual whole into understandable


parts. In the military planner's frame of reference, that means breaking down the mission, which is a conceptual whole, into understandable parts: objectives, physical objectives, necessary assumptions, enemy capabilities, own courses of action, task organization, and many others.

As a proper analysis progresses, the commander and his staff should be able to view the whole problem with increasing precision and accuracy—what they are going to do, when, for how long, and with what units. The problem is that there is an almost natural reticence on the part of commanders, and of man in general, to conduct disciplined analyses. It is hard work.

In the development of this paper I have cast certain recognizable planning types into four descriptive roles, for the simple reason that while the selection of officers to fill staff billets is a job of officer personnel assignment, the role that these officers play is largely a function of their training, experience, and *personal style*. I want to make it explicitly clear that in portraying these personal planning disorders I have purposely cast these stereotypes in exaggeration. Some of these characteristics exist in all of us, this writer notwithstanding. In an examination of this type the reader will, *hopefully*, benefit through personal introspection. Less productively, he may find some good fun in filling these roles with worthy contemporaries for whom the role is, quite naturally, not an exaggeration.

The first characterization I would like to make is the *Smoker*. What are the symptoms of the *Smoker*? First of all, I can tell you that the *Smoker* invented the "by-car" method of planning, a method diametrically opposed to the systematic analysis of a situation. There are simplistic planning situations where the commander can simply play the events as they unfold. The problem is that such situations are hard to recognize at the outset. Further-

*For a further discussion of the history of the military planning process, see Charles W. Cullen, "From the Kriegsschule to the Naval War College: the Military Planning Process," *Naval War College Review*, January 1970, p. 6-18.



more, one's judgment in this regard can be unduly biased by a number of past successes, small though they may be. The by-car planner finds himself much in the position of the amateur musician who has achieved some small amount of success without the discipline of learning to read music. When asked to perform a complex piece of music at first sight, he finds himself unprepared for such a professional task.

1. Mission and its analysis
2. Considerations affecting possible courses of action
3. Analysis of opposing courses of action
 - a. enemy capabilities
 - b. own courses of action
 - c. analysis of opposing courses of action
4. Comparison of own courses of action
5. Decision

Fig. 2—Estimate of the Situation

One symptom of the *Smoker* is readily identifiable and can serve as a checkpoint for you in your own planning or in reviewing the planning of others. You can tell when a planner is blowing smoke, as it were, by taking a hard look at his retained own courses of action. If you find that his own course of action statements are but a rewording of the mission statement assigned by his superior, you can conclude with some confidence that no analysis has been conducted. Let us assume that the commander's mission states that he is to put to sea with his force and sink submarines for purposes of interest to his superior. If, after laboriously reading pages and pages of his estimate of the situation you discover that the commander's decision states that he will put to sea and sink submarines, you have cause to doubt the depth of the analysis. Upon reinvestigation of this hypothetical example, you may find that the decision statement and mission statement are exactly the same, although the commander was not given a predetermined course of action. The conclusion to be drawn in this case is that, despite all the smoke, you do not know any

more by reading the commander's courses of action and his decision than you did when you first examined his superior's directive. In short, nothing of substance has been done. This does not necessarily mean that the commander and his staff have not produced reams of information. It means that they have not investigated the situation for the purpose of drawing conclusions. The commander simply has not broken down his mission into understandable terms. He may have as many as three tentative own courses of action that say more or less the same thing. He may sprinkle each concept for each course of action with a few cliches and superlatives, but for all practical purposes they will be identical.

Another checkpoint of a *Smoker's* work, or the lack of it, is evident in examining the concepts that are drafted during the estimate of the situation with regard to tentative own courses of action. One cannot posit an own course of action on an *a priori* basis. A course of action must have a concept of operations to support the actions proposed. The *Smoker's* concept will always be vague and void of time and distance factors. No effective military planner can come to grips with a military operation without talking in terms of time and distance and real world constraints. The *Smoker* prefers to ignore these constraints and to move about, by some mysterious power yet unclear, in a world of wish fulfillment. As his planning progresses, he becomes more and more confused. The *Smoker's* plan continues to grow until the very last syllable is typed. Oftentimes he can be found looking over the yeoman's shoulder as it is being worked up, trying to compose the final nuances of the plan that will satisfy him. Oftentimes, after developing two or three courses of action in his own way, he will choose to make a decision which will start with own course of action number 1 and

then progress through own course of action number 2 and own course of action number 3. He is so imprecise that he is unable to make a decision. He has become a victim of his own rhetoric.

Finally, you will recognize the *Smoker's* efforts by his smoke and haffle-gab. Some witty bureaucrat collected the *Smoker's* tools in the following "Baffle-Gab Thesaurus."^{*}

A	B	C
0) Integrated	Management	Options
1) Total	Organizational	Flexibility
2) Systematized	Monitored	Capability
3) Parallel	Reciprocal	Mobility
4) Functional	Digital	Programing
5) Responsive	Logistical	Concept
6) Optional	Transitional	Time-phase
7) Synchronized	Incremental	Projection
8) Compatible	Third-generation	Hardware
9) Balanced	Policy	Contingency

You can choose any three-digit number, crank it into the thesaurus, and come up with instant nonsense. Number 155, for example, yields Total Logistical Concept, which means absolutely nothing. The *Smoker* traffics in these portentous words; he is a rhetorical extremist. Unfortunately, cliches and superlatives are anathema to the whole concept of planning in a realistic manner. Their presence in a directive, especially in the concept annex, is usually inversely proportional to the amount of thought that went into the planning.

The next distinctive stereotype I would like to discuss can be named the *In and Outer*. This architect whisks in and out of the military planning process at will. Actually, "at will" is too flattering, because the motive of this movement is as emotional as it is rational. Impatience with the system is his major vice. The *In and Outer* fails to see that

the military planning process structures rather than limits thought. I will admit that invariably there is room for a degree of justified impatience. There will be times when the planner will feel that the entire military planning process is ill suited for the situation. Indeed, a knowledgeable planner, pressed with events that are moving at a rapid pace, should be able to move ahead without

damaging the results of his analysis. For the student planner, not yet formally introduced to the process, such abbreviations, often born out of impatience rather than crisis, invariably lead to numerous errors and uncontrolled leaps of illogic.

The *In and Outer*, possibly because of his impatience with the planning process, is often misled by the terms used in the process. The planning process is technical in the sense that many of its terms bear specific meanings and subtle distinctions. The distinction between objectives and physical objectives, the need for the mission statement to contain both a task and purpose, or the uses and possible misuses of assumptions and enemy capabilities all must be carefully studied if the terms are to be applied in their prescribed context.

Another problem often faced by the *In and Outer* is found in the third step of the estimate of the situation, the analysis of opposing courses of action. This step is admittedly difficult. The *In and Outer* and his staff usually cover

^{*}"Baffle-Gab Thesaurus," *Time*, 13 September 1968, p. 22.

quite adequately the first step of the estimate, the mission and its analysis, and the second step of the estimate, considerations that might affect possible courses of action. However, almost invariably he broaches over the third step of the analysis—analysis of opposing courses of action. The precise reason is not clear, but, quite possibly, it is simply because the third step is difficult work. Having skipped the third step of the analysis, which is the very heart of the entire military planning process, his planning continues erratically through the final two steps. Yet he somehow manages to come up with a course of action which he declares is a decision.

Because of his inattention to the estimate of the situation and because he and his staff do not have a solid understanding of the precise terms that are used in the system, it comes as no surprise that the *In and Outer* usually lacks the foundation necessary for the development of planning schedules. It would be an exaggeration to state that the military planning process is followed step-by-step in actual planning situations throughout the allied world, but I can stipulate that flag officers directing force and fleet staffs today think and traffic in terms of enemy capabilities, own courses of action, and the other conceptual constituents of the military planning process. When a commander states that he wants intelligence estimates on enemy capabilities, his intelligence people know exactly what he is talking about. When the Chief of Staff and the Operations Officer are informed that they should delineate some tentative own courses of action, they too know precisely what is expected of them. The *In and Outer* who does not give the planning process and its systematic aspects any serious consideration has no basis for a planning schedule in that these terms are not understood by him or his staff.

Another stereotype you should meet is the *Worrier*. His great failing in life is

that he cannot understand the mission and its implications. Unlike the problems of the *Smoker*, who perhaps does not possess the requisite mental acuity to appreciate a problem, the mistakes of the *Worrier* are more clearly inexcusable. Students who read the literature on military planning are continually alerted to the important fact that the situational analyses must be mission oriented. It is a wise practice for a planner to write his mission in bold letters and keep it before him and his staff throughout the planning process. The more complicated the scenario, the longer the planning cycle, the more people that become involved, the greater is the tendency to lose sight of the mission. If the commander and his staff do not have a crystal-clear conception of the mission in precise and definite terms, they are going to become *Worriers*.

The *Worrier* has great difficulty getting through the second step of the estimate of the situation, the considerations affecting the possible courses of action. It is here that the commander and his staff must examine the general and fixed factors that may affect his operations. Also, the commander and his staff examine relative combat power, the numbers and organic characteristics of the fighting forces opposed. A thorough mission analysis is essential if the commander is to accurately judge what information is relevant to this step of the estimate. The commander has at his disposal today so much data that it defies reading, much less comprehension. While his communications center is receiving information by the page per second, the computer in the back room is pouring forth reams of printout. What is relevant? The judgment must be based on an understanding of the mission, what the tasks are, and what one's position is in relation to his operational peers and his superior. The *Worrier*, not appreciating this, does not have the courage to turn off the information

faucet and get on with his estimate. As a result, he entertains encyclopedic concerns.

The mission and its analysis will enable you to wade through a pool of information rather than drown in an ocean of it. The decision as to how much research must be done will always be difficult. Beware, however, of applying Parkinson's Law to this endeavor and expanding your investigation to fill the time available. If the commander is not sure what information is relevant and the staff is looking hither and yon, he had best go back and reexamine the mission and its analysis to determine again whether the intelligence ball is being properly inflated or stuffed.

The *Worrier* also has difficulty in testing his own courses of action because of his lack of focus. Own courses of action, once established, should be tested for suitability, feasibility, and acceptability. The *Worrier* does not grasp his mission and oftentimes will propose courses of action that are not suitable. As the very definition of suitability is that the course of action will, by itself, accomplish the mission, such a failing is not surprising.

For example, given the tasks of providing antisubmarine warfare support to a carrier group and an underway replenishment group in separate waters, a commander may come up with a course of action which indicates that he will conduct offensive operations in support of the carrier and, time permitting, help protect the replenishment group. Upon questioning his rationale we learn that the carrier is obviously more important, therefore should receive support on a priority basis. However, upon examination of the superior's directive we note clearly that neither of the tasks assigned to the commander were given priority. The course of action suggested, therefore, is of questionable suitability.

Another symptom of the *Worrier* is his demonstrated capacity to plan at the wrong level. This is caused by his failure

to understand his mission in relation to others. Assume that our commander is one of numerous group commanders in the overall operation. He has been tasked with the responsibility of supporting only two of the seven task groups. The superior's directive indicates that this commander has no responsibilities toward the other task groups in the operation. Again his role is that of antisubmarine warfare. The *Worrier* begins by rushing through the mission and its analysis and then plunging headlong into the factors affecting possible courses of action. We then observe that he is progressing at glacial speed. His assessment of environmental factors and relative combat power becomes encyclopedic. Yet he somehow manages to set down enemy capabilities which he thinks are relevant. The *Worrier* correctly notes that the enemy has the capability of destroying all friendly forces. He therefore sets this down as an enemy capability without realizing that it is too broad. First of all, the commander is not responsible for all friendly forces. He is only responsible for so much of them as he has been assigned by his superior. In short, this would be a relevant enemy capability for his superior, but it is not a relevant one for him. He is planning at too high a level.

There is an insidious element here that one must remember. Because of the circumstances described above, the *Worrier* tends to draft unduly conservative plans. In some cases he loses all spirit and anticipation for the action. Planning at too high a level, the *Worrier* as a commander views his assets as impotent against the enemy's overall capability. Thus, rather than defining enemy capabilities strictly in terms of their direct impact on his mission, the *Worrier* sees himself as the target of all of the capabilities of the enemy in all areas. As a result, the *Worrier* has a decided tendency to be overcautious. Enemy capabilities must have a direct

impact on your mission or they do not belong in your estimate.

Lastly, we have that individual who is best characterized as the *Cowboy*. To avoid becoming a *Cowboy*, one must recognize and control bias both in one's self and in one's staff. The art of war is so complicated today that regardless of how much experience one has or how senior one is, it is impossible to have across-the-board expertise in all fields of warfare. We are expert either in one phase of warfare or in another. This is not bad as long as we recognize it. The problem is that there are many planners who do not recognize it. They are biased either knowingly or unknowingly.

The symptoms of the *Cowboy* are not too difficult to spot, but they are difficult to remove. First of all, in his estimate of the situation, the *Cowboy* will come up with only one or two own courses of action when others are obvious and relevant. For example, to use our antisubmarine warfare commander again, his assets might consist of a carrier, a flock of fixed wing and helicopter aircraft, a school of destroyers, and a large pack of nuclear submarines—in short, a formidable group. Our *Cowboy* planner, however, will whisk through the estimate and decide that this operation is going to be, in its entirety, a show for the nuclear submarines, his favorite weapon. He anticipates no serious problems.*

The commander's reasoning for all this is that he sees the enemy as being incapable of destroying his favorite weapon system. For the *Cowboy*, this idea is unthinkable. Our hero is therefore inclined to rapidly skip over enemy capabilities and own courses of action and indeed the entire estimate of the situation. He moves as quickly as possible into developing his plan, specifi-

cally the writing of his favorite annex, which might be air operations, submarine operations, or cruising instructions.

Not unlike the *Worrier*, the *Cowboy* also has a tendency to plan at the wrong level. In his case the level is often too low rather than too high. The results are twofold: the estimate is weakened because enemy capabilities and own courses of action are too confined and too constrained, and, in the development of the plan, a commander planning at too low a level cannot help but encroach upon his subordinates' legitimate areas of decisionmaking.

Our *Cowboy* also runs into problems when testing own courses of action for suitability, feasibility, and acceptability. Suitability is usually not a problem. Unlike the *Worrier*, the *Cowboy* usually has an excellent grip on his mission. The problem is that he cannot entertain imaginative ways of carrying it out. Feasibility is not seen as a matter of degree. For him a course of action is feasible without question. He is not introspective enough to compare the feasibility of several different courses of action.

The *Cowboy* also cannot adequately examine his courses of action for acceptability. When he puts forth a course of action which is judged by his superiors to be unacceptable, he becomes quite emotional about it. With hurt feelings and an indignant manner, he wants to be told why he cannot use any or all of his assets in any way he chooses. The *Cowboy* shrugs off the constraints that limit actions in the real world. He simply does not understand the parameters that have been given to him. For that reason his proposed courses of action are often unacceptable, either on political grounds or simply because the military action proposed is not appropriate. It is not the best that could be done, and this is one of the tests for acceptability. The last and most important question that you must ask yourself when completing the

*The carrier and the destroyers will protect themselves while his submarines deliver the *coup de grace*.

estimate is, "Is this the best that I can do?" For the *Cowboy* it is the best that he would like to do, but this is not the same. The meaning of acceptability and its implications in the broader sense are the cause of the *Cowboy's* lament.

Within our system of government the world will always be defined by others regardless of our rank or position in the military. This is a rather basic fact, but it has profound repercussions. It is incumbent on each and every one of us as military commanders to devise imaginative plans that accept all limitations imposed by our superiors, either civilian or military. Therefore, the constraints on planning, identified in the first step of the estimate, bear heavily on one's tests for acceptability.

While these constraints may change over a period of time, it is never acceptable to cast your basic or primary plan on a presumption that changes will take place or will be made in time by your superior. If they are not, you will be left with no plan at all. That leaves the *Cowboy* with but one personal course of action: to return to his cabin and wait for his relief. In brief, it is our duty to perform within the defined parameters. Our challenge is to do so creatively and with imagination. In the interval, our responsibility may or may not be to seek change.

Of course, to assure preparedness, alternate and contingency plans are always drafted based on assumptions that key aspects of the general situation will change or that specific constraints on current planning will be lifted or imposed. These necessary and vital enterprises are apart and distinct from the *Cowboy's* world.

I have painted the *Cowboy* in extreme. Nonetheless, in degrees he exists in all of us. Recognize him. We all must take Socrates' dictum to heart, "Know thyself." And, as Aristotle probably added when tutoring Alexander: "Know thy staff."

These then are the stereotypes

against which we must guard: the *Smoker*, who felt that the discipline of the process with its rules and models inhibited his genius for rhetoric; the *In and Outer*, who failed to see that the planning process structures rather than limits thought; the *Worrier*, who saw his mission in terms of taking on all the burdens of this world; and the *Cowboy*, who could not limit himself to acceptable options. Each, in his own way, denies the notion that a commander, as a decisionmaker, can rationally examine a problem, that he can do so without being a slave to his prejudices, and that he can construct a cogent framework for action. This is an idea at least as old as Socrates.

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I would like to discuss three additional pitfalls that portend grave danger to the planner. First is the problem of enemy capabilities and enemy intentions. You recall that only two criteria may be weighed in considering enemy capabilities. These are: can the enemy carry out the action, and will that action, if carried out, directly affect your mission? If so, the enemy capabilities should be retained and carried forward for further analysis. It is at this point that the military planner arranges the list of retained enemy capabilities in their order of probability. This is done on the basis of apparent enemy intentions. You are warned in almost all applicable planning publications that dealing in enemy intentions can be a very dangerous practice. It is nonetheless a necessary effort, in that limited resources available to the commander and the forces opposed demand choices of priorities. For the commander's own forces these resources are known, but of the enemy they can only be estimated or deduced. But in both cases they must be made.

The pitfall is not in dealing in enemy intentions, per se, but rather in con-

fusing enemy intentions with enemy capabilities. The most disastrous mistake that you as a military planner can make—the *In and Outer*, the *Worrier*, *Cowboy*, and *Smoker* notwithstanding—is to overlook an enemy capability or to reject a retained enemy capability solely on the grounds of what you believe the enemy might do. Do not miss an enemy capability. If it affects your mission, you must retain it. List it low in probability if your intelligence estimates warrant it, but do not discard it.


The adjustment in your plan to cover an unlikely enemy capability may be quite incidental. For example, the enemy may have the capability of sorticing a small mine force to mine a certain strait of interest to you. Your intelligence indications are that the chance of his doing this is remote. Still he could do it, and if he did, it would affect the execution of your plan. You can simply decide to have some lone-some pilot reconnoiter the enemy's anchored mine force every few days to see what they are up to during the operation. By this means you have covered the capability. If you discard the enemy capability, you will not have your air reconnaissance and may therefore find enemy mines where they "weren't supposed to be."

While this example is very basic, the principle holds at all levels of planning. To avoid error, the number of retained enemy capabilities must remain fixed throughout the discussion of enemy intentions. Only the ordering of the retained enemy capabilities may be influenced by enemy intentions. This is true regardless of how convinced you might be of the accuracy of your crystal ball.

The *Worrier* is perhaps least likely to be unduly swayed by enemy intentions or by constraints in planning that move one to view the enemy intentions optimistically. It would be poor counsel to enjoin you to be *Worriers*, however. Rather be a fiscal wizard and exploit

your intelligence, but always be a Capabilities Man.

Another error situation has to do with aggressive estimates and conservative plans and may be labeled the Tiger/Lamb Syndrome. I have found that the true colors of the commander are flown in the task organization. You will recall in the development of the plan, after the estimate of the situation has been completed, the commander sets forth those tasks to be accomplished and designates what units are to accomplish them and what organizational structure they are to operate within. It is interesting to contrast the decisions made at this late stage of the planning process with the conclusions made earlier in the estimate of the situation with regard to relative combat power. For an example, let us use again the commander planning for antisubmarine warfare operations. The task organization indicates that nine of 12 destroyers have been assigned solely to the carrier. Yet, in his directive we note that the tasks assigned to the destroyers are to provide ASW protection to the carrier and conduct offensive ASW operations, but we see nine ships dedicated to screen the carrier. Such an arrangement may be both appropriate and aggressive in some cases, while in others it may not be. One can find out very quickly by reviewing, if you have access to this commander's estimate of the situation. If allocation of forces assigned to each task is appropriate, you can expect to find the relative combat power assessment in the commander's estimate of the situation to indicate that the entire operation is marginal, that the enemy has considerable offensive submarine capability, and that the commander himself must therefore assume a defensive position. Or you might discover in examining the commander's mission and its analysis that certain constraints on planning have been placed upon him by his superior. For instance, he is directed to protect the



carrier at all costs, regardless of the present threat. If one of these is not the case, we have some cause to conclude that the commander is more concerned about protecting the carrier than he is about sinking submarines.

In the military, consistency is not necessarily a virtue. However, we can expect that if the estimate was thorough and the plan was developed on the conclusions made in the estimate, a correlation between the tasks assigned to the subordinates, the concept of operations, and the relative combat power assessment should be evident. Many exceptions may come to mind, but, as a check on your own planning, if you were a tiger when conducting your estimate of the situation and a lamb in tasking your organization, you have cause for reflection and reappraisal.

The final pitfall concerns the acceptability of risks. As military commanders, our great burden in life is that we are always planning in a conflict situation. You have, therefore, an automatic enemy capability the minute you begin your planning cycle. That is, the enemy always has the capability of damaging or destroying your force. Not all of the multiple threats of the enemy, however, must be met directly. Careful analysis of your mission, your role in relation to your superior and other peer commanders, as well as a careful assessment of relative combat power, are essential. The tendency of the *Cowboy* to meet every threat head on should be avoided. For example, given the task to

proceed through hostile waters to a certain area and upon arrival to conduct shore bombardment, movement into the objective area in such a manner as to invite the attention of the enemy might be dramatic and bold, but foolish. The first task of the commander is to get his forces into the objective area where they can carry out their mission and to get them there in fighting trim. In short, there is no virtue in bleeding early. Or as General Patton reputedly noted, "No bastard won a war by dying for his country. He won it by making the other poor dumb bastard die for his country."

And really, that is what the military planning process is all about.

BIOGRAPHIC SUMMARY



Lt. Comdr. Charles W. Cullen, U.S. Navy, holds a bachelor's degree in philosophy from Saint John's University, Minn., and a master's degree in international relations from The American University. Operational duty has included tours in the U.S.S. *Frank E. Evans* (DD 754), U.S.S. *William V. Pratt* (DLG 13), and command of the U.S.S. *Outagamie County* (LST 1073). A graduate of the School of Naval Command and Staff (Class of 1969), he served for 2 years on the faculty of the Naval War College as the Assistant for Military Planning and Naval Operations in the Correspondence School. Lieutenant Commander Cullen is currently assigned as Executive Officer of the U.S.S. *Agerholm* (DD 826).

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No military leader is endowed by heaven with an ability to seize the initiative. It is the intelligent leader who does so after a careful study and estimate of the situation and arrangement of the military and political factors involved.

Mao Tse-tung: On Guerrilla War, 1937