1971

March 1971 Full Issue

The U.S. Naval War College

NAVAL WAR COLLEGE REVIEW

March 1971

NWCR

FOREWORD The *Naval War College Review* was established in 1948 by the Chief of Naval Personnel in order that officers of the service might receive some of the educational benefits available to the resident students at the Naval War College. The forthright and candid views of the lecturers and authors are presented for the professional education of its readers.

Lectures are selected on the basis of favorable reception by Naval War College audiences, usefulness to servicewide readership, and timeliness. Research papers are selected on the basis of professional interest to readers.

Reproduction of articles or lectures in the *Review* requires the specific approval of the Editor, *Naval War College Review* and the respective author or lecturer. *Review* content is open to citation and other reference, in accordance with accepted academic research methods.

The thoughts and opinions expressed in this publication are those of the lecturers and authors and are not necessarily those of the Navy Department nor of the Naval War College.

CONTENTS

Cover: A portrait bust of Admiral Raymond A. Spruance, USN, as the sculptor, Mr. Felix W. de Weldon, perceived him aboard his flagship commanding the 5th Fleet during the Pacific campaign. (Photo by Mr. Russell A. Davis.)

CHALLENGE !

"History is a cruel stepmother, and when it retaliates, it stops at nothing." Lenin's poignant observation is no less relevant today than when it was made 50 years ago.

The current national apathy toward the military, toward overseas involvement and U.S. world responsibility is strikingly similar to that which so long delayed a recognition by the American people of the growing Japanese and German threat back in the 1930's. Then it took the attack on Pearl Harbor to shock the Nation and galvanize American public opinion. Three decades later, despite an ominous Soviet military challenge, a similar isolationist sentiment is very much in vogue. But today, we cannot afford another Pearl Harbor. Not in this nuclear age!

In his book *Democracy in America,* the young French scholar Alexis de Tocqueville noted well over a century ago that we Americans are slow to react to foreign threat until danger is imminent. Walt Rostow emphasized this point in his now famous lecture on the "Domestic Determinants of Foreign Policy," given at the Global Strategy Discussions here last June. And as Dr. Lloyd Free observes in his article appearing in this same issue of the *Naval War College Review,* " . . . through the years . . . it is usually events rather than persuasion or propaganda which trigger major changes in popular attitudes." Indeed, a reading of our own history in the 20th century would seem to validate all of these observations.

We delayed our entry into World War I well after our European friends were deeply involved in a battle for their very survival. We even elected a President in 1916 who campaigned on the slogan, "He kept us out of war." Over two

decades later, President Roosevelt's deep concern over the plight of Britain and France, and other European nations scourged by Hitler's blitzkrieg was not reflected in the majority of American public opinion. Similarly, there was little concern for Japan's aggressive moves in China and Southeast Asia. As a Nation we were apathetic, even hostile, to greater preparedness, notably munitions production and effective draft legislation. Our Army was training with broomsticks—and the draft bill was passed by only one vote.

This is not to say that there were not groups of concerned citizens anxious about the national mood of detachment and the disastrous results they portended for the United States. As historian Richard W. Steele notes in an article appearing in the latest issue of *The American Historical Review,* "Preparing the Public for War: Efforts to Establish a National Propaganda, 1940-41," there were numerous citizens both in and out of Government, including members of President Roosevelt's Cabinet, actively involved in trying to establish various programs and agencies to alert the people to the impending threat. Yet progress was interminably slow. The President was fearful that his active involvement in such projects would incite the same charges of sensationalism and distortion which had been leveled earlier against

5

Woodrow Wilson. In fact, he did try in his speeches and in his "fireside chats" to educate the people of the country to the dangers of the international situation. However, he was inhibited from speaking out candidly in a voice of deep concern or permitting any Government organization to sound the alarm, for fear of being accused of "propagandizing." As a result, little was done to mobilize public opinion. Pearl Harbor did what the distant, ominous rumblings in Europe and Asia could not.

It has been said that we learn from history only one thing: that men never learn anything from history. Is this likely to be the case again? The current national trends calling for reduced overseas involvement, eliminating the draft, and drastically reducing military spending would suggest that it might well be. These trends could certainly stifle any active effort to coalesce the national will in the face of a growing Soviet threat.

In both major wars of this century, we were fortunate that, despite our 11th hour response, we confronted an enemy whose strength was not to prove as durable as our own. We had time to exploit our tremendous industrial potential for producing armaments in "slow" conventional wars. But today, with the balance of power so dynamically shifting, there is the clear possibility that within 3 to 5 years the combined Soviet nuclear and conventional military capability could overwhelmingly surpass our own, that by the 11th hour our time will have already run out.

The momentum of the Soviet Union military buildup continues. That nation is now one of the world's leading seapowers . . . and in most definitions *the* leading one. Its submarine force is indisputably the world's greatest. Nor can we expect to counter this situation by relying on a superior strategic nuclear capability. In the past half decade, the Soviets have engaged in a major

effort to shift the balance of power in this crucial area too.

In contrast we see our own Nation passing through an antiwar, antimilitary, antipreparedness mood. Many prominent representatives of the congressional, business, and intellectual communities today are vociferously arguing against defense spending and military related research and development. Among some of these leaders of tomorrow there is a "laissez-faire" attitude which is drifting across the Nation —and picking up advocates with lightning speed. Some would even argue for unilateral disarmament. In short, much of the Nation seems unconcerned that we are falling behind the Soviets and rendering ourselves vulnerable to either military defeat or, as I believe, more likely, blackmail tactics. The question is: Are we setting ourselves up for the retaliation of Lenin's "cruel stepmother"?

There is one bright spot. In our democracy, even minorities can be heard. Fortunately, there are many citizens in all walks of life today deeply concerned and distressed over the effect of the Vietnam syndrome and certain domestic trends in motion which could lead to disastrous consequences for U.S. national security. Members of the Naval Reserve and the other Armed Forces Reserve components, the Navy League, and comparable civilian organizations lending support to the Army, Air Force, and Marine Corps are and must continue to be kept fully informed as to the dangers that are building. The resources, abilities, and interest of these individuals must be recognized . . . and called on. While the Regular military are limited in their credibility in speaking out about the threat—often being charged with military parochialism— Reserve officers and men and well-informed civilian supporters of the Armed Forces will be listened to. They, rather than the active military, should carry the torch. Through them and our

civilian Government leaders such as the Secretary of Defense and Secretaries of the services, the American people must be warned of the dangers ahead to their security.

Hopefully, these people in positions of responsibility will be quick to speak out at club and civic luncheons, dinners, and other gatherings. Radio, TV, and newspaper interviews with civilian Government national security experts, *backed up* by Regular military officer experts, could have the most important national impact of all.

I am confident that the American people will respond once they understand the gravity of the situation in which we find ourselves today. The documented case is clear, and, even within intelligence security constraints, the story that can be told is convincing and ominous. It must be told objectively and be absolutely factual. It must not be exaggerated or rely on emotion or estimates of "enemy intentions." Before the people can respond, they

must be told the hard, true facts: the current shift in the balance of raw military power and what it portends, both for themselves and their children and their children.

When he was CNO, Adm. Arleigh Burke said, "It is not enough to . . . have the right ideas. You must communicate those ideas to other people and convince them that you are right."

If we don't start passing the word today, we'll be guilty of failing to learn from history and risking a nuclear Pearl Harbor. As Nietzsche once wrote, "The final lesson of history is: 'Let's never go back there again!'"

R. G. Colbert

R. G. COLBERT
Vice Admiral, U.S. Navy
President, Naval War College

In dealing with the American public on important political issues, one must be conscious of a schizophrenic pattern that exists in public attitudes. On the domestic scene the majority of Americans are ideologically conservative, but, paradoxically, they are operationally liberal in that they support vast welfare programs. This pattern also exists in the public's attitude toward international affairs and military spending. In general the public supports a strong international posture but is less than enthusiastic in the commitment of forces over a prolonged period. Likewise, the majority of the public rates keeping our military posture strong high on its list of national priorities, but it also indicates that defense spending is too high.

POLITICAL BELIEFS

AND PUBLIC OPINION

An address delivered at the Naval War College

by

Dr. Lloyd A. Free

I suppose most of you would agree that the climate of opinion in most societies, and especially democracies, imposes limits, sometimes very broad, sometimes very narrow, on the government's area of maneuver. In the extreme, certain things are virtually taboo; in other cases, they are merely impolitic; in many others, anything is possible, particularly where public opinion is either in agreement or is nonexistent, weak, or divided.

Let us assume that you have just been elected President of the United States. What are the basics that you ought to know about American political beliefs and public opinion; the factors that remain more or less constant; the elements you could enlist in support of your policies and programs, domestic and international, on the one hand, or that would inhibit the exercise of your powers as President and Commander in Chief, on the other?

In discussing the domestic side (before proceeding to international affairs), I will be using the terms "liberal" and "conservative" quite freely; so, in the best academic tradition, I had better define them. Probably the meaning of few words in English or any other language has come around full circle to the same extent as "liberal" and "liberalism." According to the older definition, "liberalism" had, of course, to do primarily with the protection of the individual against encroachment by the state; its essence was individualism. Self-reliance, individual initiative, and private enterprise were unqualifiedly good. Government was the enemy to be distrusted and held in check.

At the political level, the assumptions of old-style liberalism dictated a system of checks and balances and a division of power between the States and the Federal Government, with the latter having distinctly limited powers

and all matters closest to the lives of the citizens being reserved to the States. At the economic and social level, liberalism as then defined was closely linked to *laissez-faire.* Private property was sanctified. Private enterprise was looked upon not only as a direct expression of economic freedom, but as important also in facilitating political liberty.

Particularly after the Civil War, the prevailing theories of social Darwinism held that competition, unimpeded by Government, assured the survival of the fittest. Poverty was considered the result of inherent inferiorities. State intervention, by inhibiting the development of individual initiative and responsibility, was seen as stultifying the development of character and protecting the lazy, the inefficient, and the shiftless. These doctrines of liberalism (old style), widely propagated by the stories of Horatio Alger, are what we mean by the traditional American ideology.

From "Liberalism" to "Conservatism." The main point to be made here is that in the 17th and 18th centuries, when these doctrines of liberalism were first advanced, they were devised and resorted to by "liberals" in the sense of innovators: men like Locke, Montesquieu, and Adam Smith, who were attacking the *status quo,* and more particularly (1) the domination of government by the aristocratic class and (2) the "mercantile system" under which that government stifled the rising industrial class. Their philosophy was designed to rationalize change and hence was "liberal" in character.

By the middle of the 19th century, however, the doctrines of liberalism, as further developed by such men as Spencer and Sumner, were being used for exactly the opposite purpose: namely, by "conservatives" to defend the new *status quo.* By this time, particularly after the Civil War, the business class was in the saddle and was fearful that, with the extension of

suffrage, governments would prove too sensitive to the needs of the people and adopt "dangerous" working-class reforms.

Thus, while the doctrines of liberalism remained essentially the same, they were taken over from the liberals by the conservatives, and the term "liberalism" came to mean resistance to change and the rationalization of the *status quo.* For this reason, I refer to the traditional American ideology as "conservative" rather than "liberal," despite its origins.

Ideological Conservatism. Despite all that has happened in this country during the 20th century- despite the New Deal, the Fair Deal, the New Frontier, and the Great Society—a majority of Americans continue to adhere to most of these doctrines of 19th century liberalism which in today's terminology is equivalent to conservatism; they remain what I shall call "ideological conservatives." This fact emerged very clearly from a large-scale public opinion study our institute carried out before the elections in 1964, which, along with more recent data, was published a couple of years ago in my book (with the late Hadley Cantril) *The Political Beliefs of Americans.*

Among other things, we asked a large national cross section of the American adult public whether they agreed or disagreed with a series of statements having to do with abstract ideas about the proper role and sphere of government, and of the Federal Government in particular. Here are examples of some of these statements and the reactions to them:

"The Federal Government is interfering too much in state and local matters." Four out of 10 of our respondents agreed.

"Social problems here in this country could be solved more effectively if the government would only keep its hands off and let people in local communities

handle their own problems in their own ways." One-half agreed, with only 4 in 10 disagreeing (the rest having no opinion).

"*The government has gone too far in regulating business and interfering with the free enterprise system.*" A plurality agreed.

"*The government is interfering too much with property rights.*" Again, a plurality agreed.

"*There is a definite trend toward socialism in this country.*" Close to one-half agreed, with only one-fifth disagreeing, the rest having no opinion.

"*There is too much Communist and left-wing influence in our government these days.*" Almost one-half agreed, with only 3 in 10 disagreeing.

Socioeconomic Concepts. The abstract concepts Americans tend to hold about the nature and functioning of our socioeconomic system are even more pronouncedly conservative than their notions about the role and sphere of Government. Here is the way the people interviewed reacted to a series of statements along this line:

"*Generally speaking, any able-bodied person who really wants to work in this country can find a job and earn a living.*" At the time these interviews were conducted, the unemployment rate was in excess of 5 percent (as it is today) and among blacks was considerably higher than 15 percent. Most of these people were able bodied, and most of them wanted to work. They could not find jobs because of economic conditions in general and lack of education, training, and skills in particular. Nevertheless, despite the statistical evidence to the contrary, more than three-quarters of our respondents subscribed to the myth that any able-bodied person who really wants to work can find a job.

With this assumption about the availability of job opportunities, it is little wonder that great skepticism was expressed about the unemployed and their qualifications for government relief. Here, for example, are the reactions to a couple of other statements.

"*The relief rolls are loaded with chiselers and people who just don't want to work.*" Two-thirds of our sample agreed.

"*In your opinion, which is generally more often to blame if a person is poor—lack of effort on his part, or circumstances beyond his control?*" Only one-quarter said circumstances beyond his control. Most of the rest, amounting in all to 72 percent pointed either to lack of effort, pure and simple, or to a combination of lack of effort and circumstances—which, of course, still leaves the stigma of blame resting on the poor for their own condition.

This no doubt reflects the Puritan ethic that, whereas virtue is rewarded in material ways, poverty is evidence of sin. As that great Christian leader, Henry Ward Beecher, once put it: "No man in this land suffers from poverty unless it be more than his fault—unless it be his sin." So greatly imbedded is their feeling of guilt that even a majority of the poor agreed that they were at least partially to blame for their own condition, either because of lack of effort or lack of effort plus circumstances.

The reactions of a huge majority to another of the statements are related to this dominant belief in the culpability of the poor:

"*We should rely more on individual initiative and not so much on governmental welfare programs.*" Eight out of 10 of our respondents agreed.

In short, despite actual practices in recent decades at the operational level of Government, Americans at the ideological level continue to pay lipservice in amazing degree to stereotypes and shibboleths inherited from the last century. The abstract ideas they tend to hold about the nature and functioning of our socioeconomic system still seem to stem more from the underlying assumptions

of a *laissez-faire* philosophy than from the operating assumptions of the New Deal, the Fair Deal, the New Frontier, or the Great Society.

The Ideological Spectrum. In order to make general groupings based on these results, I devised what I call an Ideological Spectrum. This rated respondents according to their reactions to certain key statements, such as those given above, some having to do with ideological conceptions about the proper role and sphere of Government and some with abstract ideas about the nature and functioning of our socioeconomic system. These provided a rough index of the degree to which respondents accepted or rejected the traditional American conservative ideology.

Under this scheme, a person who agreed with all of the chosen propositions was rated "completely conservative," and one who disagreed "completely liberal." In between these two extremes the Ideological Spectrum provided categories for "predominantly conservative" (meaning the respondent agreed with most but not all); "predominantly liberal" (meaning he disagreed with most but not all); and "middle of the road" (meaning he agreed within about half and disagreed with about half). Grouped in this way, our sample divided as follows:

Completely liberal	4%
Predominantly liberal	12
Middle of the road	34
Predominantly conservative	20
Completely conservative	30
	100%

Thus one-half of the public proved to be ideological conservatives, either completely or predominantly, and one-third middle-of-the-roaders, with only 16 percent putting themselves in the liberal category. It thus became clear that full *ideological* conformity with the trend of policies and programs represented by the New Deal to the Great Society was confined to the small minority of 16 percent who qualified as liberals on our Ideological Spectrum.

The generally conservative stance at the ideological level indicates, of course, that the liberal trend of policies and programs since the days of Franklin Roosevelt's New Deal has little secure underlying foundation in any ideological consensus. For example, so long as three-fourths of the public believe that any able-bodied person can find a job and earn a living, it can hardly be argued that there is solid support in popular beliefs for large elements of any "war on poverty" or similar programs yet to come.

Then, how did it come about that New Deal-type programs have received widespread public backing, for there is no doubt that they have?

New Style "Liberalism." To answer this question, we must first go back a bit in American history. Against the background of 19th century liberalism old style, a new liberalism in the present-day sense of the term gradually emerged in some of the States early in the 20th century and was heralded at the Federal level by the progressive regimes of Theodore Roosevelt and Woodrow Wilson.

As a practical matter, the new style liberals increasingly recognized the need for governmental action to protect the underprivileged. They favored strengthening the powers of Government in the interests of public welfare, with particular attention to social amelioration. They supported compulsory education, unemployment and old-age insurance, minimum wages, and the like as enlargements of, not restrictions on individual liberty. Earlier, resort to Government was condoned to advance economic development; now, the idea was to use Government to promote social justice. This new liberalism accomplished an

enduring breakthrough during the regime of Franklin D. Roosevelt.

However, neither Roosevelt nor those who followed him ever evolved a coherent philosophy of liberalism (new style) to rationalize the programs they supported. The approach has tended to be based on "problem solving" in the light of social conscience, rather than on any ideological premises.

Yet, while the majority of Americans remain conservative at the ideological level, in the sense that they continue to accept the traditional American ideology which advocates the curbing of Federal power, at the practical level of governmental operations there has obviously been an apparently inexorable trend in liberal directions since the days of the New Deal. In fact, in 1966 President Johnson was quoted as saying that "the developments of 1965, coupled with the election of 1964, show that the old argument over the 'welfare state' has been resolved in favor of federal action." Whether or not the United States has already become a welfare state depends upon varying definitions; but that it has been moving in that direction, no one can deny.

How has this been possible in our democracy if a majority of the citizenry are ideological conservatives who, assumedly, should resent and oppose such tendencies?

Attitudes toward Government Programs. The answer lies in the fact that the political thinking of Americans—if it can be called thought—is very different at two distinct and conflicting levels. The reactions of the majority at the *ideological* level have already been described. But, if you question Americans about the *operational* level of Government programs, a completely different picture emerges. For example, in 1968 we asked a national cross section of adult Americans whether Government spending for certain types of programs should be increased, kept at the present

level, reduced, or ended altogether. Some of the results are given below.

First, let us take the Federal program to help build low-rent public housing. Among our respondents, 35 percent thought Federal spending for this purpose should be increased, and 43 percent that it should be maintained at the present level—making a total of almost 8 out of 10 who favored maintaining at least the current level of expenditures for this purpose.

Similar results emerged in connection with the Federal program to improve education: 36 percent said spending for this purpose should be increased; an equal proportion that the present level should be maintained—making a total of more than 7 out of 10 endorsing this Federal effort.

Even more almost 9 out of 10—approved the Federal program to make a college education possible for young people who could not otherwise afford it.

Three-quarters supported the Federal program to rebuild rundown sections of our cities—that is, urban renewal: almost 4 out of 10 said that spending for this purpose should be increased and an equal proportion that it should be continued at the present level.

Nine out of 10 endorsed the Federal program to retrain poorly educated people so they could get jobs.

Almost 8 out of 10 supported the Medicaid program of the Federal Government to help pay the medical bills of low-income families.

Whatever the definitions of "liberal" and "conservative" from the historical point of view, it appears to me that, practically speaking, one of the best ways to differentiate liberals from conservatives in this country under present circumstances is to test attitudes toward uses of the power and resources of governments, and particularly the Federal Government, in order to accomplish domestic social objectives. The general disposition of the liberals is to

approve such uses, of the conservatives to disapprove. It is in this limited, primary sense that I shall use the words "liberal" and "conservative" in the rest of this article.

The Operational Spectrum. It is crystal clear from our data that, while a majority of Americans are *ideological* conservatives, at the same time a huge majority of these same people are *operational* liberals. To demonstrate this I devised an Operational Spectrum, similar to the Ideological Spectrum described above. Under this scheme a respondent was classified as "completely liberal" if he favored either increasing or maintaining the present level of Federal spending for such programs as those involving education, urban renewal, job retraining, and Medicaid, along with rent supplements for low-income families. He was rated "completely conservative" if he advocated either reducing or terminating Federal expenditures for such purposes. In between these two extremes, the Operational Spectrum, like the Ideological Spectrum, provided categories for "predominantly liberal," "predominantly conservative," and "middle of the road." On this basis, the members of our sample grouped themselves as follows:

Completely liberal	33%
Predominantly liberal	39
Middle of the road	21
Completely or predominantly conservative	7
	100%

Thus, while only 16 percent of the public were liberals in the ideological sense, it turned out that at the level of Government operations almost three-quarters were either completely or predominantly liberal in the sense of favoring key Federal programs designed to accomplish social objectives.

Not unexpectedly, the highest percentages of operational liberals were to be found among those who needed help from the Government most: the lower socioeconomic groups in terms of education and income, and especially the Negroes (98 percent of whom were rated as liberals, with no less than three-quarters qualifying as "completely liberal" because they favored *all* of the key programs asked about). In a related vein, the proportion of liberals was greater than average among blue-collar workers; Democrats; the young (21-29 years of age); Catholics; Easterners; and residents of large cities.

Markedly less liberal than average were those 50 years of age and over; the college educated; people with incomes of $10,000 a year and more; and the WASP's (white, Anglo-Saxon Protestants), especially those living in smaller places and rural areas.

Ideological Conservatives-Operational Liberals. The explanation for the discrepancy between the results on the Operational Spectrum, which revealed a consensus on the liberal side, and those on the Ideological Spectrum, which leaned toward the conservative side, lies in the fact that more than one-quarter of the American people are at one and the same time both ideological conservatives and operational liberals.

The ideological liberals proved to be highly consistent: 9 out of 10 of them qualified as liberals on the Operational Spectrum. However, among the ideological conservatives, almost one-half emerged as liberals at the operational level. Henry Steele Commager described these people to a tee in this statement about Americans in general: "They clung to the vocabulary of *laissez-faire*, yet faithfully supplied the money and the personnel for vastly expanded governmental activities."

This conflict between attitudes toward Government programs and ideological concepts tends to be resolved in typically pragmatic American fashion: the practical is given precedence over

the theoretical. At the operational level of government, the great majority are more concerned about practical problems than they are about abstract ideas. In short, they want government to *work*, and to hell with the theories.

This situation was revealed when we asked a national cross section in 1968 how worried or concerned they were about a list of 23 issues or problems. The impression derived from the results is that the American people are most concerned about a number of sweeping international issues; that, next, they are showing growing concern about certain substantive domestic problems; and that they are bothered least of all by ideological issues. Particularly noteworthy in this connection is the fact that concern about Government spending was a good halfway down the list, and concern about "the trend toward a more powerful Federal Government" was actually in next to the last place.

State and Local vs. Federal Action. It is true that, in conformity with traditional American political ideology, the majority of the public favors State and local over Federal action in such fields as the problems of the poor and education. Correspondingly, they approve the idea of the Federal Government making more money available to State and local governments for such purposes. On the other hand, they have more confidence in the Federal Government to get things done in combating air and water pollution, apparently realizing that this problem often involves interstate aspects and probably cannot be tackled successfully without Federal standards.

Nevertheless, the fundamental point is that, despite their ideological beliefs, a large majority favors the use of governmental power and resources, including those of the Federal Government, to solve current problems and accomplish social purposes.

The moral of this story as a whole is, of course, that you, as incoming President, should talk like an ideological conservative but act like an operational liberal. However, you should not do the first without also doing the second. Witness, for example, candidate Barry Goldwater in 1964. He rode high, wide, and handsome so long as he was able to confine himself to talking conservative ideology. But the moment he was forced to discuss issues and Government programs, he was a dead duck. The crux of the matter was that the American people were not about to elect an *operational* conservative to the Presidency.

And, in my opinion, this is still true despite the alleged current trend toward conservatism. Obviously, the public is exhibiting some tendencies of what has come to be called conservatism in such matters as student unrest, law and order, and civil rights. But there is absolutely no data of which I am aware showing any falling away from the basic tendency toward operational liberalism that I have been describing.

In fact, quite the contrary. The public is becoming increasingly concerned about a number of problems it was not too aware of in former years—such as air and water pollution--and, as we have seen above, is looking to the Federal Government to solve them. Thus, as to the future, I can only envision a general trend toward further extensions of Federal power and programs, solidly backed by majority public opinion.

International Attitudes. Now let us turn to what you, as a newly elected President, ought to know about the international attitudes of Americans. The first thing that needs to be pointed out is that, despite their high degree of concern about foreign policy problems, a surprising number of our citizens are abysmally ignorant of the specifics of international affairs, even at the most elementary level.

To illustrate, the study our institute

conducted in 1964 showed that more than one-fourth of the American people (28 percent) had never heard or read of NATO. Only 58 percent knew that the United States is a member of NATO, and only 38 percent were aware that the Soviet Union is *not* a member—facts which obviously go to the very nature and fundamental purpose of America's most important alliance. Equally shockingly, one-quarter of the public did not even know that the government of mainland China is Communist! All in all, two-fifths of the American public are far too ignorant to play a role as intelligent citizens of a country which is the world's leader. Only about one-fourth are really adequately informed.

Nevertheless, ignorant or not, the great majority have opinions on international matters. In this connection, perhaps most fundamental of all at this time is the public's orientation on the spectrum stretching from isolationism to internationalism. To get at this, I used a series of statements in surveys conducted both in 1964 and 1968, with respondents being asked whether they agreed or disagreed with each. Here are some of the 1968 results:

"The U.S. should cooperate fully with the United Nations." More than 7 out of 10 agreed, with only one-fifth disagreeing.

"In deciding on its foreign policies, the U.S. should take into account the views of its allies in order to keep our alliances strong." No less than 84 percent agreed, with only 9 percent disagreeing (the rest having no opinion).

"Since the U.S. is the most powerful nation in the world, we should go our own way in international matters, not worrying too much about whether other countries agree with us or not." In this case, more than 7 out of 10 disagreed, with less than one-quarter agreeing.

"The U.S. should mind its own business internationally and let other countries get along as best they can on their own." Two-Thirds disagreed, with only

a little over one-fourth indicating agreement.

"We shouldn't think so much in international terms but concentrate more on our own national problems and building up our strength and prosperity here at home." In this case, 60 percent agreed, with only 31 percent expressing dissent.

Isolationism vs. Internationalism. In order to test internationalist-isolationist orientations on a generalized basis, I worked a series of these statements into a system of International Patterns. To qualify as "completely internationalist" under this scheme, a respondent had, for example, to agree that the United States should cooperate with the United Nations and should take into account the views of our allies, while disagreeing with the statements that the United States should go its own way, mind its own business, and concentrate more on national problems. To be "completely isolationist," a respondent had to give the opposite answers. Categories were also provided for "predominantly internationalist" and "predominantly isolationist," with a middle category labeled "mixed" (meaning, of course, a mixture of internationalist and isolationist patterns). The 1968 results deriving from this scheme looked like this:

Completely internationalist	25%
Predominantly internationalist	34
Mixed	32
Predominantly isolationist	6
Completely isolationist	3
	100%

Thus, as of 1968, the isolationists numbered less than 1 in 10 members of our adult population. The majority—almost 6 out of 10—were internationalists, either complete or predominant, with about one-third in the "mixed" category.

However, between 1964 and 1968 there had been a drop amounting to 5

percentage points in the "completely internationalist" ranks, with a corresponding increase of 6 percentage points in the "mixed" category, that is, of people halfway toward isolationism.

The drift away from the internationalist pole in our system of International Patterns resulted because higher percentages than in 1964 went along with two of the interrelated statements mentioned above. In the first place, more agreed with the minority view that "the U.S. should mind its own business and let other countries get along as best they can on their own"—the percentages rising from 18 percent in 1964 to 27 percent in 1968. Secondly, undoubtedly underlying the feeling that we should mind our own business internationally, there was increased majority sentiment in favor of the proposition that "we shouldn't think so much in international terms but concentrate more on our own national problems" here at home. Agreement with this statement rose from 55 percent in 1964 to 60 percent in 1968, assumedly fed by increasing concern about domestic problems the public felt were being neglected because of the war in Vietnam.

Qualifiers of Internationalism. Obviously, this feeling of the majority that we should turn inward toward our domestic problems is an important qualifier of the predominant internationalism of Americans. As in 1964, another qualifier that emerged in 1968 was allergic attitudes toward foreign aid. Six out of 10 advocated reducing such aid, if not terminating it entirely.

A further element that must be taken into account in characterizing the international outlooks of Americans is a certain nationalistic power-mindedness. Senator Fulbright (if I dare mention his name in this journal) might well consider the majority's reaction to the following statement as evidence of "the arrogance of power": *"The U.S. should maintain its dominant position as the world's most powerful nation at all cost, even going to the very brink of war if necessary."* One-half of our sample agreed, with 4 in 10 disagreeing (the remaining 10 percent having no opinion).

This feeling that the United States should maintain its position in the world is obviously one of the important motivations behind support for our internationalist posture. In this connection, it is significant that agreement with this statement dropped from 56 percent in 1964 to 50 percent in 1968, with disagreement rising from 31 percent to 40 percent. The guess might be ventured that one of the factors at work was disillusionment with the practical effects of the application of America's power in Vietnam.

With fear of the Soviet Union and China in the background, another of the strongest motivations of the American people when it comes to the U.S. role in world affairs is unquestionably anticommunism. This is reflected in reactions to the following statement: *"The U.S. should take all necessary steps, including the use of military force as we are now doing in Vietnam, to prevent the spread of communism to any other parts of the free world, no matter where."* No less than 57 percent endorsed this statement in 1968, with an additional 19 percent saying we should defend some, if not all, areas or countries.

In short, on the surface at least, it would appear that almost 6 out of 10 Americans believe we should even go to war, if necessary, to prevent the spread of communism anywhere. Clearly, the doctrine of containment appears to be deeply implanted in the public's psychology.

Theory vs. Practice. Before we accept these results at face value, however, let me propound a hypothesis I developed recently which may have a bearing on the matter. You will remember that on

domestic issues we got widely divergent results with respect to conservatism and liberalism, depending upon whether we asked questions at the level of theory or at the level of practice. Something like this may be applicable in the case of international attitudes. I suspect, in short, that if you put a series of general principles, propositions, or slogans to the public, you will get one set of results, roughly corresponding to the ideological level. But if you confront people with a number of specific situations (particularly conflict situations), you will get a different set of results, corresponding to the operational level. I hope to chart this out systematically before long, but in the meantime let me illustrate what I have in mind.

In 1965 Lou Harris found that almost 8 out of 10 Americans thought it was right for the United States to use military power to keep communism out of North and South America. Yet in the wake of the ill-fated Bay of Pigs invasion, Gallup reported that two-thirds of the public were *against* sending our Armed Forces to help overthrow Castro; and opinion was even about equally divided on aiding the anti-Castro forces with money and war materials.

The Korean War. More broadly, let us again take the statement, endorsed by a majority of Americans, to the effect that the United States should take all necessary steps, including the use of military force, to prevent the spread of communism. How durable did this sentiment prove in the case of the war in Korea? In October 1950—before the Chinese came into the war—when respondents were asked whether the United States had made a mistake in deciding to defend Korea, two-thirds said no, that we had not made a mistake, with only 20 percent feeling that we had. At the same time, almost two-thirds felt that we should *not* stop the fighting when we had pushed the North Koreans back over the line where

they started, but should continue to fight in their territory until they surrendered.

Then the Chinese came in, and within 2 months public opinion had completely reversed itself:

One-half (which proportion rose to two-thirds by March 1951) felt we *had* made a mistake in getting involved in the first place;

—Almost two-thirds were of the opinion that we *should* stop fighting when we reached the dividing line between North and South Korea;

—Two-thirds said we ought to pull our troops out of Korea as fast as possible.

Obviously, such a change in opinion hardly squares with the belligerent stance assumed by the public on the general proposition of stopping the spread of communism. Clearly, what happened was that, with the Chinese coming into the war, the public concluded that, as a practical matter, the added cost in American lives and dollars just was not worth it. As I wrote in 1957, this abrupt turnabout was possible because "Americans were never really clear in their own minds what they were fighting for, what they were trying to accomplish, or what vital interests or purposes of theirs were involved."

The War in Vietnam. And now, of course, we have an essentially similar situation in the case of Vietnam, a situation I expected to develop even sooner than it did. To prove what a valid prophet I can be on occasion (I like, of course, to forget about those instances where my judgment proved faulty), let me quote from a lecture I delivered before the Naval War College just 1 year ago, when the trends of American opinion about the war in Vietnam were still somewhat obscure:

Our own Government will undoubtedly now have to face up to

the fact that the American people are becoming sick and tired of the war . . . It is my considered judgment as a so-called expert that we are in the early stages of an inexorable tide in favor of pulling out of Vietnam. There may be riptides from time to time which will temporarily obscure the direction of the current; but it is my belief that, however you and I may feel about the matter, the movement down below will continue ever more strongly in favor of disengagement.

As usual, when I stick my neck out this far, I did have some data up my sleeve to rely on. Studies our Institute conducted in this country showed that immediately after the Tet offensive, in mid-February 1968, the majority of Americans remained even more "hawkish" than they had been before. One-quarter advocated gradual escalation of the war, and no less than 28 percent opted for "an all-out crash effort in the hope of winning the war quickly, even at the risk of China or Russia entering the war."

However, in a report I wrote at that time, I pointed out that, in view of the then existing mood of intense frustration, a drastic change in the public opinion picture was a distinct possibility; and, in fact, a major shift was not long in coming. By June of 1968, 4 months later, one-half of the public had moved over to the "dove" side, with 7 percent favoring a cutback in the American military effort, and no less than 42 percent wanting us to discontinue the struggle and start pulling out of Vietnam (this latter figure being almost double what it had been in mid-February).

By June of this year (1970), Gallup found that the proportion thinking we had "made a mistake in sending troops to fight in Vietnam" had risen from 25 percent in March 1966 to 56 percent 4

years later. Correspondingly, by the latter date (that is June of 1970) about one-half favored withdrawal, either immediately or at least by July of 1971. And so it has gone.

Thus in regard to Vietnam we get much the same conflicting, almost schizoid patterning that we did on the liberal-conservative spectrum at the ideological and operational levels, respectively. A majority of the public says we ought to take all necessary steps, including the use of military force, to prevent the spread of communism anywhere in the world. But, when confronted with an actual conflict situation, a majority favors our withdrawing from Vietnam. After all, the last thing any realist—and particularly you as an incoming President of the United States —ought to expect from the greater public is local consistency!

Military Spending. In conclusion, much the same kind of inconsistency pertains in the case of a subject near and dear to your hearts: namely, attitudes toward the Defense Establishment and military spending. When we last asked a national cross section of Americans how worried or concerned they were about a list of over 20 issues and problems, the item "keeping our military defenses strong" was tied for second place. The only thing people were more concerned about was the problem of Vietnam.

Yet when last August, Gallup asked whether the Government was spending too little, too much, or about the right amount on national defense and military purposes, a clear majority of the public (52 percent) said too much, with only 8 percent saying too little, and 31 percent the right amount (the remaining 9 percent had no opinion). So, here again, the American people are concerned about keeping our military defenses strong and favor doing everything possible, including the use of military force, to prevent the spread of communism. But at one and the same time, a

majority wants to cut defense spending.

Certainly there is a logical inconsistency apparent here; but at the same time the public's mood is understandable. In the first place, there is frustration over the war in Vietnam which has rubbed off onto the military—unjustifiably, perhaps, but inevitably. Secondly, as our data show, since 1964 concern about several domestic problems has increased to a point where they now appear in the upper bracket of our list of worries and concerns: first, several interrelated items having to do with maintaining law and order (e.g., crime and juvenile delinquency, rioting in our cities, narcotics and drug addiction); air and water pollution; and, in general, the problems of our cities. Also, concern about inflation and the cost of living, not to mention high taxes, has gone up.

As people look around for resources with which to combat these problems their eye tends to light first on Vietnam. But even ending our participation there is not going to save enough to have much consequence. So where is the fattest looking source for more money to spend on domestic needs? Why the Defense Establishment, of course. Everybody knows how wasteful the military is. Naturally, they can manage to maintain our defenses with less money. Surely our boys can figure out some way to give us a bigger bang for less bucks.

Now this may, indeed will, seem ridiculous to most of you. But let me say in all frankness that the Defense Establishment has left itself wide open for this line of thinking. Just remember the stories that have appeared time after time in recent years: about gigantic cost overruns; about weapons and weapons systems on which billions have been spent, only to be abandoned or found faulty; about thousands of tanks "lost" or forgotten in Western Europe; et cetera.

If you ask me what can be done

about the public's current allergy toward defense spending, I would say very little for the time being. We students of public opinion have found through the years that it is usually events rather than persuasion or propaganda which trigger major changes in popular attitudes. However, this does not necessarily mean you must despair.

For one thing, when it finally eventuates, an end to our military participation in Vietnam will help remove the current bad taste in the public's mouth insofar as the Defense Establishment is concerned. More crucially, any further revival of Soviet and/or Chinese threats in contexts which clearly threaten our national security will give the public pause when it comes to crippling cuts in defense layouts.

More particularly, with the Russians probing as they now are to test U.S.

BIOGRAPHIC SUMMARY

Dr. Lloyd A. Free is the president of The Institute for International Social Research. His educational experience includes Princeton University, Stanford University Law School, Yenching University, and The George Washington University. Early in his career he practiced law, was a Fellow with the Rockefeller Foundation, and then affiliated with Princeton University as a lecturer in the School of Public and International Affairs and later served as Associate Director, Princeton Public Opinion Project. Dr. Free joined the Government in 1941 as the first Director of the Foreign Broadcast Intelligence Service. He subsequently served Government in numerous senior positions, some of which were Acting Director, Office of International Information of the State Department; Counselor of Embassy for Public Affairs in Rome; Consultant to President Eisenhower on psychological aspects of American foreign policy; and Cochairman, Task Force on USIA to advise President Kennedy.

weaknesses vis-a-vis the Middle East, Berlin, and Cuba, for example, it is more than likely that before long our illogical public will develop an enhanced awareness and appreciation of the dangers involved if the Soviet Union ever gains superiority over the United States. And, when that happens, the probability is that popular attitudes toward the operational question of defense spending will, once again, come back into line with the essentially ideological beliefs of the majority of Americans that the United States should maintain its dominant position in the world at all costs and take all necessary steps to prevent the further spread of commnnism.

———————— ψ ————————

Military philosophies, bred and crystallized in the crucible of war against the elements and other adversaries, may not convincingly register on mentalities trained and experienced in totally different circumstances.

Admiral R.B. Carney, USN: Address to the Naval War College, 31 May 1963

The traditional American framework for political and social action is being increasingly challenged by members of a "counterculture" calling for a radically different society. Aside from immediate political controversies such as the war in Vietnam or the issue of civil rights, the causes of this dissatisfaction are seen to be deep misgivings about the quality of life in a highly advanced industrial society. The theoretical basis of the movement—the works of Marx, Freud, and Marcuse—provide the intellectual underpinnings of a sharp critique of contemporary industrial society.

THE PHILOSOPHY

OF THE

COUNTERCULTURE

An article prepared

by

Ensign William F. Averyt, U.S. Naval Reserve

We are all familiar by this time with the external manifestations of the counterculture- differences in dress, music, and sexual mores—yet these differences often blind observers to the more deep-seated changes occurring in the United States today. During the first Seminar on Current Views and Attitudes, conducted by the Naval War College in the spring of 1970 and including students from the School of Naval Warfare, the School of Naval Command and Staff, Officer Candidate School, Brown University, and the University of Rhode Island, we all realized that the difficulties in communication resulted from something more than opposing views. As one naval officer put it during the postmortem panel evaluation of the seminar, it seemed that connotations of the words were different; half of each discussion was spent in becoming aware of these different languages, underlying which were evidently very different concepts of American reality.

Since the seminar will be held again this year at the Naval War College, it might be valuable to mention briefly some of the divergent attitudes that surfaced last year. This will lead to the main theme of this essay, the "philosophy of the counterculture" which I believe underlies the views of many of the civilian college students who participated. I think the attitudes of the civilian college students who participated in the seminar represent fairly well those of the general college population, and if this is true, they foreshadow some basic changes in young Americans' conceptions of what constitutes the good life.

The discussions centered, naturally, on the Vietnam war, the plight of the blacks, the condition of the inner cities, and the quality of the environment; but they quickly moved to a deeper level, revealing very different ways of conceiving American reality. How are major changes accomplished in society? How is pressure for change created and

mobilized? To what extent are our lives determined by the complex technology of contemporary America? What is the purpose of education?

The naval participants in the seminar generally espoused a formalistic theory of change, i.e., changes occurred because voters requested them, laws were passed, and thereafter citizens' conduct and values changed accordingly. Education, for them, was a formal sequence of instruction, culminating in the degree, which in turn opened the doors to a career, which itself was structured in ascending levels of wealth, power, and responsibility.

The civilian college students and some junior naval officers tended to have a fundamentally different way of conceiving these things. Their view of society and social change laid more stress upon the social forces supporting the status quo and the clash of interests when a rearrangement of these forces was in question. Education was viewed as an open-ended process, the aim of which was the development of the ability to take advantage of many different alternatives. Hopefully this difference in outlook will be clearer during the following discussion.

Briefly, what is the "counterculture"?[1] There is no need to place too strict a definition on the word, but we can use it to describe the increasingly radicalized version of reality that American youth and others were concocting in the 1960's which made the end of that decade so different from the beginning.* The young generation of the 1960's was special in several ways: They had seen no major war in their lifetime;

the nuclear balance of terror prevented a major war from erupting between the two superpowers. Incidents which in earlier times would have sparked a major conflagration failed to produce a single conflict in which the two great powers battled each other directly.

Second, they came to maturity in an era of increasing wealth (although by the 1960's the great accumulated wealth of the United States served to highlight the great disparities in its distribution).[2] Furthermore, an increasing share of this wealth was at the disposal of the young, giving them greater mobility and independence.

Finally, this generation benefited from a much greater degree of leisure than did previous ones. Perhaps "leisure" is not the most accurate term; in any case, the pattern of growing up now included, for a large part of American youth, long stretches of academic work in college and graduate school before the final exercise of a trade or profession.

This, then, was the generation which spawned the counterculture—a way of life going beyond "life styles," more aware of disparities between what society claims itself to be and what it actually is, between the official facade an individual wears and his true self. The shortcomings of American society now fell under the scrutiny of students with enough time and money to study them—an explosive combination. The black movement and the Vietnam war provided the political activation, with results too well known to be enumerated.*

---

*For a good view of the diverse movements involved and a brief historical summary, see Theodore T. Leber, Jr., "The Genesis of Antimilitarism on the College Campus: a Contemporary Case Study of Student Protest," *Naval War College Review,* November 1970, p. 58-96.

---

*For detailed account, see the following reports of Presidential commissions: *Report of the National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders,* 1968; *Violence in America: Historical and Comparative Perspectives, a Report to the National Commission on the Causes and Prevention of Violence,* June 1969; *Report of the President on Campus Unrest,* 1970.

And yet there have been other periods in American history in which American realities have been contrasted with American ideals and found wanting. Is this period of dissent different from others—the pre-Civil War abolition movements, the labor violence of the late 19th century, the muckraking, trust-busting, et cetera? We do see, indeed, strains of a very American type of anarchism and individualism in today's counterculture. The young people who retreat to their desert commune in New Mexico—are they so different from Thoreau in his retreat from "bustling" Concord to Walden Pond? Nevertheless, even granting this indebtedness to an earlier American tradition of individualism, it does seem that there is something qualitatively different in today's counterculture. It is different because the conditions in which man lives today are so radically different from anyting that has ever gone before. "Cultures," "life styles," and "schools of thought" do not grow in a vacuum: they are intimately related to the material world around them; they spring up in response or in opposition to it; they justify and exemplify it; or they condemn it.

This is not to say that all of today's college students could or would articulate this outlook as will be done below, although many of the New Left spokesmen do explicitly acknowledge their intellectual forebears. This is not to say, either, that it is only today's youth which has been attracted to the philosophy to be presented below; it has evidently influenced profoundly a large number of intellectuals, professors, writers—in short, it has significantly penetrated the groups of people who analyze, discuss, and communicate to others the developments of contemporary America.

The members of the counterculture, like almost all Americans today, are trying to come to grips with a complex, technologically advanced industrial society, searching for ways to humanize the world in which man works and plays. It is not surprising, therefore, that they have borrowed heavily from sociologists and economists who have analyzed the workings of advanced industrial societies, especially the more critical thinkers. And here a caveat is in order: we must not commit the fallacy of supposing that certain thinkers of doctrines "converted" the young and sparked their opposition:

> The fact that a growing number of people—especially students both here and abroad—are becoming more radical in their politics is a result of contemporary conditions and not a response to printed words. Those words may reflect or reinforce existing sentiments, and to that important extent they deserve examination.[3]

It is in this spirit that I will examine those thinkers from whom the spokesmen of the counterculture have borrowed theories and gained insight.

One could say that the debates now raging among New Left intellectuals center about the "miscegenation of Marx and Freud."[4] The question has more relevance for us today than at first glance; essentially, it asks whether the advanced industrial order is liberating or enslaving man. The counterculture borrows heavily from Marx's analysis of the nascent industrialism of the Victorian era. The industrial order, said Marx, divides work into meaningless units, dehumanizes the worker, splits apart the family, and wipes out the natural patterns of rural life which man has previously known. Work becomes meaningless and boring; the laborer turns off his mind during the workday, waiting for the weekend when he can "really" live: "[Work] is not the satisfaction of a need but only a *means* to satisfy other needs. Its alien character is obvious from the fact that as soon as no physical

or other pressure exists, labor is avoided like the plague."[5] The remedy, for Marx, was a drastic reordering of the political powers to bring them into line with the advances of the economy, to bring the relations of production into line with the forces of production. This would involve most probably a violent overthrow of the bourgeois capitalist regime (although toward the end of his life Marx foresaw the possibility of a peaceful change through the activity of strong labor unions, especially in Great Britain).[6] Without delving into the complexities of Marxian analysis, the main point to stress is that this political reordering would liberate man, represented by the vast mass of the proletariat, and permit him to *direct* the course of economic and social development; it would reassert man's primacy over the great economic machine that was already sweeping across Europe in the mid-19th century and drastically altering centuries-old ways of life.

This view is essentially utopian—it foresees the solution not only of man's economic and social difficulties through a liberating revolution, but also the solution of his deeper psychic problems, e.g., his inability to commune with nature and with his fellowman. This quest for a lost sense of brotherhood and community runs like a nostalgic refrain through the early writings of Marx, especially his *Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts* of 1844. At times we are reminded of the laments of Wordsworth and Blake as they confronted the "dark Satanic mills" then covering the English countryside. But Marx only glimpsed later transformations of the industrial order, of which we shall select two as the most salient: the separation of ownership and control and the increase in the standard of living of the working classes.

In the classical Marxian analysis there was no doubt about who was the enemy: the bourgeois capitalist, the owner of an industrial enterprise who

arbitrarily controlled the lives of hundreds or thousands and who, through one way or another, convinced the legislatures of those European countries with constitutional governments to outlaw associations of workingmen because these would "infringe" upon his right to bargain as a free individual. The enemy was evident, as was the squalor of the working masses.*

However, from 1890 onward, significant changes occurred in capitalism, drastic enough to alter fundamentally its prospects. First, with the growth of joint stock companies, there occurred the separation of ownership and control which has continued to the present.[7] Who was now the enemy, the manager of a firm or its hundreds of shareholders? With this change, we shall now shift from the term "capitalism" to that of "industrialism," for the economic order assumes a faceless, Kafkaesque quality in which it is difficult to identify those individuals who exercise power. Increasing bureaucratization and rationalization affected practically every area of life, bringing "cradle to grave" security, under the aegis of the nation-state, demanding the aid of thousands of anonymous, efficient clerks.** (It is interesting to note in passing that the first modern system of social welfare was not passed by any of the liberal democracies of Europe, but by the

---

*Europe at that time was undergoing the pangs of the period of primitive capital accumulation, which is a necessary step in any region's economic development—consumption must be restrained so that profits may be plowed back into the economy, building up the industrial plant. A close reading of the *Communist Manifesto* reveals that Marx never disputed the *necessity* of this stage, merely condemning the human misery which was its byproduct. See George Liebthein, *Marxism: a Historical and Critical Study* (New York: Praeger, 1961), p. 157-58, 185, 197.

**The classic treatment of the subject is Max Weber, *Economy and Society: an Outline of Interpretive Sociology* (New York: Bedminster Press, 1968), v. III, p. 956-1005.

Second Reich under the strong pressure of Bismarck, who was anxious to mollify the growing labor movement and who was desirous of extending the power of the central government, Germany still being a new amalgam of principalities.)[8]

Second, the standard of living of the working class rose considerably from the late 19th century onward. This improvement in its material conditions lessened the danger of proletarian revolt, but was nevertheless accompanied by other ills, to be analyzed below.

With this shift in the character of industrialism, we are moving closer to the second school of thought which has profoundly influenced the counterculture of contemporary America: the pessimistic assessment of the industrial order (even when it brings affluence), and of its capacity to enrich and improve human existence. The dominant thinker was Sigmund Freud, whose diagnosis of industrialism was considerably less optimistic than that of Marx. Freud concluded that civilization and human happiness are incompatible, even contradictory. Man accomplishes feats of civilization by disciplining himself, working, and postponing immediate gratification. In Freud's terminology, he must repress his sex drive, eros, and sublimate it in practical or artistic works. But eros is not so easily mastered or disciplined; it is a force of great strength, ready to burst the bounds imposed upon it at any moment. Consequently, civilized societies, as they become increasingly complex, must impose greater and greater restrictions upon this potentially dangerous force, limiting where and when and how it may be used. Civilization also requires that man sacrifice his love of aggression, according to Freud. Indeed, the disciplining of these two urges, sex and aggression, accounts for man's unhappiness in a civilized state:

If civilization requires such sacrifices, not only of sexuality but also of the aggressive tendencies in mankind, we can better understand why it should be so hard for men to feel happy in it. In actual fact, primitive man was better off in this respect, for he knew nothing of any restrictions on his instincts.[9]

Civilization, because of its demands that these two urges be curbed, can therefore be said to rest upon neurosis, just as the individual whose basic urges remain unsatisfied experiences neurosis.[10]

We are thus confronted with two contradictory assessments of the industrial order. The debate, so far, hinges on the question of the psychic strain exacted by the building of so complex a society. Before proceeding to examine the thinker who has tried to establish a synthesis of these contradictory views, we might pause to consider the importance of the analyses considered above. These lines of thought might appear unrelated to the "real" concerns of today's naval officer, but I would argue that this is due to the peculiar perspective provided by a naval career, which of necessity centers around sea duty and shore establishments, most of which are removed from the great urban and industrial centers of modern America. This was one of the most glaring differences in attitude to surface during the Seminar on Current Views and Attitudes held at the Naval War College in the spring of 1970, i.e., the fact that the participants from the Navy had difficulty in grasping the gravity of the situation in the great industrial cities of America today.

Regardless of whether one feels closer to the optimistic or pessimistic views of the industrial order, one is still bound to seek ways to improve the existing situation. The optimist would seek to implement programs

22   NAVAL WAR COLLEGE REVIEW

restructuring the society; the pessimist would endeavor to impede its further advancement. This leads us to the final stage of analysis of the philosophical bases of the counterculture, an examination of the political structure of advanced industrial societies. We will focus on the works of Herbert Marcuse because, in spite of their complexity and their adherence to a Hegelian tradition of criticism that is quite foreign to the American mind, he has nevertheless provided a powerful critique which has deeply influenced the thinking of the counterculture.

Marcuse is living in a period which has disproved Marx's predictions about the collapse of the capitalist order: class antagonisms have lessened, and the living standard of the worker has risen. The working class in the United States has little sympathy with the New Left. What is the New Left's response to this unforeseen development? Marcuse holds that the contradictions of capitalism still exist, the work it demands is still demeaning and unsatisfying. The people, he says, have been pacified by a surfeit of consumer goods and the all-pervading communications media which provide undemanding diversions during their leisure time.* The fact is that they are actually not "people" but "personnel"; their lives are still not fulfilled. Yet the immediate goads to revolt have been removed. Their lives are manipulated by impersonal bureaucracies which touch every aspect of their existence. Marcuse lists these recent developments in industrial society which account for this dehumanization:

> . . . (the) transition from free to organized competition, concentration of power in the hands of an omnipresent technical, cul-

tural, and political administration, self-propelling mass production and consumption, subjection of previously private, asocial dimensions of existence to methodical indoctrination, manipulation, control.[11]

No real threat exists from any quarter, so the meaningless exchange of views continues:

> Under the rule of monopolistic media--themselves the mere instruments of economic and political power- a mentality is created for which right and wrong, true and false are redefined wherever they affect the vital interests of the society.[12]

When strange or different manifestations of individuality do surface, such as different styles of dress, the society engulfs them, amoebalike, exploiting them commercially within the bourgeois cash nexus:

> It isolates the individual from the one dimension where he could "find himself": from his political existence. Instead, it encourages non-conformity and letting-go in ways which leave the real engines of repression in the society entirely intact, which even strengthen these engines by substituting the satisfactions of private and personal rebellion for a more than private and personal, and therefore more authentic, opposition.[13]

What are the possibilities for liberation? Since the present structures of industrial society work to anesthetize the people, they see no need to alter these structures; and they feel no need to change them because they are anesthetized. Commenting on this vicious circle of

---

*The stifling of dissent through affluence is treated in Marcuse's *One Dimensional Man* (Boston: Beacon Press, 1964).

repression, Marcuse confessed to students in Berlin in 1967, "This is a dialectic from which I have found no issue."[14]

However, if revolutionary change ever does occur in industrial society, Marcuse is quite optimistic about the results: with the perfection of automation and the passing of capitalism, man would truly be transformed, no longer forced to struggle for his existence, to prove his worth through competition, or to repress his instincts. There would be a qualitative break in history, a leap into the realm of true freedom and fulfillment.[15]

It is time to summarize the debate. Three salient points in the above discussions are of vital concern to all of us living in industrial society:

● **Technology and Human Happiness.** Do the fruits of a technologically advanced industrial society compensate for the regimentation and discipline it requires? The American Left in the 20th century has supported the increasing centralization of power in order to obtain social reform as well as orderly economic growth. Now the New Left is having second thoughts, and its critique resembles in many ways the traditional American conservative suspicion of centralized government. In this area the New Left seems to blend with a "New Right"; the concern for individual freedom in the face of powerful organized interests in government and the economy has once again become paramount in political debates. An example of this blurring of political labels is furnished by Karl Hess, the one-man "brain trust" of Senator Goldwater's movement and coauthor of the Republican platform in 1964. Hess has now left the Republican Party, works for the Institute for Policy Studies in Washington, D.C., a New Left research organization advocating active resistance to government interference in one's private life.[16] Another case in point is provided

by the Young Americans for Freedom, a Republican organization for college students, which recently experienced a split when a minority seceded and formed the "Libertarians," dedicated to preserving individual freedom and calling for active draft resistance. A final comment on this point of technology and human happiness: the current criticism of the news media, from Left and Right, surely springs from the same concern about these immensely powerful molders of public opinion that motivated Marcuse.

● **Changing Technology.** It is the point which probably provokes the greatest confusion in the counterculture today. Fundamental disagreement centers on the basic question of whether it is even possible to effect such a humanizing change; we have seen above that Marx foresaw a radical rearrangement of industrial society when the proletariat, either through violent revolution or peaceful change through labor's political power, obtained control of the instruments or political domination and used them to liberate man. This radical political change, which in turn would "reform" technology, would occur only when industrial society was sufficiently developed so that human drudgery was no longer necessary. A more pessimistic analysis, provided by Freud, held that *any* complex civilization required a great degree of discipline by its members, including some regimentation, repression of instincts, and postponement of immediate gratification. In economic terms, who will organize the payroll, deliver the letters, drive the buses, and decide where to build the monorails and heliports for the desired utopian society? There seem to be certain basic social mechanisms that are very difficult to eliminate—patterns of control and dominance, ways of allocating power, wealth, and status, et cetera. For Marcuse, who is a fervent admirer of Freud, it *is* possible to

humanize technology, although he does not specify how the future society will actually work. Man's hope for liberation, says Marcuse, rests on the fact that, with increasing automation and computerization, less and less human labor is necessary to run society. Marcuse has not theorized about the new society; he is skeptical of people's ability to realize the need for a radical change. The only possible agents for such a change are the racial minorities, the students, and the peoples of the Third World, none of whom at present have the necessary power or numbers.

● **The Desired Utopia.** But, one may well ask, if we could render the present system of government more efficient and the distribution of wealth and power more just, would this not be a humane society? Why is there this talk of revolution and liberation, when it is apparent that the industrialized nations of the West have achieved that which previous generations have long yearned for?

The spokesmen for the counter-culture would reply that "the affluent society" is not enough. It vulgarizes man while depriving him of joyful fulfillment. Many thinkers of the New Left rely on the early writings of Marx in their analysis of the deadening effects of the affluent society: man has so alienated his labor and the objects of his labor that he is now incapable of enjoying the natural world except insofar as it is a "commodity" to be bought, used and discarded. Marx uses the image of a starving man, devouring food like an animal—he does not know whether he is eating roast duck or Pablum, he merely uses food as an object to satiate his animal hunger:

For the starving man food does not exist in its human form but only in its abstract character as food. It could be available in its crudest form and one could not

say wherein the starving man's eating differs from that of *animals*. The care-laden, needy man has no mind for the most beautiful play. The dealer in minerals sees only their market value but not their beauty and special nature; he has no mineralogical sensitivity.[17]

As stated above, Marcuse has not outlined the specifics of the new society which he calls for. He has, however, given some indication of its broad characteristics: it would address itself to man's need for peace, "the need for calm, the need to be alone, with oneself or with others whom one has chosen oneself, the need for the beautiful, the need for 'undeserved' happiness."[18] Technology would be joined with art, work with play: "even socially necessary labor can be organized in harmony with the liberated genuine needs of men."[19]

Once again, however, we are obliged to counter these optimistic hopes with the pessimistic comments provided by Freud, who specifically commented on the Marxian analysis; regardless of economic or social changes, some pattern of dominance will remain:

BIOGRAPHIC SUMMARY

Ens. William F. Averyt, U.S. Naval Reserve, did his undergraduate work in American studies at the University of Alabama. He holds master's degrees from the University of Strasbourg in European studies and from Johns Hopkins University in international relations. Ensign Averyt gained his commission in the Naval Reserve through the Officer Candidate School at Newport, was an officer candidate participant of the Seminar on Current Views and Attitudes, and is currently assigned to the faculty of the Naval War College, School of Naval Warfare.

... I cannot inquire into whether the abolition of private property is advantageous or expedient. But I am able to recognize that psychologically it is founded on an untenable illusion. ... It in no way alters the individual differences in power and influence which are turned by aggressiveness to its own use. ...[20]

Although Marcuse has attempted to reconcile Freud's pessimism about the possibility of creating a "liberated" industrial society in one of his earlier works, the question of social organization in the desired utopia remains one of the key questions debated by the counterculture.

I have tried to outline the main lines of the philosophy of the counterculture;

there are divergences within this philosophy, as we have seen, yet all of the thinkers examined here have been concerned with the problem of creating a modern (and therefore industrial) society in which man may live the good life. The Founding Fathers, too, considered this goal paramount, including "the pursuit of happiness" in the Declaration of Independence as one of man's inalienable rights. The members of the counterculture have ranged widely in search of theories capable of explaining what is happening in contemporary America; they have also returned to an earlier American tradition of intense individualism in their search for a more humane society. Their debate among themselves and with American society as a whole deserves the attention of everyone concerned with social change in the United States.

FOOTNOTES

1. The term is from Theodore Roszak, *The Making of a Counter Culture* (New York: Doubleday, 1969).

2. Robert Heilbroner, "Benign Neglect in the United States," *Transaction,* October 1970, p. 15-22.

3. Andrew Hacker, *"Philosopher of the New Left,"* *The New York Times Book Review,* 10 March 1968, p.1.

4. David L. Bromwich, "The Counter-Culture and Its Apologists: 3," *Commentary,* December 1970, p. 56.

5. Karl Marx, "Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts" in Lloyd D. Easton and Kurt H. Guddat, eds., *Writings of the Young Marx on Philosophy and Society* (New York: Doubleday, 1967), p. 292.

6. George Lichtheim, *Marxism: an Historical and Critical Study* (New York: Praeger, 1961), p. 98-99.

7. Ralf Dahrendorf, *Class and Class Conflict in Industrial Society* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1959), p. 41-48.

8. Carl Landauer, *European Socialism: a History of Ideas and Movements* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1959), v. 1, p. 275-77.

9. Sigmund Freud, "Civilization and Its Discontents" in *The Major Works of Sigmund Freud* (Chicago: Encyclopedia Britannica, 1952), p. 788.

10. *Ibid.*

11. Herbert Marcuse, *Five Lectures* (Boston: Beacon Press, 1970), p. 46.

12. Herbert Marcuse, *Repressive Tolerance* (London: Jonathan Cape, 1970), p. 109.

13. *Ibid.*, p. 129.

14. Marcuse, *Five Lectures,* p. 99.

15. *Ibid.*, p. 67.

16. James Boyd, "From Far Right—to Far Left—and Farther—with Karl Hess," *The New York Times Magazine,* 6 December 1970, p. 48-49 ff.

17. Marx, p. 316.

18. Marcuse, *Five Lectures,* p. 67.

19. *Ibid.*, p. 68. Marcuse here draws on the doctrines of the 19th century French social theorist Fourier.

20. Freud, p. 787-88.

NEW HORIZONS

Project ADVANCE:
An Alliance of Generations
by
Colonel William F. Long, Jr., U.S. Army
Senior U.S. Army Adviser
Naval War College

"Let us forge an alliance of generations"
President Nixon

President Nixon, speaking to the students of the University of Nebraska in January 1971, proposed an alliance of generations for those willing to give of themselves in cleaning up the environment, combating illiteracy, and performing other services of social value at home and abroad.

An idea recently developed by the President of the Naval War College, Vice Adm. Richard G. Colbert, uses this same concept of social action and pnts it in a military context.

The primary responsibility of the Armed Forces of the United States has been and always will be combat readiness. Yet, programs contributing to national welfare are entirely possible—even desirable—within the organization of the Armed Forces. Admiral Colbert's proposal would contribute to the maintenance of the national defense while, simultaneously, improving the national welfare.

An earlier program, Project 100,000, which was initiated in October 1966, was an outstanding example of creative military involvement in social action. The innovative step in Project 100,000

was accepting disadvantaged young men under lowered mental and physical standards into the armed services. In accepting these young men, who were previously disqualified for military service, the hope was that by sharing the obligations and opportunities of service they would be prepared for more productive lives when they returned to civilian society. They were given the collective title "New Standards Accessions" (NSA) and were integrated directly into the operating forces.

In spite of the social worth of the Project 100,000, there were operational difficulties encountered by all services. While the different services did not follow uniform programs in managing New Standards Accessions (NSA) personnel, criticisms of the project were fairly uniform:

Reduction of unit readiness. This stemmed primarily from a need to spend an inordinate amount of supervisory effort and leadership investment in proportion to minimum performance returns by NSA personnel assigned to operational billets.

Increased administrative overhead time. This was necessitated by the need to cope with a high number of early discharges and courts-martial cases attributable to the increase of mental category IV personnel via the NSA infusion.

Poor management. Participants were integrated into existing units where leaders belatedly discovered individual handicaps and initiated remedial pro-

grams. This forced an additional mission on the already overloaded unit leadership structure. The frustrations of the men who did not measure up were frequently equaled by the aggravations of the leaders.

Reduced unit morale. The introduction of NSA men who did not receive sufficient special training and attention into operating units created additional work for other enlisted men and, at the same time, reduced unit efficiency. This tended to lower general morale, generate antagonism toward the NSA men, and increase disciplinary problems among other men.

In short, while Project 100,000 was a worthwhile social improvement effort, it reduced overall military operational efficiency.

However difficult the challenge of accepting large numbers of disadvantaged men into the military service may be, the political pressures against selective service are driving the Nation in the direction of an all-volunteer force. With the advent of an all-volunteer force it is likely that a great many men who will be attracted to military service will be those whose economic prospects in civilian life are bleak enough to make the pay, educational prospects, and job security appealing. With this perception, what seemed wise to Vice Admiral Colbert was to attempt to match President Nixon's inspiration to ally the generations to move the Nation forward socially without sacrificing military combat readiness.

In attempting to serve both ends, the need for new approaches was apparent. In this respect, the creative aspects of Project 100,000 served as a catalyst for innovation. If the social goals of Project 100,000 argued for revised ideas of standards for entry into military service, how could NSA men be given the opportunity for social mobility without putting another heavy burden on the operating forces?

The President of the Naval War College has long been convinced that in the ranks of retired officers and noncommissioned officers of the armed services of the United States there is a major resource of dedicated and capable individuals available to the Nation for further constructive service. To match the creative social aspects of Project 100,000, a program moving outside the boundaries of active military service and tapping still vigorous and capable retired service personnel seemed to offer a promising new approach. So, out of the desire to meet the needs of the disadvantaged of the new generation together with the possibility of employing the unused potential of the retired generation, the Project ADVANCE idea materialized.

As it matured in discussions at the Naval War College, the idea of Project ADVANCE incorporated these features.

First, the purpose is to achieve the social benefits of Project 100,000 as well as serve as a source of highly motivated potential career servicemen.

Second, Project ADVANCE calls on a reservoir of outstanding retired military personnel who would be specially educated in attitudes and techniques necessary to develop the New Standards Accessions men. The advantage of using these individuals is twofold: their use will avoid diluting the strength of operating forces; and since the cost of each retired man represents only the difference between retired pay and active pay, this benefit can be achieved at minimum cost.

In order to insure that this program would be uniformly administered and operated, a joint agency composed of selected volunteer retired military personnel from all services could be established as a Department of Defense agency under the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Manpower and Reserve Affairs. At this level of government, the establishment of such a program, pos-

sibly as an independent agency similar to the Civilian Conservation Corps (CCC) of the Roosevelt era, might be a desirable option. In this case, some constraining disciplinary instrument similar to an oath of service and the provisions of the Uniform Code of Military Justice should be considered.

The pilot program could consist of some 10 battalion-size units, located on existing military facilities, with initial training being devoted to the development of personal responsibility, literacy, simple skills, and self-confidence. Each battalion would be led by retired personnel of the particular service on whose facility the training was being conducted. A unit located on a naval base, for example, would be led by retired naval officers and chief petty officers, with the NSA trainees initially appointed as seamen recruits (E1) and uniformed and equipped by the Navy. Education and training would, however, respond to new programs designed by the Project ADVANCE agency.

As men in the individual battalions were raised to sufficient levels of education and skill, they would be integrated into operational combat units. Once assigned to such units, they would lose their NSA identification.

The advantages of using specially selected and trained retired personnel are several. In addition to relieving the operational forces of the need to provide qualified leadership, the use of such men would permit greater flexibility in staffing. The normal battalion command positions might be modified. For instance, senior officers (e.g., Colonel/Captain) could command a training battalion while other officers and senior noncommissioned officers could be assigned to training positions. Furthermore, since the personnel would have only a single mission and absolute stability, they would not suffer the usual career development dislocations of an active duty military man.

Project ADVANCE men would be sworn into a service and subject to the Uniform Code of Military Justice. However, with specially selected and trained leaders and in a highly personalized program, disciplinary action under the UCMJ would hopefully be rarely required.

The probable extension of the basic training period which would be necessary to train these individuals would be costly. But it would not be as costly as losing a handicapped man through subjecting him to normal competition with men who meet the regular standards. It is the frustration arising from failure which probably accounted for the large number of Project 100,000 men who were disciplinary problems.

With the requisite discipline maintained by a specially dedicated and educated older generation of stable retired officers and noncommissioned officers, in an atmosphere of personalized concern and education for the disadvantaged younger generation, this "alliance of generations" might produce remarkable results in inclining many of these young men toward a successful service career.

There are some logical questions which anyone could raise with respect to the idea of involving the retired older generation in a program of military training and social rehabilitation. A few of these questions with their respective answers follow.

Q. Couldn't all the benefits visualized for the Project ADVANCE idea be achieved by using active duty personnel?

A. Yes, but it would be more expensive and it would reduce the readiness posture of active forces by subtracting regular manpower and effort from the operating forces through the imposition of a dual and competing mission.

Q. Would retired service personnel be content to return to a challenging and difficult training job for the bare

difference between retired and active duty pay?

A. The motivated ones would, and they are the only ones desired.

Q. Doesn't this idea depend upon the assumption that retired personnel would be attracted to such a program in sufficient numbers to make it work?

A. Yes, this assumption is basic to the idea.

Q. Other than reduced pay cost, is there any other significant personnel management gain visualized in using retired personnel?

A. Yes. The stability of retired personnel recalled to active duty for this program could be a great asset. The fact that they would have a single mission and would not be involved in the turbulence associated with active duty unit movements and personal career development relocations should be a great factor in gaining and maintaining the person-to-person rapport essential in such a program.

Q. Could Project ADVANCE be used to contribute to improving our ecological welfare?

A. Yes, NSA trainees, stationed throughout the Nation, could be used on such projects as reforestation, fight-ing forest fires, and salvaging areas blighted by oil spills.

x x x

In proposing consideration of a Project ADVANCE type program, the benefits which might accrue are worth considering. Briefly, these might include:

 • A program which does not hinder the operational effectiveness of military units, but which does accomplish the social benefits of Project 100,000.

 • A source of career military personnel from what is now disadvantaged, potentially antagonistic men.

 • A program which uses selected retired personnel to take advantage of a large reservoir of skill and leadership at a minimum cost, with their cost representing largely the difference between active duty and retired pay.

 • A program which reflects the desire of the armed services to function as an agency of social progress.

Finally—and for those who might be skeptical about the feasibility and suitability of such an idea—ask any boy fortunate enough to have a competent and loving grandfather to teach him skills and impart unhurried wisdom whether an "alliance of the generations" is worthwhile.

Ψ

Commander Raymond A. Spruance, USN (*Circa* 1926)

Described as the most intellectual flag officer in the U.S. Navy by Admiral King, Admiral Spruance credits the Naval War College as the intellectual stimulant. Spruance, with many other fellow naval contemporaries, prefought the war in the Pacific on Coasters Harbor Island at Newport during the 1920's and 1930's. The war games conducted during this period provided these World War II leaders with the necessary intellectual and psychological fiber to overcome early defeats and lead U.S. forces to victory in the Pacific.

ADMIRAL RAYMOND A. SPRUANCE

AND THE NAVAL WAR COLLEGE:

PART I—PREPARING FOR WORLD WAR II

An article prepared

by

Lieutenant Commander Thomas B. Buell, U.S. Navy

School of Naval Command and Staff

Raymond Ames Spruance was a professional naval officer whose life in World War II was filled with the savage sounds of war, but he was a quiet man. He shunned personal publicity and avoided newsmen. Anonymous by choice throughout the war, he slipped further into anonymity after the war. Departing from active Government service as Ambassador to the Philippines in 1955, he peacefully lived out his years in a modest home among the pines of the Monterey Peninsula in California, where he passed away 28 years after the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor.*

*Ground has recently been broken—behind the existing Luce-Mahan-Pringle complex—at the Naval War College for the first new construction at the college in 36 years. The initial building in the authorized construction is the Professional Education Center, which is to be named Spruance Hall. The DD-963 destroyer class will also be named in his honor.

Many officers of this generation know little of Spruance. Some may vaguely associate his name with the war in the Pacific, but, for most, only the more famous names come easily to mind—King, Nimitz, Halsey. The war these admirals fought has receded into history, and the contemporary Navy contends with nuclear power, guided missiles, new enemies, and a different world. Some military leaders consider these developments as new and unique, never before faced by their predecessors, and they reason that history is irrelevant. But this view is wrong as the demands of combat and higher command are invariable: the ability to comprehend an entire battle panorama in flux, an understanding of the physical and psychological limitations of his forces, the need for decisions under extreme stress, and a keen perception and continuing appreciation of the objective.

The study of past military leaders is therefore useful and appropriate, and it is within this general context that this writer wishes to deal with one person in particular. He was chosen because he was found to exemplify those traits expected of a military leader in high command. He was a strategist who planned successful campaigns. He was a tactician who was victorious in all his battles. And he was a compassionate human being who saw the need to control violence.

Spruance refused to write either his memoirs or an autobiography and chose to let his record speak for itself. Whatever was destined to be said about him would have to be said by others. Fleet Adm. Ernest J. King, the brilliant, critical wartime Chief of Naval Operations, believed that Spruance was the most intellectual flag officer in the U.S. Navy.[1] Chester Nimitz, his wartime boss, said that Spruance had an extraordinarily successful naval career and that few Americans had served their country as effectively and at such high levels as did he.[2] And naval aviator Halsey recommended that Spruance, a "black-shoe" admiral, command two of the American carriers at Midway, culminating years of admiration and appreciation of Spruance despite their totally different styles.

Naval historians have said little, although a Spruance biographer predicted that they would ". . . strip from him his chosen cloak of anonymity and will record his name among those of the greatest commanders of all time."[3] Regrettably, this has not been done, except for some accounts by the eminent Samuel Eliot Morison. In his judgment, "Power of decision and coolness in action were perhaps Spruance's leading characteristics. He envied no one, rivaled no man, won the respect of almost everyone with whom he came in contact, and went ahead in his quiet way, winning victories for his country."[4]

What were those victories? In the beginning, Spruance's forces won the Battle of Midway. Said Nimitz, "Spruance's rise to fame came in the Battle of Midway where his sound judgment and wise decisions won a stunning victory over greatly superior forces. That victory reversed the long series of enemy successes and was truly the turning point in the war."[5] In Morison's opinion, Midway

> . . . might have ended differently but for the chance which gave Spruance command over two of the three flattops. Fletcher did well, but Spruance's performance was superb. "Lord of Himself" yet receptive to advice; keeping in mind the picture of widely disparate forces yet boldly seizing every opening—Raymond A. Spruance emerged from this battle one of the greatest fighting and thinking admirals in American naval history.[6]

Other victories followed: The Gilberts, the Marshalls, the Marianas, the Battle of the Philippine Sea, Iwo Jima, Okinawa. He captured islands, raided bases, destroyed planes, sank ships, and killed the enemy. Spruance was in command, and the Spruance forces won.

The United States defeated Japan for many reasons, including superior resources, a resolve to win, and an ability to fight well. But winning wars requires preparation, and the magnitude and complexity of the war against Japan were staggering. It encompassed millions of square miles, over which millions of men and thousands of ships and planes moved and fought. It was a naval war, especially in the Central Pacific, and naval officers were the planners and the leaders. Their achievements are history, but the significance of their achievements is that they had prepared themselves intellectually and psychologically for the war before they fought it.

Foremost in their preparation was

the Naval War College. Chester Nimitz had graduated there in 1923, and years later he sent a letter to the President of the College with this observation.

The enemy of our games was always—Japan—and the courses were so thorough that after the start of WWII—nothing that happened in the Pacific was strange or unexpected. Each student was required to plan logistic support for an advance across the Pacific—and we were well prepared for the fantastic logistic efforts required to support the operations of the war—The need for mobile replenishment at sea was foreseen—and even practiced by me in 1937. . . . I credit the Naval War College for such success I achieved in strategy and tactics both in peace and war.[7]

Spruance expressed a more restrained appraisal to the President of the War College.

My duty at the Naval War College prior to World War II covered six years between 1926 and 1938 . . . the first year taking the Senior Course and, later, two tours of duty on the Staff. I consider that what I learned during those years was of the utmost value to me, in the opportunity it gave me to broaden my knowledge of international affairs and of naval history and strategy.

The Naval Academy course in my time as a midshipman—1903 to 1906—was by no means a liberal education. The courses at the Naval War College in later years, with the fine lectures that we had and the problems in strategy that were given to the student officers to solve, gave us a liberal education. This to me was of the utmost value throughout

the years of World War II in the Pacific, and later after retirement during my three years as Ambassador to the Philippines from 1952 to 1955.[8]

The Naval War College and Spruance. To understand Spruance, one must understand the Naval War College. While it is not intended that this paper be a history of the Naval War College, brief excursions into the past will be necessary. There is no full and accurate record of Spruance's activities as a student at the college, so it will be necessary that he be analyzed within the context of the War College curriculum. Knowing what the War College did, knowing Spruance's character, and knowing what he did after he was a student, one can then extrapolate the influence of the War College on Spruance as a student.

The concept of the Naval War College had begun with Stephen B. Luce in the late 19th century. He believed that naval officers must systematically study the art of naval warfare. For years he had developed his thoughts and reasoning on these lines; he needed only the appropriate forum for a formal proposal to the Navy. On 4 April 1883, that opportunity presented itself, for Luce was scheduled to address the Newport Branch of the Naval Institute, meeting that day in Newport.[9]

He knew that his proposal would be opposed, so he cleverly tailored his address to appeal to an elemental Navy instinct—the traditional Army-Navy rivalry. Titling his address "War Schools," he began with a tongue-in-cheek report on the current Navy trend in postgraduate education. Some 12 ensigns were undertaking studies in the diverse fields of ichthyology, mineralogy, fossil botany, geology, ethnology, and marine invertebrates. Luce observed that they were off to a good start as scientists, but he was silent on their potential as naval officers.

Meanwhile, the Army had been studying war while the Navy had been studying fossils. He found that " . . . the need for a more extended course of study than is practicable at the Military Academy, or in the ordinary routine of active service, has long been recognized and in a great measure supplied." Then followed an impressive summary of the Army's advanced warfare training establishments.

The U.S. Artillery School, established in 1867, had a 2-year course of studies and practical training which aimed to qualify officers for any duty they might be called upon to perform, or for any position they might aspire to, however high in rank or command. Luce particularly emphasized its military art and science curriculum, because it supported his thesis that the science of war had to become an essential part of the education of naval officers. Luce then cited the U.S. Infantry and Cavalry School, Fort Leavenworth, Kans., and the Engineer Post and Depot of Willets Point, New York Harbor, as other outstanding examples of the Army's program to teach the science of war. Luce's implication was clear. The Navy had nothing, while the Army was preparing its officers ". . . for the great business of their lives--the practical operations of war."

Luce's persuasive argument continued. "This is just what we need for the Navy! The naval officer, no less than the army officer, should possess a knowledge of the science and practice of war . . . " He must study the science of war and then apply the principles to military operations at sea. And a building to teach such things already existed, close by where the assembled group was gathered—Coasters Harbor Island.

With a final appeal for approval of his proposal, he closed by submitting " . . . the question of establishing a postgraduate course for the study of the Science of War, Ordnance, and International Law, and such cognate branches of the three grand divisions as may he determined upon."

The Navy response was indifferent and hostile. But Luce prevailed, and the Naval War College was established the following year under his presidency. It had many enemies and few friends. Fortunately, it soon had Alfred Thayer Mahan as its president. He believed in it, and he articulated its mission which would later guide its preparation of military leaders for the Second World War.

Addressing the new class at the opening of the fourth annual session of the college, August 1888, he reviewed the turbulence and terrible difficulties of getting the War College established and accepted. Luce's unfortunate phrase of "postgraduate" had caused opponents to claim the War College would duplicate and compete with the Annapolis postgraduate school. "Not so," said Mahan. The Navy had many hardware experts, but none who were authorities on the art of war. The true aim of the Naval War College was " . . . to promote, not the *creation* of naval material, but the knowledge how to *use* that material to the best advantage in the conduct of war." The conduct of war was controlled by general principles, not by cast-iron rules of invariable application. These principles must be studied and understood so that they might be applied by naval leaders. The college would therefore concentrate on strategy, tactics, and logistics. In summary, the mission of the Naval War College would be " . . . the study and development, in a systematic, orderly manner, of the art of war as applied to the sea, or such parts of the land as can be reached from ships."[10]

The Naval War College survived, developed, and matured with a basically unchanging mission. By the 1920's most younger, ambitious naval officers felt that duty at the War College was a prerequisite for higher command. Spruance believed this also, and he applied

for and was selected to attend the 1926-1927 senior course at Newport.[11]

Spruance the Student. Spruance was a 40-year-old commander with 4½ years in grade, all spent at sea, and he had served on sea duty 13 of his 18 years of commissioned service. At sea he had commanded five destroyers; ashore he had served in technical billets involving electrical engineering, specializing in communications and gunnery fire control. He had traveled extensively, including duty with the Asiatic Fleet and the staff of Commander, Naval Forces Europe. His fitness reports were uniformly outstanding. He had commanded a destroyer in William F. Halsey's division; Halsey drafted a fitness report which aptly describes Spruance as he reported to the War College for duty.

> Commander Spruance is one of the best all around officers I have ever served with. He is quiet, efficient, always on the job, and with a clear thinking brain always working. His judgment is excellent, and I invariably seek his opinion on any knotty problems. It is a pleasure having an officer of his caliber in my division.[12]

He was wearing two hats in the summer of 1926, Commander Destroyer Division 27 and Commanding Officer, U.S.S. *Osborne* (DD 295). Orders issued in May 1926 had assigned him to the Bureau of Navigation for duty. He had set sail in *Osborne* for the United States from Europe and arrived in New York on 11 July. To his surprise, new orders met him on arrival, directing that when relieved he was to report to the President of the Naval War College for duty under instruction.[13]

Getting relieved and underway to the War College was a flail. Spruance knew that the course of instruction had begun on 1 July, and he was anxious to miss as little of the course as possible. His relief,

Lt. Comdr. F.G. Reinicke, had met *Osborne* on arrival, and the turnover was swift, taking little more than 3 days. Some administrative matters were understandably overlooked or postponed. For instance, the ration record was not ready for Spruance's signature when it should have been on the 15th, his last day of command and that day he would hurriedly depart *Osborne* for Newport. Preparing that ration record for the captain's signature was the job of the commissary steward, but the day before he had departed for parts unknown, leaving an unfinished report. But these matters were left unattended in the last-minute flurry of changing command.[14] Spruance left New York late that afternoon and arrived at the Naval War College before sunrise the next morning.[15]

Spruance's mood as he walked up the steps of Luce Hall, in the pre-dawn darkness of a July Friday morning, is not difficult to imagine. Belated "hurry-up" orders to the War College are not uncommon today, and a naval officer is to be forgiven if he is irritable and flustered by the inevitable inconveniences. Spruance's wife, son, daughter, and household effects were somewhere between Europe and Newport, he had no quarters, his civilian wardrobe was hardly adequate for daily wear at the War College, and his War College classmates had a 2-week head start on him. He was not in the best frame of mind to begin his War College studies. But at least he had arrived in Newport, and that coveted tour of duty could begin.

One of Spruance's first tasks was to become familiar with the War College routine. The working hours were appealing, 0900 to 1530, with Wednesday and Saturday afternoons free. Civilian clothes were the uniform of the day, although rubber-heeled shoes had to be worn to keep the corridors quiet. The library would provide a place to study and a plentiful supply of books for professional and casual reading. The

Navy medical officer would make house calls, groceries ordered from the commissary would be delivered at the doorstep, and the exchange laundry would make home pickups and deliveries. The War College Secretary had detailed housing information; once Spruance settled his family, War College duty would be very pleasant indeed.[16]

Spruance was one of 70 students, 45 in the senior class of captains and commanders and 25 in the junior class. They were mostly Navy line officers, with a sprinkling of staff corps, Marine, and Army officers.[17] As with War College classes immemorial, they represented differing levels of performance and aptitude. Some would work and some would not. Some were there because they wanted to be there, some were there despite their desires. Some were there because the Bureau of Navigation felt they were comers and needed War College training to help them on their way to flag rank. Others were there because they were available for a year for one reason or another, and the War College was a convenient temporary repository. And finally, some were there because the Bureau did not know what else to do with them and hoped that in a year that retirement or the selection board would solve the problem.[18] Five officers were destined for distinguished flag rank service: Raymond A. Spruance, Royal E. Ingersoll, Edward C. Kalbfus, Frank H. Brumby, and a future CNO, Forrest C. Sherman.

The 70 had one thing in common. They were career military officers studying war in a world that was sure there would never again be war. The military profession was at a low ebb. The era of naval disarmament and minuscule military appropriations was upon them. They were immersed in the Roaring Twenties and all for which that decade is remembered. They studied abstract war in the remoteness and solitude of Luce Hall and their own minds and played abstract war games

with miniature ships on a wooden board. They surely wondered if they would ever fight a real war but would wait 15 years for an answer. During that interval their critics would consider them " . . . as men who retired from logic 'into a dim religious world in which Neptune was God, Mahan his prophet, and the United States Navy the only true church' . . . "[19]

There was a great gap in the age, seniority, and thinking of the two classes. The juniors were considered too young to absorb the deep, profound teaching and wisdom of their seniors. The lieutenants felt in turn that many of the senior officers were fossils unwilling to absorb anything new or different. In some cases both opinions proved correct.[20] The classes would rarely mix except for several war games and special studies. Otherwise they would go their own way.[21]

The Naval War College, 1926. The War College was headed by Rear Adm. William V. Pratt, assisted by a staff of 20 officers. Pratt was ambitious, experienced, and extremely competent; the War College presidency was but one step in his successful quest to become the Chief of Naval Operations. Although he had never been a student, he had been on the War College staff from 1911 to 1913. That tour had deeply impressed him and had influenced his future career; indeed, it may have been its turning point.[22] Subsequently he had retained a continuing interest in the Naval War College and in preparing naval officers for higher command. He had been President for a year when Spruance arrived. Having experimented and innovated with the organization and curriculum during his first year, Pratt launched the second year of his presidency with the War College molded to his specifications.[23]

Pratt felt the War College was, at long last, well established and accepted by the Navy. World War I had justified

the need for War College trained officers, and current Navy policy favored War College graduates for prestigious higher command billets. Junior classes had begun in 1924, and the Correspondence Course, now almost a prerequisite for attending the War College, had been reestablished in 1919. The most recent Navy Department statement of the War College mission was that it furnished a medium whereby naval officers could in peacetime study the conduct of naval warfare and the art of command. Pratt strongly criticized that mission statement as inadequate, narrow, and restrictive. For instance, it failed to mention international relations, joint operations, testing of Navy Department war plans, and cooperation with the fleet in solving the latter's practical problems. He insisted that all these features be incorporated into the work of the Naval War College.

He formed his staff to resemble an operational Navy staff and eliminated the traditional Strategy and Tactics Departments. Despite reluctance from his staff, he reorganized them into four divisions: Logistics; Information; Movement, Communications, and Training; and Policy and Plans. This organization would be jettisoned shortly after Pratt's departure for higher and greater tasks.

Spruance's course of instruction would include the solution and playing of war games, an emphasis on committee studies and a deemphasis on thesis work, a new course in logistics, international law taught by the prestigious George Grafton Wilson of Harvard, lectures by experts in a broad field of subjects, and lots of reading. Nearly every course of instruction would be influenced in one way or another by Pratt. For instance, his influence could be inferred by a staff officer implying to the students that the staff was not responsible for what was being taught, but rather that "higher authority" had dictated what would be said or done. The staff would suggest that the students accept the validity of a concept because "higher authority" had approved or originated the concept. In many cases Pratt had simply decreed that a course be established or eliminated. "Much work is crowded into the year, perhaps too much," he reflected. But 11 months allowed little time, so "... the courses have been crowded in order to make the officers themselves realize how many important topics there are, and how many sided is the art of war."[24]

Pratt had a reputation for rapport with his staff, an ability to communicate with junior officers, a receptiveness to new ideas, and an open and innovative mind.[25] However, he was reserved in his personal relations with the students, being apparently either shy or aloof. It was not his nature to have a close association and good communications with everyone.[26] Occasionally he would clash with the students during war game critiques. The students felt that they were more familiar with the details of the game, after days of involved planning and playing, than was Pratt. When Pratt would criticize the students' decisions or reasoning, they would often lash back in defense of their actions. Spruance too, although normally quiet and restrained, would stubbornly defend his opinions in opposition to Pratt.[27] Thus, in so many ways, the many-faceted influence of Pratt on all the students would be a significant factor in the shaping of their Naval War College education.

The War Games. Pratt had said that much work had been crowded into the year. If the first month typified what was coming, it would be a busy year indeed. Spruance had a lot of catching up to do, for the staff had the students off and running hard from the opening day, 2 weeks before Spruance's belated arrival. They had been deluged with reading books and publications, attending the lecture series, researching

for thesis and international law prob-
lems, and grappling with the initial war
gaming exercises which were underway.
Spruance had to begin somewhere and
to establish priorities. The deadlines for
the thesis and the international law
solution were well into the future, so
they could wait. Lectures required little
preparation, so it looked like the war
games required the most immediate
attention. These were the war games
that Nimitz said prepared naval officers
to win the war with Japan. They were
the essence of War College training and
were the primary method by which
strategy, tactics, and logistics, advocated
by Luce and Mahan, were taught by the
War College. So it is essential to study
both their philosophy and their me-
chanics to appreciate how they affected
and influenced the minds of the future
World War II leaders, Spruance in par-
ticular. But before considering the war
games, it is first necessary to understand
Spruance's character. Spruance was
famous for his intellect. He could under-
stand and comprehend the complexities
of naval warfare. He could think clearly,
reason, analyze, and finally solve the
most difficult of problems. His decisions
were sound, logical, often brilliant, and,
most important, usually correct.

His concept of the thinking and
fighting naval commander is revealing.
Writing some years after his retirement,
he said,

> From my experience on the Staff
> of the Naval War College going
> over the solutions of operations
> problems, I came to the conclu-
> sion that there are a considerable
> percentage of individuals whose
> imagination and reasoning power
> is definitely limited. An officer of
> this type may be a fine officer on
> the bridge of a ship, but he is
> unable to solve satisfactorily intri-
> cate problems whose solution is
> not obvious. These officers have
> what I like to call the tactical type

of mind, in contradiction to the
strategical type. Both types are
needed by the Navy. Many people
have a good combination of these
two extremes. I believe the purely
strategical type of mind might
have great difficulty making an
early decision in a tight situation.
The question of a willingness to
take responsibility and to fight—a
sine qua non for command—is
something else again.[28]

Spruance had strong feelings on the
education and training of naval officers.
The Naval Academy had disappointed
him because it had emphasized memo-
rizing the application of principles and
neglected the principles themselves.
Rather than merely training the
memory, he felt that a student should
be trained to reason and think for
himself.[29] The Naval Academy empha-
sized technical subjects, and his duty
before the War College had been either
responsibility for a single ship at sea or a
technical billet ashore. His first pro-
longed involvement with the strategy
and tactics and decisions of naval war-
fare began with the Naval War College in
1926. And there he found the intellec-
tual stimulation he had been seeking for
so many years. Strategy and tactics
fascinated him. Between classes he
would meet with his fellow officers and
have exciting discussions on these sub-
jects, and when he came home he would
be elated. Life in Newport was full of
enjoyment, for he was with friends,
naval officers who loved these dis-
cussions as much as he did. His life and
hours as a student were filled with the
satisfaction of being at the Naval War
College.[30]

So he became immersed in solving
military problems and playing war
games and in the constant intercourse of
ideas on naval warfare. Later, when the
arena changed from Coasters Harbor
Island to the Pacific Ocean, it was
almost as if nothing had changed. His

later reflections give credence to this feeling. "I believe that making war is a game that requires cold and careful calculation," he said.[31] And again, "Each operation is different and has to be analyzed and studied in order to prepare the most suitable plans for it. This is what makes the planning of operations in war such an interesting job."[32] He did not hate the Japanese, but rather felt that they were the other team, and good fighters at that. He killed them dispassionately, yet he was a compassionate man. He deplored the killing of civilians and destruction of nonmilitary targets.* In the stress of battle he was serene, and his mind worked just as clearly in the clamor of war as it did in the tranquility of the War College.[33]

There is an interesting footnote to Spruance's philosophy on war. He has been credited with making many crucial decisions that worked well for him. But he was well aware of the element of luck. He candidly admitted that luck was with him at Midway,[34] and he constantly spoke of luck going for or against him in subsequent battles. During the Marianas campaign, a fellow admiral remarked that every commander must be a gambler. Spruance replied that if this were so, he was one

of the professional variety; he wanted all the odds he could get stacked in his favor.[35] He said that he was also perhaps a cautious man in that he would examine the probable effect and consequences of acts so as to avoid danger, except that in making war he tried to minimize danger rather than avoiding it.[36] War gaming and the Naval War College are synonymous, and these insights into Spruance's character offer a useful framework to examine these games.

In 1926 the students were involved in gaming from the day they stepped aboard until they graduated. War gaming had been a part of the War College almost from the beginning. In 1894 games were introduced to the students as "war problems," that year the game involved an enemy fleet attacking New England. Capt. H.C. Taylor, the War College President, was enthusiastic about them because they excited the naval mind into mental activity, having become dormant after 30 years of peacetime inertia. Hopefully it had turned some of those minds from machinery and material to questions of strategy and tactics. Taylor fervently hoped that the war problems would justify the continuance of the Naval War College, then struggling for survival.[37]

A marine takes credit for suggesting the famous applicatory system of problem solving. In the fall of 1909, a staff officer, Maj. John H. Russell, had become fascinated with a book on war gaming written by a German military writer. *Letters on Applied Tactics* by Griepenkerl advocated solving military problems on paper, then testing the solutions in a war game. The father of modern naval war gaming, Capt. Mc-Carty Little, caught Russell's enthusiasm for this concept, and it soon became established under Little's sponsorship.[38] Griepenkerl's book also introduced the *Estimate of the Situation* and the *Formulation of Orders* the same year.[39]

---

*Spruance's humanity was manifest in the following instances. Spruance cautioned Rear Adm. Richard L. Conolly not to indiscriminately bombard Guam in order to avoid killing innocent natives. (Oral History Research Office, *The Reminiscences of Admiral Richard L. Conolly* (New York: Columbia University, 1960), p. 239-240.) He was always very concerned with the health and welfare of men wounded in action, both American and Japanese. (Interview with Charles J. Moore by Thomas B. Buell, Chevy Chase, Md., 6 November 1970.) Recalling his carrier attacks on Japan in 1945, Spruance said, " . . . I gave Mitscher, as objectives for our aircraft, enemy aircraft, air fields and aircraft factories. We would use our accuracy in bombing to attack military targets. . . . " (Letter from Raymond A. Spruance to Professor E.B. Potter, U.S. Naval Academy, 6 May 1960.)

War gaming progressed and developed. Until 1922 it was used as an analytical tool for devising and testing plans and doctrines. In 1922 the emphasis shifted, and the primary purpose became providing players with decision-making experience. A sophisticated new system for assessing damage was devised, based on actual armaments on actual ships. Called the *War College Fire Effect System*, it was designed to provide a relative strength comparison between actual fleets and to provide accuracy and realism to the games. Colors were assigned to various fleets of the world, and the two fleets that were most often opponents on the War College game boards were BLUE versus ORANGE: the United States versus Japan.[40]

A game would begin with students solving a hypothetical strategic problem, using guidance contained in *The Estimate of the Situation with the Order Form*. A battle plan and an operation order would evolve for each side. Selected solutions would be played using a chart maneuver game; in this type game, ships and fleets would be strategically deployed by the students on individual navigation charts with moves recorded by the umpires on a master chart. When the fleets made contact, the problem would be transferred to a 200 inch by 308 inch wooden board. Miniature ships would then be tactically deployed on the board, and they would battle until the game was ended by the director. A history and critique would follow several days later, and full, frank discussion was invited.[41]

The prospective war gaming student first read a great number of Navy publications and War College pamphlets to become familiar with rules, doctrines, and techniques.[42] Next he individually solved simple scouting and screening problems, then played them as chart maneuvers. Having learned the basic skills, he was ready for more complicated games.[43]

Spruance missed the opening war game, Strategic Problem 1-27, a chart maneuver in the conduct of search operations. As usual, war existed between BLUE and ORANGE. BLUE had sallied forth with a central Pacific invasion force convoy, and ORANGE had to find and destroy it. The students referred to *The Service of Information and Security* to determine appropriate search methods, and they had to put themselves in the shoes of the ORANGE admiral. Later they would be required time and again to consider Japan as the enemy and to study the Japanese character, how they would fight, and what strategy and tactics they would use against the Americans. One of Spruance's most important principles which he used in World War II was "Know thy Enemy."[44]

The students' impressions of the Japanese as a future enemy would emerge from these BLUE-ORANGE games. The staff warned them not to underestimate the Japanese. The students portrayed the Japanese with high morale and well-developed military skills, well disciplined, and fanatically loyal to a centralized, autocratic government. (The students seemed almost wistful that Americans were not as well disciplined as the Japanese.) They had great patience and would endure great hardships. Their fatalism made them unadaptable to new ideas, and they had less mechanical aptitude than Americans. On the other hand, the students viewed Americans as individualists who would resist going to war, but when war came they would fight well, united by patriotism and the indomitable American spirit and will to win. And finally, the students' study of the Russo-Japanese War provided one great lesson in the Japanese character. Japan would announce hostilities by launching a surprise attack before issuing a formal declaration of war.

The students were given four demonstrative problems that first month,

which impressed them with the concept of the *mission*. Problem #1 was to derive a mission from an operation order. Problem #2 was to derive a mission from a letter of instruction (LOI) issued by the Secretary of the Navy to Commodore David Porter in 1823. It was a classic in ambiguity, and it led to Porter's later court-martial for disobeying the mission implied by the LOI. The lesson learned was that an LOI must be clear and explicit. If one receives an LOI which he does not understand, he should go back to the originator for clarification.

Problem #3 illustrated how a mission may be changed by a change in the situation. The War College solution merits quotation because of its timeless relevance. An ORANGE attack carrier force is suddenly threatening the Canal Zone.

> There is no question now what is the duty of every BLUE force that can get at this enemy menace *in time*. It is to prevent at all hazards the launching of an enemy air attack on the CANAL. No force must wait for orders. Every force that can be used must take the initiative. His decision must be instant. There is no time to lose. From this we draw the lesson that a commander must constantly apprehend a change in the situation, must constantly have his mind ready for a surprise from any quarter, must keep in mind always the plan of higher command, must be ready with a quick decision to meet an infinite number of changed situations, must be ready to suit his actions to contribute towards carrying into effect of the plan of higher command.

The effect is startling, for it was a presage to Spruance at Midway. The final demonstrative problem was an exercise in formal order writing, the decisions and missions having been given.

August was strategic problem solving time. *The Estimate of the Situation with the Order Form* would now be extensively used. The philosophy and methods of the Estimate of the Situation must be understood in order to understand the method and reasoning used by the students to solve military problems. As noted earlier, the Estimate and the Order Form had been introduced in 1910 and had been modified and refined from time to time in the intervening years. Pratt did not like the latest version, put out in 1924 by his predecessor, Rear Adm. C.S. Williams. So he rewrote the entire book, with twice as many pages, combining the order form with the estimate, and this he issued in June 1926 to Spruance and his classmates. Pratt also issued a pamphlet *The Study of Strategy as Conducted at the Naval War College*, his philosophical supplement and amplification to the estimate booklet. Again, the influence of Pratt on the students is apparent.

The estimate booklet described a method of solving problems applicable to the solution of any situation that called for a decision. The method was a logical order of reasoning that, in Pratt's view, had proved appropriate and practical in military affairs by long use in experienced hands. In other words, it would train the mind to think and to solve problems logically, which was so appealing to Spruance.

The solution of a military problem passed through four stages:

(1) The Mission—The task. The purpose. What is to be done and why.

(2) The Decision—The determination. The conclusion. The course of action adopted.

(3) The Plan—The elaboration of the Decision. Operations essential to support the Decision.

(4) The Order—Directions, putting the operation of the Plan into effect.

The first two stages were purely mental and analytical. The fourth was the action stage. The third included both the mental and action factors.

The War College then transposed the four-stage solution into a seven-part form.

(1) Mission: Derivation and Statement

(2) Opposing Forces: Their Dispositions and Comparative Strengths

(3) Enemy Forces: Probable Intentions

(4) Own Forces: Courses of Action Open to Us

(5) Decision

(6) Plan

(7) Order

Pratt placed great emphasis on Step (1), deriving the mission. A mission was rarely given a commander; rather the commander would be given a task that supported the objective of the supreme commander. He would then have to determine what the present situation was, state what new situation was desired, consider what factors would influence the desired change, and then logically select the appropriate mission. A mission was expressed as a task and the purpose of the task. It had to be very clear and well defined, avoiding such common faults as too vague, too broad, too narrow, too complex, or divided.

Spruance learned this lesson well. At Midway his staff urged him to pursue the wounded Japanese Fleet on the night of 4 June. But he knew his primary mission was to prevent the capture of Midway, so he positioned his force so that he could either strike out at the Japanese or break up an attack at Midway the following morning.[45] After the Battle of the Philippine Sea he was criticized for not heading westward to seek and destroy the Japanese Fleet. But in his mind his primary mission was to protect the vulnerable amphibious forces then landing at Saipan, and he refused to leave them undefended.[46] Halsey's action at Leyte Gulf is the classic contrast. During amphibious assaults it was often unclear whether the carriers' mission was to protect the landing force or to seek out and destroy the Japanese Fleet. Spruance advocated the former mission; the aviators were inclined towards the latter mission.[47]

In contemplating war with an enemy the planner must know the comparative strengths and dispositions of the opposing forces. This comprised Step (2). Pratt emphasized,

> By every available means we seek to learn [the enemy's] strength, dispositions and plans in order to arrive at the probabilities and possibilities regarding the points of application, nature, and strength of his impending efforts. Only after this has been done can our activities be directed to best advantage, and unless it be done the most promising plans may be thwarted by some surprise made possible by a neglect fully to consider available information.

(Today the War College calls this aspect "The Threat" when teaching military planning.) Yamamato's failure to correctly evaluate the threat at Midway contributed to his defeat. Conversely, Spruance had an acute appreciation of the need for information about the Japanese forces that he would face during an impending operation, and he insisted on gathering every available scrap of intelligence to assist his planning. Even then he was sometimes surprised by things he had not anticipated, such as the treacherous volcanic sand at Iwo Jima.

Step (3) of the estimate form was the Enemy's Probable Intentions. The student was given the impossible task of figuring out what the enemy's probable mission was and from that deriving the

enemy's probable intentions. Pratt counseled,

> . . . it would not be safe to select a single one of the enemy's possible courses of action and label it Enemy Decision, lest the word Decision tend to fix or influence our minds too definitely there, to the exclusion or neglect of other enemy effort elsewhere. We have to take into account *all* that the enemy may do and cannot safely stress any one line of action *by him.*

Yet, in reality, the staff and student solutions were predicated upon an assumption of the enemy decision, and their solutions were therefore inflexible. Although Pratt implied that one should consider the enemy's capabilities as well, he failed to elucidate this concept. Fortunately, the need to consider capabilities was later recognized and accepted before World War II began. Spruance relates,

> At the Naval War College in our Estimate of the Situation form we need to have: "The enemy, his strength, disposition and probable intentions." Later, "probable intentions" was changed to "capabilities." We found that there had been a tendency to decide what an enemy was *going* to do and to lose sight of what he *could* do. I have seen just this happen in fleet problems at sea, and it is very dangerous. During our war in the Pacific I always tried to figure what the enemy was capable of doing and then guarding against it, if possible.[48]

Next followed Step (4), Courses of Action Open to Us. Based on what is known about the enemy and about our own forces, what can be done to accomplish the mission? Or as a recent Secretary of Defense would say, "What are my options?" The students were taught to think in terms of advantages, disadvantages, and considerations. The actual considerations are familiar: urgency, prospects of success, cost of success or failure, possible gain worth possible cost, and forces. Today the War College tests a proposed Own Course of Action (OCA) for suitability, feasiblity, and acceptability. Translated these mean, (a) will the OCA accomplish the mission? (b) have we the resources to do the job? and (c) are the results worth the cost?

Spruance could reduce his OCA's to the simplest possible terms, always with his mission firmly in mind. At Midway on 4 June he could either head west and look for the enemy or he could head east and cover Midway. At the Battle of the Philippine Sea he could head west and look for the Japanese Fleet, he could stay close by Kelly Turner and cover him at the Saipan beaches, or he could interpose himself between the Japanese and Saipan, staying close enough to Turner to guard against a Japanese end run yet closing the distance to the Japanese Fleet.

In Step (5), one made The Decision, to fit two requirements: (1) It must support the mission, and (2) it must be a logical deduction evolved from full, unprejudiced reasoning. It must be clear, definite, and resolute to inspire a vigorous response from those who must execute it. Books and books have been written on decisionmaking, but the Navy has been very succinct about it. Decisions are a way of life; as much thought as time permits should be put into them, but decisions must be made, and the decisionmaker must take responsibility for the consequences of his decisions. Spruance's forte was decisionmaking. He was so good at it, and his decisions were so important that they merit a separate study and will not be discussed further at this point.

Step (6) was The Plan, or the means by which the decision was to be executed. The college wanted the students' plans to stand the test of the Principle of War. The students used this same Principle of War to study and analyze the Russo-Japanese War and World War I. The college placed great store in this principle, regarded by many as dogma. It was comprised of nine elements, also called principles: Objective, Offensive, Superiority, Cooperation, Simplicity, Economy of Force, Surprise, Movement, and Security. Some students used these principles as a scorecard. If a World War I naval commander had violated more principles than he had observed, then he had done a poor job. Conversely, adherence to these principles won the students' approval. They sometimes lost track of the greater, though less obvious, implications of the battles they were studying. Spruance himself used these principles excessively in his student analysis of the Battle of Tsushima. But by World War II he had developed a *modus operandi* which, although incorporating versions of the 1926 "Principles," was certainly not limited to those principles alone.

The final step was The Order, by which the commander told his subordinates what he wanted done. Pratt and other experienced naval officers knew that many things had gone wrong in past wars because subordinates failed to understand the orders of their superiors, and therefore Pratt wanted orders written as perfectly as possible. Thus the Order Form was a mandatory outline for the drafting of all naval operations orders at the War College, and the outline went into great detail, allowing no variance. If the form was properly used, the reasoning went that a good set of orders would result.

To add authority to the argument for use of the form, Pratt quoted extracts from the person who had thought of the form in the first place, Griepenkerl, in his *Letters on Applied Tactics.*

Every order must be perfectly clear and intelligible. If misunderstandings arise, the chief fault lies with the one who issued the order . . . Every order must be as short as possible . . . Every order must be positive; for an uncertain and weak order will be loosely executed . . . The order must not trespass on the province of the subordinate . . . The higher the commander addressed the shorter and more general his orders may be.

Pratt thought this justified the Order Form. During World War II nearly all written orders and plans followed the Order Form. In most instances Spruance used this form for his orders, and they were well understood and inspired confidence in his subordinates. Adm. Arthur W. Radford testified that when Spruance was in command you knew precisely what he was going to do, because his orders were clearly written, promptly delivered, and would be changed only if necessary.[49] Much credit must go to Spruance's staff, for they did the actual order writing after Spruance had made the basic decisions.

But Spruance would discard the Order Form when necessary. In the Battle of the Philippine Sea he wanted to be absolutely certain his principal subordinates understood what he wanted done. To this end he personally drafted messages in lieu of structured orders, telling them in his own way so there would be no misunderstandings. In any event he would let his subordinates alone so they could get the job done and was loath to interfere unless absolutely necessary. "They know what I want done," he would say. "I will not interfere with them."[50]

Spruance issued what was probably the shortest major battle order of the Pacific War. The Japanese battleship *Yamato,* in company with screening ships, was closing Okinawa during the

American amphibious assault on that island. Spruance had hoped to engage them with his own battleships, but Mitscher's planes found *Yamato* first. "Will you take them or shall I?" asked Mitscher. "You take them," Spruance replied. Without another word from Spruance, Mitscher's planes sank *Yamato*.*

But at the War College in 1926, Spruance and his classmates would rigidly adhere to the format and procedures of *The Estimate of the Situation with the Order Form* when solving military problems. These procedures, repeated again and again during his years at the War College, provided a common ground for all War College graduates to discuss military operations in later years. In the Pacific War, however, Spruance did not consciously follow the Estimate of the Situation format he had been taught. Rather, he used it unconsciously as a way of thinking, as did his chief of staff and alter ego, Carl Moore.[51]

Using these methods to solve military problems, the students addressed Strategic Problem B. It was a BLUE-ORANGE war from the ORANGE viewpoint. It also demonstrated the prevailing strategy for a future American-Japanese war. The United States would strive to blockade and isolate Japan into submission without invading the home islands. Japan, in turn, would fight a war of attrition, attacking the Americans' greatly extended lines of communication across the Pacific. Hopefully the Americans would become exhausted and the war stalemated. The American need for logistic support was recognized, as well as the need for island bases to support offensive operations. In particular, the physical characteristics

and strategic importance of every major Central Pacific island were thoroughly analyzed. Truk, for instance, was nearly always used as a forward base for westward operations. What superb training for a future Pacific naval commander! Here also, Spruance was introduced to the strategic concept of strangling Japan rather than invading her. All through 1944 and 1945 he would argue strongly for the invasion of the Chinese mainland and the encirclement of Japan. He was appalled at the thought of American losses if the home islands were invaded. However, he was overruled, and the invasion of Japan was scheduled for November 1945.[52]

The students' conception of a BLUE-ORANGE war resembled the 19th century French invasion of Russia. The invader (BLUE) would plunge deeper and deeper into enemy territory, becoming progressively extended and weakened, the defender meanwhile harassing, withdrawing slowly, and consolidating his strength. The (ORANGE) students liked this strategy, and they decided to let BLUE come to ORANGE, counterattacking in great strength when BLUE was weakest.

Strategic Problem C, also solved in August, was another portent of things to come. A deteriorating international situation exists between BLUE and ORANGE. The BLUE Fleet is concentrated in the Canal Zone, with light forces in Pearl Harbor. ORANGE has begun unusual military activity, and hostilities are expected. Where will ORANGE strike? One thing is certain. ORANGE acts will precede words. Reports of hostile and vigorous operations will be the first news that war is on.

Pearl Harbor is a likely target. It is an inadequately defended yet vital American base. ORANGE will have excellent intelligence, being amply supplied with individuals who may be secret agents in positions of responsibility. BLUE, however, will have little intelligence on ORANGE military movements. The

---

*Forrestel, p. 204-205. Throughout the war Spruance apparently yearned for a major surface engagement, for which he had practiced so often at the Naval War College. One never materialized.

normally foul January northern Pacific weather would shield an ORANGE fleet transit to Hawaii.

The words of the staff solution are chilling.

> We have explained that effective action without warning is to be expected on the part of OR-ANGE . . . such a bold conception as is involved in an expedition against OAHU is not in con-formity with their previous his-tory, but in view of the great advantage that would accrue to them from an attempt even partly successful in the initial phase of the war and of the great harm the destruction of our dock and other facilities at PEARL HARBOR would do to us we are bound to assume that some attempt against OAHU will be made.

A raid by surface forces is not probable. However, an air raid launched by an ORANGE carrier at a distance from OAHU is to be expected. The carrier " . . . could, after reaching a posi-tion 150 miles from OAHU, conduct a surprise air attack on the vulnerable parts of the base with a reasonable chance of crippling it for a considerable time." The carrier would approach from the northwest.

The BLUE solution included sending out search planes to find the carrier before it could launch an attack.

The first complex war game started with Chart Maneuver I-27. The students were given the operation order by the staff, in order to compare them with earlier classes who had used the same order. The game would also prepare them for the next war game in which they would have to develop solutions. Once more, it was BLUE versus ORANGE, this time the latter planning to attack a BLUE convoy; BLUE must intercept and engage the ORANGE raid-ing force.

The BLUE convoy proceeded gen-erally westward, and the BLUE com-mander stationed his screening forces to the north, paralleling the convoy track. Rather than seeking out the ORANGE raiding force, he was going to let them come to him. The BLUE mission was offensive, yet BLUE operated defen-sively. By the end of Move 3, the game director urged BLUE to be more aggres-sive in finding ORANGE. By Move 7 BLUE still had not found anyone, and the director was unhappy. He criticized BLUE for other tactics also, such as sending out all his aircraft to scout and leaving none in reserve for contingen-cies. Said the director, "It is believed that the unanimous opinion of the officers attending the | 1925 | discussion and critique of this maneuver was that the BLUE offensive Screen had been exceedingly well handled and that inso-far as was in their power had nullified the enemy search on the northern flank of the enemy." The 1926 BLUE force did not fare well in the eyes of the staff.

The ORANGE commander was not immune to criticism. Pratt had upgraded and emphasized the role of communica-tions in naval warfare. ORANGE's com-munications were poorly written and caused confusion, errors, and missed opportunities. "Simplicity in plan and in transmission is to be sought," said the director in the critique. Spruance had acted as BLUE communication umpire and had recorded BLUE transmissions on the logsheet with a neat, firm hand using a well-sharpened pencil. Another lesson in communicating with subordi-nates had been learned.

The last war game before Christmas was Operations Problem I-27. It was issued on 12 October, and the students turned in their solutions on the 25th. The game began 29 October and would last almost a month. It would be a wearisome, protracted, and often boring experience.

The situation was almost identical to the just completed Tactical Problem

I-27, except that this time the students had worked out solutions in advance. BLUE had to move a convoy from Guam to Malampaya Sound. ORANGE had to find it, track it, and finally to destroy it. The problem required a study of screening a base before a convoy sortie, followed by the movement and protection of a convoy through hostile waters. The BLUE and ORANGE commanders were determined not to repeat the mistakes of Tactical Problem I-27. Spruance's assignment was of a division of BLUE destroyers.

ORANGE knew the need for intelligence; he had to know what BLUE was doing in Guam. He used a simple solution; he put a ring of ships around Guam to see who was coming and going. Then he flew in patrol planes to see what was happening in Guam itself.

Once BLUE got his convoy underway, he too used a simple tactic. He surrounded the convoy with a three-circle concentric screen. He did not want to be surprised from any direction. ORANGE did a good job of surveying BLUE's activity around Guam and knew when the convoy and escort had left. ORANGE then groped toward BLUE until contact was finally made on 8 November. The game has dragged on for days.

With contact finally made, the game would have normally become a board maneuver, with the forces locked in combat. But the ORANGE commander had other ideas. He wanted a night attack, so he maneuvered just out of range of BLUE's forces until nightfall. Then, under cover of darkness, ORANGE attacked with destroyers and submarines and emerged the apparent winner. Night engagements were played under rules that restricted freedom of movement and the use of weapons; a daylight engagement with its more exciting tactical games never materialized.

The students were frustrated, fatigued, and unhappy. It had been a long war game yielding little sense of accomplishment or satisfaction. The game time from first contact until game end was 7 hours, 45 minutes. There had been 155 3-minute moves. They had played the game morning and afternoon for a total of 15 hours, covering 12 days. They had been pushed hard because the critique had to be held on Saturday, the 20th, allowing them to be free to begin the International Law Study starting the 22d.

But what irritated the students more than anything else was the concept of the best solution. Each had worked long hours on individual solutions, which were turned in, promptly ignored, and the staff solution was selected to be played as the chart maneuver. The staff solution did not even represent the combined wisdom of the staff! Rather it was the work of a single staff officer, and there was no reason why his solution should be considered superior to the 45 students who were at least his equal in age, rank, seniority, and, presumably, intelligence. As Captain Snyder of the staff put it, the students were therefore not impressed with the shortcomings of their own estimates.

It is traditional at the War College that there is no "school solution" to a

BIOGRAPHIC SUMMARY

Lt. Comdr. Thomas B. Buell is a 1958 graduate of the U.S. Naval Academy and graduated from the Naval Postgraduate School in 1964 with the degree of Bachelor of Science in electrical engineering. He has served four operational tours in destroyers, most recently as Executive Officer, U.S.S. *John King* (DDG 3). Lieutenant Commander Buell is currently a student at the Naval War College, School of Naval Command and Staff.

problem nor any "right answer." The ground rules had been laid down along these lines for Spruance's class. "It is certain that decisions and criticisms of the director of the maneuver will not be acquiesced in by everybody. It is proper and desirable that such disagreement be expressed freely. It is better that such feeling be voiced than it be kept repressed." This class did not repress anything! As for staff solutions, "The members of the Staff are not infallible. The only difference between the Staff and the students is that the former, having presumably spent more time in the study of the subjects concerned, are, other things being equal, merely more apt to be correct in their reasoning and attitude."[53]

The students clearly and pointedly disagreed. Captain Snyder, facing a student rebellion, decided that in the future the best student solution would be selected and played. If a staff solution were to be used, it would be the best opinion of the entire staff and would carry the authority of the head of the department.

The 1926 war games had been long and wearisome. Spruance had been doing other things too, such as preparing two theses and starting his Logistics and International Law studies, the

latter two in early December. He would study in the library during the day and would read for pleasure in the evening at home. He particularly enjoyed histories and biographies and would read them omnivorously.[54]

The other students had come to know Spruance and to size up his character and personality. He was quiet, reserved, and serious but not unfriendly. Indeed he had a pleasant greeting for everyone, and he would join his classmates in the usual noontime softball game. Those were Prohibition days, but the staff and students would have cocktail parties nevertheless. Spruance would never attend them; he did not socialize or engage in frivolous conversation. But he would become animated when naval warfare was the subject, and he had developed a reputation for intelligence, profound and logical thinking, and an impressive professional expertise.[55] He could regard his career to this point with great satisfaction and could foresee a promising and optimistic future. The Christmas holidays provided a chance to relax and to enjoy family and friends before starting the second half of the War College year.

The blow fell shortly after New Year's when Spruance received a letter from the Secretary of the Navy.

NAVY DEPARTMENT
WASHINGTON

28 December 1926

From: The Secretary of the Navy

To: Commander Raymond A. Spruance, U.S. Navy
Via: President, Naval War College, Newport, R.I.

Subj: Reprimand

     1. A Board of Investigation which recently inquired into the conditions existing in the general mess of the U.S.S. *Osborne* while under your command found that various regulations and instructions governing the administration of the commissary department were not carried out. It appears that the commissary steward was allowed to take charge of the commissary files contrary to Navy Regulations, that certain important papers were removed therefrom by some unknown person without authority, that commissary stores when received aboard were frequently not inspected by an officer as required by regulations, that at

various times during the spring of 1926 stores were removed from the ship without authority by a dishonest commissary steward, that no ration records were made up, nor returns submitted as required by regulations the date you were relieved as commanding officer, and that during the above mentioned period the Osborne over-expended her ration allowance about $3900.00.

2. The Department considers that your lack of supervision over this important branch of your command was a decidedly material contributory cause of this over-issue and that a reasonable supervision on your part over the observance of pertinent regulations would have resulted in a more timely discovery and probable prevention of this over-issue. Your personal responsibility as commanding officer is clearly placed under Article 1411 U.S. Navy Regulations 1920.

3. For your failures as above set forth you are reprimanded. The Department expects that in the future you will more zealously supervise the importent details of your command so that inefficiency, neglect or dishonesty of your subordinates will be more promptly detected and corrected, or eliminated.

4. You are directed to acknowledge receipt of this letter, a copy of which is being filed with your official record in the Department.

/s/   Curtis D. Wilbur

TO BE CONTINUED

[This paper will be concluded in next month's Naval War College *Review*. It will relate Spruance's reaction to the letter of reprimand, his last 6 months as a War College student, and a brief study of his duty on the War College Staff.]

FOOTNOTES

1. Ernest J. King and Walter M. Whitehill, *Fleet Admiral King, a Naval Record* (New York: Norton, 1952), p. 491.
2. E.P. Forrestel, *Admiral Raymond A. Spruance, USN, a Study in Command* (Washington: U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1966), Foreword.
3. *Ibid.*, p. 244.
4. Samuel E. Morison, *History of U.S. Naval Operations in World War II, New Guinea and the Marianas March 1944-August 1944* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1953), v. VIII, p. 235-236.
5. Forrestel, Foreword.
6. Morison, v. III, p. 158.
7. Letter from Chester W. Nimitz to President, Naval War College, 24 September 1965, Naval Historical Collection, Naval War College, Newport, R.I.
8. Letter from Raymond A. Spruance to President, Naval War College, 3 November 1965, Naval Historical Collection, Naval War College, Newport, R.I.
9. Stephen B. Luce, "War Schools," *United States Naval Institute Proceedings*, v. IX, no. 5, 1883, p. 633-657. All subsequent references to Luce are contained in this source.
10. Alfred T. Mahan, "The Necessity and Objects of a Naval War College: Address of Captain A.T. Mahan, U.S. Navy at the Opening of the Fourth Annual Session of the College, August 6, 1888," *United States Naval Institute Proceedings*, v. XIV, no. 4, p. 621-639.
11. Forrestel, p. 11.
12. *Ibid.*, p. 3-9.
13. "Bureau of Navigation orders Nov-31-HC dated 18 June 1926 to Commander Raymond A. Spruance, USN," Naval Historical Collection, Naval War College, Newport, R.I.
14. Letter from Raymond A. Spruance to the Secretary of the Navy, 8 February 1927, Naval Historical Collection, Naval War College, Newport, R.I.
15. Endorsements on 18 June 1926 BUNAV orders.
16. Naval War College, *Information for Student Officers* (Newport, R.I.: 24 January 1927), p. 3-10.

17. Naval War College, *Register of Officers 1884-1968* (Newport, R.I.: 26 June 1968).

18. This is the author's opinion, based upon the writings and correspondence of numerous War College graduates.

19. Thaddeus V. Tuleja, *Statesmen and Admirals* (New York: Norton, 1963), p. 46.

20. Letter from Rear Adm. Maurice E. Browder, USN (Ret.), to the author, 13 October 1970.

21. Letter from Rear Adm. John G. Moyer, USN (Ret.), to the author, 9 October 1970.

22. Gerald E. Wheeler, "William Veazie Pratt, U.S. Navy: a Silhouette of an Admiral," *Naval War College Review*, May 1969, p. 39.

23. Pratt's program for the War College is contained in William V. Pratt, "The Naval War College," *United States Naval Institute Proceedings*, September 1927, p. 937-947.

24. *Ibid.*

25. Wheeler, p. 60-61.

26. Letter from Adm. Royal E. Ingersoll, USN (Ret.), to the author, 29 October 1970.

27. Letter from Comdr. Raymond A. McClellan, USN (Ret.), to the author, 31 October 1970.

28. Letter from Raymond A. Spruance to E.B. Potter, Professor of History, U.S. Naval Academy, 4 February 1959.

29. *Ibid.*

30. Letter from Mrs. Raymond A. Spruance to the author, 31 October 1970.

31. Letter from Raymond A. Spruance to E.B. Potter, Professor of History, U.S. Naval Academy, 3 January 1959.

32. Letter from Raymond A. Spruance to E.B. Potter, Professor of History, U.S. Naval Academy, 28 March 1960.

33. Interview with Rear Adm. Charles J. Moore, USN (Ret.), by the author, Chevy Chase, Md., 6 November 1970. "Carl" Moore was Spruance's wartime chief of staff and closest friend, and he had known Spruance since they first served together in U.S.S. *Bainbridge* in 1913. He agreed with the author that Spruance fought the Pacific war in the same intellectual frame of mind that he had fought war games at the Naval War College. The author had also interviewed Spruance at the Spruance home in Pebble Beach in 1963. Spruance said then that the responsibility of wartime command had never bothered him. The only time he was ever worried was at night on 5 June 1942 while recovering aircraft during the Battle of Midway. The pilots were untrained for night flight operations, and he feared for their safety.

34. Forrestel, p. 56.

35. Letter, Spruance to Potter, 3 January 1959.

36. Letter from Raymond A. Spruance to E.B. Potter, Professor of History, U.S. Naval Academy, 21 February 1959.

37. "The Naval War College," *United States Naval Institute Proceedings*, v. XX, no. 4, 1894, p. 795-802.

38. John H. Russell, "A Fragment of Naval War College History," *United States Naval Institute Proceedings*, August 1932, p. 1164-1165.

39. John Stapler, "The Naval War College: a Brief History," *United States Naval Institute Proceedings*, August 1932, p. 1162.

40. For a detailed history of Naval War College war gaming, see Francis J. McHugh, "Gaming at the Naval War College, *United States Naval Institute Proceedings*, March 1964, p. 48-55, and *Fundamentals of War Gaming* (Newport, R.I.: Naval War College, 1966).

41. Naval War College, *The Chart and Board Maneuvers*, Naval War College pamphlet (Newport, R.I.: July 1926). This publication, in conjunction with a "War Game Outfit MK II," containing all the paraphernalia needed for board maneuvers, was available to and apparently used by forces afloat. It is therefore likely that Spruance and his classmates were familiar with war gaming techniques before reporting to the War College.

42. The standard Navy publications used were *War Instructions 1924; General Tactical Instructions 1924; Formations and Maneuvers of the Battle Line 1922; General Signal Book 1925;* and *The Service of Information and Security.* The latter contained doctrine for searches, patrols, scouting, and screens. The basic War College publications were *The Estimate of the Situation with the Order Form, The Study of Strategy, The Chart and Board Maneuvers* (containing war gaming instructions), and *Maneuver Rules*, 161 p., containing hundreds of unbelievably complex, detailed war gaming rules.

43. The remainder of this paper will deal primarily with the problem solving and war games conducted at the War College during the latter half of 1926. The primary source used by the author is contained in numerous manuscript documents used by the 1926 staff and students such as statements of the problem, staff and student solutions, memos, and individual war games

histories and critiques. Footnotes to cite specific documents will not be used to avoid cluttering the paper and distracting the reader.

44. Letter from Capt. Gerald S. Bogart, USN (Ret.), to the author, 29 November 1970. Spruance once told his son-in-law (Captain Bogart) that valid strategic and military objectives cannot be formulated unless you know your enemy and can place yourself in his shoes. Spruance had learned all he could about the Japanese while serving in the Asiatic Fleet, by cultivating friendships with Japanese naval officers while serving with the Office of Naval Intelligence, and through his studies during his pre-World War II War College assignments.

45. Forrestel, p. 50-51.

46. *Ibid.*, chap. 12.

47. For detailed discussions on this subject, see Samuel E. Morison, *History of U.S. Naval Operations in World War II*, v. XII; Edwin P. Hoyt, *How They Won the War in the Pacific* (New York: Weybright and Talley, 1970), chap. 23; and the Columbia University oral histories of Adms. Richard L. Conolly (p. 255-257) and Thomas C. Kinkaid (p. 331-335).

48. Letter, Spruance to Potter, 21 February 1959.

49. Hoyt, p. 489; see also E.B. Potter, "The Command Personality," *United States Naval Institute Proceedings*, January 1969, p. 25.

50. Moore interview.

51. *Ibid.*

52. Forrestel, p. 209-210.

53. Naval War College, "Outline History of the United States War College 1884 to Date." Unpublished compilation of Naval War College records, Naval War College, Newport, R.I.: 1937, p. 195.

54. Letter, Mrs. Spruance to author.

55. Letter from Comdr. Raymond A. McClellan, USN (Ret.), to the author, 23 October 1970. This opinion was substantiated by other War College classmates of Spruance in letters to the author.

———— Ψ ————

It cannot be too often repeated that in modern war, and especially in modern naval war, the chief factor in achieving triumph is what has been done in the way of thorough preparation and training before the beginning of war.

Theodore Roosevelt: Graduation address,
U.S. Naval Academy, June 1902

THE MILITARY PLANNING PROCESS:

HUMAN IMPERFECTIONS IN ITS APPLICATION

Decisionmaking systems have the tendency to take on the character of their leader, and the military planning process is no exception. In the author's research and experience, he has found four personality disorders in planners that he characterizes as the "Smoker," the "In and Outer," the "Worrier," and the "Cowboy." An understanding of these syndromes can be important to both the commander and to the development of sound plans.

An article prepared

by

Lieutenant Commander Charles W. Cullen, U.S. Navy

All men are liable to error; and most men are, by passion or interest, under temptation to it.

John Locke

Homo sapiens and the military commander—semirecognized subspecies—have throughout history felt the need for tools and devices to assist them in solving problems. Man has sought assistance that would enable him to define and project his scheme of things into a future state of affairs. The need is eternal because man, as a reasoning animal, has a host of bad habits which tend, with depressing regularity, to create significant differences between the real world and his imagined world. It would take more than these pages to properly sympathize with this regrettable state of affairs; but rather, let us merely recognize the frailty of man's reasoning powers as the starting point

and rationale for this discussion of the military planning process.

One important point warrants emphasis at the outset—that is, even the prudent use of the military planning process will *not* assure one of success. Perhaps this suggests that, like imperfect man, the tools he uses are also imperfect. In any case, no argument has ever been made that one cannot fail, using the planning process. The commander in possession of a beautiful plan rigorously drafted in strict accordance with the planning process is simply not assured victory.

What we can state is that the military planning process has proven extremely helpful to commanders over the years. It has minimized his mistakes by providing a systematic method of structuring an analysis within the limits of available and reliable information. This is saying a great deal if you ponder the environment in which the commander

must plan and operate. This, then, is the planning process' only claim to fame and the only reason that it has been nurtured and taught at the Naval War College.*

The military planning process can be described as a logic system. It is a theoretical construct that can be translated into the abstract forms and symbols that would rekindle the hearts of Aristotle, Aquinas, Von Neuman, and Morgenstern. I would not recommend the exercise as the process is demanding enough as it is. It would demonstrate, however, that the estimate of the situation lends itself to formal and symbolic logic because it is a model for handling ideas. The planning process functions independently of the arguments to which it is applied. In other words, the form is incidental to the substance of the analysis.

While the system does provide order, this is certainly no reason to suppose that it will be used in an orderly manner. Decisionmaking systems have the tendency to take on the character of the leader, and the military planning process is no exception.

From my vantage point as a reviewer of both actual operational and student estimates and the respective directives, the greatest single problem in the use of the planning process is the failure of the commander to conduct an analysis. This sounds pretty basic, but it happens. The failure to conduct an analysis is responsible for more unsatisfactory directives than any other single cause. If you take the term "analysis" and look it up in your Funk and Wagnalls, you will discover that in order to conduct an analysis you must break down a conceptual whole into understandable parts. In the military planner's frame of reference, that means breaking down the mission, which is a conceptual whole, into understandable parts: objectives, physical objectives, necessary assumptions, enemy capabilities, own courses of action, task organization, and many others.

As a proper analysis progresses, the commander and his staff should be able to view the whole problem with increasing precision and accuracy—what they are going to do, when, for how long, and with what units. The problem is that there is an almost natural reticence on the part of commanders, and of man in general, to conduct disciplined analyses. It is hard work.

In the development of this paper I have cast certain recognizable planning types into four descriptive roles, for the simple reason that while the selection of officers to fill staff billets is a job of officer personnel assignment, the role that these officers play is largely a function of their training, experience, and *personal style*. I want to make it explicitly clear that in portraying these personal planning disorders I have purposely cast these stereotypes in exaggeration. Some of these characteristics exist in all of us, this writer notwithstanding. In an examination of this type the reader will, *hopefully*, benefit through personal introspection. Less productively, he may find some good fun in filling these roles with worthy contemporaries for whom the role is, quite naturally, not an exaggeration.

The first characterization I would like to make is the *Smoker*. What are the symptoms of the *Smoker*? First of all, I can tell you that the *Smoker* invented the "by-ear" method of planning, a method diametrically opposed to the systematic analysis of a situation. There are simplistic planning situations where the commander can simply play the events as they unfold. The problem is that such situations are hard to recognize at the outset. Further-

---

*For a further discussion of the history of the military planning process, see Charles W. Cullen, "From the Kriegsacademie to the Naval War College: the Military Planning Process," *Naval War College Review*, January 1970, p. 6-18.

```
                  ┌──────────────┐
                  │   MISSION    │
                  └──────────────┘
                         │
                         ▼
┌─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐
│              ESTIMATE OF THE SITUATION                                │
│                                                                       │
│  ┌─────────┐   ┌─────────────┐   ┌──────────┐   ┌────────────────┐   │
│  │ Mission │   │Considerations│  │ Opposing │   │ Comparison of  │   │
│  │ and its │→  │ affecting    │→ │ courses  │ → │ own courses    │   │
│  │ analysis│   │ possible     │  │ of action│   │ of action      │   │
│  └─────────┘   │ courses of   │  └──────────┘   ├────────────────┤   │
│                │ action       │                 │   Test for:    │   │
│                └─────────────┘     NO           │ suitability    │ YES│ DECISION
│                                                 │ feasibility,and│   │
│                                                 │ acceptability  │   │
│                                                 └────────────────┘   │
└─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┘
                         │
                         ▼
                  ┌──────────────┐
                  │ DEVELOPMENT  │
                  │  OF THE PLAN │
                  │ AND DIRECTIVE│
                  └──────────────┘
                                   ┌──────────────┐
                                   │ SUPERVISION  │
                                   │ OF PLANNED   │
                                   │   ACTION     │
                                   └──────────────┘
```

Fig. 1—The Military Planning Process (Estimate Phase)

more, one's judgment in this regard can be unduly biased by a number of past successes, small though they may be. The by-ear planner finds himself much in the position of the amateur musician who has achieved some small amount of success without the discipline of learning to read music. When asked to perform a complex piece of music at first sight, he finds himself unprepared for such a professional task.

1. Mission and its analysis
2. Considerations affecting possible courses of action
3. Analysis of opposing courses of action
   a. enemy capabilities
   b. own courses of action
   c. analysis of opposing courses of action
4. Comparison of own courses of action
5. Decision

Fig. 2—Estimate of the Situation

One symptom of the *Smoker* is readily identifiable and can serve as a checkpoint for you in your own planning or in reviewing the planning of others. You can tell when a planner is blowing smoke, as it were, by taking a hard look at his retained own courses of action. If you find that his own course of action statements are but a rewording of the mission statement assigned by his superior, you can conclude with some confidence that no analysis has been conducted. Let us assume that the commander's mission states that he is to put to sea with his force and sink submarines for purposes of interest to his superior. If, after laboriously reading pages and pages of his estimate of the situation you discover that the commander's decision states that he will put to sea and sink submarines, you have cause to doubt the depth of the analysis. Upon reinvestigation of this hypothetical example, you may find that the decision statement and mission statement are exactly the same, although the commander was not given a predetermined course of action. The conclusion to be drawn in this case is that, despite all the smoke, you do not know any

more by reading the commander's courses of action and his decision than you did when you first examined his superior's directive. In short, nothing of substance has been done. This does not necessarily mean that the commander and his staff have not produced reams of information. It means that they have not investigated the situation for the purpose of drawing conclusions. The commander simply has not broken down his mission into understandable terms. He may have as many as three tentative own courses of action that say more or less the same thing. He may sprinkle each concept for each course of action with a few cliches and superlatives, but for all practical purposes they will be identical.

Another checkpoint of a *Smoker's* work, or the lack of it, is evident in examining the concepts that are drafted during the estimate of the situation with regard to tentative own courses of action. One cannot posit an own course of action on an *a priori* basis. A course of action must have a concept of operations to support the actions proposed. The *Smoker's* concept will always be vague and void of time and distance factors. No effective military planner can come to grips with a military operation without talking in terms of time and distance and real world constraints. The *Smoker* prefers to ignore these constraints and to move about, by some mysterious power yet unclear, in a world of wish fulfillment. As his planning progresses, he becomes more and more confused. The *Smoker's* plan continues to grow until the very last syllable is typed. Oftentimes he can be found looking over the yeoman's shoulder as it is being worked up, trying to compose the final nuances of the plan that will satisfy him. Oftentimes, after developing two or three courses of action in his own way, he will choose to make a decision which will start with own course of action number 1 and

then progress through own course of action number 2 and own course of action number 3. He is so imprecise that he is unable to make a decision. He has become a victim of his own rhetoric.

Finally, you will recognize the *Smoker's* efforts by his smoke and baffle-gab. Some witty bureaucrat collected the *Smoker's* tools in the following "Baffle-Gab Thesaurus."*

A	B	C
0) Integrated	Management	Options
1) Total	Organizational	Flexibility
2) Systematized	Monitored	Capability
3) Parallel	Reciprocal	Mobility
4) Functional	Digital	Programing
5) Responsive	Logistical	Concept
6) Optional	Transitional	Time-phase
7) Synchronized	Incremental	Projection
8) Compatible	Third-generation	Hardware
9) Balanced	Policy	Contingency

You can choose any three-digit number, crank it into the thesaurus, and come up with instant nonsense. Number 155, for example, yields Total Logistical Concept, which means absolutely nothing. The *Smoker* traffics in these portentous words; he is a rhetorical extremist. Unfortunately, cliches and superlatives are anathema to the whole concept of planning in a realistic manner. Their presence in a directive, especially in the concept annex, is usually inversely proportional to the amount of thought that went into the planning.

The next distinctive stereotype I would like to discuss can be named the *In and Outer.* This architect whisks in and out of the military planning process at will. Actually, "at will" is too flattering, because the motive of this movement is as emotional as it is rational. Impatience with the system is his major vice. The *In and Outer* fails to see that

the military planning process structures rather than limits thought. I will admit that invariably there is room for a degree of justified impatience. There will be times when the planner will feel that the entire military planning process is ill suited for the situation. Indeed, a knowledgeable planner, pressed with events that are moving at a rapid pace, should be able to move ahead without damaging the results of his analysis. For the student planner, not yet formally introduced to the process, such abbreviations, often born out of impatience rather than crisis, invariably lead to numerous errors and uncontrolled leaps of illogic.

The *In and Outer,* possibly because of his impatience with the planning process, is often misled by the terms used in the process. The planning process is technical in the sense that many of its terms bear specific meanings and subtle distinctions. The distinction between objectives and physical objectives, the need for the mission statement to contain both a task and purpose, or the uses and possible misuses of assumptions and enemy capabilities all must be carefully studied if the terms are to be applied in their prescribed context.

Another problem often faced by the *In and Outer* is found in the third step of the estimate of the situation, the analysis of opposing courses of action. This step is admittedly difficult. The *In and Outer* and his staff usually cover

---

*"Baffle-Gab Thesaurus," *Time,* 13 September 1968, p. 22.

quite adequately the first step of the estimate, the mission and its analysis, and the second step of the estimate, considerations that might affect possible courses of action. However, almost invariably he broaches over the third step of the analysis—analysis of opposing courses of action. The precise reason is not clear, but, quite possibly, it is simply because the third step is difficult work. Having skipped the third step of the analysis, which is the very heart of the entire military planning process, his planning continues erratically through the final two steps. Yet he somehow manages to come up with a course of action which he declares is a decision.

Because of his inattention to the estimate of the situation and because he and his staff do not have a solid understanding of the precise terms that are used in the system, it comes as no surprise that the *In and Outer* usually lacks the foundation necessary for the development of planning schedules. It would be an exaggeration to state that the military planning process is followed step-by-step in actual planning situations throughout the allied world, but I can stipulate that flag officers directing force and fleet staffs today think and traffic in terms of enemy capabilities, own courses of action, and the other conceptual constituents of the military planning process. When a commander states that he wants intelligence estimates on enemy capabilities, his intelligence people know exactly what he is talking about. When the Chief of Staff and the Operations Officer are informed that they should delineate some tentative own courses of action, they too know precisely what is expected of them. The *In and Outer* who does not give the planning process and its systematic aspects any serious consideration has no basis for a planning schedule in that these terms are not understood by him or his staff.

Another stereotype you should meet is the *Worrier*. His great failing in life is

that he cannot understand the mission and its implications. Unlike the problems of the *Smoker*, who perhaps does not possess the requisite mental acuity to appreciate a problem, the mistakes of the *Worrier* are more clearly inexcusable. Students who read the literature on military planning are continually alerted to the important fact that the situational analyses must be mission oriented. It is a wise practice for a planner to write his mission in bold letters and keep it before him and his staff throughout the planning process. The more complicated the scenario, the longer the planning cycle, the more people that become involved, the greater is the tendency to lose sight of the mission. If the commander and his staff do not have a crystal-clear conception of the mission in precise and definite terms, they are going to become *Worriers.*

The *Worrier* has great difficulty getting through the second step of the estimate of the situation, the considerations affecting the possible courses of action. It is here that the commander and his staff must examine the general and fixed factors that may affect his operations. Also, the commander and his staff examine relative combat power, the numbers and organic characteristics of the fighting forces opposed. A thorough mission analysis is essential if the commander is to accurately judge what information is relevant to this step of the estimate. The commander has at his disposal today so much data that it defies reading, much less comprehension. While his communications center is receiving information by the page per second, the computer in the back room is pouring forth reams of printout. What is relevant? The judgment must be based on an understanding of the mission, what the taks are, and what one's position is in relation to his operational peers and his superior. The *Worrier*, not appreciating this, does not have the courage to turn off the information

faucet and get on with his estimate. As a result, he entertains encyclopedic concerns.

The mission and its analysis will enable you to wade through a pool of information rather than drown in an ocean of it. The decision as to how much research must be done will always be difficult. Beware, however, of applying Parkinson's Law to this endeavor and expanding your investigation to fill the time available. If the commander is not sure what information is relevant and the staff is looking hither and yon, he had best go back and reexamine the mission and its analysis to determine again whether the intelligence ball is being properly inflated or stuffed.

The *Worrier* also has difficulty in testing his own courses of action because of his lack of focus. Own courses of action, once established, should be tested for suitability, feasibility, and acceptability. The *Worrier* does not grasp his mission and oftentimes will propose courses of action that are not suitable. As the very definition of suitability is that the course of action will, by itself, accomplish the mission, such a failing is not surprising.

For example, given the taks of providing antisubmarine warfare support to a carrier group and an underway replenishment group in separate waters, a commander may come up with a course of action which indicates that he will conduct offensive operations in support of the carrier and, time permitting, help protect the replenishment group. Upon questioning his rationale we learn that the carrier is obviously more important, therefore should receive support on a priority basis. However, upon examination of the superior's directive we note clearly that neither of the tasks assigned to the commander were given priority. The course of action suggested, therefore, is of questionable suitability.

Another symptom of the *Worrier* is his demonstrated capacity to plan at the wrong level. This is caused by his failure

to understand his mission in relation to others. Assume that our commander is one of numerous group commanders in the overall operation. He has been tasked with the responsibility of supporting only two of the seven task groups. The superior's directive indicates that this commander has no responsibilities toward the other task groups in the operation. Again his role is that of antisubmarine warfare. The *Worrier* begins by rushing through the mission and its analysis and then plunging headlong into the factors affecting possible courses of action. We then observe that he is progressing at glacial speed. His assessment of environmental factors and relative combat power becomes encyclopedic. Yet he somehow manages to set down enemy capabilities which he thinks are relevant. The *Worrier* correctly notes that the enemy has the capability of destroying all friendly forces. He therefore sets this down as an enemy capability without realizing that it is too broad. First of all, the commander is not responsible for all friendly forces. He is only responsible for so much of them as he has been assigned by his superior. In short, this would be a relevant enemy capability for his superior, but it is not a relevant one for him. He is planning at too high a level.

There is an insidious element here that one must remember. Because of the circumstances described above, the *Worrier* tends to draft unduly conservative plans. In some cases he loses all spirit and anticipation for the action. Planning at too high a level, the *Worrier* as a commander views his assets as impotent against the enemy's overall capability. Thus, rather than defining enemy capabilities strictly in terms of their direct impact on his mission, the *Worrier* sees himself as the target of all of the capabilities of the enemy in all areas. As a result, the *Worrier* has a decided tendency to be overcautious. Enemy capabilities must have a direct

impact on your mission or they do not belong in your estimate.

Lastly, we have that individual who is best characterized as the *Cowboy*. To avoid becoming a *Cowboy*, one must recognize and control bias both in one's self and in one's staff. The art of war is so complicated today that regardless of how much experience one has or how senior one is, it is impossible to have across-the-board expertise in all fields of warfare. We are expert either in one phase of warfare or in another. This is not bad as long as we recognize it. The problem is that there are many planners who do not recognize it. They are biased either knowingly or unknowingly.

The symptoms of the *Cowboy* are not too difficult to spot, but they are difficult to remove. First of all, in his estimate of the situation, the *Cowboy* will come up with only one or two own courses of action when others are obvious and relevant. For example, to use our antisubmarine warfare commander again, his assets might consist of a carrier, a flock of fixed wing and helicopter aircraft, a school of destroyers, and a large pack of nuclear submarines—in short, a formidable group. Our *Cowboy* planner, however, will whisk through the estimate and decide that this operation is going to be, in its entirety, a show for the nuclear submarines, his favorite weapon. He anticipates no serious problems.*

The commander's reasoning for all this is that he sees the enemy as being incapable of destroying his favorite weapon system. For the *Cowboy*, this idea is unthinkable. Our hero is therefore inclined to rapidly skip over enemy capabilities and own courses of action and indeed the entire estimate of the situation. He moves as quickly as possible into developing his plan, specifically the writing of his favorite annex, which might be air operations, submarine operations, or cruising instructions.

Not unlike the *Worrier*, the *Cowboy* also has a tendency to plan at the wrong level. In his case the level is often too low rather than too high. The results are twofold: the estimate is weakened because enemy capabilities and own courses of action are too confined and too constrained, and, in the development of the plan, a commander planning at too low a level cannot help but encroach upon his subordinates' legitimate areas of decisionmaking.

Our *Cowboy* also runs into problems when testing own courses of action for suitability, feasibility, and acceptability. Suitability is usually not a problem. Unlike the *Worrier*, the *Cowboy* usually has an excellent grip on his mission. The problem is that he cannot entertain imaginative ways of carrying it out. Feasibility is not seen as a matter of degree. For him a course of action is feasible without question. He is not introspective enough to compare the feasibility of several different courses of action.

The *Cowboy* also cannot adequately examine his courses of action for acceptability. When he puts forth a course of action which is judged by his superiors to be unacceptable, he becomes quite emotional about it. With hurt feelings and an indignant manner, he wants to be told why he cannot use any or all of his assets in any way he chooses. The *Cowboy* shrugs off the constraints that limit actions in the real world. He simply does not understand the parameters that have been given to him. For that reason his proposed courses of action are often unacceptable, either on political grounds or simply because the military action proposed is not appropriate. It is not the best that could be done, and this is one of the tests for acceptability. The last and most important question that you must ask yourself when completing the

_____

*The carrier and the destroyers will protect themselves while his submarines deliver the *coup de grace*.

estimate is, "Is this the best that I can do?" For the *Cowboy* it is the best that he would like to do, but this is not the same. The meaning of acceptability and its implications in the broader sense are the cause of the *Cowboy's* lament.

Within our system of government the world will always be defined by others regardless of our rank or position in the military. This is a rather basic fact, but it has profound repercussions. It is incumbent on each and every one of us as military commanders to devise imaginative plans that accept all limitations imposed by our superiors, either civilian or military. Therefore, the constraints on planning, identified in the first step of the estimate, bear heavily on one's tests for acceptability.

While these constraints may change over a period of time, it is never acceptable to cast your basic or primary plan on a presumption that changes will take place or will be made in time by your superior. If they are not, you will be left with no plan at all. That leaves the *Cowboy* with but one personal course of action: to return to his cabin and wait for his relief. In brief, it is our duty to perform within the defined parameters. Our challenge is to do so creatively and with imagination. In the interval, our responsibility may or may not be to seek change.

Of course, to assure preparedness, alternate and contingency plans are always drafted based on assumptions that key aspects of the general situation will change or that specific constraints on current planning will be lifted or imposed. These necessary and vital enterprises are apart and distinct from the *Cowboy's* world.

I have painted the *Cowboy* in extreme. Nonetheless, in degrees he exists in all of us. Recognize him. We all must take Socrates' dictum to heart, "Know thyself." And, as Aristotle probably added when tutoring Alexander: "Know thy staff."

These then are the stereotypes

against which we must guard: the *Smoker,* who felt that the discipline of the process with its rules and models inhibited his genius for rhetoric; the *In and Outer,* who failed to see that the planning process structures rather than limits thought; the *Worrier,* who saw his mission in terms of taking on all the burdens of this world; and the *Cowboy,* who could not limit himself to acceptable options. Each, in his own way, denies the notion that a commander, as a decisionmaker, can rationally examine a problem, that he can do so without being a slave to his prejudices, and that he can construct a cogent framework for action. This is an idea at least as old as Socrates.

* * * * * * *

I would like to discuss three additional pitfalls that portend grave danger to the planner. First is the problem of enemy capabilities and enemy intentions. You recall that only two criteria may be weighed in considering enemy capabilities. These are: can the enemy carry out the action, and will that action, if carried out, directly affect your mission? If so, the enemy capabilities should be retained and carried forward for further analysis. It is at this point that the military planner arranges the list of retained enemy capabilities in their order of probability. This is done on the basis of apparent enemy intentions. You are warned in almost all applicable planning publications that dealing in enemy intentions can be a very dangerous practice. It is nonetheless a necessary effort, in that limited resources available to the commander and the forces opposed demand choices of priorities. For the commander's own forces these resources are known, but of the enemy they can only be estimated or deduced. But in both cases they must be made.

The pitfall is not in dealing in enemy intentions, per se, but rather in con-

fusing enemy intentions with enemy capabilities. The most disastrous mistake that you as a military planner can make—the *In and Outer*, the *Worrier*, *Cowboy*, and *Smoker* notwithstanding—is to overlook an enemy capability or to reject a retained enemy capability solely on the grounds of what you believe the enemy might do. Do not miss an enemy capability. If it affects your mission, you must retain it. List it low in probability if your intelligence estimates warrant it, but do not discard it.

The adjustment in your plan to cover an unlikely enemy capability may be quite incidental. For example, the enemy may have the capability of sorticing a small mine force to mine a certain strait of interest to you. Your intelligence indications are that the chance of his doing this is remote. Still he could do it, and if he did, it would affect the execution of your plan. You can simply decide to have some lonesome pilot reconnoiter the enemy's anchored mine force every few days to see what they are up to during the operation. By this means you have covered the capability. If you discard the enemy capability, you will not have your air reconnaissance and may therefore find enemy mines where they "weren't supposed to be."

While this example is very basic, the principle holds at all levels of planning. To avoid error, the number of retained enemy capabilities must remain fixed throughout the discussion of enemy intentions. Only the ordering of the retained enemy capabilities may be influenced by enemy intentions. This is true regardless of how convinced you might be of the accuracy of your crystal ball.

The *Worrier* is perhaps least likely to be unduly swayed by enemy intentions or by constraints in planning that move one to view the enemy intentions optimistically. It would be poor counsel to enjoin you to be *Worriers*, however. Rather be a fiscal wizard and exploit

your intelligence, but always be a Capabilities Man.

Another error situation has to do with aggressive estimates and conservative plans and may be labeled the Tiger/Lamb Syndrome. I have found that the true colors of the commander are flown in the task organization. You will recall in the development of the plan, after the estimate of the situation has been completed, the commander sets forth those tasks to be accomplished and designates what units are to accomplish them and what organizational structure they are to operate within. It is interesting to contrast the decisions made at this late stage of the planning process with the conclusions made earlier in the estimate of the situation with regard to relative combat power. For an example, let us use again the commander planning for antisubmarine warfare operations. The task organization indicates that nine of 12 destroyers have been assigned solely to the carrier. Yet, in his directive we note that the tasks assigned to the destroyers are to provide ASW protection to the carrier and conduct offensive ASW operations, but we see nine ships dedicated to screen the carrier. Such an arrangement may be both appropriate and aggressive in some cases, while in others it may not be. One can find out very quickly by reviewing, if you have access to this commander's estimate of the situation. If allocation of forces assigned to each task is appropriate, you can expect to find the relative combat power assessment in the commander's estimate of the situation to indicate that the entire operation is marginal, that the enemy has considerable offensive submarine capability, and that the commander himself must therefore assume a defensive position. Or you might discover in examining the commander's mission and its analysis that certain constraints on planning have been placed upon him by his superior. For instance, he is directed to protect the

MISSION

↓

ESTIMATE
OF THE
SITUATION

DEVELOPMENT OF THE PLAN

Step 1

Review the decision and formulate broad concept of operation

Step 2

State assumptions

Step 3

Determine component operations and friendly supporting operations

Step 4

Determine how each component operation is to be carried out

Step 5

Organize forces into task organization

Step 6

Assign tasks and prepare amplifying instructions

Step 7

Solve command problems

Step 8

Compile information for subordinates

**Step 9
DIRECTIVE**

SUPERVISION
OF PLANNED
ACTION

Fig. 3—The Military Planning Process (Development Phase)

carrier at all costs, regardless of the present threat. If one of these is not the case, we have some cause to conclude that the commander is more concerned about protecting the carrier than he is about sinking submarines.

In the military, consistency is not necessarily a virtue. However, we can expect that if the estimate was thorough and the plan was developed on the conclusions made in the estimate, a correlation between the tasks assigned to the subordinates, the concept of operations, and the relative combat power assessment should be evident. Many exceptions may come to mind, but, as a check on your own planning, if you were a tiger when conducting your estimate of the situation and a lamb in tasking your organization, you have cause for reflection and reappraisal.

The final pitfall concerns the acceptability of risks. As military commanders, our great burden in life is that we are always planning in a conflict situation. You have, therefore, an automatic enemy capability the minute you begin your planning cycle. That is, the enemy always has the capability of damaging or destroying your force. Not all of the multiple threats of the enemy, however, must be met directly. Careful analysis of your mission, your role in relation to your superior and other peer commanders, as well as a careful assessment of relative combat power, are essential. The tendency of the *Cowboy* to meet every threat head on should be avoided. For example, given the task to proceed through hostile waters to a certain area and upon arrival to conduct shore bombardment, movement into the objective area in such a manner as to invite the attention of the enemy might be dramatic and bold, but foolish. The first task of the commander is to get his forces into the objective area where they can carry out their mission and to get them there in fighting trim. In short, there is no virtue in bleeding early. Or as General Patton reputedly noted, "No bastard won a war by dying for his country. He won it by making the other poor dumb bastard die for his country."

And really, that is what the military planning process is all about.

BIOGRAPHIC SUMMARY

Lt. Comdr. Charles W. Cullen, U.S. Navy, holds a bachelor's degree in philosophy from Saint John's University, Minn., and a master's degree in international relations from The American University. Operational duty has included tours in the U.S.S. *Frank E. Evans* (DD 754), U.S.S. *William V. Pratt* (DLG 13), and command of the U.S.S. *Outagamie County* (LST 1073). A graduate of the School of Naval Command and Staff (Class of 1969), he served for 2 years on the faculty of the Naval War College as the Assistant for Military Planning and Naval Operations in the Correspondence School. Lieutenant Commander Cullen is currently assigned as Executive Officer of the U.S.S. *Agerholm* (DD 826).

Ψ

No military leader is endowed by heaven with an ability to seize the initiative. It is the intelligent leader who does so after a careful study and estimate of the situation and arrangement of the military and political factors involved.

Mao Tse-tung: On Guerrilla War, 1937

There are several approaches to management which interpret the management process in the light of various academic disciplines. All of them apply to military as well as industrial management, and all reveal a growing preoccupation with the manager's social responsibility as well as his concern for the organization of which he is a part.

THE MANAGEMENT PROCESS

A lecture delivered at the Naval War College

by

Captain Alexander H. Cornell, SC, U.S. Navy

James V. Forrestal Chair of Military Management

Although management has been called a relatively new discipline, its development has been exceedingly rapid in the past 30 years. We might wonder at calling it new, because we have all been engaged in management in all our careers. The newness is simply a matter of growing complexity and technology and of management's attempts to meet these challenges by becoming a science as well as an art. Management has become more important as labor has become more specialized, as the scale of organized operations has increased, as technological developments have produced a greater number of factors requiring management, and as the complexities of human relationships have increased.

It is not enough today to manage solely for increased production or profit or whatever the old objectives may have been—today the human side of the equation has become paramount. The dynamics of management now are concerned with people more than with production. If I were asked today what single ingredient in government or civilian enterprise is the most important, I would have to answer honestly that it is management. Good managers are our scarcest commodity in the United States in 1970, and I believe this is true of all countries. I further happen to believe that there are no underdeveloped countries—merely undermanaged ones.

Because of the increasing importance of management and the formidable challenges it faces, many academic disciplines have addressed it in the past 30 years. Today we find contributions being made to solving management's problems from the fields of psychology, sociology, social psychology, economics, accounting, public administration, business administration, political

science, history, mathematics, statistics, the physical sciences, and anthropology—to name a few.

Research on subjects important to management offers renewed hope to those of us who must face the increasing complexities of the operating manager. It has been determined that in the hard-core field of behavioral sciences alone (psychology, sociology, political science, economics, and anthropology), some 45,000 academicians in the United States are now engaged in the study of the human aspects of organization and management.

In examining the management process, I will start with a few definitions of management and then will look briefly at several "schools of management" which have led us to where we are today. In general usage the world management identifies a group of people whose job it is to direct effort toward common objectives through the activities of other people. Simply stated, "management is getting things done through people." This is the view held by the human relations management school within the broad field of behavioral science. This point of view had great prominence during the 1930's, partially as a late reaction to the oppression of the working classes.

While the emphasis of this definition is on people, it nevertheless implies that there is a group that gets things done by using other people. Who is this special group which does all the managing? Estimates have been made that it is about 7 percent of the working forces. You are part of that 7 percent by reason of your position and vocation as military officers and civilian administrators.

The second definition of management reflects an economic and systems analytic view of the world. "Management is the process of determining the most efficient allocation of limited resources to achieve organization objectives, under conditions of risk and uncertainty." In industry this means that management should be intelligent enough to choose those objectives which promise the greatest return on invested resources and to allocate the resources to maximize productivity and minimize production costs. In the military, at least in this country during the McNamara era, this definition received special emphasis. However, in nonprofit organizations like the military, translating this definition into something meaningful for the military manager brings up a question of output value. Industry, by and large, uses profit as its measure of performance. What relevant yardstick do we have for measuring this Nation's security?

The third definition of management also concerns people: "Management can be described as a process by which a cooperative group directs actions toward common goals." Like the first one, this is a definition of management held by the human relations school. Notice the implications as to who is doing the managing. In the first definition we said managing is getting things done through people. That implied that an individual (the manager) is in an authoritative position and is superior to those people through whom things are getting done. In this case it is the people themselves, through the mechanism referred to as a cooperative group, who represent the directing force. This does not mean, however, that there is no difference in rank structure in the group. This particular definition is used by a relatively new school of thought called "participative management."

Following is a definition of management prepared by the Joint Chiefs of Staff of the U.S. military forces.

Management is a process of establishing and attaining objectives to carry out responsibilities. Management consists of those continuing actions of planning, organizing, directing, coordinating, controlling, and evaluating the use of

men, money, materials, and facilities to accomplish missions and tasks. Management is inherent in command, but it does not include as extensive authority and responsibility as command.

The first sentence is more or less of the same kind of general definition as the previous ones. However, note the phrase "to carry out responsibilities." This implies that there are constraints on managers, established by higher policy levels, which limit freedom of action. This definition is superior to the others because of this point, which they failed to make. But it is true for managers anywhere. The constraints may be economic; they may be social; they may be moral. For example, neither our military forces nor the Secretary of Defense nor even the President of the United States is permitted to develop a defense strategy which includes unprovoked attack on another nation. American society determined in the beginning that such an attack was morally unacceptable.

The middle section of this definition comes to grips with management as a process. It lists six subprocesses: planning, organizing, directing, coordinating, controlling, and evaluating.

Before departing from this description, I would like to cite a threefold concept of management. Management can be viewed as an economic resource (one of the factors of production like money or materials); a system of authority, a synthesis of the old hierarchical authoritarian concept and the more recent participative management approach; or a class or elite. As viewed by the sociologist, management is a class and status system. The complexity of relationships in modern society demands that its managers become an educated elite in order to cope with the tasks to be accomplished. Entrance into this class is based more on ability today and less on family or political connec-

tions than was the case some years ago. Some view this development as a so-called "managerial revolution," by which the managerial class will ultimately obtain power and become autonomous. I do not share that view for the simple reason that managers, as a class, will probably never have as much allegiance to their "class" as to their country, organization, profession, or military service. These three perspectives of economic resources, system of authority, and class or elite are a few of many ways in which to categorize management.

The Evolution of Management Theory and Practice. Management problems are not new. The Bible, for example, explains that even Moses had some organizational problems in leading his people. The history of the Roman Empire is filled with information on how complicated administrative problems were handled. The Roman Catholic Church hit upon a hierarchical form of organization that has worked well for 2,000 years.

However, no important managerial tools of analysis developed until the Middle Ages, when merchants conceived of a means of keeping business records called "double entry bookkeeping," first described by an Italian writer in 1494. After the rise of the capitalistic system, students began to give attention to economics. The inevitable "division of labor" to get things done became a principle that sparked the industrial revolution.

In the early 19th century the corporation came into being, and with it came the division of labor at the top. Managers of various functions of industry now appeared who could handle a complex business entrusted to them by the stockholders. They, the stockholders, could own the business, but they needed professionals to run it.

By 1886 an Englishman, Henry R. Towne, was asking society to recognize

management as a separate field of study. An American, Frederick W. Taylor, was at the same time making contributions to the study of management which were to give him recognition as "the father of scientific management."

What was this early "scientific management" which was expounded by Taylor? It was not so much individual techniques as it was a new attitude toward management. Its essence can be found in four general areas:

1. The discovery, through the use of the scientific method, of basic elements of man's work to replace "rules of thumb."

2. The identification of management's function of planning work, instead of allowing workmen to choose their own methods.

3. The selection and training of workers and the development of co-operation, instead of encouraging individualistic efforts by employees.

4. The division of work between management and the workers so that each would perform those duties for which he was best fitted, with the resultant increase in efficiency.

While Taylor was a major contributor to "scientific management," he was by no means alone. Henri Fayol arrived at many similar conclusions before Taylor did—but unfortunately there was no suitable translation of his works. Henry Gantt next emphasized the psychology of the worker and the importance of morale. He devised a wage-payment system which stimulated management and workers to do more. Then Frank Gilbreth originated motion study and revolutionized the construction industry. Later, Urwich, a Britisher; Davis, an American college professor; Mooney and Reiley, two industrial executives; and many others also expounded the views of the early "scientific management" or "management process" school.

The management process school was one of the earliest approaches, and it is still viable. This approach perceives management as a process of getting things done through and with people operating in groups. This school analyzes the process of management, establishes a conceptual framework, identifies underlying principles, and builds a theory of management upon them. It is often referred to as the "traditional" school.

The school bases its approach on several fundamental beliefs. It feels that managing is a process which can be analyzed and dissected. It feels that long experience with management can produce useful generalizations of predictive value. It feels, also, that management is an art learned principally from practice. The experience which results, however, can furnish the elements of a useful theory of management.

The empirical school, on the other hand, identifies management as a study of experiences, sometimes to draw generalizations from them, but usually merely to teach experience in order to transfer it to the practitioner. The analysis of cases by means of the "comparative approach"—comparing a proposed style of management with an experienced one—is its keystone.

It is based on the premise that if we study the experience of successful managers or solve tough management problems, we will learn how to apply the most effective management techniques. In other words, what worked or did not work in individual circumstances is applicable in comparable situations.

One drawback of this school is that management is not yet a science based wholly on precedent, and exact, comparable situations are not likely to occur. But to the extent that this school draws generalizations from its research, it is similar to the "management process" school.

The approach of the human behavior school is based on interpersonal relations. Since managing involves getting

things done through and with people, this school believes we must study human relations in light of the "behavioral science" approach. It brings to bear the theories and techniques of the social sciences upon the study of inter and intrapersonal phenomena. It ranges from individual personality dynamics to the relations among cultures.

In other words, this school concentrates on the people part of management and the principle that people should understand people. Psychologists and social psychologists are among the scholars in this school, and their studies in the last three decades have included practically every facet of the managerial process.

Often confused with the human behavioral school, and closely related to it, is the social system approach. This school looks upon management as a system of cultural relationships. Sometimes it is limited to the formal organization. Sometimes the approach encompasses any kind of human relationship, including the informal organization. Mainly sociological, the study identifies the nature of cultural relationships of various groups and shows how these are related in an integrated system. The spiritual father of this school is Chester Barnard, who developed a theory of cooperation grounded in the needs of the individual to solve, through cooperation, the biological, physical, and social limitations of himself and his environment—from which he carved a set of interrelationships he called the "formal organization." He came up with a rather ingenious concept that any cooperative system can exist in which there are persons able to communicate and who are willing to contribute their actions toward a conscious common purpose. He arrived at his classic theory without benefit of higher mathematics, quantitative methods, or questionnaires.

Still another recent approach by a scholarly and growing number is the decision theory school. This group believes in developing an array of alternatives, by rational approach, and the selection of a course of action from the alternatives. It is similar to the military planning process. The approach can be one of dealing with the decision itself or with the group or the person making the decision. It has its roots in such concepts as "economic" consumer's-choice theory and such things as utility maximization, indifference curves, marginal utility, risk, and uncertainties.

The decision school has gone well beyond merely evaluating alternatives, and today its proponents look at the very nature of organization structure, the reactions of groups and individuals, the development of basic information necessary for decision management, and many other areas. As one practitioner put it, the "keyhole" look at management, which began as merely decision-making, has led to a consideration of the entire field of organization, management, and their environment. There are problems, however, in attempting to build a theory of management exclusively around decisionmaking.

The mathematical school is yet another interpretation of management. Mathematics can be used by any school or theory, but here management is seen as a system of mathematical models and processes. The idea is that if management is a logical process, it can then be expressed in terms of mathematical symbols and relationships. The main approach is the model, and it can be constructed to simulate basic relationships and principles in terms of goals or objectives.[1]

Listing the main schools of thought here is one way of portraying the evolution of management. Still another way is to look at it the way one writer,

---

[1] This categorization of schools of management adapted from Koontz, H., "The Management Theory Jungle," *Journal of the Academy of Management*, vol. 4, no. 3, p. 174-188, December 1961.

Joseph L. Massie, has done. He lists these five contributions in order of their appearance on the managerial scene:

|	
1910-1940	Industrial Engineering (Scientific Management)
1910-1970	Human Relations and Behavioral Science
1920-1970	Organizational Theory
1930-1970	Managerial Economics
1930-1950	Managerial Accounting

Naturally, there is overlap and continuity among the contributions, and all of them are still contributing even today. Note this expert excludes mathematics except as it may be a part of economics, engineering, and accounting. This list does not contain a significant segment of management which is today grounded in decision theory and quantitative tools.

The Management Functions—an Integrated, Interrelated Process. The so-called processes of management are really the functional ways in which management theory was brought to bear

on what management is, what management does, and what it should be. A fairly good way to visualize this structure or process is by the accompanying chart, adapted from one by Harold Koontz.

Out on the peripheral areas we have depicted the sources of the learning which has taken place. The broad disciplines of mathematics, physical sciences and statistics, psychology, public administration, business administration, anthropology, and, for want of a better name, decision theory, all have been the foundations for the more precise theory shown in the inner circle: systematic (quantitative) relationships, individual behavior, management experience (principles), group behavior, and rational choice. The target of all these disciplines and research has been the process or function one finds in managing an organization.

The first of these processes, or functions, is planning. Planning is the initial, but also the continuing, process by which an organization is conceived and kept running.

Planning is concerned, first of all, with the objectives of an organization and their clear definition. It is concerned with developing alternative courses of action to reach these objectives, courses of action which are in harmony with the capabilities of the components of the organization. It is concerned with developing courses of action which are flexible enough to adapt to changing circumstances. It is concerned, finally, with its own periodic, continual review.

Planning is so essential that it usually heads the list of any functions or processes and is referred to as the primary principle of organization or the "primacy of planning." Planning is what the manager should be doing most of his time.

The second subprocess is that of organization. It should be created, not as a final structure to be maintained at all costs, but again as a framework through which a vast, complex, and changing set of functions can be best carried out. The questions one must ask in planning a new organization or making additions to an already existing one are numerous. Is the organization necessary? How do its costs compare with the importance of its objectives? Does the head of the organization have authority to match his responsibilities? Do any subordinates report to more than one person? These and other questions assist the manager in evaluating the projected organization.

As you can see by these questions, organization is more than a hierarchical chart. It is a living, changing structure and scheme for the relationships of management to workers, of top management to lower management, of worker to worker.

The next process to examine is that of staffing. Once plans have been made and an organization created in concept, it must be staffed by people. They are both the means and the ends of endeavor, whether it be for profit in business or for protection in the military. In the process of staffing one must define clearly the authority, responsibilities, and duties of each individual. Job descriptions must be carefully composed. Promotion procedures must be carefully defined. Constant attention must be given to personality styles in reference to the requirements of the job. In other words, through dynamic, ever-changing staffing, human beings are put to work and constantly reviewed in an effort to obtain the best possible in each job.

Once the organization is planned, built, and staffed, it must be given constant direction toward the objectives or goals which have been set.

In directing the organization, the manager must ensure that he is communicating his plans and objectives to his subordinates and that they understand his instructions. He must seek to inspire confidence in his subordinates so that they will feel their best interests are served by following his guidance. He must always remain aware of the fact that his subordinates have interests unrelated to their jobs.

Over all of the previous processes, management must maintain and practice control. This is one of the most important day-to-day functions of managers, despite the fact that many controls now have become mechanized. The practice of control is an activity which seeks, among other things, to detect deviations from planned operations early enough for prompt corrective action to be taken. The actions which managers take in light of these deviations must be effective and proportionate in cost to the seriousness of the original problems. Objective standards of performance must be set whenever possible. Most important, control techniques are dynamic and must be constantly reviewed.

Coordination, which is relevant to and a prerequisite of all the processes mentioned thus far, is a continuous and essential process that pervades all the

others. Indeed, there have been great management theorists and practitioners who feel that this is the cardinal process of all. Without it all the others cease to function correctly.

Coordination and all the other processes depend largely upon good communications. Communication channels must be free, open, unrestricted, up and down, crossways, and in all directions to bring about the desired ends.

Still another process, or function, that takes place from beginning to end and then takes place all over again and again in organized effort is that of decisionmaking. In management the decisionmaking process is affected by the environment of the decisionmaker and by the role he assumes as chief decisionmaker. By role I mean what kind of decisionmaker he is. This can range all the way from a manager who personally makes all decisions to one who simply gives his approval to decisions made by his subordinates. A decision can be defined as a course of action consciously chosen from available alternatives for the purpose of achieving a desired result. If there are no alternatives, there is no decision process. Three essential ideas are inherent in decisions.

● First, a decision involves a choice—if there is only one alternative, there is no need for a decision.

● Second, a decision involves mental processes at the conscious level. Logic is supposed to prevail throughout, but, unfortunately, emotion, nonrational and subconscious factors do enter into the process. The process is greatly assisted in many cases today by techniques we call systems analysis and other quantitative approaches.

● Third, a decision is for a purpose. The only reason it is necessary is to facilitate attainment of some objective.

Today, decisionmaking by groups is receiving a lot of emphasis, and some new principles of good group participation in decisionmaking have been arrived at by research. These include the

absence of a "threat" factor, the formulation of goals by the group, the reaching of a consensus after deliberation, and group interaction and participation by the entire group in the interaction.

Finally, policy formulation is the process of development of understandings for members of the organization so that the actions of each member of the group in a given set of circumstances will be more predictable to other members. Policy is simply a guide for making decisions. It is usually made by top management. It is not a rule, not law or a procedure, practice, or principle. Policies may originate at the top by executive deliberation, or they may be imposed from outside the firm by the Government or an association, or they may be something simply implied from consistent actions by top management.

Some examples of policy are whether to diversify or not; whether to integrate or not; whether to undersell competition or not; whether nepotism will be permitted or not; racial discrimination; mandatory retirement because of age—and so on.

Current Trends in Management. All of what I have said thus far should help us to see how important and complex management has become. Indeed, there are many who say, and I am one of them, that management is today the key ingredient in all organized effort. Should you feel that military management is any different, let me remind you that all of the processes just discussed are part of the military management process, just as they are in industry.

If we ponder the various fields of specialization in management as depicted below, we can get still another perspective on the vastness and specialization in the field of management today.

● **Personnel Management**
   National—International
● **Public Personnel Management**
   National—International

- **Industrial Management**
  Manufacturing/Production Management
    National—International
  Business Management
    National—International
- **Research and Development Management**
    National—International
- **Financial Management**
  Management Accounting
  Management Economics
- **Marketing Management**
- **Institutional Management**
  Hotel Management
  Hospital Management
  Educational Management
  Exchange Management
  Club Management
    et cetera
- **Military Management**

As a naval officer engaged in military management, one can be thrust into any one or all of these fields in the span of a naval career! Add command responsibility to this picture, and you have a most formidable array of challenges for each and every one of you. So much for the fields of management.

There are several trends taking place in management today. The first is that of greater and greater specialization within management itself, as we have just seen from the preceding lists of management fields. A second area is that of an even greater specialization with regard to basic problems within a specific kind of management. For example, in the field of managing the production of goods or services alone, some of the areas in which you can now find specialists attempting to solve particular functional problems are these:

- *Inventory*—wherein highly trained specialists, usually operations researchers closely related to production control, attempt to solve the questions of (1) What is the optimum amount to carry? (2) What is the economic lot size to order or to produce? (3) What system of controlling inventory should be used? In our own Navy, for example, there are now Supply Corps officers who have as their main specialty just this function of inventory control.

- *Resource Allocation*—a new look in the military, and one which has assumed a great importance, attempts to bring specialization to bear on what amounts of what kinds of resources will be made. Again, we have controller-type managers today engaged wholly in this aspect of management.

- *Sequencing and Routing*—the determination of what operations will be performed, their sequencing, and the path or flow of materials through a series of operations. We have specialists in our Navy, for example, who are concerned solely with the proper routing, operations, and functions of materials handling and packaging and preserving of materials alone.

- *Sales and Promotion*—specialization of sales management need not be elaborated upon. Advertising and sales promotion have been with us for some time but are even more precise fields of specialty today.

- *Replacement*—in addition to mere replacement problems for the usual resources, the deliberate, planned obsolescence to create new products is now a way of life. Automobiles and even some weapons fit this category, and specialists are hard at work "managing" the trends.

- *Search*—in product management, the search for new products, for new brand names, symbols, or designs. The systematic gathering, recording, and analyzing of data relating to distribution and sales is now a profession for some.

Two other management trends I see coming about in the future are: first, in addition to the need for good managers and for specialized managers being greater than ever, there is the need for managers to expand their horizons beyond their business, beyond their military service, beyond their particular corps and specialty—and to appreciate their place in society. They must, in the future, see beyond national boundaries to international fields of management. Management can no longer look only to the product or to profit or to their

military services' welfare—they must be concerned with their national and international "social role." Society has awakened to the fact that every organization is a social system. It has influence beyond itself. It has responsibility to those who fall within the organization and to those without the organization. The manager, whether he likes it or not, has an important function in the social system, and he must be held responsible for his unique social function. His is a moral responsibility, not amoral, as he has been prone to think and certainly not immoral. His role in the moral realm must be evaluated as such. If he is made aware that he is a cocreator of a social system, he will make decisions and act upon that awareness. This is true whether he is a businessman, scientist, politician, union leader, professor, or military commander.

The other trend I foresee is the continued and accelerated growth of a managerial elite. We already have military elite groups, but I think that within the military, as in business life, there will come to pass an increased awareness of the fact that educated, brilliant, experienced managers are running a great deal more of our lives and our world than has been heretofore realized. One day, who knows, perhaps the managerial elite will become organized and become powerful in politics as it has become powerful in economics and in social life. I say who knows, because if anyone had told me 10 years ago I would live to see a strike against the U.S. Government, as we recently had with our post office, I would not have

believed him. Or if anyone had told me that the military itself would be approached from within and without to consider being unionized, again I would have scoffed at him. But it is being suggested now.

In summary, I believe the need for managers will continue to increase. The world has awakened to the fact that managers do not simply manage a going organization. They change organizations, they make things happen, they shape the economic, social, political, and technical course of history. The manager, I would offer you in conclusion, is the most important single ingredient of all enterprise and of progress.

BIOGRAPHIC SUMMARY

Capt. Alexander H. Cornell, SC, U.S. Navy, has had extensive experience in the field of business administration. His degrees include a B.A. from Union College, an M.A. in history from Connecticut University, an M.S. in administration from Ohio State University, and a Ph.D. degree from American University, also in administration. As a supply officer he has served in a variety of administrative positions, including a tour of duty as Director of Warehouse Operations with the Naval Supply Systems Command in Washington, D.C. Captain Cornell served as Plans Officer for the School of Naval Warfare during the last academic year and is presently occupying the James V. Forrestal Chair of Military Management at the Naval War College.

Ψ

EUROPEAN

NAVAL EXPANSION

AND MAHAN, 1889-1906

Much has been written about the influence that Alfred Thayer Mahan had upon naval policy and ship construction of major maritime powers. The author postulates that Mahan's writings largely substantiated policies and strategies already conceived, especially in England and Germany. He reasons that Mahan's greatest influence was with Germany who, at the turn of the century, was in the throes of building an overseas empire.

An article prepared

by

Captain Ronald B. St. John, U.S. Army

Beginning in the latter part of the 19th century, there occurred in Europe an unprecedented expansion in naval forces. The new European naval expansion took the form of an uncritical demand for seapower and sparked the greatest warship building boom in history. A comparison of Europe's fleets in 1900 and 1914 graphically illustrates the expansion which took place.[1]

The impetus for this phenomenal expansion was closely rooted in the tenor of the time—Social Darwinism, imperialism, and militarism. To be great, a state had to have a colonial empire; and to have a colonial empire, it had to

EFFECTIVE FIGHTING SHIPS, COMPLETED—1900

	Great Britain	France	Russia	Germany
Battleships	45	33	17	12
Cruisers	126	38	14	20
Torpedo-Gunboats	34	21	9	4
	205	92	40	36

EFFECTIVE FIGHTING SHIPS, COMPLETED—1914

	Great Britain	France	Germany	Russia	Austria-Hungary
Battleships	68	21	37	8	11
Cruisers	110	30	48	14	7
Destroyers	218	83	142	105	19
Torpedo-Boats	70	153	47	25	58
Submarines	76	70	27	25	10
	542	357	301	177	105

have a great battle fleet, whether or not the state could afford or even use it.

Such reasoning found considerable inspiration in *The Influence of Sea Power upon History* published in 1890 by an American naval officer, Alfred Thayer Mahan. According to Mahan, seapower had three inseparable links: internal development and production, peaceful shipping, and overseas colonies. For Mahan, an essential element of a successful naval policy was the maintenance of naval stations in the distant parts of the world so that armed shipping could follow the vessels of commerce. "Colonies attached to the mother-country afford, therefore, the surest means of supporting abroad the sea power of a country."[2]

The fact that Mahan was writing during the era of naval expansion in Europe, coupled with the adoption of many European nations of a rationale similar to that of Mahan, has left many historians in doubt as to the exact role that the teachings of Mahan played in initiating and stimulating European naval expansion. An excellent example of the somewhat widespread confusion is the conclusion reached by Capt. Russell Grenfell, R.N.: "Whatever may have been the influences leading to a possible war between Germany and France, the conclusion cannot be avoided that the publication of Mahan's books on sea power played an important part in bringing on the war between Germany and Britain."[3] Even so eminent a scholar as Charles C. Taylor has written: "... careful examination of the works of distinguished writers on the subject leads irresistibly to the conclusion that Mahan's teachings were primarily responsible for the transformation which took place in the naval policy of Germany shortly after the publication of the Sea Power series."[4] Both of these authors are rather typical in that they emphasized the supposed influence of Mahan on European naval expansion but did not differentiate between

Mahan's writing serving as a catalyst and for justification, as opposed to being responsible for the initiation of the growth of navies. The period of naval expansion between 1889, when the British two-power formula was adopted, and 1906 is an era of vibrant naval policy and construction that does shed light on Mahan's influence on naval policies of the time. By 1906 the stage was set, and the great powers could do little to halt the expansion in naval forces even when they tried to do so in 1912.

Great Britain and Germany were the principal antagonists in the dramatic pre-World War I naval expansion. France was of interest only because the French *Jeune Ecole* exemplified the strategic and tactical confusion prevalent in European naval circles at the turn of the last century.

The industrial revolution had a great effect on armies, but it had an even greater effect on navies. The introduction in the middle decades of the 19th century of iron ships, armor, steam, big guns, and torpedoes had revolutionary consequences on naval strategy and tactics. The high point of the resulting strategical and tactical confusion was reached in the 1880's when the French *Jeune Ecole* and its disciples in other states argued that the new torpedo boats had made battleships obsolete. It was maintained that the wars of the mid-19th century had shown the command of the sea to be almost useless.

At the height of the torpedo-boat craze, Germany, Russia, and Austria-Hungary terminated battleship construction while the British Admiralty felt obligated to apologize to Parliament for completing those battleships already under construction.[5] In 1886 the House of Commons was told that the battleships being built might be the last to be added to the Royal Navy. In the same year, Admiral Théophile Aube, the leader of the *Jeune Ecole* and the French Minister of Marine, stopped all

French construction of battleships and put the money into torpedo boats and cruiser construction.[6]

The decline, particularly in Great Britain and Germany, of the doctrines of the *Jeune École* may be dated by two events: the British Naval Defense Act of 1889 and the publication in 1890 of *The Influence of Sea Power upon History*. Of these two events, the enactment by the British of a Naval Defense Act in 1889 is the more significant benchmark for the decline of the theories advocated by *Jeune École*. The Naval Defense Act appropriated large sums of money for the purpose of raising the British fleet to a two-power standard of equality with the combined fleets of Russia and France. The other European powers soon followed suit, and the race was on. France, for example, attempted to establish and maintain a standard equal to the Triple Alliance (Germany, Italy, and Austria-Hungary).[7]

The theories presented in *The Influence of Sea Power upon History*, when it first appeared in 1890, also signaled the decline of the doctrine of the *Jeune École*. Mahan argued that a state had to have a large fleet in order to have a successful naval policy, and the acceptance of this theory meant the rejection of the doctrine of the *Jeune École*. In was the British Naval Act of 1889, however, and not the publication of *The Influence of Sea Power upon History* which started the naval race in Europe. Mahan was not the instigator of the naval race; but as will be seen, his theories coincided with those prevalent in Europe at the time; and, therefore, the Europeans later used his writings to justify their expansion of naval forces.

In 1890 France was the second greatest naval power in the world, and because of this, one would naturally have expected Mahan's thesis to have attracted some attention in that country. While this was the case, the theories presented in *The Influence of Sea Power*

upon History never attained the popularity among French political and military leaders that they were destined to achieve in Britain and Germany. This assertion can be justified by comparing the types of ships completed by France, Britain, and Germany between 1900 and 1914. Because Mahan's theories were never as popular in France as they were in Great Britain and Germany, attention will be paid to the factors behind the expansion of British and German naval forces after 1889.

A number of interrelated factors led to the British adoption of the two-power standard embodied in the Naval Defense Act of 1889. In 1888 there were six great powers in Europe. Three were in one camp—the Triple Alliance: Germany, Italy, and Austria Hungary—two in another—France and Russia—and England stood aloof, though splendid isolation was more a principle than a commanding policy. In essence, Britain's policy rested on the time-honored maxims of naval supremacy and balance-of-power. With an eye to the increasing cordiality between Russia and France, the first maxim was defined in 1889 by the Two-Power Standard. Under this policy, the strength of the British Navy was to be elevated to and maintained at a level stronger than the combined strength of the two strongest continental naval powers—at the time, Russia and France.

In the decade after 1889, the rapprochement between Russia and France was an ever-present reason for English naval expansion because of the strategic problems it caused the Royal Navy. The October 1893 visit of the Russian fleet to Toulon was followed by a decision to establish permanently a Russian squadron in the Mediterranean. This move threatened to upset the whole world balance of seapower and checkmate England in all parts of the world. At the time the Royal Navy was only slightly larger than the combined fleets of France and Russia. So far as the

Mediterranean was concerned, the French force outnumbered the British squadron; and, in addition, the fine French base at Toulon was far superior to the British base at Gibraltar. With the establishment of a Russian squadron in the Mediterranean, the British squadron could hardly be expected to hold its own against the combined fleets and certainly could not prevent the Russian Black Sea Fleet from blasting through the Dardanelles Strait and entering the Mediterranean.

By the second maxim of foreign policy, the balance of power, England meant to oppose at once, by diplomacy or by war, any continental power so strong and so potentially hostile as to threaten her security through a domination of the European Continent. Given the relatively small size and strength of the British Army, the survival of this maxim was also dependent on a strong navy.

To ensure her security in the face of such threats, England once again turned to the two-power standard. This two-power standard of naval strength, which was to dominate British policy between 1889 and 1904, was as old as the time of the Earl of Chatham (1770) and was rediscovered by Cobden and others after the Crimean War. It was officially adopted by England on 7 March 1889. On that day Lord George Hamilton, the First Sea Lord, concluded that the idea underlying the speeches of all first sea lords and prime ministers had been "that our establishment should be on such a scale that it should at least be equal to the naval strength of any two other countries."[8]

Along with matters of security, throughout the ages trade protection had been a *raison d'etre* for British seapower. In the late 19th century, this factor assumed crucial importance because of the increasing need to import foodstuffs and the materials needed for industry. In order to maintain her industries, feed her rapidly growing popula-

tion, and equip her armies, it was imperative for England to keep her trade lanes open.[9]

A final factor to be considered in an examination of British naval expansion is the role of the armaments manufacturers. It is impossible to measure this factor in any quantitative manner, but it must be mentioned because of the importance attached to it by some writers when attempting to ascertain the causes for World War I. It has already been noted that the drive for imperialist gains and the needs of national and imperial defense were the major motivating forces behind English naval expansion at the turn of the century. Therefore, armament manufacturers were in no sense the originators of English naval expansion, but they certainly encouraged and propagated the idea that Great Britain needed to increase its naval forces. "They supplied one more basic motive, the desire for gain. So far as the origins of pre-war English navalism go, though not the prime factor, the industry played a prominent secondary role."[10]

From the discussion thus far, we see that British naval expansion at the turn of the century was both offensive and defensive in character. The age was dominated by imperialist thought; and for Great Britain, a strong navy was the only way to ensure herself that she would reap her share of the fruits to be derived from territorial expansion in non-European areas. A consequence of this race for overseas trade, raw materials, and empire was an increasing embroilment of the European nations. For example, as Germany increased the size of its fleet and concentrated it in home waters, British observers began to wonder as to the place of the German fleet in future German foreign policy. In England, as elsewhere, the increase in the size of the German fleet led to increasing concern for the needs of national and imperial defense just as the increase in the size of the English fleet

prompted Germany and other nations to expand their navies.

English naval expansion was also influenced in its later stages by the young and ardent reformers who began to crystallize around Adm. Sir John Fisher after 1899. In 1904-1905, the original two-power standard was revised.[11] The revised standard, a product of Fisher's return to the Admiralty, called for an additional 10 percent margin. England was to maintain a superiority in battleships of at least 10 percent over each of the most likely combinations—Germany and Russia, and France and Russia.[12]

As we have seen, by the time Mahan's *The Influence of Sea Power upon History* first appeared in 1890, the British Admiralty through the Naval Defense Act of 1889 was already fully engaged in an augmented and accelerated shipbuilding program. The program was begun in the spring of 1889; but as early as December 1888, the *London Times* had declared: "A new era of naval rivalry seems to have begun."[13] In support of his naval plan, Lord Hamilton, Spencer's predecessor, called attention to the building programs of the leading powers of Europe and concluded that England must choose between increased naval expenditure and decreased security. The British Parliament voted the increase.

From the above, it seems impossible to conclude other than that Mahan's writing played no role in initiating the pre-World War I European naval expansion which began with Britain's adoption of the Naval Defense Act of 1889. The only book that Mahan published before 1890 was a work entitled *The Gulf and Inland Waters*, and nothing in that text foreshadows the books on seapower. Furthermore, there is no evidence in the various biographies of Mahan or the innumerable works dealing with European naval expansion to suggest that any important European naval officers attended the lectures of

Mahan before 1890 and transported his gospel of naval power to Great Britain or the Continent. This conclusion is further strengthened by the fact that the exchange of naval officers for study between the United States and Europe was not a common practice before World War I. The *History of the United States Naval War College*, prepared at the Naval War College, states that 1894 was the first year that foreign students attended the 4-month course.[14]

Mahan's role in the vast array of factors promoting British naval expansion was the role of a catalytic agent. By 1890 there was already beginning that renewed competition in navies and colonial possessions which was to play such a crucial and tragic role in the international relations of the next 30 years. The role of Mahan, through *The Influence of Sea Power upon History* and through his numerous later works, was to supply the justification for British policies already adopted or contemplated. In 1890 and 1891, when the British Government was attempting to justify the decisions that were made in 1888 and 1889, Mahan's clear exposition was welcomed as sound history and more. It became almost a campaign handbook for the advocates of a two-power standard for the British fleet. In this regard Mahan's work was a real boon to the advocates of increased British seapower. While clarifying their own ideas, it helped them to answer the arguments of the many army officers and civilians who were pressing for an elaborate system of defenses along the British coast.

Germany formally entered the European naval race when the Reichstag passed the first Navy Law in April 1898; but Wilhelm II, the grandson of Queen Victoria, had been fascinated by navies, the Royal Navy in particular, since his childhood. In his frequent boyhood trips to England, he had spent considerable time at the Portsmouth Dockyard and on board British ships. The

fact that these early impressions left their mark on him is aptly demonstrated by the entire chapter he devoted to "Naval Memories" in *My Early Life.*[15] Wilhelm II later commented: "When I came to the throne I attempted to reproduce on a scale commensurate with the resources and interests of my country that [the Royal Navy] which made such a deep impression on my mind when I saw it as a young man in England."[16]

Wilhelm's early interest in naval affairs was later to mesh well with the new imperialism of the late 19th century. For the most part, opportunities for expansion on the Continent of Europe were exhausted. Reflecting on this, Wilhelm II came to feel that the future of Germany lay in overseas colonialization. While Britain remained supreme at sea, however, any empire which Germany could found across the sea must be held in fee of her. Wilhelm II concluded, "the trident must be in our fist."[17]

"Our German Empire," Wilhelm II said in January 1896, "has become a world-empire. Thousands of German people live in all parts of the earth, and German products, German knowledge, and German industry go out across the ocean. To you falls the earnest duty of binding firmly this greater Germany to the Germany at home." "Everyday," he said at Potsdam in December 1902, "shows afresh that a prosperous development of the country without a corresponding operation of its sea power is unthinkable."[18]

As Wilhelm II suggested, Germany felt compelled by economic necessities, population increases, and the need for outlets for her enterprise and commerce to expand beyond the boundaries of her own frontiers. These reasons are very similar to those expressed by the British to justify their expansion; and the similarity is very significant to this study since it indicates that naval expansion in general, and in Germany in particular,

was not the product of any one man, but rather reflected the tenor of the time—imperialism, militarism, and Social Darwinism. The idea that a European nation had a right to colonies and needed a navy to protect them was widely accepted in Europe. As late as 1909, the Englishman John Leyland wrote in *Brassey's Naval Annual* that German naval policy, " . . . is based upon the ground of national necessity, and upon those unquenchable impulses which have driven other countries in the same circumstances to seek outlets for their energies and fields for their enterprise in countries outside their own . . . "[19]

German naval expansion also received a boost from the political events which took place in South Africa in the middle of the 1890's. These events proved to be quite significant since they awakened the German people to the importance of a strong navy. On 3 January 1896, Emperor Wilhelm II sent a telegram to President Kruger congratulating him on his suppression of the Jameson raid. The result was a deterioration of Anglo-German relations while Germany remained in a position where she could do nothing to aid the Boers. Yet from the point of view of German naval enthusiasts, the telegram had very useful consequences. The inability of Germany to influence the South African situation was taken as an object lesson in the importance of seapower. The mobilization of a British flying squadron drove this lesson home. After 1896, the German Government used the hostility toward England expressed during the South African incident as a fulcrum in its push for a shipbuilding program.[20]

Another factor of some importance in explaining German naval expansion was the failure of the British Government in 1897 to renew the Anglo-German commercial treaties of 1862 and 1865. Instead, the British sought a new treaty in terms of the "most-

favored nation." The Emperor immediately visualized prospective ruin for German trade and concluded that Germany must build a strong fleet without delay.[21]

While the accession of Wilhelm II to the throne on 15 June 1888 promised the opening of a new era for the German fleet, the German Navy was not the arbitrary creation of one man. The enlargement and modernization of the German fleet prior to World War I can be directly traced to two men, Wilhelm II and his Naval Minister, Adm. Alfred von Tirpitz. Through the efforts of these two men and over the protests of the Reichstag and the Bundesrat, Germany was able to attain a position of naval strength and potency among the maritime nations.

Von Tirpitz had made up his mind in regard to the battleship-cruiser controversy as early as 1891. In that year he had drawn up a memorandum emphasizing the importance of developing a battle fleet and a system of tactics suitable for naval warfare on the open sea. In 1892 Von Tirpitz was called to the *Oberkomando* in Berlin. It was here that he composed the document which "converted the Emperor to the plan of building a battlefleet."[22]

After the appointment of Alfred von Tirpitz as Minister of Marine in January 1897, German naval expansion entered a new and vitalized phase. He knew the German limitations thoroughly and had the ability to present both clearly and effectively his arguments for a battleship fleet. Furthermore, he appears to have been one of the best politicians in the German Navy at the time. In the end much of the credit for the German fleet of 1914 must revert to this man.

In April 1898 the Reichstag passed the first Navy Law affecting the strength of the modern Imperial German Navy. This law was largely the consequence of the South African incident and the appointment of Von Tirpitz. The crucial importance of the

1898 German Navy Law was that it put an end to uncertainty and instability and to the building of vessels for the single purpose of coast defense. The battleship-cruiser controversy was over with Germany deciding to follow England's lead in the construction of battleships.

The 1898 Navy Law embodied three of Von Tirpitz's principles: an automatic regulation of the obsolescence and replacement of ships; the principle of fixing a definite establishment of ships, officers, and men, to be reached and maintained, and with this a legal enactment of the conditions in which ships are to be kept in commission; and the principle of risk. Von Tirpitz's risk theory was described in a memorandum accompanying the proposed Fleet Law of 1900:

> To protect Germany's sea-trade and colonies, in the existing circumstances there is only one means: Germany must have a battle-fleet so strong that, even for the adversary with the greatest sea-power, a war against it would involve such dangers as to imperil his position in the world.
>
> For this purpose, it is not absolutely necessary that the German battle-fleet should be as strong as that of the greatest naval power, because a great naval power will not, as a rule, be in a position to concentrate all his striking forces against us. But even if it should succeed in meeting us with considerable superiority, the defeat of a strong German fleet would so substantially weaken the enemy that, in spite of a victory he might have obtained, his own position in the world would no longer be secured by an adequate fleet.[23]

Again and again, Von Tirpitz emphasized the political bargaining power a

fleet would bring to Germany. He maintained that Britain would make concessions to Germany rather than risk a war that would leave her too weak to face the Franco-Russian alliance. Conversely, if war broke out between Britain and Russia and France, an enlarged navy would leave Germany with the balance of naval power and thus increase her alliance value.

On 14 June 1900, Von Tirpitz submitted a new program of naval expansion to the Reichstag. According to this New Navy Law, by 1920 the German fleet was to consist of 38 battleships, 14 armored cruisers, 34 third-class cruisers, and 96 destroyers. The Reichstag passed additional Fleet Laws after 1900, but the 1900 Navy Law remained Von Tirpitz's major achievement. Later British attempts to halt the naval race were always answered by the bland statement that the German Government was legally committed to an expansion of her navy.[24]

Of all the European states, it was in Germany that Mahan was destined to have the greatest influence. The German Emperor found many of his vague concepts and aspirations crystallized on the pages of *The Influence of Sea Power upon History*. On 26 May 1894, Wilhelm II wrote: "I am just now, not reading but devouring Mahan's book; and am trying to learn it by heart. It is a first-class book and classical in all points. It is on board all my ships and constantly quoted by my Captains and officers."[25]

It was evidence such as this which led Charles C. Taylor to conclude that Mahan's teachings were primarily responsible for the change in German naval policy which occurred under Wilhelm II.[26] Given the early interest of Wilhelm II in naval affairs and the important role in German naval expansion played by Admiral Von Tirpitz, however, it would appear that writers, such as C.C. Taylor, tend to over-emphasize the influence of Mahan.

Although Mahan may have crystallized the ideas of Wilhelm II and Von Tirpitz and certainly furnished fodder for propaganda guns promoting German naval expansion, both Wilhelm II and Von Tirpitz had been contemplating a change in naval policy for several years before 1890. The same factors which prompted Great Britain to expand its naval forces were also at work on Germany.

It is possible that Mahan may have influenced Von Tirpitz more than he influenced Wilhelm II, but the exact amount of influence is difficult to measure. The tendency has been for writers to make rather bold statements concerning Mahan's influence on Von Tirpitz without providing much in the way of substantiating data. For example, concerning Von Tirpitz's 1891 memorandum, Hurd and Castle state that its fundamental principles were a reversal of those of his predecessor, "for it was based on the idea, probably adopted from Mahan, that battleships alone are the decisive factors in naval warfare."[27] Yet they give no evidence to suggest why the reader should conclude that Mahan's publication influenced Von Tirpitz's rejection of cruiser warfare.

In his autobiography *My Memoirs*, Von Tirpitz asserted that he reached his tactical and strategic conclusions independently of Mahan. "Whilst we were discovering these things quite empirically on the small practice-ground by Kiel Bay, the American Admiral Mahan was simultaneously evolving them theoretically from history, and when I made the acquaintance of his book later, I drew his attention to this extraordinary coincidence."[28] Exactly where the truth lies is almost impossible to ascertain. While it is quite possible that Von Tirpitz reached his conclusions independently of the writings of Mahan, it is difficult to accept *My Memoirs* wholeheartedly because of the sometimes exaggerated nature of the analysis.

In retrospect, Von Tirpitz had a tendency to occasionally exaggerate his powers of self-perception and his role in the whole process of German naval expansion. At the same time, no concrete evidence has come to light which definitely proves that Von Tirpitz took any or all his ideas from Admiral Mahan.

At any rate, it is impossible to conclude other than that Mahan influenced German naval expansion much more than he affected the growth of the Royal Navy after 1888. The publication in 1890 of *The Influence of Sea Power upon History* stirred Wilhelm's lifelong interest in navies and added strength to the efforts begun in 1888 to increase and modernize the German Navy. Throughout the decade from 1890 to 1900, Mahan's principles were cited again and again in support of German naval expansion, especially by the German Navy League. Mahan's clear, concise presentation had a definite influence on the shipbuilding programs of both England and Germany; but it had a greater influence on German naval expansion, probably because Germany lacked the strong naval tradition which England had cultivated for over 300 years.

Mahan's weakness as a historian lay in his critical acceptance of the Social Darwinist view of international politics. At the same time, his acceptance of the popular views of international politics, race, and imperialism may partly explain the great influence he was to have in his own time.[29] His interpretation of national history, which linked seapower with national greatness and imperialism with seapower, strengthened the economic and political events which were encouraging the growth of European navies at the end of the 19th century. Accelerated naval expansion in turn fostered and supported the growth of additional imperialism which came full circle by quickening the pace of naval construction.

However, to hold Mahan's writings responsible for European naval expansion after 1888 would be to overlook other forces which would have resulted in naval expansion even in the absence of Admiral Mahan. European naval expansion at the turn of the last century had its roots in the wave of imperialism which swept over the Continent in the 1880's. To remain a great power, a state had to secure colonial possessions; and to take and hold colonies, it had to have a strong navy. In such an age the principles of Mahan were predestined to receive a warm welcome; but the age and its ideas did not originate with the publication of *The Influence of Sea Power upon History*. Admiral Mahan did not bring new ideas to England, Germany, and some of the other European countries; but the theories set forth in his writings crystallized and clarified old ideas. Moreover, his writings appeared at precisely the time the Europeans needed them to justify their naval increases.

BIOGRAPHIC SUMMARY

Capt. Ronald Bruce St. John, U.S. Army, did his undergraduate work in political science at Knox College and earned an M.A. (1969) and Ph.D. (1970) in international relations from the Graduate School of International Studies, University of Denver. His primary academic research and interest has been American politics; and he spent 1968 in Lima, Peru—under the Shell Fellowship for Research in a Developing Area—researching Peruvian foreign policy. Captain St. John is currently serving with the intelligence section, Headquarters, Military Assistance Command, Vietnam.

FOOTNOTES

1. Figures taken from *Brassey's Naval Annual* (Portsmouth, Eng.: Griffin, 1900), p. 62-80; *Brassey's Naval Annual* (London: Clowes, 1914), p. 66-83.

2. Alfred T. Mahan, *The Influence of Sea Power upon History* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1895), p. 83.

3. Russell Grenfell, *Sea Power* (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, Doran, 1941), p. 11.

4. Charles C. Taylor, *The Life of Admiral Mahan* (New York: George H. Doran, 1920), p. 133.

5. Theodore Ropp, "Continental Doctrines of Sea Power," Edward M. Earle, ed., *Makers of Modern Strategy* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1944), p. 447. This is by far the best brief description of this aspect of the problem yet available.

6. Theodore Ropp, *War in the Modern World* (Durham: Duke University Press, 1959), p. 190.

7. *Ibid.*, p. 191.

8. Quoted in Arthur J. Marder, *From the Dreadnought to Scapa Flow* (London: Oxford University Press, 1961), p. 125.

9. *Ibid.*, p. 4-6.

10. Arthur J. Marder, *The Anatomy of British Sea Power* (New York: Knopf, 1940), p. 43. See p. 24-43 for a fuller discussion of this factor of English naval expansion.

11. Marder, *Dreadnought*, p. 11-12. See p. 12 for the reforms initiated by Fisher.

12. *Ibid.*, p. 123.

13. Quoted in William D. Puleston, *Mahan* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1939), p. 106.

14. U.S. Naval War College, *History of the United States Naval War College, 1884-1963* (Newport, R.I.: 1963), p. 4, 57.

15. Wilhelm II, *My Early Life* (London: Methuen, 1926), p. 218-228.

16. Archibald Hurd and Henry Castle, *German Sea-Power* (London: Murray, 1913), p. 98.

17. Gerald Fiennes, *Sea Power and Freedom* (New York: Putnam, 1918), p. 256-257.

18. John Leyland, "The Spirit of the German Navy Law," *Brassey's Naval Annual* (Portsmouth, Eng.: Griffin, 1913), p. 154-155.

19. John Leyland, "The Naval Expansion of Germany," *Brassey's Naval Annual* (Portsmouth, Eng.: Griffin, 1909), p. 125.

20. E.L. Woodward, *Great Britain and the German Navy* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1935), p. 23-24.

21. Ropp, "Continental Doctrines," p. 447.

22. Woodward, p. 23.

23. Quoted in Fiennes, p. 259.

24. Ropp, *War*, p. 194.

25. Taylor, p. 131.

26. *Ibid.*, p. 133.

27. Hurd and Castle, p. 196.

28. Alfred von Tirpitz, *My Memoirs* (New York: Dodd, Mead, 1919), v. I, p. 72.

29. Ropp, *War*, p. 191-192.

———————— ψ ————————

The capture of the U.S.S. "Pueblo" by a third-rate power provoked an internal conflict between the forces of domestic public opinion and the U.S. Navy. Public sentiment, as reflected in news accounts, editorials, letters, and congressional statements, had a significant effect on the behavior of Navy officials dealing with the problem. The apparent public hostility during the Court of Inquiry was possibly a factor in determining final disposition by the Navy. A recognition and analysis of the factors contributing to public hostility toward the Navy suggest the inevitability of the public opinion crisis over the "Pueblo" affair and its outcome.

THE PUEBLO CRISIS

AND PUBLIC OPINION

A research paper prepared

by

Lieutenant Commander William A. Armbruster, U.S. Navy

School of Naval Command and Staff

INTRODUCTION

Public opinion has historically been a potent force to be reckoned with in American political history. On the military scene, however, its influence and impact have been less easily discernible. Public support for the Armed Forces, though subject to periods of stress, has generally remained loyal and steadfast. During the past few years there has been a clearly discernible shift in the climate of public opinion, and the military services find themselves increasingly confined by the pressures of capricious public sentiment. For the Navy, the *Pueblo* incident dramatically reflected the shift.

The purpose of this paper is to examine the *Pueblo** crisis from a public relations perspective, to determine those factors which contributed to public hostility toward the Navy, and to determine what effect hostile public opinion had on the Navy's handling and eventual disposition of the case.

The paper is not concerned with the merits of the issues involved except to the extent that they influenced or affected public opinion and vice versa.

---

*Constructed as a U.S. Army cargo vessel in 1944, the *Pueblo* (AGER 2) was converted to an auxiliary general environmental research vessel in 1967 and was captured on its first mission on 23 January 1968.

Commander Bucher is given a principal role in this study, as indeed he must. The paper is not concerned with trying to second-guess his decisions or actions nor those of other Navy and Government officials. It is concerned with the effect such decisions, actions, or statements may have had on the American public.

BACKGROUND

Neither the fury of battle, the anguish of a mortal wound, nor the horrors of approaching death could subdue his gallant spirit. His last words were "Don't give up the Ship."[1]

On 1 June 1813, Captain Lawrence uttered those five immortal words as he lay dying aboard the American frigate, U.S.S. *Chesapeake* following a losing battle with H.M.S. *Shannon.* Six years earlier the crew of H.M.S. *Leopard* had boarded the *Chesapeake,* the last American naval vessel to surrender in peacetime—the last until 23 January 1968, when a U.S. naval auxiliary, U.S.S. *Pueblo* (AGER 2) surrendered to a North Korean boarding party. No single event since Pearl Harbor has had such a profound effect on the U.S. Navy. Nothing in recent memory has so aroused the emotions and confused the mind as the story of U.S.S. *Pueblo.*

In considering the crisis and its relationship to public opinion, it is necessary to keep in mind the unique role of public opinion in a democracy. Harold Lasswell reminds us that the "level of democratic attainment depends upon public opinion, and that opinion, like democratic government itself, is a social variable of ever shifting scope, direction and intensity of expression."[2]

The *Pueblo* crisis is considered by the author to be a significant indicator of a fundamental shift in American public opinion. Supporting this belief is the contention by many Americans that had the *Pueblo* incident occurred 20 years

earlier, the outcome would have been "different." Obviously such a statement cannot be proven; however, what is implied is a belief that, given the national mood or sentiment of the period shortly after World War II, the piracy of the *Pueblo* was unlikely. If it had occurred, the national response would have been swift and unmistakable. Further, had an American naval vessel surrendered without a fight, courts-martial for those responsible for the surrender would have seemed a certainty.

The *Pueblo* crisis dramatically illustrates the dilemma the Navy faces in dealing with a hostile public and thus provides the vehicle for this analysis. The paper is concerned with public opinion as reflected in the Nation's news media and statements of elected officials. The fundamental question posed concerns the restraints imposed by public sentiment and pressure upon the Navy's disposition of the case.

Despite the advent of other news media such as radio and television, the Nation's press continues to play a major role in molding public opinion. Ideally, bias in the press is limited to the editorial pages. But content studies have established that newspapers tend to favor in the news columns those issues and candidates supported editorially. Through the use of sensational headlines and emotional picture words, the press can convert "objective" news reporting into a partisan viewpoint. This technique was used extensively by the press during the *Pueblo* crisis and must be credited with a major contribution in portraying the Navy as the oppressor and the *Pueblo* crew as the oppressed.

THE CAPTURE AND RESPONSE

1411 *Pueblo* sent, . . . sure could use some help now.

1412 *Kamiseya* sent, . . . We still with you and doing all we can . . . figure by now Air Force got some birds winging your way.[3]

Military. One fact that surfaced from the Navy's investigation into the *Pueblo* affair was that the entire mission was generally considered to be one of low risk. It appears that the rationale for this assumption was that all nations would observe international law with respect to the right of U.S. ships to traverse the high seas. This faulty assumption is the apparent reason that the Navy neglected to develop a contingency plan to provide for aid to *Pueblo* in the event of an emergency. Thus, when *Pueblo* called for help, there was no help to send—at least in time to be of any assistance.

Incredible as it may seem, the vaunted military power of the United States proved impotent to deal with this crisis. "What the piracy of *Pueblo* did rehearse for the nation—and its adversaries—was a dismaying litany of military procedures and political assumptions that proved in the crunch to be inadequate, unimaginative and unbelievably overconfident."[4]

National. The first messages on the *Pueblo's* difficulty arrived in Washington shortly before midnight Sunday, 22 January, approximately one-half hour before the *Pueblo* was boarded. The President received word of the incident around 0200 on the 23d. At 0830 that morning the Pentagon made the first public disclosure of the incident and candidly described the vessel as an AGER utilized for intelligence collection.[5]

The national reaction proved predictable and followed the usual crisis pattern of response American Presidents have resorted to since the advent of the cold war. The White House, in an effort to underline the urgency of the situation and thereby stimulate public opinion, ordered a partial mobilization of the Reserves. Some 14,787 Navy and Air Force reservists were called to active duty.[6] The Navy responded by sending a carrier task force to the crisis area. *Enterprise* was diverted from her Tonkin Gulf destination and directed north into the Sea of Japan. "Admiral Hyland, Commander in Chief of the Pacific Fleet, notified the Seventh Fleet to position units off Wonsan in international waters . . . to provide air coverage and prepare to recover or tow the *Pueblo*."[7] The White House also directed Ambassador Goldberg, U.S. Representative to the United Nations, to bring the matter to the attention of the Security Council. Thus, the Nation was now ready to deal with the situation as demands for action issued forth from the Halls of Congress and elsewhere across the land. Congressional reaction generally followed predictable lines, with those usually identified with conservative and hawkish positions demanding a quick military response, while those more disposed to a liberal image counseled restraint. To be sure, however, there were significant defections from both sides. Senator Richard B. Russell, Chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee, said that the action was "A breach of international law amounting to an act of war . . . it certainly behooves our Government to take a very strong position in demanding release of the ship and return of the men."[8]

Representative Bob Wilson, a member of the House Armed Services Committee, in calling for recovery of the ship and crew, stated that "If this means sending in military and naval forces, including air cover, it must be done—and done at once."[9]

Senator Strom Thurmond recommended to the President that the United States deliver "the North Koreans an ultimatum that the *Pueblo* will be retaken by force if it is not delivered within a specified period of time."[10]

Somewhat surprisingly, Senator Frank Church of Idaho called the seizure " . . . act of war against the United

States. The ship must be returned at once, with all Americans aboard. Our national honor is at stake here."[11]

Governor Ronald Reagan of California urged that warships be sent into Wonsan harbor and "get the ship back if it isn't released in twenty-four hours."[12]

On the other side of the debate, moderate voices urged restraint. Senator John Stennis, normally identified as a Senate "hawk," cautioned Americans to "avoid precipitous and rash over-reaction. Despite the anger and resentment we all share, we must proceed without panic."[13]

Senator Mansfield of Montana, in calling for "caution, coolness and restraint," said "any rash action would not only . . . seal the doom of the 83 Americans of the U.S.S. *Pueblo*, it could also bring about another bloody and prolonged involvement in Korea. . . ."[14]

Vietnam critic Senator Fulbright said, "The fact that we are deeply committed in Vietnam undoubtedly contributes to other countries feeling more free than normal from serious retaliation."[15]

The *Pueblo* seizure was similarly tied to Vietnam by Senator Symington who said that the North Korean action "verified the reservations I have had about the degree of our commitment in Vietnam."[16]

President Johnson, concerned over the rising level of emotion, set about to keep it under control. In a meeting with key congressional experts on foreign affairs and atomic energy, he emphasized the need for a calm approach, giving diplomacy every opportunity to work.

In assessing the mood of the United States during the period immediately following the *Pueblo*'s capture, Soviet news accounts are perhaps worthy of note. A *Pravda* dispatch of 25 January described the Washington scene as follows: "Commentators here point out

that the events off the coast will to some extent intensify chauvinist passion among certain segments of the U.S. population . . . as for sober-minded Americans, they do not believe the Pentagon statement that the *Pueblo* was supposedly seized in international waters."[17] *Izvestia* reported from Washington on the same date that: " . . . In order to divert public attention from the U.S.A.'s aggressive actions against the Korean People's Democratic Republic, the American press has raised a provocational uproar. . . ."[18]

Contrary to *Izvestia*, however, the tone of the American press was surprisingly restrained, perhaps unconsciously recalling the U-2 and Bay of Pigs incidents in which American involvement was subsequently revealed, to the embarrassment of the Nation at large. There were exceptions, of course, but a *Wall Street Journal* editorial entitled "The Momentum of Belligerence" reminded its readers that the United States was in "fairly poor shape to wage a new Korean War" and urged moderation.

In an editorial entitled "The *Pueblo* Incident," *The New York Times* said: "Remembering the Gulf of Tonkin, Americans would be wise to keep cool and not leap to conclusions . . . about the North Korean capture of the American naval intelligence ship. . . ."[19] Even among those sectors of the press normally identified with hawkish viewpoints, moderation was urged. For example, the ultraconservative Blackstone, Va., *Courier-Record* commented: "The score with North Korea will one day be settled but it is not in U.S. interests right now to be provoked into a war in Korea. . . ."[20]

In reviewing the Nation's response immediately after the *Pueblo*'s capture, one senses an attempt to react in the classic manner of another era. The surprising fact though is how rapidly this indignant, belligerent attitude dissipated, or at least was directed into

other channels. To be sure, there were the hardliners who remained unmoved in their desire for positive action right up to the release of the *Pueblo*'s crew, but this element, if not silent, at least appeared to be in the minority. Adm. Daniel Gallery, USN (Ret.) has written a rather volatile and emotional book on the *Pueblo* incident in which he describes the *Pueblo* case an "an ominous symptom of decay in our national character."[21] Alan L. Otten, in a *Wall Street Journal* article, suggests, however, that the response is a sign of national maturity:

> Perhaps, the United States, after decades of almost adolescent confidence in its infinite ability to shape and reshape conditions at home and abroad, is beginning to comprehend the confines of power. This long delayed maturing results, at least in part, from the nation's Vietnam involvement; it is an unexpected but valuable by-product of the war.[22]

Whether character decay, national maturity, or whatever term is used, as a Nation we seemed preoccupied with other things.

Public frustration is shown in the results of polls taken by the American Institute of Public Opinion (Gallup) and Lou Harris in early February 1968. The Gallup poll sampling indicated Americans would like to make the North Koreans back down; while at the same time they were fearful of military involvement. Gallup revealed that four out of 10 Americans favored using force, if necessary, to get the ship back.

The Harris poll, on the other hand, showed that, of those polled, 76 percent believed that a prisoner exchange should be negotiated with North Korea. The Harris survey also showed that 58 percent of the public believed the crisis would be peacefully settled. "It is clear," the Harris survey pointed out, "that the American people are prepared to back military action in Korea, but they do not feel the *Pueblo* incident justifies another war."[23]

Gallup poll (completed 6 February 1968)[24]

1. "Do you think the present North Korea situation is likely to lead to war or not?"

   Results:
Is likely	45%
Is not	40%
No opinion	15%

2. "What, in your opinion, should the U.S. do in regard to this situation?"

   Results:
Get the Ship back—use force if necessary	40%
Negotiate as at present	21
Negotiate to a point—then use force	6
Too late now—should have taken ship back earlier	3
Declare war against North Korea; other extreme "hawkish" comments	3
Apologize for spying	2
No opinion	20
Other responses	5
	100%

3. "What do you think are the main reasons behind North Korea's action?"

Results:

Diversionary tactic	29%
Communist plan; Russia, Red China are behind action	29
Harassment	13
Thought we were spying	3
Other responses	9
No opinion	22
	105%

(Note: table adds to more than 100% because of multiple answers.)

4. "Do you approve or disapprove of the way President Johnson is handling the North Korea situation?"

Results:

Approve	46%
Disapprove	33
No opinion	21
	100%

As with any poll, diverse conclusions can be drawn from the results of both these surveys. To this observer the results suggest national frustration rather than national maturity. While there was no clear mandate for massive retaliation to avenge the national honor, there definitely was no sentiment for acquiescence. Within a short time span the American public faced a number of minicrises: Khe Sanh, the Vietcong Tet offensive, a lost H-bomb over Greenland, and civic violence. It seems likely that aggressive instincts of the majority were diverted by concern over these other problems as well.

IMPRISONMENT

While the Government continued to seek the release of the *Pueblo* and her crew through diplomatic channels, the American public began to ask agonizing questions regarding the events surrounding *Pueblo* and demanded forthright answers. From the outset, the Defense Department assumed a defensive position from which it never quite recovered. Initially, there were press reports that Commander Bucher had made a number of calls for help, but the Department of Defense (DOD) quickly responded by saying these reports were wrong.[25] The questions concerning the lack of timely response received vague and often contradictory answers, but the Pentagon response was that "time and distance factors made it impossible to respond to the call that was made when the ship was being boarded."[26]

During a "Meet the Press" television broadcast on 4 February 1968, Defense Secretary McNamara was asked why the *Pueblo* could be captured so easily and why it wasn't better protected. McNamara replied: " . . . first, to have protected it would have been a provocative act. Secondly, it would have compromised the mission . . . . And finally, the protection itself always runs the risk of leading to military escalation."[27] In responding to a question as to why we failed to rescue the *Pueblo* during the hours it took to tow the vessel into Wonsan, the Secretary stated:

. . . First, it was necessary to find out what happened, and it

90   NAVAL WAR COLLEGE REVIEW

takes time . . . . Secondly, we do not maintain contingency plans to prevent the hijacking of each individual American ship operating on the high seas. Thirdly, any reaction force that would have moved into the area would have moved into the air control sectors of the North Korean Air Defense, manned by about 500 aircraft . . . And finally, I think it is quite clear with hindsight that no reaction force could have saved those men.[28]

Other perplexing questions bothering many in the Nation were those to which the answers would have to wait for the crew's release. They, of course, concerned the *Pueblo*'s actions as they were known then.

It appeared at first that Bucher might have been remiss for not having summoned help immediately, for not fighting back, for not scuttling his ship when it was obvious that she was going to be captured and, finally, for not attempting earlier to destroy the gear and intelligence that fell into Communist hands.[29]

Admiral Moorer, in replying to questions concerning Bucher's actions, stated his support for the *Pueblo* skipper: "From what we know Bucher behaved well."[30] Despite this support from the Chief of Naval Operations, many naval officers were disturbed by the events surrounding the *Pueblo*'s capture. Hanson W. Baldwin, the military affairs expert for *The New York Times*, wrote in March that "naval officers were generally shocked that the *Pueblo* had been captured by the enemy without a serious fight and that she had been taken into Wonsan harbor apparently without any attempt by her crew to sink her."[31]

The primary concern of the American public was the release of the crew. As early as 27 January, Senator Mansfield urged the United States to put all questions of fact aside and make any apologies required to free the *Pueblo*'s crew and avert war.[32] Involved in the question of an apology was, of course, the admission on the part of the United States that *Pueblo* did indeed violate North Korean waters. While all available evidence supported the U.S. position, no responsible Government official was ready to state unequivocally that *Pueblo* did not intrude. This reluctance brought forth a a wave of skepticism as journalists and pundits reminded their readers of the so-called credibility gap ascribed to the Johnson administration. Norman Cousins, editor of the liberal *Saturday Review* wrote: "If we are lucky, we may have learned that there is something even more costly than the loss of an electronic-intelligence ship. That is the loss of confidence by the American people in what their government tells them. . . ."[33] The administration, the so-called military-industrial complex, the establishment, all were viewed as involved and the *Pueblo* just one more chink in the armor of American moral invincibility.

The attitude of some seemed to be influenced by the more sinister connotations attached to the *Pueblo*'s intelligence mission. The tendency to view the incident as another abortive intelligence effort undoubtedly was a significant factor in the relative calm which followed the *Pueblo* capture. The public concern became a humanitarian one—do what is necessary to effect the safe return of the *Pueblo* crewmen. The circulation by North Korea of photographs allegedly showing *Pueblo* log entries within North Korean territorial waters prompted *The New York Times* to suggest editorially that the time had come to "introduce greater flexibility into the American position . . . The

chief objective now is to free the *Pueblo* crewmen."[34]

The geographic center of public concern and activity in behalf of the *Pueblo* quite naturally was San Diego. Newspapers in the city were among the most vociferous in demanding action on behalf of the imprisoned crew. One, *The San Diego Union*, daily reminded its readers of the number of days *Pueblo* had remained in captivity. It deplored the lack of response by the Government: "The men still held by the North Koreans, the crew members of the ship, have been let down by their country. The nation has in turn been let down by the present administration."[35]

A 14-year old school girl gained widespread publicity for her efforts to rally support for the *Pueblo* crew. A prayer vigil she organized drew a crowd of 800 persons to San Diego's Balboa Park.[36] Several organizations developed the common goal of putting pressure on the U.S. Government to gain release of the *Pueblo*. The strongest and most vocal operated in the San Diego area with their principal energies directed toward distributing bumper stickers (Remember the *Pueblo*!), gathering signatures on petitions, and writing Senators and Congressmen. The wife of Lt. Comdr. Alan Hemphill, close friend of the Buchers, headed what was described as a nationwide campaign to free the crew. In November, Mrs. Hemphill reported that some 75,000 bumper stickers had been distributed and 25,000 letters had been answered.[37]

In early December, Mrs. Bucher accepted petitions containing 8,500 signatures collected by the 800-member "Release the *Pueblo* Committee" of San Diego. Another group on the west coast known as the "*Pueblo* Committee" reportedly collected some 100,000 signatures which were sent to the President and to members of Congress.[38]

On the east coast a New York-based organization called the "National Committee for Responsible Patriotism" gathered some 500,000 signatures and organized a motorcade to deliver them to President-elect Nixon.[39] Another group calling itself the "Remember the *Pueblo* Committee" was organized by the Reverend Paul Lindstrom, pastor of the Church of Christian Liberty in Prospect Heights, Ill. Little is known about this organization except that it was viewed as a maverick or rump group by those based in the San Diego area. This may have been caused by Lindstrom's peculiar brand of concern for the crewmen. During a television interview, Reverend Lindstrom allegedly declared that national honor required that we get our men back even if they ended up getting killed in the process.[40] Despite the efforts of these groups, however, the *Pueblo* issue remained unresolved as the Government periodically announced that no progress had resulted from the negotiations with the Koreans.

During the summer months when the Nation went through its quadrennial ritual of electing a president, the case of the *Pueblo* became a partisan one, with Republicans avowing that such an act of international piracy would not be condoned by a Republican administration while Democrats generally avoided the issue. Meanwhile, the State Department continued to pursue its quest for release through diplomatic channels, and by the middle of October 1968 there were persistent reports that the release of the crew was imminent. Along with these reports were suggestions that the United States would apologize to the North Koreans, thus conceding a violation by *Pueblo* of North Korean waters. In retrospect, of course, it appears that the Government was using an oft-tried ploy of "leaking" stories to gauge the reaction of the American public.

Apparently, Government officials were satisfied that the step could safely be taken, for on 22 December 1968 the State Department released the following statement: "The crew of the U.S.S.

Pueblo was freed today at Panmunjom. They will immediately be given medical examinations and returned to the United States. Their families will meet them in San Diego. . . . "[41] The statement continued to describe the agreement reached by both sides, including the unprecedented and bizarre admission of guilt by the United States which was promptly repudiated by our negotiator at Panmunjom, General Woodward:

> . . . The position of the United States Government with regard to the *Pueblo*, as consistently expressed in the negotiations at Panmunjom and in public, has been that the ship was not engaged in illegal activity . . . and that we could not apologize for actions which we did not believe took place. The document which I am going to sign was prepared by the North Koreans and is at variance with the above position, but my signature will not and cannot alter the facts. I will sign the document to free the crew and only to free the crew.[42]

Before proceeding with the events attendant to the release, some mention should be made of Defense's plans for this historic occasion. Few events in the recent history of the Defense Department can rival the *Pueblo* crew release in terms of planning; particularly public affairs planning. Many of the plans dealt with contingencies such as releasing the crew at various areas around the globe other than Korea. Others, of course, dealt with the more sensitive aspects relating to the crew's mission and debriefing arrangements. Of particular interest were copies of texts to be used in situations such as briefing for *Pueblo* dependents, newsmen on legal aspects of processing crew members, and canned statements to be used by the official welcoming delegation.

The Navy and DOD each had special *Pueblo* committees designated to handle the myriad problems involved. Richard Fryklund, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs) headed the DOD task force. Capt. William Crowe was *Pueblo* action officer for the Navy. Later, Rear Adm. Leslie J. O'Brien was designated by CNO to answer all queries about the *Pueblo* for the Navy. One of the principal functions of the Fryklund group was to coordinate various plan preparations with the State Department. Capt. Vincent Thomas, at the time Public Affairs Officer for CINCPACFLT, was designated as head of the Command Information Bureau established in San Diego after the release.

Clearly, the extent of preparation and overriding concern for the public affairs aspects demonstrated DOD awareness and understanding of the public's interest and a new maturity in public relations planning. It was obvious to many in the Navy's Information Office, however, that the military position had to be a defensive one. Even then, the mail arriving at the Pentagon portrayed a marked belligerent, anti-Navy tone. While the volume of letters to the Information Office was not particularly heavy,[43] few had sympathy for the military position, and most condemned the lack of support and protection for the *Pueblo*. Thus, great care had to be taken to avoid further inflaming of public sentiment.

THE RELEASE

The manner in which the U.S. Government gained the release of the *Pueblo* crew prompted an initial outburst of editorial disbelief around the country. Critical appraisal, however, soon dissipated as the American people prepared to welcome the crew back from 11 months' imprisonment. *The New York Times* said in an editorial:

> . . . Neither the United States nor North Korea emerges with un-

tarnished honor . . . America's already strained credibility was put deeper in doubt by the bizarre circumstances surrounding the crew's release. The one area in which the United States did distinguish itself, however, was in the Administration's unflagging concern with its humanitarian obligation to put the safety of the men ahead of all considerations of face or political prestige.[44]

Secretary of State Rusk, in defending the action, stated that lengthy negotiations had failed to turn up any other way to effect the crew's return.

At 2130 (c.s.t.), 22 December 1968, Bucher and his crew were released at the bridge marking the dividing line between North and South Korea after almost a year as captives of the North Koreans. Up until the moment of actual release, U.S. officials expressed concern that the North Koreans might at the last minute renege on their part and not release the crew. Only three U.S. military photographers were permitted to record the signing of the agreement, which led to the crew's return, and to be present at the end of the bridge where the crewmembers actually returned to U.S. custody. This was a major point of protest of civilian news media representatives.[45]

Once it began, the transfer proceeded smoothly, and the crew arrived shortly at the U.N. advance camp, approximately 4 miles from Panmunjom. There they were greeted by Gen. Charles H. Bonesteel, III, commander of U.S. and U.N. forces in Korea, and then transported by helicopter to the 121st Army Evacuation Hospital near Seoul for thorough medical examinations. However, prior to his departure for the hospital, and after it was ascertained that he was in good enough condition physically to appear briefly before the press, Commander Bucher held a short press conference. In his initial statement, he attempted to answer one question that was foremost in the minds of many Americans—did *Pueblo* violate North Korean territorial waters?

> . . . that at no time did the U.S.S. *Pueblo* ever intrude into territorial waters of North Korea. We never closed land closer than 13 miles—land or offshore islands. We were attacked on the open seas and we were captured on the open seas. It is pure and simple and plain as that.[46]

The following day, after the crew had received their physical examinations, Rear Adm. Edwin M. Rosenberg, the senior naval officer on the scene and the Navy's official representative, and the commanding officer of the hospital met with the press. At that time Rosenberg, who by now had had the opportunity to meet and talk with each member of the crew, to note their physical condition, and to learn something of their treatment at the hands of the North Koreans, made the following observation: "From what I have seen the last day and a half, I have the utmost admiration for Captain Bucher and his crew . . . These men are heroes as far as I am concerned." At that time he also referred to Bucher as a "hero among heroes."[47] These phrases were not included in the prepared briefing referred to earlier. The text of that brief avoided any sensitive phrasing and generally took a low-key approach, using the phrase "pleased to have you." The remarks made by Admiral Rosenberg were apparently his own. One witness on the scene at the time suggests the admiral made them with regard to the crew's behavior while interned, for one of the striking things about the return was the unexpected preservation of the *Pueblo*'s unit integrity—they were still a crew, and their morale was high. However, as a correspondent for a major daily subsequently noted, Admiral

Rosenberg would not respond to questions concerning the surrender of the ship, stating that he could not answer such questions because he did not want to prejudice the case.[48]

Admiral Rosenberg's remarks were given prominent display on the front pages of newspapers across the Nation and were widely reported in television and radio reports.

While they were at the hospital and on the aircraft bringing them home, Bucher and his crew received a number of briefings. Among other things, these briefings stressed the importance of public affairs but cautioned crewmembers to limit their contact with the news media until the intelligence briefing had taken place. Stress was laid on the tremendous amount of public interest in them in the United States; however, crewmembers were advised that they did not have to participate in interviews at any time if they did not desire to. Crewmembers were also given copies of a DOD directive which spelled out the restrictions regarding information which could be given to the press.

It was to be Navy policy from the outset that the public be made as fully aware as possible of the activities of the crew, limited only by national security considerations and individual rights.

Air Force C-141's bringing the crewmembers back to the States made a brief refueling stop at Midway Island. While there, a small pool of newsmen who had accompanied Adm. John J. Hyland, Pacific Fleet Commander from Hawaii, heard a long statement from Bucher and then were afforded a very brief opportunity to question him. The last question of the conference was "Why didn't you fire your guns?" His response—an extremely emotional one—was never either officially released by the Navy nor used by the newsmen present; it was put "off the record" at that point primarily because all concerned readily recognized that any discussion of this subject by Bucher

should properly take place before the upcoming court of inquiry and not during a press conference at a time when he was physically and mentally exhausted.

The Navy and the City of San Diego had cooperated in preparing for the return of the *Pueblo* crew. The Navy flew the families of the crewmembers to San Diego so that a reunion in time for Christmas was possible. The San Diego Chamber of Commerce provided, at the chamber's expense, lodging for the families at the El Cortez Hotel. Some 72 hours after they had crossed the bridge at Panmunjom, the *Pueblo* crewmembers were reunited with their families. An entire Nation joyfully witnessed the emotional reunion via live television from the Naval Air Station at Miramar. The scene might be described as a massive national catharsis—the Nation wept tears of relief and happiness. Said *The San Diego Union* in an editorial on the day of the crew's return:

> ... Today San Diego is again happy with tears as 82 men whose names will be permanently inscribed in history ... come home to San Diego. We are proud to represent the entire nation as the host for these gallant men. There could be no better Christmas present. It is fitting and proper that San Diego should be selected as host for the returning heroes and a place for them to rest and relax. ... [49]

At the airport ceremony, comments were made by Governor Ronald Reagan, Senator Margaret Chase Smith of Maine, Mayor Frank Curran of San Diego, and Vice Adm. Allen M. Shinn, Commander, Naval Air Forces Pacific. The welcome was the type the country normally reserves for heroes and, so it seemed, to much of the Nation they were. To be sure there were those who questioned the praise and adulation heaped upon

the *Pueblo* crew. For instance, Admiral Gallery in his book on the incident stated:

> We are becoming a nation of phonies. What you are doesn't matter much—it's your public image that counts... when the *Pueblo*'s men were brought back to the United States, their arrival was featured on nationwide TV and they were hailed as conquering heroes. While a prisoner, the *Pueblo*'s skipper ... was made an honorary citizen of Pueblo, Arizona [sic]. Upon his return, the town gave him a triumphal welcome and civic reception. Proposals have been made to award medals to all men in his crew ... Bucher and his men are products of their times... Our way of life has produced a generation of sailors and officers who surrender without a fight, and millions of Americans applaud them for it![50]

Senator Russell likewise questioned the hero appellation for the crew: "Those men are being hailed as heroes. They are heroes in the sense that they survived the imprisonment. But they did sign a great many statements that did not reflect any great heroism in my mind."[51]

But like the cries for action sounded almost a year earlier when *Pueblo* was seized, these, too, seemed strangely anachronistic. After all, the American public had not been given reason to think otherwise of Bucher and his crew. At least the official Navy statements gave no hint of disfavor with Bucher. The speeches at the air station by the assembled dignitaries did nothing to detract from the hero image.

Bucher, during the course of an emotional statement at Miramar upon the crew's return, described North Korea as a land "completely devoid of humanity, completely devoted to the enslavement of men's minds." Later the same day, after the crew had been transported to Balboa Naval Hospital from Miramar, Rear Admiral Rosenberg appeared at a press conference with Lt. Edward Murphy, *Pueblo*'s executive officer, at which time Murphy gave his impressions of life in custody. According to *The New York Times*, Murphy seemed "willing to discuss the entire *Pueblo* story with newsmen but indicated he was under some sort of wraps from higher authority." Newsmen then confronted Admiral Rosenberg with the charge that a "lid" was being put on information. In support of their contention, they recalled earlier that "when Commander Bucher began speaking, somewhat emotionally (at Miramar), about the shooting of four men in the crew, Navy officers next to him appeared to be cautioning him against too much discussion."[52] Admiral Rosenberg replied merely that the men had been advised of their rights and of the fact that discussion before the inquiry was held might prejudice their case. This point was subsequently reemphasized to newsmen almost daily by Captain Thomas. However, this guidance had no relation to the alleged incident at the time of arrival on which newsmen were attempting to base their contention of a "lid"; in the latter circumstance, senior personnel, and in particular the senior medical officer who had traveled with the crew from Korea, were concerned for a very tired and emotionally spent Bucher and did not want to see him embark on a lengthy emotional statement that might not be in his own best interests.

The news media, stymied in their quest for individual eyewitness accounts of what actually happened, occupied themselves with reassessing the chain of events as known up to that point; reporting on the Navy's preparations for the inquiry and other associated trivia to fill up the public's voracious appetite

for *Pueblo* stories. In a day-after-Christmas postmortem, the *Christian Science Monitor* editorialized:

Welcome as is the news of the release of the crew of the U.S.S. *Pueblo* that whole affair remains highly messy and unsatisfactory. It should and we trust that it will become an object lesson from which future American surveillance efforts will profit . . . Meanwhile Christmas for all America was happier knowing that the 82 crewmen of the *Pueblo* were back with their families for the holiday. The past year has been a turbulent one in the United States. It was a far rougher one for those brave men, who, doing only their duty, suddenly found themselves in the bitterest kind of captivity.[53]

On the same day, *The New York Times* carried a story on the front page which discussed the upcoming inquiry and subtly suggested that Bucher's behavior just might be suspect after all. In referring to the inquiry as "one of the most sensitive in recent naval history," the article quoted one naval officer as saying, "Every man in the Navy will be watching to see what the court recommends, . . . was Commander Bucher right in surrendering his ship without a fight? . . . and what about the confessions? They certainly told the enemy more than name, rank and serial number." The column acknowledged that "there is tremendous sympathy for Commander Bucher and the 81 other survivors of the intelligence ship. . . . "[54]

Joseph C. Harsch, noted columnist for *The Christian Science Monitor* devoted one of his columns to a discussion of the *Pueblo* affair.

Questions are now being asked about the behavior of skipper and crew, both when the ship was taken and afterward in prison. Did they do all that a country with a proud naval history expects of its warrior seamen? Is this the way Decatur or Preble or Lawrence would have behaved? What would admirals like Farragut or Porter have to say? Above all, what would John Paul Jones think?[55]

In answering the above questions Harsch drew a distinction that would subsequently provide an alibi of sorts for naval officers genuinely concerned over the surrender of *Pueblo*, namely that the reputations of Decatur, Preble, et al., were all made and those traditions were all established by fighting seamen aboard ships of the battleline of the U.S. Navy. The *Pueblo* was not a "ship of the line" of the U.S. Navy. And it was not manned by men trained for war. Thus, having drawn a distinction between ships of the line and those not equipped for war, Mr. Harsch renders a judgment of Bucher's behavior: " . . . so far as present evidence permits it would be fair judgement that captain and men behaved about as must be expected with ships of this kind engaged in the kind of work the *Pueblo* was doing when taken."[56]

As the crew continued to undergo intensive intelligence debriefing, Secretary of Defense Clark M. Clifford ordered Secretary of the Navy Ignatius to "conduct an inquiry into the treatment of the crew of the U.S.S. *Pueblo* by the North Korean authorities."[57] This, of course, would be in addition to the regular Navy Court of Inquiry scheduled for mid-January. The latter had been delayed due to the strain of the intelligence debriefing or by what doctors termed "physical and emotional exhaustion of Commander Bucher."[58] The court itself would be headed by Vice Adm. Harold G. Bowen, Commander, Antisubmarine Warfare Forces, Pacific, and would, for the most part, be conducted in public. Said *The Christain*

Science Monitor: "A navy court of inquiry is to look into all aspects of the seizure and the ensuing captivity. The Navy has been careful to point out that the inquiry would be expected regardless of any possibilities of wrongdoing." With regard to the Navy's position on the crew's behavior, the same article stated: "So far, the Navy has been going out of its way to give the impression through a well-managed public relations campaign that the Navy benevolently views the crew as young heroes.[59] And so it appeared.

THE COURT OF INQUIRY

Prior to the start of the Court of Inquiry, the Navy announced several legal decisions with direct bearing on the upcoming hearing into the *Pueblo* crew's behavior. On 28 December 1968 the Navy issued a public statement which advised that the Military Code of Conduct was only a guideline telling servicemen how they should behave in combat or captivity and violating it was not a criminal offense. Any misconduct, however, on the part of those involved would be tried under the Uniform Code of Military Justice.[60]

Then, on 13 January, the Navy announced that the Judge Advocate General had ruled that the *Pueblo* crewmen would be considered as "illegal detainees" and not prisoners of war. Further, the Navy had ruled that North Korea could not be considered an "enemy" because the United States and North Koreans had ended hostilities.[61] The effect of these rulings was to sharply limit the grounds on which a court-martial could be based. In commenting on these decisions, Capt. William R. Newsome, legal counsel for the Court of Inquiry, said, "Since they (the North Koreans) are not the enemy we don't have prisoners of war. And when we don't have prisoners of war we don't have the application of the code of conduct."[62]   Captain Newsome was

then asked whether one could surrender to a nonenemy and he replied, "Well, I don't know, I honestly don't know."[63]

The Court of Inquiry began on Monday, 20 January 1969, in an amphitheater on the Naval Amphibious Base, Coronado, Calif. According to Bernard Weinraub, who covered the court proceedings for *The New York Times* and other newspapers across the Nation, "The peninsula of Coronado swarmed with reporters and rumors. The inquiry would be a coverup, a whitewash, the British journalists were convinced . . . a pudgy American magazine writer insisted it could be nothing more or less . . . the Navy would not tolerate . . . the truth."[64]

The news media, whether conscious or not, conveyed an underlying tone of skepticism about the fairness of the Court of Inquiry. The image conveyed to the public unfortunately appeared to place the Navy in the role of the "oppressor" while Commander Bucher and the crew remained national heroes. The carefully planned Navy public affairs program undoubtedly blunted much of the media effort, but bias was obvious nonetheless in the reporters' use of such phrases as "the brass," "Drumhead court," "Kangaroo Court," et cetera.

The daily dispatches constantly portrayed Commander Bucher as "wan and thin," "weeping and trembling," "pale and drawn," and when he spoke it was usually in a "choked voice" or with "quivering lips." "Commander Lloyd Mark Bucher recounts his story of the seizure of the *Pueblo* in a monotone that rarely breaks. He appears tired and powerless before the admirals who sit behind an elevated table and watch him . . ."[65]

Other stories dealt with Commander Bucher's background and his deprived childhood, his life as an orphan at Boys Town, Nebr., his devoted family, all of which undoubtedly had a tremendous impact in generating an outpouring of

public sympathy for him and, conversely, contempt for those who would "persecute" him further. Senator Dominick, Republican of Colorado, charged that the Navy was trying to blame Bucher for the *Pueblo* affair rather than the officials who denied him the means to destroy the ship's secret equipment.[66] And Senator Mansfield, the Senate Majority Leader, indicated that at least two Senate committees would want to look into the *Pueblo* affair.[67] Editorials deplored the personalization of the inquiry:

> The Navy Court of Inquiry . . . has now degenerated into a personalized inquiry into the conduct of Commander Lloyd M. Bucher, the skipper who gave up his ship . . . what is shockingly clear is that, only weeks after being freed from this harrowing experience, Commander Bucher is being forced to undergo the excruciating emotional agony of an inquiry that is almost a trial . . . The real problem in the *Pueblo* inquiry is to bring up to date the rules that govern command and intelligence in vessels operating under Pentagon orders. Then their officers and crews will have a clear idea of their obligations under attack. Certainly now there is neither need nor excuse for subjecting Commander Bucher to the emotional trial he is being forced to endure.[68]

If there had been any doubts as to where the public's sentiment lay, these were dispelled by the reaction to the session of 23 January. As Commander Bucher began discussing the boarding of the *Pueblo* he was interrupted by Captain Newsome who read the following statement: "Commander Bucher, it is my duty to apprise you of the fact that the facts revealed in this court of inquiry render you to be a suspect of a

violation of Navy regulations, Article 0730."[69]

The Navy had anticipated and prepared for this moment with utmost care. Commander Bucher and his civilian attorney, Miles Harvey, had been briefed on the procedure and were aware that, as required by the Uniform Code of Military Justice, a warning would be given him at the appropriate time. According to Capt. Vincent Thomas, the Public Affairs Officer, the press likewise had been briefed prior to the session of 22 January to expect the warning as a required, routine, legal procedure.[70]

The reaction was immediate, swift, and overwhelming. Despite the meticulous care and advance planning, Navy explanations were drowned in a cacophony of strident criticism. The stream of letters that had been arriving at the Pentagon since the *Pueblo* capture suddenly turned into a torrent. The sentiments were strong in their support of Bucher and extremely critical of the Navy's efforts to "punish Bucher." An estimated 3,000 letters poured into the Navy's Information Office at the Pentagon from all parts of the country. The volume and tone were described as "unprecedented" by a veteran public affairs officer. Each letter received an official reply in which the Navy attempted to answer the charges.

In a speech before the American Bar Foundation in Chicago, on 25 January, Admiral Moorer, obviously upset by the barrage of criticism, stated that the Navy "is searching for facts—not scapegoats." In attempting to put the nature of the inquiry in proper perspective, Admiral Moorer wanted to "reassure the American people that the Court of Inquiry is being conducted in a straightforward, legal and objective manner." He stated that he was "deeply troubled —the Navy is deeply troubled—that what was a routine and totally correct legal procedure has been widely misinterpreted."[71] The admiral stressed the

fact that the warning was not unexpected by Commander Bucher and his counsel and repeated the counsel's reply to Captain Newsome:

> We have discussed this matter with Commander Bucher in some detail. As you know, we had some preliminary conversations with you before this Court of Inquiry convened as to the procedures that would be followed and the manner by which Commander Bucher's story and the story of the U.S.S. *Pueblo* could be presented to this Court. We obviously anticipated the situation that we find ourselves in at the present moment ... In view of your warning, Commander Bucher persists in his desire to fully and completely tell this Court of Inquiry the details of the 23rd of January and the events subsequent thereto.[72]

Press accounts of the warning incident reported that Commander Bucher was visibly stunned and shaken by the warning. Some reports said that tears welled in his eyes. "There was another aspect to the hearing: a feeling that Commander Bucher had decided to shake the Naval establishment, to thrust his case before the public and stir the compassion of the American people, severely damaging his career but vindicating his actions."[73]

Commander Bucher undoubtedly was aware of the public sympathy and sentiment in his behalf. What is not known, however, is the extent to which he directed his remarks toward that support. It is the feeling of some public affairs officers who know Commander Bucher and who worked with him that he did not consciously exploit public opinion for his own purposes. The debate continued, however, and a hostile (to the Navy) press became even more so. Anti-Navy sentiment cropped

up in "Letters to Editor" columns: "The majority of citizens of the country admire the moral courage and the common sense and humanity of Commander Bucher in saving the lives of his crew. Let us not allow the situation to be confused by any 'mumbo jumbo' about the technicalities of Navy regulations."[74]

The furor over the "warning" was having a profound effect upon the Court of Inquiry and the Navy itself.

At a brief news conference on the 27th, Miles Harvey made a statement for the *Pueblo* skipper in which he described the Court of Inquiry as being "completely fair."

> Commander Bucher feels an overreaction has set in concerning the warning of the court. In his mind and our mind the court of inquiry has been completely fair ... Commander Bucher sees all of this as an opportunity to clear any slur that might have existed on his name and present the facts to the entire nation ... The record of these proceedings will tell the full story of the *Pueblo* and answer all the questions that need to be answered.[75]

Harvey acknowledged that Bucher had received about 300 telegrams of support since the Court of Inquiry began. "Many of the telegrams show concern for his physical health ... I can assure you he is in good physical condition and mentally alert and these proceedings have not been trying on his physical or mental health."[76] There is no evidence to indicate that the Navy urged Bucher or his attorney to issue such a statement. It was, however, welcomed by harassed naval officials. Captain Thomas noted that the court had received several hundred letters and telegrams and that the general tenor was a source of considerable concern for the court. The telegrams and letters indicated that in the mind of many people "Commander Bucher was being court-martialed."[77]

Congressional interest remained at a peak, reflecting constituent sentiment. Senators Dominick and Young (Democrat, Ohio) called for Congressional investigations of the *Pueblo* incident. While Representative Edwin D. Eshleman (Republican, Pennsylvania) urged newly appointed Secretary of the Navy Chafee to halt "An inquisition of a man who is neither physically nor mentally in position to be subjected to the kind of investigation being conducted."[78]

The Navy, facing a storm of public criticism, continued its efforts to "educate" the public as to the real nature and purpose of the proceedings. The press received daily reminders from Navy lawyers and public affairs officers that the investigation was an "inquiry" and not a trial, stressing that the word "court" was a misnomer. Naval officers might have been divided on the merits of Bucher's behavior, but they generally agreed on the need for a full-scale inquiry into the *Pueblo* story. The problem was in convincing the public. Much of the criticism undoubtedly was generated by a lack of understanding of the military judicial system. From the outset the procedures were explained, and, as outlined previously, great care was taken to see that the public was informed on all aspects of the case except those of a sensitive security nature. Again, emotion tended to obscure rational understanding of what was transpiring at Coronado. Some writers did make honest efforts to understand the Navy's position. As an example, Vermont Royster writing in the *Wall Street Journal* stated: " . . . the Navy is doing not only what it has traditionally done but what it ought to do. For that much, at least, there should be public praise, not public censure . . . when men accept responsibility they should also accept accountability for what they do with it . . . "[79] And *The New York Times* said in an editorial:

. . . The hearings are putting an excruciating emotional strain on Commander Bucher . . . but the fairness with which the Navy is conducting them provides needed reassurance that they will result in a clarification and modernization of the rules governing command in vessels under Pentagon orders, not an effort to find personal scapegoats.[80]

Support or even tacit approval of what the Navy was doing, however, was slow in coming if, in fact, it was ever admitted by the news media. The fact is that the press generally remained antagonistic toward the Navy. Captain Thomas attributes the basic misunderstanding of the warning given Bucher to this fact.

Conceding press hostility, the Navy did little to improve its standing with the fourth estate by denying requests from *The New York Times, Washington Post, Los Angeles Times,* and *Reader's Digest* for transcripts of the Court of Inquiry proceedings. According to knowledgeable sources in the Navy, the question was debated in Washington with legal and public affairs officials agonizing over why could the press *not* be provided transcripts. High-level Navy officials apparently found the arguments for doing so unconvincing. Navy Regulations, article 1251, states that records of Navy courts of inquiry "are intended solely for use in the naval establishment and are privileged" and "confidential."[81]

The rationale behind the Navy decision, however, appeared to be a fear that in releasing the transcript to newspapers all over the country, some might print only parts of the proceedings and therefore convey a misleading impression. This reasoning, if in fact valid, seems inadequate in view of the situation prevailing then.

The Navy's action, in regard to the

transcript question, was certainly not a fatal or even major error in the *Pueblo* chain of events. By that time the lines had been drawn in the public mind; it is doubtful whether the Navy had any remaining options that could have changed national sentiment. The task became one of keeping the situation from getting any worse, for it began to appear that the Navy, not Commander Bucher, was being tried—a trial conducted in the pages of the Nation's press.

A cartoon by Bill Mauldin portrayed an admiral dangling from a giant crane, holding a Navy commander in front of him saying, "Bucher, I'm afraid you might be on a bit of a hook",[82] while Oliphant, cartoonist for the *Denver Post* showed four Navy admirals in a row-boat named "Navy Brass" approaching a mine labeled "Bucher's *Pueblo* Testimony." The cartoon was captioned "Explosive Issue: A peril for the probers no less than the probed."[83] *The Christian Science Monitor*, in an editorial, stated:

> The Coronado inquiry is far from over. But . . . Commander Bucher may be well on the way to becoming America's newest anti-hero. And if anybody is on trial—at least in the view of the general public—it is men much closer to the top in the United States Navy than he.[84]

Also indicting the Navy, James Reston said: "Not only Commander Lloyd M. Bucher, the *Pueblo*'s skipper, is suspect in this tragic incident, but the Navy and the Defense Department are also under suspicion, and the latter are in effect sitting in judgment on themselves."[85]

The Navy's less than successful efforts to convince the American public that the Court of Inquiry was not a "trial" was vividly demonstrated during a Presidential news conference held on 6 February 1969. In response to a reporter's question as to whether it was proper for the Navy "to be in effect sitting in a judgment on itself," President Nixon replied:

> . . . As a Navy man, I know that the Navy has procedures which I think very adequately protect the rights of defendants in courts martial. Second, I believe those procedures from my investigation to date have been very scrupulously followed . . . I . . . will examine the whole record myself both with regard to the individual guilt or innocence of the people involved and also with regard to the even more important objective of seeing to it that this kind of incident can be avoided in the future.[86]

The President's use of the terms "guilt" and "innocence" emphasized the very misunderstanding the Navy had taken great pains to clarify, namely that in the proceedings underway at Coronado the guilt or innocence of the *Pueblo* crew was not at stake. Subsequent clarification by the White House that the President only wished to emphasize that he would give the *Pueblo* matter thorough review provided little comfort to discouraged Navy officials.

On 18 February 1969, L. Mendel Rivers, Chairman of the House Armed Services Committee, established a special subcommittee "to conduct a full and thorough inquiry into all matters arising from the capture and internment of the U.S.S. *Pueblo* and its crew by the North Korean Government."[87] The subcommittee, headed by Otis G. Pike (Democrat, New York) began formal hearings on 4 March 1969. Unlike the Coronado proceedings, the Pike subcommittee appeared to concentrate more on the larger questions of Navy preparedness, code of conduct applicability, and intelligence operations. Like the Navy Court of Inquiry, however,

they provided additional grist for America's press mills.

The *Pueblo* remained front page news, much to the Navy's discomfort. The headlines generated out of Washington reported a discouraging picture of a Navy caught ill-prepared to deal with a *Pueblo*-type emergency, of serious deficiencies in the military command structure. The stories emanating from Coronado continued to recite the distressing litany but in human, emotional terms.

On 13 March 1969, almost 8 weeks after it started, Admiral Bowen announced that the Court of Inquiry was completed. In reviewing the almost 8 weeks of testimony, the news media remained firmly in the camp of the *Pueblo* crew. The harsh criticism to which the Navy had been subjected for most of the court was muted somewhat, but there was no mistaking the dominant sentiment. The *Wall Street Journal,* in a postinquiry editorial opined:

> If the court of inquiry's findings are as fair as its hearings have been, then, they will show that whatever questions there may be about the commander's conduct, the big mistakes were made at far higher levels. For the Navy, the lesson of the *Pueblo* is an old one: If you send men on a difficult mission ill-equipped, ill-prepared and ill-instructed, you cannot expect exemplary performance.[88]

The Pike inquiry would provide the press *Pueblo* continuity for another 2 months.

THE DECISION

One point not elaborated upon earlier in this paper is the Code of Conduct. While it not intended to investigate the applicability of the code, the prominent role given it both by the Navy and the news media before,

during, and after the Court of Inquiry requires that it be discussed. As noted earlier in this paper, prior to the beginning of the inquiry the Navy had defined the code as a guideline for servicemen—nothing more. Captain Newsome told reporters the code was "like the Ten Commandments. It's not something you can violate punitively."[89] Yet, during 8 weeks at Coronado the code dominated much of the proceedings as the crew's performance was measured against it by the court.

Each crewmember was asked to describe his reasons for violating the code. This testimony provided much of the drama and emotional copy for reporters. At one point during the hearings Captain Newsome asked Bucher: "Do you feel there was proper indoctrination of the Code of Conduct for members of the crew?"[90] Bucher, after commenting that the evaluation was hindsight, replied: "Considering what happened, neither myself nor the crew had adequate training in the Code of Conduct."[91]

The Navy's original position to view the code as inspirational rather than penal appeared to undergo a change during and subsequent to the Court of Inquiry. For instance, on 20 February, Captain Newsome said that, "It has become obvious that the Code of Conduct is applicable in this situation."[92] If the public was bewildered and confused, they were not alone; the Pike subcommittee shared this sense of bewilderment.

> Testimony received by the subcommittee from representatives of the Department of the Navy resulted in a very confusing picture as to the applicability of the Code of Conduct to the members of the U.S.S. *Pueblo* crew. Also confusion was created in the minds of the members of the subcommittee as to whether or not a violation of the Code of Conduct constituted

an action punishable under the Uniform Code of Military Justice.[93]

In testimony before the Pike subcommittee, Rear Adm. Joseph B. McDevitt, the Navy's Judge Advocate General, stated that the code was "not a punitive article on which punishment can be based." But then, under questioning by members of the subcommittee, he admitted that all violations of major provisions of the code were punishable as breaches of Navy general orders and of the Uniform Code of Military Justice.[94]

The ambivalent views of the Navy as expressed above vividly demonstrated the dilemma it faced—weighing military duty against humanitarian considerations.

Admiral Gallery severely chastises the Navy in this regard. In referring to the "Ten Commandments" view expressed by Captain Newsome, Admiral Gallery relates:

When I learned the Ten Commandments I was told that a rather severe penalty eventually was attached to violating them. Of course, those who don't believe in this penalty don't take the Ten Commandments very seriously either. But it seems to me an executive order from the President should be taken very seriously indeed by members of our Armed Forces.[95]

The retired admiral goes on to suggest that the Navy simply sought to avoid the extremely unpopular task of court-martialing the *Pueblo* crew for violating the code. It would indeed appear that the Navy's vacillation was generated to some extent by a desire to avoid the issue in the face of strong public hostility.

The unfortunate conclusion must be drawn, however, that the Navy's handling of the Code of Conduct dilemma did little to improve public understanding of the issues involved and may, in fact, have had just the opposite effect. While the Navy may have hesitated to take a stand, the news media as well as Congressmen called for changes to the code to reflect behavior that could be realistically expected of normal men. Not a few reminded their readers and constituents of the precedent set by the Government in signing a false confession to obtain the crewmembers release.

In the few days following the end of the Court of Inquiry at Corouado, Navy officials in the Washington Public Affairs Office concerned themselves with formulating a plan for handling the next and possibly the most explosive (public relationswise) event in the *Pueblo* case, the Court of Inquiry's decision. Here again the situation was fraught with complexities. Inasmuch as the court had been ordered convened by Adm. John J. Hyland, Commander in Chief of the Pacific Fleet, the findings would be forwarded to him for further action, and then up the chain of command to the Secretary of the Navy. Conceivably, there were at least four reviewing points along the chain of command that could pose problems for the Navy of a public relations nature. Sensing this, public affairs officials argued successfully that the decisions and recommendations should be announced only once—at the top—rather than at each point along the chain. The public relations rationale behind this, of course, was that one bad headline was better than four!

On 6 May 1969, at 11:30 a.m., Secretary of the Navy Chafee read a statement to an assembled press conference at the Pentagon. In his statement, the Secretary reviewed the findings, opinions, and recommendations of the Court of Inquiry and the recommendations of the subsequent reviewing authorities. The Court of Inquiry had recommended that Commander Bucher

and Lieutenant Harris (Officer-in-Charge of the Intelligence Detachment aboard the *Pueblo*) be tried by general courts-martial; that Lieutenant Murphy (Executive Officer), be issued a letter of admonition; and that Rear Adm. Frank L. Johnson and Capt. Everett B. Gladding (Director Naval Security Group, Pacific) each receive nonjudicial punishment in the form of a letter of reprimand.

The convening authority, Admiral Hyland, recommended letters of reprimand for both Bucher and Harris instead of courts-martial. Recommendations in the cases of Murphy and Admiral Johnson were approved. The recommendation to issue a letter of reprimand to Gladding was withdrawn by Admiral Hyland. The Chief of Naval Operations concurred in the recommendations of Admiral Hyland.

The Secretary then stated:

As a result of my review, I have decided that no disciplinary action will be taken against any of the personnel involved in the *Pueblo* incident . . . I make no judgment regarding the guilt or innocense of any of the officers of the offenses alleged against them . . . I am convinced, however, that neither individual discipline, nor the state of discipline or morale in the Navy, nor any other interest requires further legal proceedings with respect to any personnel involved in the *Pueblo* incident.

Secretary Chafee reviewed each of the recommendations and added his own assessment. He concluded the statement by saying:

In light of the considerations set out above, I have determined that the charges against all of the officers concerned will be dismissed and I have directed the

Chief of Naval Operations to take appropriate action to that end. Every feasible effort is being made to correct any Navy deficiencies which may have contributed to the *Pueblo*'s seizure. The Navy's leaders are determined that the lessons learned from this tragedy shall be translated into effective action.[96]

The decision produced a somewhat mixed reaction in the press and among Congressmen. The press generally appeared caught by surprise not only at the final outcome, but not with the unusual manner in which the Navy handled the announcement. Key congressional figures indicated they accepted Chafee's decision. Senator Richard Russell, who had earlier questioned the hero role for the *Pueblo* crew, accepted Chafee's conclusion on the basis that "there was dereliction all down the line . . . It wouldn't have been fair to punish or admonish the juniors in the matter if it hadn't also gone across the board to the joint chiefs."[97] Representative Pike, then conducting his own inquiry, commented to reporters: "The Navy took a hardline position which the Secretary tempered with mercy."[98] Senator Dominick, who earlier had charged the Navy with trying to make Bucher a scapegoat, called the recommendations of the Court of Inquiry "simply ridiculous" and indicated his intention of pressing the case.[99] The press, clearly retaining its sympathy for the crew, generally supported Secretary Chafee. Said *The New York Times* in an editorial:

Lawyers have a saying that hard cases make bad law. Secretary of the Navy John H. Chafee may have had this maxim in mind when he wisely decided against a general court-martial for Cdr Lloyd Bucher and Lt Stephen R. Harris . . . In tempering justice

with compassion, Secretary Chafee probably reflects the view of most Americans, summed up in his comment that the principals in the *Pueblo* case "have suffered enough."[100]

EPILOG

The power of public opinion must be faced, understood and dealt with. It provides the psychological environment in which organizations prosper or perish.[101]

During the course of the unfolding events of the *Pueblo* crisis, the U.S. Navy recognized this "power of public opinion" and, for the most part, appeared to understand it. The efforts in dealing with it were caused by a number of factors, many of which, as we have seen, were simply beyond the Navy's ability to influence. If public relations considerations were not paramount in the *Pueblo* case, they were at least of primary importance; the extensive planning and attention to public relations detail demonstrated this. The final decision by the Secretary of the Navy, in the author's opinion, represents an unmistakable compromise with the forces of public opinion in this country. The news media, admittedly hostile, undoubtedly were able to influence public opinion to a degree. More accurately, however, the press reflected or mirrored sentiments shared by many Americans. To be sure, the initial reactions to the *Pueblo* seizure followed the somewhat predictable conservative-liberal dichotomy, but lines rapidly blurred as public indignation shifted from the North Koreans to the Government at home. Political identification, notwithstanding, there appeared to be a genuine reluctance on the part of the American public to take a stand until more was known—a reluctance born of experience with the U-2 and Bay of Pigs. Americans generally united in their

efforts to gain the crew's release, and this unity was reflected in editorial content of both the liberal eastern press and the more conservative rural and western press. The effort became a humanitarian one, a not unimportant byproduct of which was the tremendous amount of public sympathy for the crew during the inquiry. Here the Navy fostered this mood by indicating its support for the crew through statements issued by its leaders.

The extraordinary means the Government used to retrieve the crew strongly suggest official recognition and surrender to popular sentiment. There were few diplomatic precedents offered in explanation. The Navy, accurately gauging national sentiment and latent hostility from the outset, assumed a defensive position vis-a-vis the media. Arrayed against the Navy was a hostile press waiting for an opportunity to strike were the Navy to take a wrong step. In assessing the reasons for this phenomenon, several key factors emerge:

● **Credibility Gap of the Johnson Administration.** It may be recalled that domestic criticism of the administration reached a peak in the winter of 1968. Vietnam and our involvement there proved the major contributor with the February 1968 Vietcong Tet offensive acting as a catalyst. There was a marked cynicism evident in the mood of the press. Editorialists and pundits assumed a skeptical stance in relation to Government pronouncements. *Pueblo* occurred during this period of dwindling confidence in the American Government.

● **Antimilitarism.** For the first time since before World War II, the military became the target of heavy domestic criticism. Much of this can be ascribed to the general disenchantment associated with the credibility gap cited above. For the Navy and the *Pueblo* crisis, however, the unfolding story

simply aggravated public manifestations of antimilitarism and conversely promoted a hero image for the *Pueblo* skipper and his crew. Related to this was a general public concern or feeling of helplessness in the face of huge impersonal bureaucratic institutions. Many, frustrated by the system, found it easy to identify with Commander Bucher—a helpless victim of an insensitive, unresponsive, military bureaucracy. Not surprisingly, a considerable amount of sympathy for the *Pueblo* skipper could be found within the Navy, particularly among more junior officers who seemed to vicariously share Bucher's sense of frustration. Admiral Gallery in noting this situation said: "... one of the frightening aspects of this case is that if the Navy did decide to court-martial Bucher, a court composed of the rising generation of naval officers might acquit him."[102]

● **Humanitarianism.** As a Nation we have taken pride in our basic humanitarian approach to world problems. Our high regard for human life supposedly distinguishes us from other cultures in the world. Thus, in the spirit of this tradition, the U.S. Government humbled itself before a third-rate power for humanitarian reasons—to gain release of the *Pueblo* crew. This humanitarian concern manifested itself again in the form of support from liberal elements of the public for the *Pueblo* commander who gave up his ship to save the lives of his crewmembers. He was portrayed as a "new breed of hero, a skipper who recognized the realities and chose to save his crew rather than sacrifice it."[103]

● **Morality.** From the day *Pueblo* was captured, the American people were continually reminded of the fact that the vessel was a "spy ship." For many Americans the term carries romantic, albeit unsavory, connotations. The knowledge that the ship engaged in covert activity allowed for public rationalization of the crew's behavior. The intelligence ramifications posed a dilemma for the Navy of a different sort—how to measure the performance of a commanding officer given the traditional total responsibility over his ship but only part of the authority. The *Wall Street Journal* asked if Bucher's "very mission was a contradiction of sorts to the gentlemanly code laid down by John Paul Jones."[104] This ambiguity further clouded the issues in the public mind.

Thus, in assessing the mood of the country and determining reasons for public hostility toward the Navy, the above four factors emerge. These were factors over which the Navy had little or no control. They provided the inhospitable stage for the *Pueblo* drama. Navy mistakes were made, however, which intensified public hostility. While these mistakes, in the opinion of the author, were not of sufficient magnitude to have substantially altered the eventual outcome of the case, they are considered of major import in determining reasons for public resentment and hostility toward the Navy.

Navy Ambivalence. Up to the commencement of the Court of Inquiry, Navy statements conveyed to the public a position of support for the *Pueblo* skipper and his crew. Whatever the reason for this, available evidence indicates public shock and anger over events subsequent to the court beginning. In particular, the warning given to Bucher represented, in the public eye, a fundamental shift in the Navy's position. As noted earlier in this paper, the Navy took great care in defining to the press and court participants the strictly legal, procedural necessity for this step. Surely if this were all that it meant to the public, reaction to the incident would be hard to explain. Clearly, something else was involved. Up to that moment Bucher had been proclaimed a

hero; a proclamation shared and fostered by official Navy statements. The warning was the first manifestation that the Navy thought otherwise! Even the decisions regarding the Code of Conduct appeared to have been stretched to fit the view that the *Pueblo* crew had done no wrong. It seems reasonable to assume that had the Navy's official public position from the outset been one of skepticism and doubt concerning Bucher's behavior, the warning would have been more properly portrayed in its true context. As it was, however, it represented an emotional juncture that was disastrous for the Navy from a public relations perspective.

Court of Inquiry. Despite a resolute public affairs effort, the American people never became reconciled to the fact that the proceedings at Coronado were not a trial! Here again the Navy proved to be its own worst enemy. Although there have been courts of inquiry for many generations, in the circumstances of this case, the very use of the word "court" may have created in the public mind the type of adversarial image normally associated with the word in the civilian judicial context.

The decision by the Secretary of the Navy was a skillful one, yet it is hard to imagine how he could have acted otherwise, in the face of public opinion. On the one hand, the Navy's tradition of military responsibility and accountability was at stake; while on the other, the climate of public opinion clearly would not accept punishment of the crew. The Navy simply could not have withstood another long siege of adverse, page-one publicity that a court-martial

would most certainly have aroused. The experience of the preceding 5 months at least made that painfully clear. Public opinion, like it or not, proved the final arbiter in the *Pueblo* case!

For better or worse, the military as a whole finds its options for freedom of action increasingly restricted or curtailed by public sentiment. In the *Pueblo* case the Navy simply had no option—it was up to the civilian Secretary to salvage the situation. Secretary Chafee's decision appeared deliberately designed to blunt the public outcry but at the same time allowed the Navy to keep a measure of its self-respect. Navy submission may be distasteful to some, but one incontrovertible fact remains—the support of the American people is a must if we are to continue to maintain a strong, effective naval force.

BIOGRAPHIC SUMMARY

Lt. Comdr. William A. Armbruster, U.S. Navy, holds a B.A. in government from the College of William and Mary and an M.S. in international affairs from The George Washington University. He is also a graduate of the U.S. Navy Air Intelligence School, the U.S. Armed Forces Air Intelligence Training Center, and the School of Naval Command and Staff of the Naval War College. As an intelligence officer he has served in a patrol squadron, headquarters of the North American Air Defense Command, and in Vietnam. Lieutenant Commander Armbruster is currently assigned as a staff intelligence officer to the Naval War College.

FOOTNOTES

1. From the inscription on the monument marking Captain Lawrence's grave in New York City, as described by the author John R. Spears, *The History of Our Navy* (New York: Scribner, 1897), v. II, p. 225.

2. Harold Lasswell, quoted in Bernard Berelson and Morris Janowitz, *Reader in Public Opinion and Communication* (Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press, 1950), p. 469.

3. U.S. Congress, House, Armed Services Subcommittee, *The U.S.S. Pueblo Inquiry*, Hearings (Washington: U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1969), p. 1660.

4. "The Impotence of Power," *Time*, 2 February 1968, p. 17.

5. "Pentagon Statement," *The New York Times*, 24 January 1968, p. 15:1.

6. Tom Wicker, "U.S. Calls 14,787 Air Reservists; Asks Urgent U.N. Council Talk on 'Grave Situation' in Korea," *The New York Times*, 26 January 1968, p. 1:8.

7. "Admiral Says Carrier Was Alerted to Retaliate When *Pueblo* Was Attacked," *The New York Times*, 4 February 1969, p. 5:3.

8. "Seizure of Vessel Scored in Capital," *The New York Times*, 24 January 1968, p. 1:8.

9. "The Seizure of the U.S. Patrol Boat '*Pueblo*,'" *Congressional Record*, 23 January 1968, p. 727.

10. "Seizure of the U.S.S. '*Pueblo*,'" *Congressional Record*, 23 January 1968, p. 679.

11. "The Seizure of the '*Pueblo*,'" *Congressional Record*, 24 January 1968, p. 888.

12. Governor Ronald Reagan quoted in Ed Brandt, *The Last Voyage of U.S.S. Pueblo* (New York: Norton, 1969), p. 111.

13. "Seizure of the U.S.S. '*Pueblo*,'" *Congressional Record*, 24 January 1968, p. 882.

14. "The '*Pueblo*' Affair," *Congressional Record*, 29 January 1968, p. 1231.

15. "Seizure of Vessel Scored in Capital," p. 14:7.

16. *Ibid.*

17. "Provocational U.S. Actions in Sea of Japan," *Pravda*, 25 January 1968, p. 5, reprinted in the *Current Digest of the Soviet Press*, v. XX, no. 3, p. 3.

18. "Provocational Uproar," *Izvestia*, 25 January 1968, p. 3.

19. "The *Pueblo* Incident," *The New York Times*, 24 January 1968, p. 44:1.

20. "Gas from the Capitol," *Blackstone (Va.) Courier-Record*, 15 February 1968, p. 5.

21. Daniel V. Gallery, *The Pueblo Incident* (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1970), p. 107.

22. Alan L. Otten, "Facing Reality," *Wall Street Journal*, 8 February 1968, p. 10:3.

23. "Four of Ten Favor Force on *Pueblo*," *The New York Times*, 11 February 1968, p. 1:1.

24. *Ibid.*

25. William Beecher, "Perplexing Questions," *The New York Times*, 24 January 1968, p. 14:5.

26. *Ibid.*

27. "Secretary Rusk and Secretary of Defense McNamara Discuss Vietnam and Korea on 'Meet the Press,'" *The Department of State Bulletin*, 26 February 1968, p. 271.

28. *Ibid.*

29. "The Impotence of Power," p. 14.

30. *Ibid.*

31. Hanson W. Baldwin, "U.S. Military Weaknesses Are Underlined by *Pueblo* Incident," *The New York Times*, 24 March 1968, p. 44:4.

32. "Letter from Washington," *The New Yorker*, 3 February 1968, p. 85.

33. "In the Wake of the *Pueblo*," *Saturday Review*, 17 February 1968, p. 24.

34. "Remember the *Pueblo*," *The New York Times*, 20 April 1968, p. 32:1.

35. "A Name in Shame," *The San Diego Union*, 25 March 1968, p. 8:2.

36. "800 Join in Prayer for *Pueblo* Crew," *The San Diego Union*, 2 May 1968, p. 1:5.

37. "Boycott Urged of N. Korea to Free *Pueblo*," *The San Diego Union*, 23 November 1968, p. 1:4.

38. "'Free *Pueblo*' Petitions Given Mrs. Bucher," *The San Diego Union*, 11 December 1968, p. 5:3.

39. "Signatures Collected to Back *Pueblo* Release," *Christian Science Monitor*, 13 December 1968, p. 9:1.

40. "Bring 'Em Back Dead or Alive!" *Christian Century*, 14 August 1968, p. 1009.

41. Department Press Release 280 dated 22 December, *The Department of State Bulletin*, 6 January 1969, p. 1.

42. *Ibid.*

43. Exact figures were not available in the Information Office; however, Capt. J.W. Clinton, USN, Mail Section, Office of the Chief of Information, estimated that approximately 300 letters had been received up to the time of the crew's release.

44. "Lessons from the *Pueblo*," *The New York Times*, 24 December 1968, p. 22:1.

45. An agreement signed by General Woodward and the North Korean representative prior to the release of the crew limited the number of photographers to three for each side and these were to be military.

46. Transcript of News Conference, *The New York Times*, 24 December 1968, p. 3:3.

47. "Admiral Hails *Pueblo* Men; They Return to U.S. Today," *The New York Times,* 24 December 1968, p. 1:2.

48. Interview with Capt. Vincent Thomas, USN, Director for Community Relations, Office of Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs, Washington, 27 January 1970.

49. "City Proudly Hosts *Pueblo* Crew," *The San Diego Union,* 24 December 1968, p. A-14:1.

50. Gallery, p. 108.

51. George W. Ashworth, "Lessons Sought in *Pueblo* Affair," *The Christian Science Monitor,* 4 January 1969, p. 13:1.

52. "*Pueblo* Crewmen Greeted on Coast; Captors Assailed," *The New York Times,* 25 December 1968, p. 1:1.

53. "Lessons from the *Pueblo,*" *The Christian Science Monitor,* 26 December 1968, p. E:1.

54. "*Pueblo* Men Face Sensitive Inquiry," *The New York Times,* 26 December 1968, p. E:1.

55. Joseph C. Harsch, "U.S.S. *Pueblo,*" *The Christian Science Monitor,* 7 January 1969, p. E:3.

56. *Ibid.*

57. "Clifford Orders Inquiry," *The New York Times,* 31 December 1968, p. 5:1.

58. "Questioning of *Pueblo*'s Captain Delays Court of Inquiry Two Weeks," *The New York Times,* 9 January 1969, p. 8:1.

59. Ashworth, p. 13:1.

60. "Code Called a Guideline," *The New York Times,* 29 December 1968, p. 3:3.

61. Bernard Weinraub, "Navy Narrows Grounds for Possible *Pueblo* Trial," *The New York Times,* 15 January 1969, p. 4:3.

62. *Ibid.*

63. *Ibid.*

64. Bernard Weinraub, "Behind the *Pueblo* Case: a Classic of Irony," *The Boston Sunday Herald Traveler,* 11 May 1969, p. 1:5.

65. Bernard Weinraub, "Bucher Pits Moral Judgement Against Naval Code," *The New York Times,* 27 January 1969, p. 8:3.

66. "Senator Assails Navy," *The New York Times,* 25 January 1969, p. 3:1.

67. "The *Pueblo*: An Odyssey of Anguish Replayed," *Time,* 31 January 1969, p. 16.

68. "The *Pueblo* Inquiry," *The New York Times,* 25 January 1969, p. 28:1.

69. "Navy Court Puts Bucher Under Suspicion," *The New York Times,* 23 January 1969, p. L:5.

70. Interview with Captain Thomas, 27 January 1970.

71. Letter (Enclosure) from Chief of Information to Distribution List. "*Pueblo* Court of Inquiry: information concerning," Ser. 140, Washington: 28 January 1969.

72. *Ibid.*

73. "*Pueblo* Trial—A Dramatic Change in the Scenario," *The New York Times,* 26 January 1969, p. 6E:1.

74. "*Pueblo* Hearings," *The New York Times,* 2 February 1969, p. 13E:1.

75. Bernard Weinraub, "Bucher Terms Navy Inquiry 'Completely Fair,'" *The New York Times,* 28 January 1969, p. 10:3.

76. *Ibid.*

77. Interview with Captain Thomas, 27 January 1970.

78. Weinraub, "Bucher Terms Navy Inquiry 'Completely Fair,'" p. 10:3.

79. Vermont Royster, "Ordeal of a Captain," *Wall Street Journal,* 30 January 1969, p. 10:3.

80. "Command Decision," *The New York Times,* 30 January 1969, p. 34:3.

81. U.S. Navy Dept., *Regulations for the Government of the Navy of the United States,* 1948 (Washington: U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1948).

82. Cartoon appearing in *The New York Times,* 2 February 1969, p. 13:3.

83. Cartoon appearing in *Newsweek,* 3 February 1969, p. 31.

84. "Who Is on Trial?" *The Christian Science Monitor,* 6 February 1969, p. E1:1.

85. James Reston, "Commander Bucher: Who Will Investigate the Investigators," *The New York Times,* 2 February 1969, p. 12E:3.

86. Transcript, Presidential News Conference, *The New York Times,* 7 February 1969, p. 16:6.

87. House Armed Services Subcommittee, p. 1629.

88. "The *Pueblo* Inquiry," *Wall Street Journal,* 17 March 1969, p. 16:1.

89. Bernard Weinraub, "*Pueblo* Inquiry Emphasis Shifts from Bucher's Surrender of Ship," *Boston Herald Traveler,* 13 May 1969, p. 4:3.

90. *Ibid.*

91. *Ibid.*

92. House Armed Services Subcommittee, p. 1691.

93. *Ibid.*

94. "Two Navy Officers Defend Conduct Code," *The New York Times,* 29 April 1969, p. 6:4.

95. Gallery, p. 124.

96. From the text of the prepared statement of John H. Chafee, Secretary of the Navy, Pentagon, Washington, D.C., 6 May 1969.

97. "Chafee Decision Writes Finis to Witch Hunt Over *Pueblo,*" *Newport* (R.I.) *Daily News,* 7 May 1969, p. 13:3.

98. *Ibid.*

99. *Ibid.*

100. "The *Pueblo* Affair—Finis," *The New York Times,* 7 May 1969, p. 46C:1.

101. Scott Cutlip and Allen Center, *Effective Public Relations* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice Hall, 1958), p. 58.

102. Gallery, p. 123.

103. "The Proud Men of the *Pueblo,*" *Reader's Digest,* June 1969, p. 61.

104. " . . . and 'Gentleman' Officer," *Wall Street Journal,* 14 February 1969, p. 10:3.

———————— Ψ ————————

. . . a popular outcry will drown the voice of military experience.

Mahan: Naval Strategy, 1911