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TRENDS IN SPANISH FOREIGN POLICY

The aftermath of World War II found Franco's Spain as the sole surviving Fascist state and somewhat of an outcast in the European community. In this situation Spain sought security in close relations with Latin American and Arab States and later was able to gain a bilateral security treaty with the United States. Today Spain seeks integration with Europe and the Common Market and could become progressively less interested in retaining American military bases on her soil.

An article prepared
by
Professor E. Inman Fox

Neutralist Spain emerged from World War II as the sole country with a totalitarian government in Western Europe. Slunned by its immediate neighbors, Spain was also isolated from the Soviet bloc countries because of its strong anti-Communist attitudes. In 1946 the General Assembly of the United Nations voted to deny Spain's entry into that body, hoping by this action to undermine the Falange as the last vestige of fascism in the West. Paradoxically, the result of this diplomatic ostracism was to strengthen Franco's position at home. Franco wisely saw—and has since proved—that the waiting game was the best policy to assure the continuity of his government. He knew that the nationalistic pride of the Spanish people is such that, when wounded, it tends to grow stronger.

The United States was the first major power to reconsider its policy vis-à-vis Spain, but its rethinking was prompted not by the aim of weakening or

strengthening Franco's regime, but by what it considered to be military needs. From the U.S. point of view, the Pact of Madrid, signed in 1953, was a means of gaining valuable military bases. More than 60 percent of the funds granted under the Economic Aid Agreement, a part of the pact, was devoted to achieving or supporting military objectives. It is evident that first-stage United States-Spanish relations contributed little to the economic development of Spain. Rather, they served to strengthen the Spanish military, long the backbone of Franco's authority. Franco was able to achieve the double goal of coming to an agreement with the world's greatest power and, at the same time, to reward his more important domestic supporters.

Along with its new-found relations with the United States, Spain's foreign policy in the fifties included the development of its historical ties with Latin America and the Arab world. If Spain

was to be isolated by Europe, it seemed wise to exploit its traditional relations with these emerging areas. Success in this venture would find Spain in the unique position of serving as a diplomatic "bridge" between North Africa and Europe, and between Latin America and the United States. Franco publicly denounced France's disposition of the Sultan of Morocco in 1953, courted Nasser, and even allowed the use of Spanish Morocco as a base by France's enemies after a full-scale revolt broke out in neighboring Algeria in 1954. When France suddenly granted Morocco independence in 1955, however, Spain found the shoe on the other foot and was forced to relinquish its Moroccan protectorate. Also, the aftermath of the Suez crisis of 1956 caused further erosion in Spain's pro-Arab policy because of the appearance of the Soviet Union as a powerful influence in the Middle East. For these and other reasons, Spain's interest in the Arab countries began to be less important than the increasing necessity for European cooperation.

In part due to U.S. influence, Spain was finally admitted to the United Nations in 1955—a fact which again enhanced Franco's reputation at home. Nevertheless, Spain was still excluded from NATO and the Council of Europe for what the member nations termed the "odious" character of its form of government. The decision to exclude Spain from NATO, however, was not unanimous. When General de Gaulle returned to a position of power in 1958, he stood ready to support Spain's admission to NATO. Although De Gaulle was an elected leader, the powers which he enjoyed as President of France paralleled those of Franco in Spain. Again Franco's regime enjoyed moments of justification. What De Gaulle really wanted, as we know, was a western Mediterranean alliance, with Spain playing a key role.

The question of Spain's relation or

admission to NATO has not been resolved, but, with the new base agreement signed with the United States in August of 1970, joining NATO is of little consequence to Spain's national security. The dilemma, nevertheless, was symptomatic of the difficulty that Spain has had in plotting its course in international relations. If NATO is to be considered as primarily a military defense system against Soviet bloc aggression, then Spain should clearly be admitted. This, of course, is essential to both the American and French line of reasoning. If, however, NATO is to stress its political purpose of protecting democracy and assuring the development of free institutions, then the admission of Spain is contradictory to these ends. This was the policy of the British Labor Party. We cannot overlook that any support from Great Britain in favor of Spain's admission would certainly undermine her arguments against the Spanish claim to Gibraltar.

Arthur P. Whitaker in his excellent book, *Spain and Defense of the West*, succinctly analyzes Spain's relationship to NATO in the following paragraph:

It is doubtful that joining NATO would give Spain any greater assurance of security, whereas it would nullify or diminish several advantages she now enjoys. For example, Spain would lose both the operational simplicity of her present bilateral relationship with the United States and some of the bargaining power she derives from her special position vis-à-vis the United States. That she nevertheless wants to join NATO is almost certainly due mainly to considerations of prestige, for admission to it would strengthen Franco's hand at home and abroad. In addition, it would aid Spain's efforts to promote trade with her European neighbors and to obtain large-scale

foreign aid in bringing her armed forces up to NATO standards.

In light of what has been said above, the advantages that Spain would again, then, would be clearly domestic: that is, improved opportunities for economic recovery and more satisfied armed forces.

Capitalizing upon its strategic geographical position, Spain was slowly but surely working its way back into the European community in the late fifties. The so-called Atlantic policy, which had served its ends, was beginning to be subordinated to "Europeanism." This was symbolized by the abrupt dismissal of the Foreign Minister, Martín Artajo, in 1957. He was closely identified with pro-Arab and anti-French attitudes and was replaced by one of the leading exponents of Europeanism, Fernando María de Castiella.

When considering Spain's post-World War II foreign policy, one must bear in mind that to the Western democratic powers who had fought in a long, hard war, there continued to exist in Spain a state that had won victory in a civil war under the ideological banner of totalitarianism. This meant that the democratic powers had to deal, for institutional convenience, with a state whose ideology and institutions were totalitarian. It seems evident that this difference gave rise to a duality of perspective on the part of the Western democratic powers. On the one hand, they could induce pressures in an effort to liberalize Spain; and on the other, they could make concessions to the Spanish regime in order to avoid a confrontation. From the beginning, Spain has taken advantage of this situation. It has been able to obtain aid without compromising the nature of its government, but it has had to accede to what otherwise would be uneven agreements. This was clearly the case in the Pact of Madrid with the United States.

A most important process of interna-

tional European politics, the construction of a platform which would lead to European integration, was not taken into consideration in the Spanish foreign policy of the fifties. One of the major reasons for this was that European public opinion on Spain was not always in line with the foreign policy of their governments. This caused Spain to depend principally on the United States for support, and the elements of persuasion and propaganda employed were not always in consonance with European views.

With the creation of the European Common Market in 1958 and the clear indication that Europe was in the midst of an evolution toward integration, the Spanish regime found itself having to deal with the contradiction mentioned before. That is, it had to close the gap in the differing political and economic institutions that separated the Franco regime from the European democracies. The first step was to examine the Spanish economy which, by the end of the 1950's, was in a disastrous condition. Spain had been admitted to the World Bank and International Monetary Fund in 1958, and in 1959 it gained entrance to the Organization for European Economic Cooperation. It requested their assistance, as well as that of Spanish banking circles (an unusual move for the Franco regime), in analyzing Spain's economic condition. These actions brought \$420 million in foreign loans and a stabilization plan to control inflation, a liberalization of regulations on controlling international trade and the domestic economy, and policies for the promotion of private investment. The large amounts of European economic aid to Spain plus the enormous increase in tourism—the major remedy for a deficit in the balance of payments—caused a rapid rise in the standard of living which served to Europeanize the Spanish market and consequently the Spanish way of life. The liberalization of Spain's economic

policies, however, produced a surprising contradiction between domestic and foreign policy. Foreign policy under Castiella apparently reflected the aspirations of Spanish society, but it was in direct conflict with Spanish political institutions.

This economic expansionist policy led Spain to negotiate international trade agreements with all of the countries of Eastern Europe. By 1969, exports and imports to the COMECON countries were not of much significance (\$85.7 million and \$79.2 million, respectively), but doors are now open to the Communist bloc. Increased efforts in this area might contribute to the solution of its serious deficit in the balance of payments. As might be expected, the old diplomatic specter of anticommunism deteriorated during the sixties. Domestic policy seemed to be less and less consistent with its foreign counterpart as Spain began formulating its foreign policy in terms similar to those of other Western nations. Only Gibraltar remained as a tie between foreign and domestic policy, and it permitted the Spanish Government again to enter the arena of international polemics by challenging the permanence of the American bases.

During the 1960's Spain's diplomatic relations seemed to lose much of their flexibility as they clearly aimed at integration into the European community. But Spain has been leading from a weak hand, and it is evident that new domestic policies have evolved in response to the demands imposed by the international scene. This evolution is reflected in several important internal happenings in 1969, which must be understood before one can undertake an examination of two external events that represent the culmination of Spain's foreign policy of the last decade: the signing of a preferential trade agreement with the Common Market in June of 1970 and the renewal of the military

base accord with the United States in August of 1970.

To the casual visitor, Spanish society seems to be no more restricted than others in the Western World. The apparent public apathy toward political issues can be credited, in no small measure, to lack of popular representation at the national level and the absence of a free press. Thus the very obvious improvement in the standard of living in the late fifties and in the sixties, for example, created the general impression among Spaniards that Franco's regime was successful in its plans for economic recovery. On the other hand, increased contact with Europe served to emphasize the lack of freedom inherent in Spanish political institutions. Also, in 1966 a new press law abolished all censorship prior to publication. The basic change was that printed matter no longer passed through the hands of a state censor, but rather the editor or publisher remained criminally liable for any subversive statements. Although the law has been applied unevenly and several responsible people have either been fined or imprisoned, critical evaluation of the social and political posture of Franco's government is now openly aired by many newspapers and books. The change produced by the granting of this partial freedom has been dramatic when one considers the nature and extent of previous public information. By 1967 representative government and free political association—political parties are officially outlawed in Spain—were publicly debated, and the workers and the students were challenging state-controlled syndicalism. The university students had been a thorn in Franco's side since 1956, but now their protest was supported not only by workers, but by growing numbers of middle-class professional people and priests.

It is not suggested that Franco's regime was approaching a showdown; this simply was not the case. However,

public disorder and protest had reached such a level that on 24 January 1969 Franco used it as a pretext to invoke the trumped-up "Spanish Bill of Rights" (*Fuero de los españoles*) of 1945 and decreed a "State of Exception" in Spain. This amounted to a return of police state tactics in an attempt to thwart the increasing threat to the legitimacy of Franco's government. It was obvious that one of the purposes of this move was to destroy a "syndrome" that was developing of considering criticism of the government—and therefore democratic participation—as a normal activity. The press was politicizing public opinion. The "State of Exception" was seen by many as engineered by the military in order to regain some of the power they had been steadily losing. They certainly vocally supported the action. But Spanish politics are often deceptive to the uninitiated. Better informed Spanish observers believe that the 2 months' suspension of constitutional guarantees was a necessary preparation for the declaration by Franco in July of 1969 that upon his death or abdication the monarchy would be restored in the person of Juan Carlos, grandson of Alfonso XIII.

How Franco was to prepare for his disappearance from the political scene had long been a moot question in Spanish political circles. But in 1968 the topic was already being used to define political alignment. The military and the Falange favored a regency in which they would be able to actually change Spain's political course, whereas *Opus Dei* and the moderate and conservative pro-European neocapitalists favored the continuity of the system which they believed possible under the monarchy of Juan Carlos.

The *Opus Dei* has emerged from Franco's shift in policies as the single most important social and political force in Spain. It is a semisecret Catholic lay organization founded in 1928 under Spanish auspices and officially

established under papal authority with an apostolic constitution in 1950. It appeals to an elite who desire to carry out an apostolate without abandoning their secular occupations. Although they claim no political organization, Spanish members of *Opus* have managed to rise to key positions not only in the Government, but also in the universities, publishing outlets, private banking, and other national commercial and industrial concerns. The first major Cabinet shift that Franco made, in 1957, included two *Opus* ministers: Alberto Ullastres (Commerce) and Mariano Navarro Rubio (Finance). Ullastres has been the architect of Spain's plans to enter the Common Market. Laureano López Rodó, another member of *Opus Dei*, was named to head up a ministry created in the early sixties to direct Spain's series of development plans. In fact, *Opus Dei* has been successful in attracting and training a large body of talent. Known as the "technocrats," they have emphasized the sciences and technical branches of learning, and they are especially capable and knowledgeable in economic and industrial development, although politically and socially they are conservative.

Franco had long practiced political astuteness in appointments to his Cabinet, being careful to assure representation from all the major pressure groups. However, the Cabinet realignment in 1965, on the heels of an economic crisis, increased the number of *Opus* members, and the new Government announced in October of 1969 has at least nine identifiable *Opus Dei* ministers, including the President of the Government, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, the Minister of Information and Tourism, and the Minister of Education. Because it is almost certain that this Cabinet will effectuate the transition from Franco to the monarchy, one must consider *Opus Dei's* domination as little short of a coup d'état. It is also significant that the Falange, for the first time

since the civil war, found itself without representation. The Falange is the official political organization of the Spanish nationalist state and its doctrine of national syndicalism has been central to Franco's regime. The result of its exclusion at the Cabinet level is a transfer of the decisionmaking process from the ideologists and bureaucrats to a new order of administrators.

So powerful has *Opus Dei* become that it was able to shake off its involvement in the only major financial scandal to break in Spain. This scandal resulted from policies that were designed to make available large Government loans to private industry in order to make the private sector competitive in the international market. In the spring of 1969 it was discovered and publicized that MATESA (manufacturers of textile machinery) had received some \$140 million of Government loans in a 5-year period with little to show for their operation since they had only manufactured some 900 machines and sold none. They were also unable to meet their repayment schedule. Government accounting procedures were called into question, and several *Opus* ministers were rumored to have been implicated, including Gregorio López Bravo, who became the new Minister of Foreign Affairs in October of 1969. The Falange was tireless in trying to discredit the "technocrats," but to little avail. As of this present writing (autumn 1970), the affair has not gone beyond the secret report of a special commission.

The strong position, then, of López Rodó, the new President of the Government and Minister of the Development Plan, and his team—many of the new ministers worked under him in the previous Cabinet—indicates that Franco will continue his basic political policy of liberalizing the domestic economy with the principal goal of pursuing association with the Common Market.

Spain first explored entry into the Common Market in February of 1962,

but conversations did not start until December of 1964. It was these conversations, under the leadership of Alberto Ullastres, that the Franco regime used as the nucleus for its public propaganda during the middle and the late sixties. Actually, little was accomplished for some time, but the Spanish populace was led to believe that their country was on the verge of total integration into the European community. By 1969 Spanish trade with the countries of the Common Market amounted to more than 50 percent of both exports and imports. To continue without any formal agreements with these countries would place Spain in an unguarded economic position.

To ensure a legitimate position, Spain signed a Preferential Trade Agreement with the Common Market in June of 1970. This represented an essential step toward possible full integration with the European Economic Community, but there are some who believe that the concessions Spain made exceeded her ability to compete.

The Common Market itself operates on the principle of no trade barriers for manufactured goods and on regulated guarantees for agricultural products. Spain has agreed, on a reciprocal basis, progressively to lower tariffs on industrial imports, while the Common Market has agreed to only slight reductions on some of the agricultural items grown by Spain. Others have been excluded entirely. The burden is placed clearly on the successful development of industry in an economy which is still predominantly agricultural. Spanish industry—until recently supported mostly by Government loans and foreign investment, with little private Spanish investment—will have to compete in a period of 6 years with countries whose economy has been developed and hardened by more than 10 years of free competition. Many feel that Spanish industry will not be able to compete effectively with the Common Market.

When compared to Greece, the critics of these developments have good grounds for complaint and believe that the regime has jeopardized the Spanish economy in order to improve its international image. In 1962 Greece was given 12 years, offered economic and permanent technical assistance to aid in the transition, and was promised full membership at the end of its term. The Spanish application for entry into the Common Market will be reviewed after 6 years with no assurance of acceptance.

We should not overlook one other basic point. One ultimate objective of the Common Market is the integration of the social and economic fabric of each member country in an attempt to achieve political unity. By the time the term of Spain's agreement runs its course, the European Parliament, made up of popularly elected representatives from each country, may be in operation. It is apparent that if Spain's goal is to achieve final admission into the Common Market, it must radically revise its political institutions. It would seem reasonable that Spain would at least have to have a mechanism for electing representatives and, further, that Spanish labor syndicalism would have to be abandoned, at least in its present form, in order to have a common meeting ground with the other European trade unions.

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The obligatory period of the Pact of Madrid was 10 years, with the provisions for two renewal periods of 5 years each. It was renewed in 1963 with the added stipulation that the United States could home-port Polaris submarines in Rota. In return for the use of the bases during the 5-year period, Spain was granted \$100 million in economic aid. In 1968, however, Spain was more confident of her diplomatic position on the international scene—national security had not been Spain's primary

purpose for negotiating with the United States—and she refused to renew the agreement under the same conditions. Instead, Spain made four basic demands: (1) \$1.2 billion of new military equipment; (2) the removal of Spain from the list of "developed" countries so that it could be eligible for U.S. economic aid to underdeveloped countries; (3) the subjection of U.S. military bases and personnel in Spain to Spanish military jurisdiction; and (4) the fulfillment of U.S. unmet obligations to Spain.

In view of the growing antiwar sentiment in the United States and the subsequent abhorrence of the continued support of the military in nondemocratic countries, to request an increase in military aid of such proportions was a tactical error on the part of Madrid. Given this situation, these conditions were unhesitatingly rejected by the United States. But Spain maintained that the presence of the bases on Spanish soil represented a maximum risk for Spain at a minimal obligation for the United States. Both nations agreed that the bases would not be dismantled until negotiations were declared at an impasse.

Between September of 1968 and the summer of 1970, several developments took place which seemed to enhance Spain's bargaining position. It became obvious that the increasing Russian military and technical presence in the United Arab Republic and other Arab nations, coupled with the deployment of a capable Russian naval force, was forcing a change in the balance of power in the Mediterranean area. Also, De Gaulle's demand for the evacuation of the American bases in France by 1967, followed by the sudden expulsion of the U.S. military from Libya and Wheelus Air Force Base in 1969, made the bases in Spain even more important.

Torrejón de Ardoz, on the outskirts of Madrid, is the headquarters of the 16th Air Force and the largest SAC base

in Europe. It is a key to the NATO defense system. Most of the air-refueling aircraft in the Mediterranean are stationed at Morón de la Frontera, Seville, and the naval base at Rota not only provides major logistic support for the 6th Fleet, but also for the Polaris submarines deployed into the Mediterranean. Military geography of 1970 postulates the importance of Spain to any Western defense system, but the Spanish have still not been asked to join NATO. When one views the American commitment to the continued strength of a Western defense alliance, with the apparent withdrawal of France from NATO, the growing autonomy of West Germany, and the Italian Parliament's criticism of U.S. power, it would appear that the United States needs Spain as much as Spain needs the United States.

In 1953 the Pact of Madrid had been signed without referral to the Spanish Cortes, the so-called representative body with no legislative powers. In a then depoliticized society there was no way of judging public opinion, but the new press law of 1966 has brought about some change. The public was bombarded with analyses of United States-Spanish relations, and, with the exception of several official organs, the conclusions often suggested that Spain was being exploited. The Spaniard was reminded, for instance, that his country had been denied inclusion in the Marshall Plan and through 1968 American aid to Spain had amounted to only \$2.1 billion, of which almost 40 percent was in the form of loans, half of which (\$400 million) was to be spent in the United States. By the same date the United States had given \$5.6 billion to Turkey, \$4.2 billion to Greece, and \$3.1 billion to Yugoslavia. The United States had not even produced all of the \$100 million in economic aid promised in 1963. It was also argued that relations with the United States are of little value to Spain's international diplomacy: they alienate Spain from many of the Latin

American countries and from much of the Arab world, and they certainly have produced no support for what the Spaniards consider their legitimate claim to Gibraltar.

The accidental ejection of a nuclear device over Palomares in 1965 brought to the attention of the Spanish people the risk they were taking in allowing American bases on their soil. Not conceiving of themselves as participants, the Spaniards were unable to accept psychologically the realities of a cold war. From their point of view the risk was not necessary to their own national security, but rather to that of the United States. It was in this context of the fear of a nuclear retaliation on an uninvolved third country that the Spanish press continually pointed out to its readers that the bases at Zaragoza and Torrejón are in close proximity to heavily populated areas. Indeed, Torrejón is almost a suburb of Madrid, an area where one-tenth of Spain's population is concentrated.

While some of these objections can be debated, most of them have some validity. Spain is being used in the defense network of Western Europe but has not been *accepted* by these countries. It is probable that if the Franco regime had consulted the Spanish people the negotiations would have been different and more arduous. During Secretary Rogers' visit to Spain in May of 1970, 120 Spanish leaders of all political persuasions signed a petition requesting an audience with him in order to express their views. Not only did Secretary Rogers refuse to talk to them, but they were fined by the Spanish authorities for their political activity.

Nevertheless, it remained for the Spanish Government to convince its people that any agreement it made with the United States would stress cooperation between the American and Spanish military in a defense system, rather than the almost total freedom of action

enjoyed previously by American forces. A more palatable arrangement would play down the military aspects, assure the reduction of retaliatory risks, and emphasize aid for economic development. The advent to power of the *Opus Dei* technocrats and the appointment of Gregorio López Bravo, previous Minister of Industry, as Minister of Foreign Affairs in October of 1969 were to play a significant role in the change of direction of the negotiations.

In the United States the Committee on Foreign Relations, chaired by Senator Fulbright, was adverse to any agreement not thoroughly discussed on the Senate floor. For this reason the Nixon administration requested, with little notification, the presence of the Spanish officials, and on 6 August 1970 both countries signed the "executive" Agreement of Friendship and Cooperation between Spain and the United States. There are 40 articles of which eight, the most detailed, deal with military and defense arrangements. The others cover cooperation in the areas of cultural exchange (pumping up of the Fulbright Program), scientific and technical education, problems of environment and urbanism, and agricultural and economic development. The fact that the new agreement was placed on the list of general international accords rather than that of military agreements is of mere diplomatic and propagandistic value. If commitment is to be measured in dollars—and López Bravo insists that friendship cannot be—then a large majority of the aid promised by the United States is tied to defense.

Under the new agreement, Spanish sovereignty over the bases is greater than before. Spain simply "permits" the presence of American forces as a defense partner but is responsible for the security of the bases and must approve, in joint consultation with American officials, their operational and tactical use. If the United States withdraws its forces before or upon expiration of the

5-year agreement, the bases will revert intact, at no cost, to the Spanish Government. Civilian labor needed for the maintenance and operation of the bases will be hired by the Spanish Government, and their salaries and conditions will be regulated by Spanish labor laws. This last item answers to the past complaints made by the syndicates on American hiring and firing practices.

In exchange for the use of the bases, the United States will arrange for loans from the Export-Import Bank for the purchase of 55 aircraft (estimated at \$120 million), of which 36 are the Phantom F-4C; it will give the Spanish Army 54 M-48 tanks, 48 M-113 APC's, 16 HUEY helicopters, and some 78 pieces of heavy artillery; and it will loan the Spanish Navy two Guppy IIA submarines, five FRAM II destroyers, four minesweepers, three LST's and two auxiliary ships. The United States will

BIOGRAPHIC SUMMARY



Professor E. Inman Fox holds a doctoral degree in romance languages from Princeton University (1960). The author of a book and many articles on contemporary Spain, he was a Fulbright Scholar in

France, held a Fulbright Research Grant in Spain, and is currently the holder of a Guggenheim Fellowship. He has taught at Princeton, Vanderbilt, and the University of Massachusetts and since 1967 is Professor of Hispanic Studies and Chairman of the Department at Vassar College. An NROTC graduate from Vanderbilt, he served at sea aboard the U.S.S. *Navarro* (APA 215) and the U.S.S. *Walworth County* (LST 1164). A commander in the U.S. Naval Reserve, he has been Commanding Officer, Naval Reserve Surface Division 3-87(M), now holds the billet of Group Commander, Naval Reserve Group Commander/Staff Unit 3-12(S), Poughkeepsie, N.Y., and recently served a period of active duty for training at the Naval War College.

also contribute 70 percent of the cost to complete the modernization and extension of Spain's air alert defense system and will train the people to man it. This will not only allow Spain to protect its own air space, but the Spanish alert and control system will be integrated into the NATO network. In addition, Spain will be given the huge American oil pipeline which extends across almost three-fourths of the country from Cádiz to Zaragoza. This will represent enormous economies for the Spanish petroleum industry in the Sahara.

Spain, of course, would like to have had a mutual defense agreement. There had been concern in some American circles that the vague language in the Pact of 1953 could have been interpreted as an obligation on the part of the United States to come to Spain's defense in case of attack by a third party. However, this would be more realistically a treaty commitment that would require ratification by two-thirds of the U.S. Senate, a possibility too remote for serious consideration. Spain had to settle for "support of the defense system."

In an interview published in *Informaciones* of Madrid on 8 August 1970, López Bravo—when asked about Spain's interest in a formal association with NATO—stated that one would have to consider the political and economic

situation as well as the necessities of defense. At least, he said, Spain would need a period of transition to rearrange budgetary priorities. He calculates that in order to join NATO, Spain would have to double its current defense budget of approximately \$629 million. The new agreement with the United States strengthens Spain's national security considerably. It gives to Spain most of the advantages of membership in NATO—except diplomatic leverage—with fewer obligations. Given its past policy and its feeling of rejection by the European community, Spain will surely wait to be asked to join NATO. With the continuing Soviet buildup in the Mediterranean and hesitation of NATO membership to commit resources to maintain parity with the Warsaw Pact, Great Britain and the Scandinavian countries might be forced to withdraw their opposition. Public acknowledgment of such would enhance the credibility of the Spanish regime at home. Nevertheless, progress in the integration of Spain into the European community does depend on the progressive democratization of Spanish political institutions. However, if this occurs—given the "colonialized attitude" of the Spanish people toward the U.S. military presence—it would not be unlikely that the Americans would be requested to abandon the bases.

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The safety of the people must be the supreme law.

Roman proverb