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In order to determine the feasibility of an all-volunteer officer corps in the absence of a draft, a group research project at the Naval War College examined the attitudes of college youth toward military service. They concluded that the draft provides the major incentive for first-term officer volunteers in all services and that without a draft it will not be feasible to obtain a sufficient supply of qualified officers to maintain a 2.5 million man force.

THE OFFICER CORPS IN AN ALL-VOLUNTEER FORCE: WILL COLLEGE MEN SERVE?

A Group Research Project

by

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For those interested and involved with national security, it is a critical period in time. The whole issue of national defense requirement—how much, what kind, and how much will it cost—has been caught up in the larger issue of the type of society this country sees for itself in the decade ahead. The American public has been made keenly aware of such problems as increased crime rates, deterioration of cities, pollution of air and water, and the continuing unrest on college campuses. A national debate has evolved over the priority national defense should enjoy in relationship to society's social and environmental needs. The war in Vietnam and the operation of the draft have brought into question our existing military manpower procurement policies. These policies have been challenged as archaic and inequitable, and the propo-

sition has been made that the Nation should abandon conscription in favor of voluntary recruitment.

Conscription was introduced to this country during the Civil War—the first conflict that called for the use of large bodies of men over a sustained period of time. It was reintroduced in World War I. With the threat of America's involvement in World War II, Congress enacted the first national peacetime draft on 6 September 1940. This act subsequently resulted in the induction of over 16 million men during the 5-year period of hostilities. At the time of its passage, opposition in the Congress was considerable, and renewal of the act in August 1941 was accomplished by the narrow margin of one vote.

In the post-World War II period, the United States for the first time found itself in a significantly different inter-

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national role. National security requirements and worldwide commitments demanded the largest peacetime military force in the history of the Nation. The administration requested Congress to extend the Military Training and Selective Service Act of 1940. The legislation was extended to 31 March 1947, but upon the recommendation of President Harry S. Truman, Congress permitted the act to expire.

During this period, from March 1947 to March 1948, the United States experienced its only true volunteer armed force in an environment of extensive peacetime military commitments. Attention was directed to enhancing the image of the Armed Forces and making service life more attractive to the youth of the country. Innovative steps were taken to improve the living, working, and training conditions of men in service. The Army spent \$20.5 million for recruiting in an effort to induce eligible young men to volunteer. Despite these concerted efforts, the Army fell more than 20 percent below minimum manpower goals. President Truman ended the experiment on 17 March 1948 and asked Congress to enact universal military training and to reenact Selective Service. Congress rejected the request for universal military training but acceded to his desire for the selective draft. This action culminated in passage of the Universal Military Training and Service Act of 1951 which has been the basis in law for maintaining U.S. military strength for the past two decades.

In 1966 the President and Congress again reviewed the operation of the Nation's conscription laws. The Marshall Commission, appointed by President Johnson, while finding certain inequities in the Selective Service System, rejected the idea that the Nation adopt a voluntary system of manpower procurement because of its inflexibility in times of crises. It is interesting to note that some of the provisions suggested by this earlier commission were the use of a

lottery-type selection system, the draft of 19-year olds, and the tightening of student and occupational deferments. Similarly, the Clark Panel, appointed by the Congress that same year, also rejected the all-volunteer concept on the grounds of inflexibility, expense, and lack of a unifying influence on the Nation.¹

On 27 March 1969 President Nixon announced the creation of an Advisory Commission to develop a comprehensive plan for eliminating conscription and moving toward an all-volunteer armed force as soon as the reduced manpower requirements in Vietnam would permit. The 15-member commission, chaired by former Secretary of Defense Thomas S. Gates, Jr., submitted its report to the President on 21 February 1970. The Commission recommended that the present Selective Service System should be replaced by an all-volunteer force by 30 June 1971, when the present draft law expires. A standby draft system would be required in the event of national emergencies, and that system would be invoked only by resolution of Congress at the request of the President.²

A key element to the effectiveness of any military establishment is the procurement and composition of its officer corps, and it is this subject which shall be examined in some depth. Noteworthy is the fact that in recent years the major portion of the officer corps has been recruited from the ranks of college graduates. While it is important to continue to attract college-graduate officers, it is generally acknowledged that without a draft a college-graduate officer corps will be more difficult to recruit. Consequently, crucial to determining the feasibility of the all-volunteer force concept is an examination of the college-trained officer procurement programs currently in being. By far the largest single source of newly commissioned officers for the Army is the Reserve Officer Training Corps (ROTC)

located on college campuses across the country. The Navy relies on its Officer Candidate School (OCS) for the majority of its new officers. In the Air Force, the ROTC and Officer Training School (OTS) programs share equally as the major sources of commissioned officers. Both the Navy OCS program and the Air Force OTS program are composed of college graduates.

During the last few years, a number of schools have either ended their ROTC programs or indicated they planned to phase them out in the future. It is not clear whether these are isolated incidents or the beginning of a trend. However, with advancing weapon systems technology and the complexity of the roles required of officers, it is important that the majority of new officers continue to come from the college campuses. Consequently, the campus-centered ROTC and college-graduate OCS/OTS programs will continue to be the major source of new officers for years to come.

While this may be so, one needs only to read the daily newspapers to be aware of the fact that a social change has been underway on college campuses over the past several years. Campus unrest and disorders have resulted in such acts as the physical takeover of administration buildings and the burning of ROTC offices. These actions are not confined to any particular section of the country, but appear to be widespread. They occur at both large and small colleges, both public and private schools, and involve some of the most prestigious universities in the country.

Much of the unrest and the resulting physical violence have been attributed to youth's hostility toward existing authority, typified by the draft, and sparked by revulsion against the war in Vietnam. Another element that is contributing to campus unrest, and will continue to do so for the next few years, is described by academic officials as a "new breed" of youngsters to

whom the traditional campus seems wholly outdated. Dr. Kenneth Hoffman, professor of mathematics and chairman of the commission studying the future of education at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, conceded: "The change in students during the 1960's was tremendous—yet you wonder what is going to come in the 1970's when you see the pace of change as reflected in our entering freshmen and the unrest in high schools."³

While studies have been conducted by various groups concerning the development of a voluntary armed force, they tend to pose the question of professional officer motivation primarily in economic terms. Little has been done by way of measuring the attitudes of college youth toward military service. The question that presents itself is, How deep do these antimilitary feelings run, and how will they affect officer procurement efforts in the future? Specifically, given the current attitudes of college youth toward the military, can the United States expect to maintain an adequate number of college-trained officers in the Armed Forces under an all-volunteer force concept? To answer this question a research project was developed, and a national survey was conducted at the college level.

The President's budget message of April 1969 suggested that active duty force levels would eventually return to pre-Vietnam levels which, for the period FY 61-65, averaged 2.6 million men. The Secretary of Defense gave some indication of postwar force levels in January 1970 when he reported that U.S. treaty obligations will not permit reduction of the Armed Forces below 2.4 million men without a considerable expenditure to maintain a large and modern reserve force.⁴ Based on these factors, the study group assumed 2.5 million men to be a reasonable force level approximation upon which to develop officer strength estimates.

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TABLE I—OFFICER DISTRIBUTION FOR 2.5 MILLION FORCE AND PROJECTED AVERAGE ACCESSIONS REQUIRED FOR 1971-80 BY SERVICE

Service	Number of Officers	Percent of Total Corps	Avar. Annual Access. 1971-80
Army	101,690	32%	10,800
Navy	69,795	22%	7,300
Marine Corps	16,605	5%	2,000
Air Force	131,602	41%	8,200
DOD Total	319,692	100%	28,300

Source: Office of the Secretary of Defense, Directorate for Statistical Services, "Selected Manpower Statistics," 15 April 1969, p. 19-24; Center for Naval Analysis, "Computation of Officer Accessions 1971-80," Working Paper (Washington: February 1970).

Pre-Vietnam experience indicates that such a force would include approximately 320,000 officers, representing 12.7 percent of the total active duty force. This total would be distributed by service as indicated in table I. Also shown is the estimated officer accessions required during the 1970's to maintain the officer corps strength. These estimates are based on continuation of Selective Service and are computed from anticipated loss rates for all reasons, both voluntary and involuntary.

These data represent requirements which officer procurement programs must satisfy. The projections indicate the Armed Forces will need approximately 28,300 first-term officers annually in order to support a 2.5 million man force. The primary source for meeting this need is the male college graduate.

Officer procurement programs have traditionally emphasized the baccalaureate degree as a desirable requirement for a commission, although each of the services has commissioned officers with less than this level of academic education during periods of mobilization in order to meet minimum officer needs. Approximately 25 percent of the present officer corps are not college graduates (the majority of these officers

are products of older programs which required only 2 years of college or in some instances no college at all). The emphasis on college-trained men is reflected by the increasing proportion of officers who are college graduates as demonstrated in table II.

The accelerated rate of change in weapons technology, coupled with the many options available for their deployment, has carried with it the demand for increased numbers of technically and managerially qualified commissioned officers. The impact of battlefield mobility tactics and small-unit independent actions in unconventional ground warfare has created new demands for tactical and technical leadership skills

TABLE II—ESTIMATED EDUCATIONAL LEVEL OF COMMISSIONED OFFICERS ON ACTIVE DUTY BY SELECTED YEARS 1956-67

Educational Level	1956	1960	1963	1967
College Graduate	55%	57%	69%	73%
Soma College	84%	90%	93%	91%
High School Graduate	98%	99%	99+%	99+%

Source: Office of the Secretary of Defense, Directorate for Statistical Services, "Selected Manpower Statistics," 15 April 1969, p. 37.

among junior officers. Several analysts have emphasized that military officers must not only possess the traditional military attributes and skills, but must thoroughly appreciate the many aspects of our national, political, economic, and social life. They must have technical competence as well as a broad outlook, judgment, and wisdom.⁵

The demand for highly skilled military officers coincides with the increased complexity of the American economy. The armed services must compete for talent in a highly competitive labor market and must continue to tap those social groups most likely to predispose young men toward a military career. College graduates represent the primary source within American society for providing the quality demanded by the officer corps. It has been estimated that during the 1970's approximately 400,000 male students annually will earn baccalaureate degrees.⁶ The ability to attract sufficient numbers of these young men to military service is a prerequisite to an all-volunteer force.

Most officers enter active duty at the ensign or second lieutenant level and receive their initial commission as a result of one of the service-sponsored officer training programs. A brief description of the three primary programs—service academies, ROTC (Reserve Officer Training Corps), and OCS (Officer Candidate School) is necessary for subsequent analysis.

The U.S. Military Academy, the U.S. Naval Academy, and the U.S. Air Force Academy all conduct 4-year courses combining academic and military education and all award a bachelor's degree. The services are currently experiencing a career retention rate of approximately 75 percent among Academy graduates after the initial 4 or 5 years of obligated service have been completed.

For the Army, the ROTC is a major source of new officers each year. There are both 2- and 4-year programs leading to Reserve commissions, although out-

standing graduates may qualify for the Regular Army. Navy ROTC is unique in that a distinct part of its "Regular" program provides a sizable number of scholarship-assisted graduates for the Regular Navy. The "contract" programs of NROTC compare to the Army's standard ROTC program. The Marine Corps participates to a limited degree in the Navy ROTC program. Air Force ROTC offers two principal programs. One sponsors academic preparation leading to flying duties as a rated officer, while the other program sponsors students desiring a nonflying duty assignment.

The Army's minimum active duty requirement varies from 2 years for Reserve officers to 4 years for full scholarship holders. The overall career retention rate for Army ROTC graduates averages approximately 25 percent. The Navy requires 3 years' active duty for contract Reserve officers and 4 years for Regular ROTC graduates. Average career retention is approximately 7 percent and 27 percent respectively. The Air Force has the longest active duty requirement, demanding 4 years active duty for nonflying officers and 6 years of service for pilots and navigators. The average career retention rate for Air Force ROTC officers is approximately 50 percent.

Army OCS is a prime source of second lieutenants during expansion periods. Candidates are chosen from warrant officer and enlisted applicants who possess at least a high school education. College graduates may enlist for the Army OCS but are required to complete basic and advanced individual training before entering OCS training. The majority of Army OCS graduates are commissioned as Reserve officers. All candidates for the Navy OCS program must have a college degree except for a limited number of meritorious enlisted men. With minor exceptions, the Navy program awards a Reserve commission. The Air Force Officer

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Training School (OTS) limits its input to college graduates only, including those enlisted men who are in the Airmen Education and Commissioning Program (AECP). Distinguished graduates may qualify for Regular Air Force commissions. The Marine Corps OCS is used to fill unprogramed Marine officer requirements, and the selection criteria vary yearly. The Marine Platoon Leader Course (PLC) is a college source program conducted during the summer months. Army OCS demands a minimum active duty commitment of 2 years and currently achieves a career retention level of 75 percent. Air Force OTS requires a 4- and 6-year service obligation, the longer term being for flight trainees, and OTS achieves a career retention rate of approximately 48 percent. The Navy and Marine programs all have minimum service requirements of 3 years for Reserve and 4 years for Regular appointees. These programs are experiencing retention rates of approximately 15 percent for Navy OCS, 50 percent for Marine OCS, and 30 percent for Marine PLC.

The contribution to officer accessions by the various procurement programs during the period FY 61-65 is

shown in table III.⁷ It can be seen from this table that during the pre-Vietnam period the United States obtained the majority (64 percent) of its first-term officers through the OCS and ROTC programs. Further, it should be noted that, excluding the direct appointees and special category officers from the 5-year totals, the ROTC and OCS programs have provided 90 percent of the first-term officer accessions. This group is obviously vital to the maintenance of a viable and well-qualified professional officer corps.

One reason for suspecting that an adequate supply of volunteer officers could prove difficult to obtain is that the center of current dissent is the college campus. The most vocal and physical manifestations of opposition to the Vietnam war, to the draft, and to ROTC units on campus are found among college youth. As previously discussed, the primary source of officers is this same college youth, and the direct results of their protests have been significant. During the 1968-69 academic year, student pressures caused four ROTC units to be "invited" to leave campus. During the same period, student groups at 49 universities

TABLE III—PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL ANNUAL OFFICER ACCESSIONS BY SOURCE FOR FY 61-65

Service	OCS/OTS ^a	ROTC	ROC/PLC ^b	Academy	Other ^c
Army	8%	63% S	—	3%	26%
Navy	41% S	17%	2%	7%	33%
Marine Corps	31% S	12%	33%	4%	20%
Air Force	31% S	32% S	—	4%	33%

^aIncludes Navy AOC, Marine OCC, Air Force OCS, and AECP.

^bAlthough a significant source of Marine Corps officers, this group assembles for training during the summer months only and was unavailable to this study group.

^cIncludes direct appointments, medical, dental, nurses, chaplains, lawyers, women officers, interservice transfers, NESEP, Navy Limited Duty Officers, and recalled retired and Reserve officers.

S—denotes program included in Naval War College Survey, March 1970.

Source: Alan E. Fechter, *The Supply of First-Term Military Officers* (Institute for Defense Analysis, Alexandria, Va.: 1967), p. 55.

convinced the administration that compulsory ROTC should be discontinued.⁸ This general disaffection with the military resulted in a dramatic 35 percent decline in the Army and Air Force first-year ROTC enrollments and a 25 percent decline overall during the 1969-70 academic year.⁹

While the Vietnam war has undoubtedly accelerated and amplified youth's dissatisfaction with the military, these attitudes are not just a recent

phenomenon. The change in attitudes began in the early 1960's and is manifested in the ROTC enrollment data portrayed in figure 1. Student pressure over the years has been the major factor in the sharp decline in the number of compulsory ROTC units. The related decline in MS-I enrollment is clearly evident. The only aberrations in the enrollment curve are the 1961-62 Berlin buildup and the 1965-66 Vietnam buildup.




Fig. 1—Army ROTC MS-I Enrollment Compared with Compulsory Programs FY 61-70

Source: U.S. Dept. of the Army, Office of DCSPER, "College Male Enrollments, ROTC Enrollments, and Officer Production," and "Trend Required to Elective," Working Papers, 1969.

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Essentially, production from this vital source of college trained youth is supported by draft pressures. Figure 2 displays the close parallel between production and draft calls when the lag time between increased draft pressure and the 2- to 4-year production lag is taken into account. A slight decline in production was experienced in the early 1960's, but this was rescued by the combined effect of the 1964 ROTC Vitalization Act and the 1966 jump in

draft calls. The study group foresees that with a continued reduction in draft calls, the ROTC production curve will assume a slope similar to the MS-I enrollment curve in figure 1. In any event, these data clearly indicate that a significant downward trend in attitudes was established before the war became a major issue.

Another supporting hypothesis is that economic incentives at or below comparability with the civilian sector




Fig. 2—Army ROTC Production Compared with Draft Calls FY 61-70

Source: U.S. Dept. of the Army, Office of DCSPER, "College Male Enrollments, ROTC Enrollments, and Officer Production," Working Paper, 1969; U.S. Dept. of Defense, "Selected Manpower Statistics," April 1969, p. 46-48.

will be inadequate to attract college graduates in sufficient numbers to satisfy requirements. There is substantial evidence that, although significant, the pay of officers is not the prime inducement for service.¹⁰ There is also a finite limit to monetary incentives which are politically feasible. The possibility of the President and the Congress approving monetary incentives which would raise officer salaries above comparability is unlikely. Historically, officer salary increases have lagged behind civilian raises, and basic scales have remained below the level of comparability.¹¹ There is another important aspect to the monetary considerations of an all-volunteer concept. Assuming the legislative and executive branches did agree on salary increases adequate to initiate a volunteer system, the political feasibility of maintaining comparative rates on a continuing basis is a moot question. The costs of such a system during periods of mobilization would be astronomical and must be considered by the Congress in making their initial decision. Consequently, the feasibility of a volunteer system based primarily on monetary incentives appears questionable.

Research Design. The central problem and the subordinate notions just presented describe the basic framework and direction of the research effort. A review of prior investigations reveals that considerable research has been accomplished in the general area of attitudes toward military service. Although not current, these earlier efforts have been particularly useful in the formulation stage of the study and have been invaluable throughout the study in comparative and trend analysis.

The principal deficiencies in available data are lack of timeliness and lack of information related specifically to potential officers. The increased pitch of campus dissent and the ominous drop in ROTC enrollments this year estab-

lished a clear requirement for current data directly from this primary source of officers. Other research on this subject has concentrated on active duty junior officers and enlisted inductees or enlistees. Since no current data on the attitudes of potential officers toward military service could be located, an original research effort was considered mandatory.

Before specific methods of collection were established, it was necessary to formulate the exact information that would be required to support the central problem. Answers to the following questions were deemed essential: What are the current attitudes toward military service among prospective officers (namely ROTC and OCS candidates)? What percent of these officers would have volunteered for a commissioning program if there had been no draft? What is the strength of realistic monetary incentives? Has the image of being a military officer deteriorated in the eyes of prospective officers? What has been the impact of the Vietnam war on current attitudes toward a military career? Are there quality differences between those who indicate they would volunteer and those who admit they are definitely draft motivated? Current information on these points should lead to a confirmation or denial of the downward trend in attitudes of college youth toward military service and permit a realistic appraisal of the central problem: the supply of officers under an all-volunteer force system. Critical questions concerning anticipated officer requirements under an all-volunteer force concept generated a need for a variety of quantitative data regarding force levels, annual accessions, and retention rates. These data were taken almost exclusively from Department of Defense (DOD) sources. Over 20 direct interviews and telephone conversations were conducted by members of the study group with key DOD manpower officials, high-ranking military officers,

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social scientists at several universities, and with four of the key research associates who worked for the Presidential Commission on the All-Volunteer Force.

The groups of prospective officers whose attitudes were required are described in the previous section on officer resources. The large size and geographical dispersion of these groups dictated two features of the research. Since it was impossible to conduct sufficient personal interviews to approach any degree of representativeness, the questionnaire was selected as the primary data-gathering instrument.

The ROTC sample was stratified to insure representativeness by service (Army and Air Force) and by year of school (freshman through senior). The sample size was established by using the standard error of the proportion to insure an accuracy of plus or minus 6 percent at a .05 probability level on the key draft motivation question.¹² Sufficient universities were purposefully selected (from among those having voluntary ROTC programs only) to insure adequate representation along geographic, size, and school sponsorship lines. At the universities selected, approximately 20 percent of the ROTC enrollment in each school year was surveyed.¹³ A total of 3,000 questionnaires were mailed to 29 universities. Of these, 2,400 were returned from 28 universities. This represents a 1.7 percent sample of the total Army and Air Force 1969-70 ROTC population of 145,000 students.

The samples of the Navy OCS, the Air Force OCS, and the Marine Corps OCS were taken from a total of 10 different classes which were in session during February 1970. A total of 1,250 questionnaires were sent to these schools, and 1,197 were returned, which yields a 12 percent sample of the programed FY-70 output of 9,800 officers from these sources.

The basic questionnaire was designed to secure essential information in three general areas: biographical data, extent of draft motivation, and attitudes toward a variety of military-related subjects. The ROTC questionnaire was pretested by administration to 117 students representing 4 class years at a nearby university. This pretest was accomplished by the study group to afford the opportunity to gain firsthand the reactions and suggestions of the students. As a result of this effort, several questions were eliminated and others were extensively revised. None of the pretest responses are included in the final data. The NOCS, AFOTS, and MCOCS questionnaires required only minor adaptations (primarily in the biographical section) to the basic ROTC questionnaire.

A special questionnaire was designed to obtain information from Professors of Military Science and Aerospace Studies, pertaining to the overall ROTC program. The insights provided by these senior officers from their vantage points proved extremely valuable in the interpretation of the basic data.

All questionnaires were mailed to the school military faculty for administration. The inherent danger of sponsorship bias was recognized; however, steps were taken to minimize these effects. First, individual envelopes were attached to each questionnaire with specific instructions for the respondent to seal his reply in the envelope provided. Second, at no point were respondents asked for their names or other identifying information. In this way the anonymity of the respondent was assured thus minimizing bias and encouraging frank answers. The frequency of voluntary write-in comments and the high percentage of responses to sensitive questions (e.g., as to father's income; over 90 percent responded) indicate the objectives of these safeguards were realized.

Analysis of the Survey Data. The officer corps of the U.S. Armed Forces is composed primarily of volunteers. That is, officers have entered military service as a voluntary action and not as a result of being conscripted. It has been argued that since the officer corps is currently composed of volunteers, there is little reason to believe that it would be difficult to recruit sufficient numbers of officers under an all-volunteer armed force concept.

Realistically, it should be recognized that a given percentage of the current officer corps was motivated to volunteer by the pressures of the existing draft laws. Many of these officers were "reluctant volunteers" at first, but after experiencing service life they decided to remain on active duty. The question that comes to mind is, What percentage of the current officer corps do they represent? There is evidence to indicate that it is substantial.¹⁴ While the overall size of this particular group is unknown, one may conclude that many present career officers would not now be in the service had it not been for the initial exposure to service life induced by the draft.

In considering an all-volunteer armed force, two groups of more immediate concern are the college students and the recent graduates who enroll in officer procurement programs. These represent the primary source of future officers. What is their attitude toward military service? Would they volunteer in sufficient numbers to maintain required force levels in the absence of a draft?

There is ample evidence to conclude that during the last decade the attitudes of youth toward military service have indeed changed. While the United States may eventually withdraw its combat troops from Vietnam and the armed services may be reduced to pre-Vietnam levels, world conditions will never return to 1965 nor will the attitudes of college youth reflect those of 1965.

Consequently, while some earlier data

are available, any forecast of volunteer officer accessions in the absence of a draft would be deceiving if developed by using the attitude data generated during this earlier period. For these reasons it was considered essential that current data be obtained for a meaningful analysis.

Earlier studies, which were based on a 1964 DOD survey, implied a substantial draft effect on the procurement of first-term officers.¹⁵ A comparison of the current attitudes of college youth toward military service with these earlier studies is appropriate. Therefore, the 1970 Naval War College survey posed the same question to current officer candidates concerning draft motivation that was asked of first-term commissioned officers in earlier DOD surveys. A comparison of the responses reveals that the negative trend toward voluntary service evident in 1968 continues in 1970. More complete appreciation of this decline is obtained by a review of the principal procurement programs.

In the 1964 survey, 46 percent of the first-term officers who entered military service from an OCS program indicated that they would have volunteered without the draft. This percentage dropped to 31 percent of the officer candidates currently enrolled in the Navy OCS and Air Force OTS programs.

The 1964 DOD survey data indicated that 52 percent of the first-term officers who entered military service through an ROTC program would have done so without the draft. The current study shows that of the college students now enrolled in Army and Air Force ROTC programs, only 46 percent would have joined these programs in the absence of a draft.

Figure 3 reflects the relative degree of volunteerism and draft motivation by program and service. It is obvious that a wide disparity exists among the various programs. Surprisingly, only 20 percent of the Navy OCS candidates indicate

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


Fig. 3—Response to Draft Motivation Question by Participants in Officer Procurement Programs^a

^aThe question asked was "If there were no draft and you had no military obligation would you have enrolled in the OCS/OTS program?"

Source: Naval War College Survey, March 1970.

they would have volunteered in the absence of the draft. The fact that the Navy currently receives far more applicants than it can accept for this program is evidence of the impetus provided to other service programs by the Army draft. Another partial explanation of the differences in volunteerism among programs is the difference in obligatory service associated with each. Those selective programs which require the longer obligatory service commitment tend to attract a higher percentage of career motivated individuals. In this example, the Navy OCS program carries a 3-year commitment, while the Air Force ROTC program requires 6 years obligatory service for rated (flying) officers and 4 years for nonrated officers. Another factor influencing the relatively high degree of volunteerism in the Air

Force programs is the attraction provided by the opportunity for flight training. Additionally, Air Force ROTC candidates are at least partially screened for career motivation. By contrast, this is not a requirement for Army ROTC. The high percentage of volunteerism displayed in the Marine Corps OCS program is probably due to the large number of noncollege graduates (16 percent) and the high percentage of prior enlisted personnel (20 percent).

Figure 4 represents the relative "interest in a military career" among the candidates of the various programs. These results are consistent with and provide further evidence of the significant differences observed in figure 3.

It is important to note that the overall percentage of true volunteers (46 percent) in the Army and Air Force




Fig. 4—Percentage of Career Motivation^a by Program

^aThe percentage indicating as their first choice "Interest in a military career" in response to the question, "Which of the following most nearly represents your primary reason for enrolling in the ROTC/OCS/OTS program?"

Source: Naval War College Survey, March 1970.

ROTC includes all participants, freshmen through seniors. While the students enrolled in ROTC III and IV (primarily juniors and seniors) must commit themselves by contract to serve on active duty upon graduation, this is not the case for those students enrolled in ROTC I and II (primarily freshmen and sophomores). On those campuses where no compulsory ROTC program exists (over 80 percent), students may enroll in ROTC I and II as an elective for academic credit without committing themselves for any further ROTC training or subsequent military service. Upperclassmen, on the other hand, have arrived at a hard decision point. If they become eligible for the draft at the end of their senior year, they can either be conscripted in the Army enlisted ranks or enter one of the officer procurement programs. Since the underclassmen are still several years away from having to

face that decision, the pressure of the draft is considerably less.

Table IV provides an indication of the degree of volunteerism associated with each college class year group. Since it is the ROTC senior and not the freshman that becomes the first-term officer, the relatively low percentage of seniors who would be in the program without benefit of the draft is significant. On this particular question there exists a high degree of consistency between responses of the ROTC seniors and those of the new college graduates in the OCS/OTS programs. This indicated reduction in productivity in the absence of the draft may, in fact, make it uneconomical to continue the ROTC program at many institutions under an all-volunteer force scheme.

Previous studies have suggested that geographic source, marital status, academic achievement, and socioeconomic

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background are among the factors which may be predictors of attitudes toward military service. Examination of the Naval War College Survey data permits the following observations concerning these factors.

TABLE IV—ARMY & AIR FORCE ROTC RESPONSE TO THE DRAFT MOTIVATION QUESTION^a BY CLASS YEAR

Class Year	Percent Responding "Yes" ^b	Number of Respondents
Freshman	54%	724
Sophomore	45%	529
Junior	40%	453
Senior/ Graduate	30%	741
All Classes	46%	2,447

^aThe question asked, "If there had been no draft and you had no military obligation, would you have enrolled in ROTC?"

^bThose responding "Yes Definitely" or "Yes Probably." These data proportionately adjusted for relative program size and population distribution by class.

^cA chi-square test of the class year differences in volunteerism was statistically significant at the .01 probability level.

Source: Naval War College Survey, March 1970.

The Naval War College Survey compared the percentage of total respondents by geographical region who indicated they would have volunteered for their respective officer programs in the absence of a draft. Currently, officer procurement programs oriented toward college graduates draw heavily from the South. Approximately 50 percent of the Army and Air Force ROTC members are from colleges in this area. In the absence of a draft, the existing area imbalances would be amplified somewhat by virtue of the indicated higher percentage of volunteerism in the South

(45 percent) and the significantly lower percentage in the Northeast (31 percent).

The survey data also indicate an inverse relationship between academic achievement and the propensity for military service. It is observed that the volunteers in all the officer programs sampled fell below their draft motivated counterparts in academic achievement. These findings are consistent with those of previous studies which measured the relationship of career motivation to educational attainment.¹⁶ Significantly, of the 71 advanced degree members included in the OCS/OTS sample, only nine indicate voluntary enrollment in the absence of the draft and only two indicate they are motivated toward a military career. Similarly, of the 87 candidates for advanced degrees included in the ROTC sample, only seven are true volunteers and only two of these are career motivated. This inverse relationship of academic achievement and propensity for military service may be evidence of the relatively better earning opportunities the academic achiever perceives in civilian pursuits. It may also be associated with the general aversion of persons with higher academic achievement toward the military environment.

Survey data indicate that over 40 percent of the candidates enrolled in college oriented procurement programs are confined to two academic disciplines—engineering and business administration. It appears that except for select fields, such as medicine and law, the services have not identified their needs by academic specialty. Generally, officer candidates are enrolled regardless of their academic majors and are assigned to duty in accordance with service needs. Career retention studies demonstrate that failure to recognize first-term officers' education, training, and personal interests is at the root of dissatisfaction with assignments during the first tour of active duty and is a

prime influence in their decision to reject a service career.

The expected inverse relationship between father's income and the degree of volunteerism is confirmed by the survey data. A similar comparison between father's occupation and volunteerism reveals that an inverse relationship also exists but is not statistically significant in all programs. As might be expected, of the 192 sons of military fathers in the survey, a high percentage (72 percent) indicate they would volunteer for service in the absence of a draft.

Married candidates represent a large segment in the OCS/OTS sample (41 percent), while the percentage of married students in the ROTC sample is comparatively small (10 percent). The study group anticipated that the married group would reflect a larger degree of draft motivation than the single group. In the OCS/OTS sample, single candidates were found to be somewhat more favorably disposed (36 percent) toward volunteering for a commissioning program than were married candidates (34 percent). However, this small margin is reversed in their response to an expressed interest in a military career (married—16 percent vs. single—11 percent). This indicates that an almost equal response to voluntary service may be expected from these two groups in the absence of a draft.

Based on the responses to the Naval War College questionnaire, the typical officer candidate currently enrolled in the officer programs surveyed feels rather strongly that he could obtain a good position in civilian life at a much better salary than he will be receiving as a newly commissioned officer. However, having entered the program, the officer candidate believes that military service as an officer, in the career field of his choice, will clearly enhance his potential for a rewarding position when he returns to civilian life.

Generally, the officer candidate strongly supports the concept that every

able-bodied male citizen has an obligation to serve his country in some kind of *national* service. However, he does not feel that such service should necessarily be in the *military*. In fact, he is inclined to believe that during peacetime, military service should be on a voluntary basis. This negative attitude toward military service is influenced by the U.S. involvement in the Vietnam war, but this factor is only one of several that frame this general attitude. Interestingly enough, while this negative attitude toward required military service is rather strong, an equally firm conviction is expressed that a strong military force is essential to U.S. world leadership.

Becoming a commissioned officer in the Armed Forces of the United States is considered a distinct achievement. However, becoming an officer in the Armed Forces is not what the new college graduate prefers for himself upon graduation. In fact, were it not for the threat of the draft, less than half of the officer candidates would voluntarily have entered the officer programs. Despite the other attitudes expressed, it is this latter fact that must be recognized and realistically assessed before an all-volunteer armed force can be considered feasible.

Clearly, the threat of the draft is the strongest motivating factor currently influencing college youth to volunteer for officer training programs. In recent years the increased draft calls resulting from requirements for Vietnam have prompted greater numbers of college trained youth to volunteer for military service. Consequently, certain officer procurement programs (most notably the Navy OCS and Air Force OTS) received an abundant supply of applicants and became more selective. This selectivity is typical of the behavior of employers in a loose labor market. With the draft stimulating more potential officers to seek commissions than otherwise, the labor market for newly

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commissioned officers has been predominately a buyers' market. In some programs available positions are, in effect, rationed by establishing high educational and other standards. This procedure is apparent in the Navy OCS program (which displayed the highest percentage of draft motivation) where the grade point average is 3.1 on an adjusted 4.0 scale and where 13 percent of the candidates possess advanced degrees. The Air Force OTS program has also enjoyed sufficient applicants to afford considerable selectivity.

It has been argued that with decreasing military manpower requirements and the increasing population, there will be sufficient numbers of college graduates to satisfy officer requirements. However, the data indicate that the magnitude of the officer procurement problem in the absence of the draft will pose serious difficulties for those programs surveyed.

One surprising fact revealed during the course of this study was the large percentage of the sample population that did not answer positively for or against many of the questions. There was some concern during the pilot testing of the questionnaire that the undecided group was larger than should be expected. However, discussions with students in the pilot sample revealed that while the questions were clear, they simply had not formed an opinion on some of the topics addressed.

Economic Incentives. The analysis thus far has examined the capability to man the officer corps of the Armed Forces in the absence of a draft and without the application of other inducements. Earlier studies implied that an all-volunteer officer corps was feasible, providing the basic pay of first-term officers was increased substantially (28 percent). In an effort to determine the effect monetary incentives might have for enticing the currently "reluctant volunteer" to become a "true volun-

teer" in the absence of a draft, the following question was asked: "If you did *not* indicate that you would have enrolled in the ROTC/OCS/OTS program in the absence of a draft, would you have enrolled in the program under any of the following conditions?"

If the service agreed to pay my college expenses at the school of my choice in return for an equivalent number of years of active duty (e.g., 3 years college for 3 years active duty).

If the service provided a \$100 monthly allowance during each of 4 college years in exchange for a 2-year military obligation.

If the initial pay and allowances offered by the service were comparable to or greater than the initial salary of the civilian occupation I intend to pursue upon graduation.

In a "no draft" situation I would not have considered volunteering for ROTC/OCS/OTS under any of the above conditions.

Recognizing that these data apply only to the nonvolunteer group, a comparison of the responses received showed that 34 percent of the total would favorably respond to financial assistance while in college in exchange for military service. Another 32 percent would favorably respond if the pay of first-term officers was comparable to the initial salary of the civilian occupation they intended to pursue. A disturbing fact is that in the absence of the draft, 34 percent of the nonvolunteer group would not volunteer under any of the incentive conditions posed in the questionnaire. Most notable, in the Army ROTC program 47 percent of the nonvolunteers did not respond favorably to the range of incentives offered.

ALL-VOLUNTEER FORCE 47

An integral part of this study is a survey of Army Professors of Military Science (PMS) and Air Force Professors of Aerospace Studies (PAS). A questionnaire was designed to obtain a personal appraisal of student attitudes toward the ROTC program and military service from responsible individuals living in the campus environment and associated with college students on a daily basis. Of the 28 colleges and universities surveyed, 21 ROTC unit commanders responded.

A review of these responses reveals the following assessment. All but two respondents report a generally negative attitude of college youth toward the ROTC program and toward military service in general. Influence of the Vietnam war on the attitudes of campus youth toward the ROTC program is described by the respondents as being substantial. Significantly, the comments of the military professors ascribe a greater impact of the Vietnam war on campus attitudes than do the student questionnaire responses.

Most respondents indicated that the ROTC program had incurred losses following the draft lottery; however, few were able to relate the losses directly to the lottery itself. Two respondents indicated that an approximately equal number of withdrawals by low lottery risk members had been replaced by applications from high lottery risk students. The nature of the responses does not permit a definitive conclusion as to the effect of this first draft lottery on the ROTC program. However, it does demonstrate the importance of the selection of a meaningful date to conduct the draft lottery so as to minimize the disruptive effect it may have during the class year. Otherwise, a degree of turbulence in ROTC membership can be expected following the draft lottery each year.

Judgment of the respondents reflects a unanimous opinion that the ROTC program would suffer a severe reduction

in membership in the event of an all-volunteer force. Many expressed the view that continuation of an ROTC program on their particular campus would be of questionable value given the small number of volunteers who would be attracted to the program. The majority indicated that currently less than 12 percent of the ROTC membership is career motivated, although a few claimed a career group as large as 30 percent. A few, however, reasoned that the quality of membership would improve by virtue of the anticipated high level of career motivation which would characterize an all-volunteer program.

It is the judgment of a majority of military professors that monetary incentives, such as increased monthly allowances and scholarships, would be unable to offset the expected drop in ROTC enrollment resulting from an all-volunteer armed force. Similarly, a great majority of the professors do not consider first-term officer pay to be an influencing factor in attracting students to the ROTC program. In fact, some identified a general unfamiliarity with officer pay and allowances on the part of ROTC students, particularly those at the freshman and sophomore level.

The study group experience supports this observation on the basis of its contact with college students during the pilot testing of the survey questionnaire. Students requested elementary information about first-term officer pay in order to answer questions posed in the questionnaire. There is some evidence that interest in the pay of junior officers is not manifested by ROTC members until they reach their senior year, at which time the immediacy of military service becomes a reality.

This generally pessimistic appraisal of campus attitudes is cause for concern. The fact that this appraisal was made by a uniquely qualified group of observers, representing both public and private institutions in all regions of the country, including both Army and Air Force

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programs, is particularly significant. Despite the subjective nature of the responses, an unmistakable conclusion is reached that Professors of Military Science and Aerospace Studies consider that ROTC is regarded with apathy and general dislike by the large majority of campus youth. They indicate that the draft provides the principal stimulus for the program, and in the absence of a draft the ROTC program could not be sustained on many campuses.

The feasibility of obtaining sufficient military officers under voluntary conditions will, in large measure, be determined by the attitudes of eligible youth toward military service. Toward this end, the principal officer procurement sources were surveyed, using attitudinal survey techniques. While recognizing that attitudes may change with changing circumstances, analysis of the survey results does permit certain conclusions and recommendations.

Conclusions.

1. The security of the United States demands a guaranteed system of providing qualified young men to serve as officers in the Armed Forces. The needs of the Armed Forces for a steady flow of qualified college graduates into the officer corps cannot be left to the free choice of the market place. During the pre-Vietnam period of 1961-65, conscription was required to maintain the officer corps in a 2.6 million man force. Given the current attitudes of college youth, return to this approximate force level on an all-volunteer basis is not considered feasible. Consequently, it is concluded that in the current environment, minimum officer needs for the Air Force may be marginally obtainable, but Army, Marine Corps, and Navy officer requirements will be unattainable except at the expense of quality.

2. The possibility of military service as a conscripted enlisted man in the U.S. Army provides the major incentive for first-term officer volunteers in all the

services. However, without this pressure, monetary incentives would entice some college youth to enroll in one of the officer procurement programs. College-related financial assistance, such as a combination of scholarships and increased monthly allowances for officer candidates, will be just as effective as a substantial increase in first-term officer pay. Nevertheless, in the absence of a draft, both types of incentives will be required if the college oriented officer procurement programs are to remain productive.

3. A significant downward trend in ROTC enrollment was established before the Vietnam war became a major issue. This trend was obscured by the dramatic increase in draft calls during the 1966-69 time period. Under the pressure of high draft calls, the current group of advanced ROTC students committed themselves in 1968 for military service upon graduation. Consequently, it is expected that the impact of reduced draft calls and negative campus attitudes will result in sharply curtailed ROTC enrollment and production beyond the 1970 time period.

4. The high degree of selectivity now being enjoyed by the Navy OCS and the Air Force OJS programs will diminish substantially in the absence of a draft. While deterioration in quality can be expected without the draft, overall motivation and retention should improve as these programs shift to attracting candidates on career merits rather than draft pressure.

5. The prolonged involvement in Vietnam has exerted a negative influence on the college oriented officer procurement programs. It has, in fact, contributed to the decision by several prestigious universities to abandon their ROTC programs. In addition to the immediate impact on enrollment, withdrawal actions by these schools may permanently change the character of the ROTC program. If generally higher quality universities drop the ROTC

program and are not replaced in kind, the overall quality of the ROTC product will be adversely affected.

6. The ROTC scholarship program is accomplishing its objective of attracting quality students. Unlike the Navy Regular program, however, there is no evidence that the Army and Air Force employ career motivation criteria in the selection of scholarship students. Consequently, in the absence of a draft, approximately half of the ROTC scholarship holders questioned would drop out of the program.

7. In the absence of a draft, the officer corps would attract college youth of lower socioeconomic background and reduced level of academic achievement. Furthermore, existing geographic imbalances in the officer corps would be amplified somewhat by virtue of the higher percentage of volunteerism in the South and the significantly lower percentage in the Northeast.

8. Candidates are generally enrolled in the college oriented officer procurement programs regardless of their academic field of study. Almost half the candidates surveyed were limited to two academic disciplines—engineering and business administration. This approach to officer procurement may, in fact, contribute to eventual dissatisfaction with military service. Failure to recognize education, training, and personal interests in the utilization of college graduates is a primary influence in first-term officer decisions to reject a service career.

Recommendations.

1. That a system of conscription be

retained and incentive programs progressively implemented to reduce or eliminate reliance on the draft. Should experience demonstrate attainability of an all-volunteer force under these conditions, maintain a standby draft system for use during general mobilization.

2. That existing ROTC monetary inducements be revised to include an increase in the monthly allowance and that a substantial increase be made in the number of ROTC scholarships awarded.

3. That the military departments establish criteria for identification of officer requirements by field of academic study.

4. That scholarship inducements be employed to support procurement of officers with selected degree specialties and that the criteria for award of ROTC scholarships be revised to include consideration of the career motivation of recipients.

5. That consideration be given to the utilization of monetary incentives in non-ROTC institutions as a means of inducing contract commitment to one of the college graduate officer programs such as OCS/OTS.

6. That first-term officer pay be raised to a level of comparability with civilian salaries for new college graduates.

7. That maximum publicity be given to existing and proposed monetary incentive programs. The full potential of incentive programs cannot be realized unless the desired population is aware they exist.

FOOTNOTES

1. National Advisory Commission on Selective Service, "In Pursuit of Equity: Who Serves When Not All Serve?" Report (Washington: U.S. Govt. Print. Off., February 1967).

2. *Report of the President's Commission on an All-Volunteer Armed Force* (Washington: U.S. Govt. Print. Off., February 1970), p. 9.

3. "The Real Revolution on Campus," *U.S. News & World Report*, 12 January 1970, p. 29.

4. "Laird Says Volunteer Plan Would Cut Forces a Third," *The New York Times*, 30 January 1970, p. 16: 1, 2.

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5. Gene M. Lyons and John W. Masland, *Education and Military Leadership* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1959), p. 11.
6. Encyclopedic Almanac, *The New York Times* (New York: 1969), p. 205.
7. It should be noted that force levels during this period averaged 2.6 million officers and men.
8. U.S. Dept. of Defense, *Annual Report of the Secretary of Defense on Reserve Forces* (Washington: 9 February 1970), p. X.
9. U.S. Dept. of the Army, Office of the Adjutant General, *Enrollment Report Army Reserve Officers Training Corps Opening of School Year 1968-69* dated December 1968 and 1969-70 dated December 1969; U.S. Dept. of the Air Force, *Enrollment and Production of Graduates of AFROTC Units*, 31 October 1968 and 31 October 1969.
10. Franklin Institute Research Laboratories, *Career Motivation of Army Personnel—Junior Officer Duties*, Technical Report 1-212, v. 1: Summary Report (Washington, 1968), p. 24. On file, DCSPER, U.S. Dept. of the Army. See also Harold Wool, *The Military Specialist* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins, 1968), p. 116.
11. Bette Mahoney and Joan McRae, *The Opportunity Costs of Military Careers*, Study S-291 (Arlington, Va.: Institute for Defense Analysis, March 1967).
12. A ratio of 60 percent to 40 percent draft motivated vs. volunteer was used based on the pretest survey data. For a discussion of this method of determining sample size, see John R. Stockton, *Business Statistics*, 2d. ed. (Cincinnati: South-Western, 1962), p. 245.
13. It is recognized that control of randomness in the selection of individuals was relinquished to the ROTC faculty.
14. A 1961 DOD study indicates that 33 percent of Army officers surveyed (lieutenant through colonel) indicated that their initial motivation for entering the service was "drafted or ordered to duty." (As reported in Morris Janowitz, ed., *The New Military Changing Patterns of Organization* (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1964), p. 274.
15. Alan E. Fechter, *The Supply of First-Term Military Officers*, Study S-290 (Arlington: Institute for Defense Analysis, March 1967), p. 23.
16. Bette Mahoney and Alan Fechter, *Military Compensation and the Supply of Career Officers*, Study S-290 (Arlington: Institute for Defense Analysis, May 1967), p. 10; *Career Motivation of Army Personnel, Junior Officers' Duties*, p. 36.

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We must train and classify the whole of our male citizens, and make military instruction a regular part of collegiate education. We can never be safe till this is done.

Thomas Jefferson. To James Monroe,
June 18, 1813, Works, VI, 131