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Coordinated policy planning and management have long been recognized as being fundamental to the success of any country's foreign policy. Military preparedness and strategic planning should always play an important part in this process, but in periods of acute international tension, as characterized in the 18 months before Pearl Harbor, the integration of the military planning process into national policy circles is mandatory. While U.S. policy and strategic planning were in harmony by late 1941, this foundation upon which the next 4 years' war effort would be based was not the result of close coordination between strategic planners and foreign policy experts as has generally been assumed.

THE EVOLUTION OF PACIFIC POLICY AND STRATEGIC PLANNING: JUNE 1940-JULY 1941

A research paper

prepared by

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Traditionally the period between wars has been used by the Armed Forces for study of past conflicts and preparation for future operations. During the period between the World Wars this function was assigned to the Joint Board with the assistance of the Joint Planning Committee of the Army and Navy which had been organized in 1919.[1] U.S. national policy during the interwar period provided relatively small scope for military planning, owing to our preoccupation with the avoidance of entangling alliances, maintenance of neutrality, and international agreements to limit armaments and to outlaw war. The strategic concept dictated by these national policies was the defense of the United States "alone against any and all combinations of foreign powers."[2]

For the purposes of this investigation, U.S. Pacific policy shall be considered to be the planned courses of action developed by the political decisionmakers of a state, vis-a-vis other states, aimed at the achievement of specific goals defined in terms of the national interest. These courses of action can (and did in this case) include the use of military forces in ways quite unrelated to the military strategy contemplated. The term "strategic planning" in this paper will refer not to grand or national strategy per se, but to the prewar development by military decisionmakers of a design for the military conduct of a war deemed possible.

Inasmuch as policy and strategic planning must be closely coordinated if either is to achieve a full measure of success, a brief review and analysis of the gap which existed between U.S. Pacific policy and strategy during the interwar period will provide valuable insights into the shortcomings of both in the period immediately prior to

America's entry into World War II.

Plans dealing with the possibility of war with Japan were titled ORANGE and had been in existence as early as 1913.[3] By the early twenties these plans envisioned an offensive war, with the emphasis on seapower and a naval base in the Philippines from which operations could be conducted against the Japanese homeland. The U.S. Navy was at this time a one-ocean navy. The fact that it was based on the Pacific coast represented a consensus of naval thought—that the most probable war was one with Japan.[4]

In 1922 agreements reached at the Washington Naval Conference resulted in a naval scrapping program and building holiday. In 1924 the first Joint Board ORANGE plan was approved. By 1926 the assumption that the Philippines would be reinforced directly was dropped however, due to a lack of required men and ships, with the revised plan calling for seizure of the Marshall, Caroline, and Mariana Islands to serve as forward bases in a drive across the Pacific. In 1928 the Kellogg-Briand Pact outlawing war was signed by the United States.

Early in 1931, after an interim of liberal government, a militarily oriented government came to power in Japan. On 18 Spetember 1931, the Japanese Army in Manchuria, on its own initiative, launched simultaneous surprise attacks on the Chinese garrisons at Mukden, Changchung, and other locations. The stated reason for these attacks was an alleged Chinese attack on a section of the Japanese controlled South Manchurian Railway. The true reason, however, lay in the Japanese Army's desire for conquest, despite the fact that the Government in Tokyo did not at first approve. China, lacking the means to conduct an effective resistance, appealed to the League of Nations. The League hesitated, vacillated, and finally named an investigatory commission. During these proceedings the Japanese consolidated their position and completed the conquest of Manchuria in January 1932. Henry Stimson, Secretary of State at the time, issued a strong statement which became known as the Stimson Doctrine. In it he informed China and Japan that the American Government would not recognize any change in territory brought about by force and would frown on any violation of Open Door principles.[5] This doctrine of nonrecognition formed part of U.S. foreign policy until Pearl Harbor, as President Roosevelt indicated his wholehearted support of it shortly after his first inaugural.[6]

On 18 February 1932 the sovereign State of Manchukuo was proclaimed by a group of Japanese puppets. Shortly thereafter the investigatory commission delegated by the League made its report, which was debated for nearly a year before the League adopted a resolution mildly critical of Japan but containing no recommendations for sanctions. Even so, the result was Japanese withdrawal from the League and an increase in military pressure; and since China's last hope had failed, she accepted an armistice on 31 May 1933.

In view of increasing Japanese power and declining American strength, U.S. military planners began to argue that it was no longer possible to defend the Philippines. Successive revisions to ORANGE plans then followed, calling first for defense of only Manila Bay and ultimately envisioning a stand at Corregidor. By 1937 the Joint Planning Committee had reached an impasse, with the Navy members favoring retention of offensive aspects of the plan (the trans-Pacific operations) and Army members arguing for a strictly defensive strategy, one which contemplated no reinforcement of the Philippines. The ORANGE plan drawn in 1937 reflected this disagreement and called for a combination offensive-defensive strategy. The difficulty faced by the planners was a contradiction in national policy—the

Philippines were to be held, but no funds were granted to produce the forces necessary. "American Policy had created a wide gap between objectives and means and forced on its planners a compromise strategy and the virtual abandonment of Guam and the Philippines."[7]

China and Munich: the RAINBOW Plans. Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek continued to show little interest in resisting Japanese aggression, being more concerned with the activities of the Chinese Communists. This preoccupation must have pleased the Japanese, and after careful preparations another "incident" was manufactured—this time in Peiping. On 7 July 1937 the Japanese attacked, launching a war which was to last for more than 8 years. The United States issued several strong statements, and Japanese response was a typical offer to discuss and negotiate while continuing her military advance. President Roosevelt decided in August not to apply the Neutrality Act to the war in China, as was his prerogative. Although not publicly stated, his rationale was that such application would be more disadvantageous to China than it would be to Japan.[8] In October 1937, in Chicago, Roosevelt delivered what has become known as his quarantine speech, saying in part ". . . the will for peace on the part of peace-loving nations must express itself to the end that Nations that may be tempted to violate their agreements and the rights of others will desist from such a course. There must be positive endeavors to preserve peace."[9] No strong measures followed, however, for in following months the President came to the conclusion that the American people would not support them.[10] This speech gave little pause to the Japanese as, since the days of John Hay, the United States had been unwilling to back up its Pacific policy pronouncements with force. This was further highlighted when, in December 1937, the Government took no positive action after U.S.S. *Panay* was deliberately strafed and sunk by the Japanese.

The sinking of U.S.S. *Panay* was still very much in the minds of military planners at the time of the Munich Conference almost a year later in September 1938. Together they provided the impetus for a comprehensive review of strategy.[11] In November of 1938 the Joint Board directed the Joint Planning Committee to study ". . . the various practicable courses of action open to the military and naval forces of the United States in the event of (a) violation of the Monroe Doctrine by one or more of the Fascist powers and (b) a simultaneous attempt to expand Japanese influence in the Philippines."[12] This was the first directive for study of the problems of a two-ocean war in which the United States would be faced by more than one adversary.[13]

Meanwhile, the question of Pacific bases was being addressed. Base development had been forbidden by the Naval Treaties, but their expiration, coupled with reports of Japanese fortification of the Marianas and Carolines, reopened the issue, and the Secretary of the Navy was directed to investigate and report on the need for bases. After convening a factfinding board, he recommended construction programs in Alaska, Hawaii, Midway, Wake, and Guam, with the latter gaining emphasis because of its strategic location. Most of the recommendations were eventually followed to a greater or lesser degree, with the glaring exception of Guam, fortification of which was considered to be a provocative act.[14] The result is known—as Admiral King so aptly put it, "Whether or not Guam could have been made efficiently strong to withstand the full force of enemy attack is of course problematical, but we appear to have had an object lesson to the effect that if we are to have outlying possessions we must be prepared to defend them."[15]

In April 1939 the Joint Planning

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Committee completed its study of the many contingencies possible in a two-ocean war and recommended that plans be drafted to cover the most probable ones. They further stated that in the event of a two-ocean war the first priority must go to the Western Hemisphere, necessitating a defensive strategy in the Pacific. The Joint Board approved and in June 1939 directed preparation of the RAINBOW plans. There were five basic plans, and their contents are summarized below:

> RAINBOW NO. 1: To prevent violation of the Monroe Doctrine and to protect the United States, its possessions, and its sea trade.
>
> RAINBOW NO. 2: To carry out No. 1, and also to sustain the authority of democratic powers in the Pacific zones.
>
> RAINBOW NO. 3: To carry out No. 1, and to secure control of the Western Pacific.
>
> RAINBOW NO. 4: To afford unilateral Western Hemisphere defense.
>
> RAINBOW NO. 5: To achieve the purposes of No. 1 and No. 4, also to provide ultimately for sending forces to Africa or Europe in order to effect the decisive defeat of Germany or Italy or both. This plan assumed cooperation with Great Britain and France.[16]

These plans were approved by the Joint Board in June 1939. Preparations of detailed supporting plans commenced immediately following approval by the Joint Board, with RAINBOW NO. 1 receiving the first priority.

The Japanese economy, then as now, was almost totally dependent on outside resources for its supply of petroleum products, scrap iron, and other raw materials vital to her policy of expansion. Commencing in 1937, Japanese purchase of these materials soared, with scrap iron and steel imports rising to 1.3 million tons.[17] Oil purchases also rose sharply, leading to speculation, later proved correct, that Japan was stockpiling these materials. Although there was rising sentiment in the country for limitation on the exportation of these materials, the United States could not legally take that action as it was bound by the provisions of a Commercial Trade Treaty which had been negotiated with Japan in 1911. By July 1939, however, Washington moved to terminate the United States-Japanese Commercial Trade Treaty. This action was required 6 months before the provisions of the treaty would actually cease to apply and economic sanctions could be applied. The public statements of the President at the time did not address trade directly, however. In September he was content to describe the primary purposes of our foreign policy as the avoidance of war in general and the subsequent avoidance of participation in any war which did break out.[18]

Axis Success and an American Election. In September 1939 Hitler invaded Poland. Following declaration of war by Britain and France, American planners shifted their emphasis to RAINBOW NO. 2, which was Pacific oriented. This change was occasioned by an assumption that, as Britain and France seemed to be in control of the Continent and the surrounding sea, the most likely adversary the United States would confront was Japan.

During the following month, in response to rising public horror at Japanese excesses, Congress agreed to modify the Neutrality Act, making selective shipment of arms and munitions possible. This was followed in December by a Presidential statement regarding the sale of aircraft and associated repair parts: "The American government and the American people have for some time pursued a policy of wholeheartedly condemning the unprovoked bombing of civilian populations . . . This Government hopes

. . . that American manufacturers and exporters will bear this fact in mind before negotiating contracts for the exportation of these articles."[19] The President later referred to his action as a moral embargo and would gradually increase the list of items which he considered to be affected.

With the lapse of the 1911 Trade Treaty in January 1940, the United States became free to employ economic sanctions against Japan. Opinion was divided, however, on just what form the sanctions should take, if indeed we should apply sanctions at all. Secretary Hull characteristically recommended caution—"Neither should we make concessions so sweeping that Japan would accept them as a basis for agreement and then bide her time to make further demands or take further steps, nor should we embark upon military or economic actions so drastic as to provoke immediate war with Japan."[20] As might be expected, former Secretary of State Stimson recommended a stronger line—in a letter to the editor of *The New York Times* printed on 11 January 1940, he argued that it was inconceivable that Japan would attack the United States and that the best way to help China was to cut off Japan's means of conducting war.[21] In his annual message to Congress during the same month, the President enlarged his stated foreign policy only somewhat in saying that "nobody expects" the commitment of troops on foreign soil and that while U.S. participation in war was to be avoided, we should and could act to encourage the maintenance of peace.[22]

At that time it was customary for the U.S. Fleet to conduct war games in the spring of each year, in either the Atlantic or the Pacific. Accordingly, the fleet moved out of California ports, conducted annual war games en route, and arrived at Pearl Harbor on 10 April. They were scheduled to depart Hawaii on 9 May, but on 4 May, Admiral Stark ordered Admiral Richardson, the Fleet Commander, to remain for "a short time."[23] During the next several weeks the departure date was moved back in increments, resulting in some difficulties for Pacific planners. Admiral Richardson was, in Morison's words, "not the type of Naval Officer who simply does as he is told and asks no questions."[24] Accordingly, he wrote to Stark outlining the problems associated with his unscheduled visit extension and asked, "Are we here primarily to influence the actions of other nations by our presence . . . ?," to which Stark replied, "You are there because of the deterrent effect it is thought your presence may have on the Japs going into the East Indies."[25] Richardson accepted this, but his disquiet during the ensuing months became more pronounced, largely due to the difficulty of maintaining his ships in an acceptable state of readiness.

The President made a peripheral comment on 16 May which may serve to illuminate his thinking: "The islands of the Southern Pacific are not too far removed to prevent them from becoming bases of enormous strategic importance to attacking forces."[26]

The fall of Denmark and Norway to Hitler, followed by his invasion of France and the Low Countries in May 1940, resulted in the addition of RAINBOW No. 3 (also Pacific oriented) to RAINBOW NO. 2 for active planning. As the Joint Board put it, there was "every indication that Japan intended to exploit the axis victories in Europe and take over French, British, and Dutch possessions in Asia and the Southwest Pacific."

During the following month, however, the overwhelming magnitude and rapidity of Hitler's victories stunned American planners. There was, in fact, real fear that the French and possibly the British Fleets might fall into German hands and that the next steps would be the Azores and Brazil. The President, Under Secretary Welles,

General Marshall, and Admiral Stark agreed that "... we must not become involved with Japan, that we must not concern ourselves beyond the 108th meridian, and that we must concentrate on the South American situation."[27] Accordingly, work on RAINBOW NO. 2 and 3 was suspended, and RAINBOW NO. 4 (unilateral defense of the Western Hemisphere) took first priority.

The expansion of moral embargoes had continued from the time the President requested them, as had discussion of legal economic sanctions which had become possible in January. The President chose the National Defense Act as a vehicle for obtaining authorization to apply legal sanctions. The primary purpose of the act was to enlarge the Military Establishment, but Secretary Hull, with some misgivings, recommended the insertion of a section permitting sanctions.[28] The President indicated that he would stop shipment as soon as he had the authority, but Secretary Hull, believing that negotiations and the moral embargo still enjoyed some chance of success, wavered. In any event, with the passage of the act in June 1940, Hull fell into line and recorded his reaction this way: "Hitherto we had relied on moral embargoes to accomplish our purpose . . . now this act of Congress . . . gave us an additional instrument for use in our relations with Japan."[29]

The Japanese, meanwhile, had been as much encouraged by Axis success in Europe as Americans had been shocked. Following the surrender of France, the Japanese demanded concessions from all three Pacific colonial powers (Britain, France, and the Netherlands). France and Britain acceded to the stationing of Japanese troops in northern Indochina and the closure of the Burma Road, respectively, but the Dutch held firm in control of oil resources in the East Indies.

Japan was by this time importing 88 percent of all petroleum products she consumed, with about 80 percent coming from the United States. She had been buying in enormous quantities in order to build a stockpile, importing nearly 40 million barrels during the year ending 31 March 1941.[30] With the Dutch refusal of oil concessions, Japan undertook to buy still more oil from the United States, and in July 1940 offered to purchase the entire production of the Standard Oil Company of New Jersey.[31]

Shortly after this rather unique offer was made, the President issued the first embargo order under the powers granted him by the National Defense Act. This first order was of limited scope and forbade only munitions, critical raw materials, airplane parts, optical equipment, and some machinery.[32] This was followed, on 26 July, by a prohibition of aviation gasoline, lubricants, and high grade iron and steel scrap.[33] The ensuing month saw a series of moves and countermoves, which are outlined below:

26 July—Embargo on gasoline and some iron and steel

22 September—Japanese march into Indochina

26 September—Embargo on all steel scrap and iron

27 September—Japan signs Tripartite Pact

While it may not be entirely accurate to argue that each action directly produced the one following, they are shown in this fashion to indicate the growing conflict of interests between the two nations. Hull describes the embargoes in just this context.[34] Interestingly, at approximately the same time the Japanese Foreign Minister said, "If you stand firm and start hitting back, the American will know he's talking to a man . . . "[35]

Herbert Feis describes these initial embargoes as "a hard blow, but not a knockout," and indicates that they damaged Japan in several ways: diversion of badly needed industry to iron

and steel production, commencement of use of stockpile iron and steel scrap, and falling industrial production due to lack of scrap.[36] Stimson, who had by now been confirmed as Secretary of War, seemed to have perceived the damage being done and recommended a total embargo, saying, "Japan . . . has historically shown that when the United States indicates by clear language and bold actions that she intends to carry out an affirmative policy in the Far East, Japan will yield to that policy."[37] With the elections approaching, however, the President apparently did not feel that the electorate was ready to approve such a step, even though a Gallup poll showed that 90 percent of those interviewed favored it.[38]

As the election neared, the question of American intentions regarding the use of troops assumed increasing importance in the campaign. In July the President said that troops would be used only in the event of an attack on the Western Hemisphere.[39] Secretary Stimson, in public confirmation hearings before the Senate during the same month, went only slightly farther in saying, "The purpose of our military policy is . . . to protect from attack the territory of the United States. No one wishes to send American troops beyond our borders unless the protection of the United States makes such action absolutely necessary."[40]

An additional line of policy which became manifest in July was the "Arsenal of Democracy" approach. The President said that "We will extend to the opponents of force the material resources of this nation."[41] The negotiation of the destroyer-bases agreement underscored this policy.

During Secretary of the Navy Knox's September 1940 visit to Pearl Harbor, Admiral Richardson, demonstrated his continued concern at the stationing of the fleet at Pearl by asking in part, "is it more important to lend strength to diplomatic representation in the Pacific by basing the fleet in the Hawaiian area, than to facilitate its preparation for active service in the area . . . ?"[42]

There was no reaction from Washington following the Knox visit, however, and in October, Admiral Richardson determined to go to Washington to present his case in person. He had seen the President in July but had not discussed the question directly. Admiral Richardson's recollection of his meeting with the President follows:

> I took up the question of returning to the Pacific coast all of the fleet except the Hawaiian detachment.
>
> The President stated that the fleet was retained in the Hawaiian area in order to exercise a restraining influence on the actions of Japan.
>
> I stated that in my opinion the presence of the fleet in Hawaii might influence a civilian political government, but that Japan had a military government which knew that the fleet was undermanned, unprepared for war, and had no train of auxiliary ships without which it could not undertake active operations. Therefore, the presence of the fleet in Hawaii could not exercise a restraining influence on Japanese actions.
>
> The President said in effect, "Despite what you believe, I know that the presence of the fleet in the Hawaiian area has had a restraining influence on the actions of Japan."[43]

This exchange effectively put an end to the matter—the U.S. Fleet was in Hawaii to stay, and shortly thereafter it was permanently reorganized into Atlantic and Pacific Fleets. As Langer and Gleason aptly put it, "The commander of the fleet was thus obliged to assume responsibility for incurring risks in order that the fleet might be used, not as a weapon of war, but as a weapon of diplomacy."[44]

By October 1940 the President had become sufficiently alarmed about the question of use of troops to say, in a much quoted speech, "I have said this before and I shall say it again and again: Your boys are not going to be sent to any foreign wars."[45] Interestingly, Secretary Hull was asked to make a similar statement (denying that Americans would fight abroad) but refused on the grounds that the world situation did not warrant such a statement.[46] Although these declarations are the ones which made the strongest impression on the voters, President Roosevelt's last campaign speech, delivered in Cleveland on 2 November 1940, contained a succinct statement of the foreign policy which could be expected upon his reelection:

> There is nothing secret about our foreign policy. The first purpose of our foreign policy is to keep our country out of war . . . the second purpose of this policy is to keep wars as far away as possible from the shores of the entire Western Hemisphere . . . Finally our foreign policy is to give all possible material aid to the nations which still resist aggression, across the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans . . . We intend to commit none of the fatal errors of appeasement.[47]

Combined Strategy and Diplomatic Pressure. During the fall of 1940, largely because of the President's conviction that Britain, given support, could hold Hitler, American strategic planning started to undergo a change. Henceforth the successes and capabilities of the British would play an increasing role in shaping American plans.[48] American aid, lend-lease destroyers, and success against the Luftwaffe had occasioned rising hopes—the problem was to avoid a conflict with Japan in the interim. As we have seen, the solution was to commence increasing economic sanctions and to attempt the use of the Pacific Fleet as a deterrent. What was manifestly apparent to Navy planners, however, was the urgent need for British-American cooperation in planning.

The first effort at developing combined British-American military strategy was a study, written by Admiral Stark's planning staff, dealing with the approaching war. By this time the embargo had proceeded to the point where all iron and steel products were listed. In this study Admiral Stark cited four lines of strategy which he felt to be feasible:

- Limitations of American activity to hemisphere defense, with emphasis on the Western Hemisphere.
- Primary emphasis to Japan, secondary to the Atlantic.
- Equivalent emphasis in Pacific and Atlantic.
- Primary offensive emphasis in the Atlantic, defensive in the Pacific.[49]

Admiral Stark recommended the last alternative and the memorandum came to be known as Plan DOG. His conclusion was based on the belief that the British were too weak to defeat Germany alone and that the United States was too weak to attempt major offensives in two theaters.[50] Although the President did not commit himself, the Joint Board concurred with Admiral Stark, and General Marshall directed commencement of detailed planning based on the study.[51] It is interesting to note that at least one historian attributes the strategic thinking in Plan DOG to studies conducted at the U.S. Naval War College.[52]

The President could have construed his success in the election as wide approval of his stated policy of firm resistance to aggression and of massive aid to Britain and China. He did not, however, and for good reason—there was no certain knowledge as to just which of his policies had been confirmed, as he had been elected on a "no war" platform. The slow and gradual method was continued, therefore, and

during December 1940 and January 1941 additional embargoes were imposed on metals, ores, and certain manufactured items.[53] Cordell Hull, Henry Stimson, and others in government were by now sure that our policy should be to "preserve the status quo in the Pacific while lending every effort to preserve Great Britain."[54] Roosevelt was convinced that this view was correct; further, that if Britain remained strong, Japan would not attack.[55] Stimson did not agree with this last analysis, believing instead that a policy of unyielding opposition was sure to lead to war.[56] By January the President believed the public ready for another glimpse of his foreign policy, saying in his state of the Union message:

> Our foreign policy is this: First ... we are committed to all-inclusive national defense. Second ... we are committed to full support of all resolute peoples everywhere who are resisting aggression. Third ... we are committed to the proposition that principles of morality and consideration for our security will never permit us to acquiesce in a peace dictated by aggression and sponsored by appeasers.[57]

Preliminary British-American conferences had been held in London in September 1940.[58] As Plan DOG had included a strong recommendation for immediate formal talks as a prerequisite to detailed planning, arrangements were made for a Joint Staff conference to be held in Washington in January. The final report of this conference, known as ABC-1, laid down the basic guide for allied strategy during the war. The major strategic objectives adopted were: (1) That the main effort was to be the early defeat of Germany, (2) That the Far Eastern strategy be defensive, with the U.S. Fleet employed offensively "in the manner best calculated to weaken Japanese economic power and to support the defense of the Malay barrier by directing Japanese strength away from Malaysia." The only significant area of disagreement was in the method of conducting the defense in the Pacific. The British position was that Singapore was vital to the defense of the Malay barrier, while the Americans believed that Singapore could not be successfully defended and that to attempt it would be to risk the Pacific Fleet needlessly.[59] The minutes reflected this impasse: "It was agreed that for Great Britain it was fundamental that Singapore be held; for the United States it was fundamental that the Pacific Fleet be held intact."[60] Secretary of War Stimson strongly supported the stationing of fleet units at Singapore, but Welles, Hull, and Marshall were just as firmly opposed, and serious consideration of the question was dropped.[61] Visits, however, were another matter. Stark says, in a letter dated 10 February 1941, to Admiral Kimmel, who had by then relieved Admiral Richardson,

> I had another hour and a half in the White House today and the President said that he might order a detachment of three or four cruisers, a carrier, and a squadron of destroyers to Phoenix and Gilbert or the Fiji Islands, then reaching over into Mindanao for a short visit and on to Manila and back. I have fought this over many times and won, but this time the decision may go against me. Heretofore the talk was largely about sending a cruise of this sort to Australia and Singapore ....[62]

During this period, American policy with respect to Japan continued to take shape. Upon a Japanese protest at the continuing expansion of the embargo in March, Secretary Hull told Ambassador Nomura, "It was Japan's movement of conquest that produced the embargoes; the embargoes did not produce the movement."[63] The attention of the seat of government was not directed toward

the Far East, however, as during this month the principal concern was with approval of lend-lease. Secretary Hull described our foreign policy toward Japan as consisting of four parts: respect for the territorial integrity of all nations, noninterference in the internal affairs of other nations, equality of commercial opportunity, and nondisturbance of the status quo.[64] "Status quo" was not defined, however, that was to come later.

In April 1941, at the request of the State Department, the President sent four cruisers and a destroyer squadron to Australia and New Zealand.[65] The purpose of the visit was to "indicate to Japan solidarity between the United States and the British Commonwealth, and to indicate to Japan that if British interests were attacked that the United States would enter the war on the side of the British."[66] The previous statement was made by Admiral Turner, who was War Plans Officer at the time. Curiously, however, Admiral Kimmel was unaware of the purpose of the cruise at the time of sailing.[67]

The visit was an immense success,[68] and Stark, in a letter to Kimmel dated 19 April, says, in part:

> The President said . . . just as soon as these ships come back from Australia and New Zealand . . . I want to send some more out. I just want to keep them popping up here and there and keep the Japs guessing . . . I said to the President: "How about going North?" He said, "Yes, you can keep any position you like, and go anywhere."[69]

Stark's request to go north was made with malice aforethought, as he did not believe that the visits were accomplishing anything more concrete than the interruption of training. He suggested a cruise northwestward from Hawaii, approaching the Kurile Islands, in the expectation that his proposal would "give the State Department a shock and make them haul back."[70] His estimate proved to be correct, and no more was heard about naval visits in the Pacific.[71] As Herbert Feis puts it, "The tactics of Theodore Roosevelt—who sent the fleet around the world in 1908, to impress Japan—were out of date."[72]

Admiral Stark, in a letter to the Fleet Commander dated 3 April 1941, said, "Unquestionably the concentration of the U.S. Pacific Fleet in Hawaii has had a stabilizing affect in the Far East."[73]

Stimson, however, believed that, "The Fleet at Hawaii was no real threat to Japan since the Japanese clearly understood that we would never use it offensively without ample warning; that it had little or no defensive value there since it was powerless to protect the Philippines."[74]

Perhaps the best way to look at the situation as it existed at this time is provided by Langer and Gleason: ". . . even though the presence of the fleet at Pearl Harbor might not be an effective deterrent to Japan, its withdrawal to the West Coast would be interpreted at home and abroad as a step backward on the part of the United States."[75]

The major problem now was what to do about those areas in the South Pacific where Japan was expected to strike or how, in other words, to plan for implementation of the defensive strategy decided upon.[76] Accordingly, American, Dutch, and British representatives met in Singapore on 21 April 1941 for the purpose of arriving at a working ADB war plan. The meetings were based on the assumption that "our most important interests in the Far East are . . . the security of Singapore . . . the security of Luzon in the Philippine Islands."[77] Any recommendation based on these assumptions was bound to meet with disfavor in Washington, and the U.S. Joint Chiefs rejected the ADB report.[78] The principal reasons for rejection were nonavailability of forces with which to defend the Philippines

and the desire to retain the Pacific Fleet intact.

While developments in the Atlantic Theater are beyond the scope of this narrative, suffice it to say that, while the situation in the Pacific in the spring of 1941 was uneasy, that in the Atlantic was becoming critical. The *Bismarck* crisis, coupled with increasing U-boat successes, convinced Stark that, "The situation is obviously critical in the Atlantic . . . In my opinion it is hopeless except as we take strong measures to save it."[79] By this time, the overall strategic plan in the case of global war had been agreed upon, and that plan called for a strategic defensive in the Pacific, with the major effort being applied in the Atlantic. Accordingly, on 26 April, Admiral Stark informed Kimmel that he anticipated transfer of "3 BBs, 1 CV, 4 CLs, and 2 squadrons of destroyers because King [Atlantic Fleet Commander] has been given a job to do with a force utterly inadequate to do it on any efficient scale."[80]

In the light of the strategy adopted in ABC-1, work on RAINBOW NO. 5 superseded all other functions of naval planners. Work proceeded rapidly, and on 30 April 1941, the Joint Committee submitted a plan almost identical to the concepts outlined in ABC-1.[81] Many of the tasks assigned the Navy were familiar, as some had been in the ORANGE plans. The Pacific Fleet was assigned to ". . . divert enemy strength through attacks on the Marshall Islands, and raids on sea communications and positions . . . Support British forces . . . protect allied territory and sea communications . . .. Prepare to capture the Marshalls and Carolines."[82] Thus, the defensive strategy in the Pacific precluded the sending of any reinforcements to the Pacific Theater and emphasized a tactical offensive with forces available. Unlike the early ORANGE plans, RAINBOW No. 5 recognized that resources dictated strategy. RAINBOW NO. 5 was not an operation plan, however, and before detailed plans could be drawn, the concept had to be approved. Approval of the service secretaries was granted in May, but the President refused comment, presumably on the grounds that ABC-1 had not yet been approved by the British.[83] It was decided, therefore, to proceed with detailed planning on the assumption of Presidential approval when war came.[84] As Admiral Stark later testified: "I do know the President, except officially, approved it . . . he was not willing to do it officially until we got into the war."[85]

Pacific policy definition continued during May, with the major event being a slightly more rigorous definition of what we were prepared to accept in terms of a status quo. Secretary Hull, in a conference with Ambassador Nomura, added an acceptable solution to the China problem to the equation.

By June the U-boat war had moved into the Central Atlantic; new allied construction had not progressed to the point where it could meet the demand for escorts. Accordingly, Stark effected the transfer of Pacific Fleet units which he had warned Kimmel of earlier.

There was only one critical commodity still not prohibited by embargo at the beginning of July—oil. The reasons for serious consideration of an oil embargo were several: the growing need for POL products in the United States, a similar and much more urgent need in Great Britain, and finally, the recognition that the Japanese war machine could not function without it and that the only other source was in the Indies. It was this last consideration which was crucial. Admiral Stark, speaking for the Navy, opposed the embargo on the grounds that it would "lead to an invasion of the Netherlands East Indies . . . which would immediately involve us in a Pacific War."[86] Secretary Hull agreed,[87] and even the usually bellicose Stimson supported the continued shipment of oil to Japan on the grounds

that it would "prevent the development of a war crisis in the Pacific at a time when the United States was both unprepared and preoccupied by the Nazis."[88] The President agreed with Admiral Stark's opinion that continued supply of oil to Japan would keep them from further penetration of Indochina, saying in July, "Therefore there was . . . a method in letting this oil go to Japan with the hope—and it has worked for two years—of keeping war out of the South Pacific for our own good."[89] In July 1941, then, there existed a condition of equilibrium, however unstable—that in return for Japan's continued "abstention from invading southern Indochina and the Dutch Indies," the United States would continue to provide precious oil.

Late in July the Government learned, through intercepted messages, of Japanese intentions to move south in Indochina and to take Thailand, and the President issued a strong warning to the Japanese Ambassador.[90] On the 24th, Japanese warships arrived at Camranh Bay, and the President issued the order to freeze Japanese assets and to impose a total embargo.[91] Thus the advance of the Japanese into Indochina occasioned a major change in American policy, ending "a policy which Stimson had at the time considered akin to the 'appeasement' of Neville Chamberlain."[92] President Roosevelt, writing on 25 July said,

> [This government] . . . also continued its efforts to prevent a war from starting in the South Pacific, by all possible means—even including the permission of shipment of some supplies to Japan. Up to date—July 25, 1941, when the freezing of Japanese assets occurred and our government's control was extended over financial and import and export trade transactions with Japan—that aim has been accomplished.[93]

On 28 July Secretary Hull completed the foreign policy picture when he gave "renunciation of force and conquest" as a quid pro quo with regard to the oil cutoff.[94] The Japanese were hardly likely to accept these terms—the conquest of Manchuria had been initiated 10 years before, and Japanese industry had become dependent on Manchurian ore.

Shortly after President Roosevelt imposed the oil embargo, he decided, apparently without consulting the War Department, to create a new Army Command in the Philippines under Gen. Douglas MacArthur.[95] Interestingly, Secretary Stimson appeared to feel that the idea originated with his military subordinates:

> There occurred during this same month of August an important change in the thinking of the general staff with regard to the defense of the Philippine Islands. For twenty years it had been considered that strategically the Philippines were an unprotected pawn . . . Now it began to seem possible to establish in the Philippines a force not only sufficient to hold the islands, but also, and more important, strong enough to make it foolhardy for the Japanese to carry their expansion southward through the China Sea.[96]

The notion that the Philippines were defensible can be attributed to the optimism of General MacArthur and to the success of the B-17 in Britain. It was thought that adequate numbers of these aircraft could become self-sustaining fortresses capable of blocking any Japanese thrusts through the China Sea.[97] Secondarily, the requests of the British delegates to both ABC and ADB for the United States to provide a fleet detachment at Singapore had been reinforced in the President's mind by an appeal from the British Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden.[98] The decision to re-

inforce the Philippines was most probably a partial response to these requests. RAINBOW NO. 5 called for the U.S. Asiatic Fleet to support the Army in the defense of the Philippines "as long as that defense continues," and Admiral Stark had said that the U.S. Asiatic Fleet "would not be reinforced, but would be supported by offensive operations of the U.S. Pacific Fleet."[99] The reinforcement of the Philippines did not occasion any change in Pacific strategy, however, and must be viewed as either a new tactic or an aberration, depending upon one's opinion of MacArthur.

Conclusions. The broad objectives of American Pacific foreign policy during the immediate prewar period, as defined by public statements, were three: the avoidance of U.S. involvement in war, the achievement of peace between other nations, and the granting of material aid to those nations engaged in war with the aggressors. Actions to attain these objectives proceeded in three distinct phases —the first lasting until June 1940, the second during the following year, and the third from July 1941 until Pearl Harbor. Each phase of policy in the Pacific was characterized by a distinct line of action: in the first, avoidance of conflict; in the second, deterrence; and in the third, delaying tactics.

In the first phase, prior to June 1940, we were, in the words of Herbert Feis, "attempting to make foreign policy out of morality and neutrality alone."[100] Moral embargoes, strong protests, humanitarian aid to victims, and many other devices were employed, all of which were rooted in a desire to refrain from provocation or direct threat. Reduced to basic terms, our actions before June 1940 were aimed at the avoidance of any conflict with Japan.

In June 1940 the United States initiated a series of actions which, although they supported the broad policy objectives, evidenced a distinct change in methods of attainment. These steps were progressive in nature, each one adding in its own small measure to the increasing military and economic pressure on Japan. The principal elements of this program were, in chronological order, the basing of the fleet at Pearl Harbor, the imposition of legal economic sanctions and the gradual increase in numbers of items restricted, and the cruise to Australia. There was careful avoidance, however, of any action likely to provoke an attack—the continued shipment of oil and the reluctance of the Government to send ships north of Japan are examples. American methods during this second phase, then, could be described as deterrence, grounded in the hope that Japan could be dissuaded.

With the Japanese invasion of southern Indochina in July 1941, however, it became clear that deterrence was doomed to failure and that war with Japan was inevitable at some time. This occasioned the third change in method. No longer was provocation to be avoided, therefore oil shipments were stopped and assets frozen; no longer was the fleet considered a deterrent, therefore badly needed units were transferred to the Atlantic. These actions marked a shift to a delaying tactic—to put off hostilities as long as possible while assuming a defensive posture in order to gain time for war preparations which would put primary emphasis on the war in the Atlantic.

Turning to a review of strategic planning, we assume that because strategy should follow from policy, we will be able to detect the influence of our three phases of policy evolution. At first glance, this appears to be so: major departures in strategic thinking (Plan DOG/ABC-1 and the Philippine reinforcement) seem to have taken place at roughly the same time as did the shifts in Pacific policy. However, there appears to be no cause and effect relationship. The fall of France in June

1940 was the impetus for Plan DOG and ABC-1 which together produced some degree of strategic preparedness for war. The application of economic sanctions, which occurred at the same time, was not occasioned by Hitler's victory in France but seems to have been a logical extension of a policy which had been adopted long before. On the other hand, a second turning point in policy evolution (the oil cutoff in July 1941) occasioned no basic change in strategy. The B-17 reinforcement of the Philippines represented a change in tactics, not strategy.

The deterrence policy was never favored by the strategists who were from the outset convinced of the inevitability of war and thus favored delay. Viewed in this light, Admiral Stark's actions supporting the Secretary of State in his opposition to an oil embargo are consistent with his resistance to Hull's advocacy of naval visits and demonstrations. The objectives of Stark and naval strategists throughout was to keep Japan out of war for as long as possible, until Hitler had been controlled or defeated.

While Pacific policy and strategic planning did proceed on generally parallel but distinct paths, each was subject to its own discrete influences. Strategic thinking became global relatively early in the period with the adoption of the basic wartime strategy. Yet the methods of implementation of foreign policy tended to be compartmentalized—European on the one hand, Far Eastern on the other—and were characterized by fits and starts and changes of direction. The fact that policy and strategic planning in the Pacific arrived at a condition of compatibility by late 1941 was not merely coincidental, but neither was it because of the close coordination between strategic planners and foreign policy experts as has generally been assumed.

BIOGRAPHIC SUMMARY

Lt. Comdr. John B. LaPlante, U.S. Navy, is a graduate of the U.S. Naval Academy and has done graduate work at George Washington University. He is a graduate of the Naval Destroyer School at Newport, R.I., and has served in the U.S.S. *D.H. Fox*, the U.S.S. *Sample*, the U.S.S. *Duncan*, and as Commanding Officer of the U.S.S. *San Joaquin* and the U.S.S. *Floyd City*. Lieutenant Commander LaPlante was Training Officer at the U.S. Naval Academy from 1970 to 1972 and is currently a student at the College of Naval Command and Staff.

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It is a doctrine of war not to assume the enemy will not come, but rather to rely on one's readiness to meet him; not to presume that he will not attack, but rather to make one's self invincible.

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