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Soviet Strategy for the Seventies

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third section extends deterrence theory on the basis of historical evidence and inductive logic.

The authors point to the fact that the real problems—and failures—of deterrence in American foreign relations since the end of World War II have come not in the realm of strategic nuclear confrontation, but in conflicts considerably lower on the scale. One problem is that traditional deterrence theory does not provide internal guides to application when the use of deterrence is appropriate and likely to produce desirable results. As a result, American leaders have often depended on deterrence in situations in which there was never any real possibility that it would work as, for instance, in the Middle East and to a certain extent in Indochina. Furthermore, showing its heavy debt to political science approaches, deterrence theory has been deductive and prescriptive, rather than inductive and explanatory, with the paradoxical result that it has been less, rather than more useful to policy-makers. The authors, therefore, in section three of the volume have suggested a new emphasis, understanding the intentions and calculations of the state or power which initiates a conflict situation rather than concentrating on the behavior that is necessary for a defender to deter a potential initiator of change or confrontation.

It is difficult in a short review to convey the depth of thought, the breadth of coverage, or the quality of material contained in this large book. The historical case studies alone are worthy of careful reading, and the chapters on theory as it stands and theory as it should be will indeed repay the effort invested in a reflective perusal. The book addresses one of the most fundamental issues of national strategy and policy, and it behooves every military professional to educate himself in the complexities and the

advances of this subject. There is no better way to begin than to read this book.

PROFESSOR THOMAS H. ETZOLD
Naval War College

Kohler, Foy D., et al. *Soviet Strategy for the Seventies: From Cold War to Peaceful Coexistence*. Miami: University of Miami Center for Advanced International Studies, 1973. 241p.

American public opinion in recent years has tended to vacillate between believing that the Government of the Soviet Union is bent on hostility and that détente has become a firm and lasting reality. The purpose of the present volume is to demonstrate that regardless of the current trend in public opinion, the Russian leadership from Stalin down to Brezhnev and Kosygin has been unswervingly hostile to the United States, an unpopular task in many circles, official and private. Assuming the general outlook of Americans at the present time, many reviewers will contend that the authors of *Soviet Strategy for the Seventies* are only interested in perpetuating the cold war. Yet, the hopes of the American people for peaceful coexistence with the U.S.S.R. have never borne fruit in the past, and one must at least be cautious about the present. (Back in the 1930's, a similar spirit of détente prompted the president of the Daughters of the American Revolution to visit the Soviet Embassy in Washington to participate in a fete of friendship, and the time must have come when Mrs. William D. Becker was sorry for her effervescent opinions.)

The authors of this volume believe that "peaceful coexistence" is just a meaningless phrase to the Soviet leadership and its in-house philosophers of Marxism, and surely the quotations gathered by the authors support their contention. The Soviets exclude from their calculations of "peaceful" wars of

liberation virtually all conventional wars, and some of the military leaders evidently believe that the protection of the socialist camp might be necessary by preventive atomic war. During the era of Khrushchev—that attractive though contentious and sometimes downright dangerous antagonist, the man who refused to be a nonperson and whose two-volume memoir is now receiving the closest attention from Sovietologists—the Soviet Union clearly was backing away from the use of force, either in large or small wars. Then came the reversion to the traditional precepts of Marxism, and the leaders of today have not hesitated to announce in the most formal manner where they are going and how. To them the only purpose of peaceful coexistence apparently is to buy enough time to get hold of Western technology, especially computer technology—all the while they continue the arms race. Eventually the Soviet Union will attain such a position of power that as Brezhnev said in 1970, “no question of any importance in the world can be solved without our participation.”

About half of this volume is text, although even that half is heavy with quotation. The other half is comprised of various documents keyed to the text. A great deal of work has gone into this book, and it deserves close reading, after which the reader may be forced to rethink his position on détente and the overall sincerity of Soviet good will.

PROFESSOR ROBERT H. FERRELL
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Luttwak, Edward N. *The Political Uses of Sea Power*. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press. 1974. 79p.

With the publication of this brief analytic study, Mr. Luttwak has once again proven the wisdom of the adage that “good things come in small packages.” Demanding no more than an hour and a half of concentrated reading, this book contains a treasury of the core

concepts necessary for either professional or interested lay observers who wish to develop an appreciation for the political worth of modern navies.

Using examples or analogies drawn from both the historic past and recent international experience, Luttwak skillfully outlines and supports the view that naval forces in the modern era play a psychological and political role in the peacetime interactions of nations which is both unique and little appreciated. In laying the theoretical basis for his premise, the author correctly notes that “The familiar attributes of an ocean navy—inherent mobility, tactical flexibility, and a wide geographic reach—render it peculiarly useful as an instrument of policy even in the absence of hostilities,” and that “the focus of Great Power naval strategy has been shifting to missions that are ‘political’ in the sense that their workings rely on the reactions of others, . . .” Luttwak further takes into account that much of the terminology associated with this unique characteristic of naval power is often ambiguous or marred by previously acquired and often misleading connotations. In his effort to avoid such misunderstanding, he brings into the jargon a new term—“suasion”—which he suggests is more neutral in its commonly understood meaning than the more frequently used terms, “naval presence” or “gunboat diplomacy.”

In outlining his “theory of suasion,” Luttwak casts the influence of naval power on the political decisions of other nations as but one form of the general peacetime influence of overall military power. Luttwak points out that

Any instrument of military power that can be used to inflict damage upon an adversary, physically limit his freedom of action, or reveal his intentions may also affect his conduct, and that of any interested third parties, even if force is never actually used. The necessary . . . condition is that the